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1. Introduction
1.1 e reform debates of the revolutionary era 1917–19 
 in inter- and transnational comparisons 
e First World War was a transnational tragedy the eects of which 
crossed boundaries and led to the questioning of established truths. is 
unprecedented tragedy, which made peoples suer without the prevailing 
political systems responding to their views, also provided an unexpected 
impetus for reforms that extended democratic surage and increased the 
parliamentary responsibility of governments. e total war, consequent 
revolutions in Russia and Germany, surage reforms, declarations of 
independence and modications of constitutions aected and were aected 
by changing understandings of ‘democracy’, the political role of ‘the people’ 
and ‘parliamentarism’. ese terms and related concepts became objects of 
constant debate, redenition and contestation within, and at times between, 
European political cultures as part of constitutional and political struggles. 
e dynamics of the discursive processes related to the transformation 
catalysed by the war is the subject of this book.
Unlike in previous revolutionary eras, ‘democracy’ (or ‘the power or 
rule by the people’ in various vernacular translations) was widely used of 
in parliaments and newspapers in the years 1917–19 as nearly all political 
groups wished to identify themselves with democracy and view themselves 
as democrats. Especially among socialists and liberals, the experiences of 
the war, turns in political discourse and constitutional shis aer spring 
1917 gave rise to redenitions of the political order that were of historic 
importance. e understandings of democracy were inherently diverse, 
however, and tended to get more so in the ideological heat of reform 
demands and constitutional debates that oen led to the expression of 
radicalised stances before ending up with compromises with which few 
would be completely happy. Attitudes towards parliamentarism were 
also becoming more positive in that parliaments came to be regarded as 
providing a proper medium for the representation of the will of the people 
in the political process, though parliamentarism remained an object of even 
greater dispute than democracy. Many European political cultures were, as 
a result of the devastating war, entering a new stage of nationally multi-sited 
14
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and transnationally connected debates on democracy, the political role of 
the people and parliamentarism. 
is transformative period will be explored comparatively and 
transnationally on the basis of parliamentary and media sources in what 
follows. Such an exploration relativises any simplifying narratives of popular 
sovereignty and representative democracy as having emerged already 
among the English revolutionaries or Dutch authors in the seventeenth 
century or as a result of the French Enlightenment thought, innovative 
political practices in mid-eighteenth-century Sweden or the American or 
French Revolutions in the eighteenth century.1 It also relativises narratives 
on democracy being straightforwardly related to the rise of capitalism2 or 
having made linear progress under liberal constitutionalism in the course of 
the nineteenth century.
Recent research suggests, aer all, that Europe that went to war in 1914 
was far from democratic in either a French revolutionary or any post-First 
World War sense. As Bo Stråth has pointed out, the century that followed the 
French Revolution had been characterised by competing and contradictory 
denitions of the nation and the people and their relations to sovereignty 
– and hence increasingly also of democracy.3 Volker Sellin has argued that 
Europe had experienced since 1814 a century of restorations, all of them 
aimed at countering the revolutionary principle of popular sovereignty 
and solving crises of legitimacy of monarchies by introducing reactionary 
constitutions, Russia of 1906 being an extreme case.4 Researchers in the 
project ‘Europe 1815–1914: Between Restoration and Revolution’ have 
likewise demonstrated that no linear development from absolute monarchies 
to representative democracy existed but that authoritarian regimes had 
rather introduced constitutions and parliaments for anti-revolutionary 
purposes.5 By the early 1910s, the Habsburg Empire and the Russian Empire 
– and to a great extent also states such as Britain, Germany, Sweden and 
Finland – were experiencing a domestic political crisis in which there was a 
parliament but also widespread disappointment with what it had to oer in 
terms of popular representation. While conservatives reacted by supporting 
extra-parliamentary politics, leists looked for ways to replace parliaments 
1 A summary of the conventional narrative can be found in Eley 2002, 18. 
Contemporary parliamentary and public as well as later historiographical 
debates on democracy in the late eighteenth century have been discussed by 
Ihalainen 2010, 1–28. Teleological narratives of nineteenth-century progress 
from absolutism to parliamentary democracy on the basis of the values of the 
Enlightenment and the French Revolution has been questioned by Stråth 2016, 
1–2, 5, 17. Inspired by Reinhart Koselleck’s emphasis on discursive struggles in 
politics he emphasises contingency, human agency and imagination in and the 
connected fragility of democratic projects instead. 
2 is is questioned also by Geo Eley who rather links the rise of democracy to 
the socialist analysis of capitalism and calls for societal reorganization. Eley 2002, 
4, 18, 109.
3 Stråth 2016, 7.
4 Sellin 2014, 7–11, 135.
5 Grotke & Prutsch (eds) 2014, 4, 13.
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as ‘bourgeois’ institutions with more democratic political bodies. Both ways 
of thinking increased potential for the radicalisation of political debate and 
expectations of major political changes once a major was encountered.6 
e transforming eects of the First World War on political systems 
have been aptly summarised in recent research inspired by its centennial, 
though without particular attention to parliamentary debates. Jan-Werner 
Müller, Jay Winter, Richard Bessel and Jörn Leonhard have characterised 
the Great War as a test of the credibility and legitimacy of the principles, 
hierarchies and institutions of the states involved in it. e war and the 
connected revolutions challenged all previous conceptions of the state and 
society, intensifying and reorienting postponed processes of reform. e 
old categories of those entitled to participate in the political process tended 
to lose relevance as everyone was required to participate in the defence of 
the state. e experiences of the war and the revolutions separated the old 
world from the new, opening new visions for the future. Prevailing political 
structures and connected political concepts were transformed by new, oen 
more optimistic conceptions of the proper relationship between the people 
and the state, formulated in new constitutions and reinterpretations of old 
ones. e demands placed on the people during the war oen also led to 
the strengthening of parliamentarism. At the same time, the pervasive war 
potentially vindicated violence not only in international relations but also 
in domestic politics.7 Violence could be used to replace dialogical means of 
political action, including parliamentary deliberation, as a way to resolve 
conicts of interest. In addition to their democratising and parliamentarising 
eects, the war and the revolutions also inspired attempts to use extra-
parliamentary methods to force through societal change that voting and the 
parliamentary framework seemed unable to produce. 
State interventions in various areas of societal life increased drastically 
during the war. Richard Bessel has pointed out the risks that such interventions 
entailed: the rulers might lose their credibility and the legitimacy of their 
power if they failed to full the rising expectations of the people. Especially 
in countries whose political systems did not care much about popular 
opinion, wartime sacrices and shortages tended to give rise to popular 
discontent. ere followed calls for political reforms that would strengthen 
the participation of the people at large in politics in a way that corresponded 
to their participation in ghting the war or their contribution to the wartime 
economy. However, the combination of poor economic conditions and 
postponed reforms could have similar eects in countries that were not 
directly involved in the war as well. Without the military disasters of the war, 
there would hardly have been revolutions in Russia and Germany, Bessel 
argues.8 And without these revolutions and the German defeat, there would 
6 Lieven 2015. I am grateful for Alexander Semyonov for pointing at this pan-
European pattern.
7 Leonhard 2008; Müller 2011, 16–19; Winter 2014, 1; Becker 2014, 32; Bessel 
2014, 126–7, 144. On the totality of the war and political changes, see also Müller 
2002, 289, and Leonhard 2014, 11, 14.
8 Bessel 2014, 128–30, 136, 139–44.
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not have been such clear political transformations in Sweden and Finland, 
for instance, I argue in this book. Pan-European experiences of massive 
violence led to brutality nding its way into domestic political conicts also 
in countries that were not directly involved in the war,9 most famously in 
Finland. International wartime debates on national and popular sovereignty 
and revolution, furthermore, had global eects, awakening expectations for 
autonomy and independence in various national contexts.10 
e war internationalised (in the sense of producing references to 
relations and comparisons between nation states) and transnationalised 
(in the sense of creating political discourses that crossed frontiers through 
networks and individual contacts) debates on political reform. While the 
reform processes took place, and have been studied, primarily at the level 
of nation states, I argue that they were also more transnationally linked 
than has been customarily recognised. Wartime propaganda increasingly 
presented the battle as concerning the basic character of the states involved. 
However, the political elites and the press had been transnationally 
connected before the war and remained so during it. Furthermore, as 
Richard Bessel has pointed out, national and transnational interaction 
between people of various social backgrounds caused by the war led to the 
dissemination of revolutionary ideas and contributed to the rise of a shared 
understanding of the necessity of an immediate political transformation. 
Individuals acted as micro-level agents, transferring a revolutionary mood 
from one national context to another;11 conversely, individuals might also 
reinforce reactionary views held in one country in other national contexts, 
as this book will show. e reform debates became entangled both on the 
macro and micro levels, and their transnational connections deserve more 
analytical attention. I have hence paid particular attention to revolution as 
a transnational phenomenon. As Robert Gerwarth has put it, the Russian 
Revolution redened international politics and provoked anti-revolutionary 
action to counter real and imagined Bolshevik threats. It led to brutal civil 
wars inspired by the Bolshevik conception of foreseeable resistance from 
the old elites and a class war as thus unavoidable – Finland being a case 
in point. is new type of revolution also extended the practitioners of 
revolutionary agitation from intellectuals and activists to self-educated 
revolutionaries who were ready to use both radical rhetoric and radical 
action.12 By focusing on these phenomena I wish especially to provide 
a complementary interpretation on the background of the Finnish Civil War. 
I am not interested in questions of ‘guilt’ but aim at understanding national 
9 Gerwarth 2014, 640–1.
10 Leonhard 2014, 655, 706, 937, 940–2. 
11 Bessel 2014, 141–3.
12 Gerwarth 2014, 642, 644–9. Robert Gerwarth concludes on the basis of the 
numbers of Russian volunteers and the assumption that the moderate Social 
Democrats controlled the revolutionary movement that there was no real 
Bolshevik threat in Finland. However, he does not consider the revolutionary 
discourse of the le and its implications on both sides of the conict; Leonhard 
2014, 940.
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and transnational discursive processes that led to the use of violence instead 
of parliamentary deliberation to solve conicts of interest.13  
In early 1917, political leaders on both sides of the Western Front shared 
an understanding that the war had made it necessary to look for better ways to 
take the will of the people into consideration and that the best way to do this 
was through universal surage and parliamentary representation. In both 
the great powers engaged in the war and in countries not directly involved 
in it, people came out onto the streets in the spring weather. Following 
an exceptionally cold winter that had brought hunger, the spring of 1917 
became an experience that was both real and psychological. is happened 
rst in Petrograd on 8 March 1917.14 ereaer references to a spring of 
democracy – as a powerful metaphor emphasising the irresistibility of the 
political changes that were to follow – were also heard in reform debates 
in London, Berlin, Stockholm and Helsinki, and such metaphors have also 
provided the starting hypothesis for this book. Once the revolutionary 
process had started, many, especially on the le, believed that a new age of 
revolution was beginning and that it would change societies and the entire 
world in ways that would allow of no turning back.15
By the autumn of 1917 and the spring of 1918 – aer the postponement 
of reforms in Germany, the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, 
the continuation of the warfare with evident German successes in the east, 
and fatal failures of reform processes as exemplied by the Finnish Civil 
War – the atmosphere both internationally and nationally would already 
be very dierent. Instead of a permanent spring of democracy, an autumn 
of parliamentarism seemed to have come, which caused especially the right 
side of the political spectrum in several countries to take up anti-reformist 
stances. 
By autumn 1918 and spring 1919, the international situation had again 
changed completely – with Western parliamentary democracies victorious 
in the war, the Germans beginning to construct what was to become 
the rst democratic system in that country and the Swedes and Finns, 
too, reconstructing their polities, trying to reconcile native traditions, 
alternative foreign models and ideologically motivated rival understandings 
13 Cf. Liikanen 1993, 562, 567–79, according to whom interwar literature on ‘a war 
of liberty’ denied the existence of national socio-political confrontations and 
emphasised Russian Bolshevist inuence on the labour movement instead. While 
Juhani Paasivirta (1957) pointed at the Red Guards having adopted Bolshevik 
revolutionary examples, Hannu Soikkanen (1975) concluded on the basis of 
party documents (not parliamentary debates) that the labour leaders remained 
Kautskyist rather than became Leninists, attempting to conne readiness for 
an armed rising among the unorganised and spontaneous ‘masses’ led by a few 
activists inuenced by Bolshevism (also Kettunen 1986). Marja Leena Salkola 
(1985) failed to nd Bolshevik impulses at this micro level either. Liikanen hence 
concluded that no new interpretation on the political background of the Civil 
War had emerged and hence the emphasis remained on ‘social or structural 
conicts’. See also Haapala 2014.
14 Hobsbawm 1994, 60.
15 Bessel 2014, 127.
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of democracy, the people and parliamentarism. Autumnal metaphors 
were used in several national contexts to describe the unavoidability of 
constitutional reform. 
e spring of 1919 consequently arrived with promises of the beginning 
of a new global democratic era – only to be superseded by a further 
international change of climate in the summer of that year, manifested in the 
Treaty of Versailles. e course of reform and revolution was changeable like 
the four seasons in the period of roughly two years between the outbreak 
of the Russian Revolution in March 1917 and the adoption of the Weimar 
Constitution in August 1919. Many contemporaries nevertheless believed, or 
at least wanted to believe, in a transnationally changed political atmosphere. 
In this book I reconstruct and analyse the discursive processes of 
reform and revolution, as catalysed by the First World War and the two 
Russian Revolutions, in four national parliaments and presses, aiming at 
a  synthesis written from a new perspective of combined parliamentary 
and conceptual history. I do this not only in national but also comparative 
and transnational contexts. is work aims at a deeper understanding of 
the dynamics of nationally multi-sited and to a great extent transnationally 
interconnected debates, in which democracy, the political role of the people 
and parliamentarism came to be dened in conicting ways by various 
actors and groups involved in political processes. e book explores how 
the participants construed, dened and redescribed these concepts through 
political use in particular arguments, why certain conceptual redenitions 
took place and with what consequences. It does not build on any normative 
denitions of analytical concepts such as ‘democracy’ or ‘parliamentarism’.16
e research for this book consists in a textual and comparative conceptual 
analysis of the contents of the most important plenary constitutional debates17 
and related press debates in four interconnected countries that experienced 
dierent versions of democratisation and parliamentarisation almost 
simultaneously: Britain, Germany,18 Sweden and Finland.19 Democratisation 
refers here simply to the process of extending the possibilities for the political 
participation of the people mainly through universal surage (as opposed to 
16 On the historical nature of the concept of democracy, see Ihalainen 2010, 15; 
Friberg 2012, 16, 42, and Kurunmäki 2015, 32.
17 Only debates explicitly related to constitutional reforms have been analysed as 
the parliamentary records are extensive and digitised ones allowing a big data 
approach are not yet available from all four countries. Alternative uses of the key 
concepts may of course have appeared in the context of other debates. 
18 An earlier version of a comparative analysis of British and German constitutional 
debates of spring 1917 has been presented in Ihalainen 2014, 423–48.
19 I have analysed the parliamentary discursive processes related to constitutional 
reform in the four countries side by side, paying attention to the specic 
linguistic resources available in the various national contexts and to the fact that 
none of the key political concepts was simply translatable into another language. 
e national contexts and occasionally phrases in the original languages have 
thus been retained, although English has been used as the medium of the 
comparative and transnational analysis. Unfortunately, full original citations 
cannot be provided owing to space limitations.
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alternative applications in late twentieth-century political science20), while 
parliamentarisation refers to a transformation that gave representative 
institutions inuence on the formation and control of government.21 I intend 
to show, furthermore, how and why transnational transfers in debates on 
democracy, the people and parliamentarism occurred or were blocked and 
what their political implications were. I propose a thesis on the existence of 
competing ideologically motivated transnational theoretical and ideological 
networks, in the period studied, most clearly those of the socialist le and 
the conservative right but to some extent also of the reformist liberals. 
Why should we focus on parliamentary debates and not on executive 
actions or academic discussions to uncover these? Philip Norton has pointed 
out that the British unwritten constitution has experienced considerable 
‘organic evolution’ within Parliament.22 e same is true of states with written 
constitutions: various constitutions represent stages in long-term discursive 
processes that dene the values of political communities, customarily in 
transnational interaction. Parliaments have provided the forums in which 
proposed constitutions have been most extensively and publicly debated, 
a high variety of political views expressed and the meanings of concepts 
disputed, even in cases in which the decision had already been made by 
cabinets, parties or committees. is discursive action needs to be taken 
seriously,23 which has not always been the case in older political history. 
e fact that parliament was simultaneously a national and a transnational 
institution and the process of legislating on constitutions common to the 
states in question together with transnational contacts between MPs calls for 
an analysis of the cross-border circulation of ideas, including transnational 
communication, borrowings, importations, transfers, imitation, selective 
applications and dissemination. As I shall argue in subsection 1.3, it is helpful 
to analyse parliamentary debates as nexuses of multi-sited political discourses 
and academic and public debates so that the previous and simultaneous 
activities of parliamentarians in other national and transnational forums are 
taken into consideration.24 National parliaments and their members have 
oen had extensive transnational connections in the form of ocial contacts 
between representative institutions, participation in inter-parliamentary 
conferences, the exchange of parliamentary records, foreign news in the 
national press and political literature. Learning from abroad could take 
place by reading newspaper reports and literature, visiting foreign countries 
and contacting politicians and experts there or applying foreign models in 
parliamentary practice.25 Socialist parties had their Internationals, while 
conservative parties were interconnected through established academic 
20 For contemporary denitions of democracy, see also Ihalainen 2018, which sets 
the debates of 1917–19 in the context of European debates on ‘democracy’ over 
the long term.
21 Schönberger 2001, 624; Kühne 2005, 311–12.
22 Norton 2011, 1, 12.
23 Bollmeyer 2007, 41; Ihalainen 2010, 19; Friberg 2012, 68; Galembert, Rozenberg 
& Vigour 2013, 9–10.
24 e methodological background is explained in Halonen, Ihalainen & Saarinen 
2015 and is also based on Ihalainen, Ilie & Palonen 2016.
25 Pekonen 2014, 28, 34, 38.
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contacts as a result of the signicant number of professors in various 
elds who were leading rightist politicians. Many liberals, too, entertained 
internationalist ideas. While measuring their exact ‘impact’ is dicult, 
considering the signicance of explicit and implicit transnational transfers 
is important.  
Both ocial and informal individual links could be activated when 
necessary to gain support in political battles at home, possibly leading to 
transfers in political discourse. International comparisons and the activation 
of transnational links tended to be highly variable: foreign models were 
always selected, oen tendentiously interpreted and deliberately applied in 
the discursive processes of constitutional decision-making to win arguments 
and extend political power at home rather than to introduce unmodied 
transfers between political cultures. e seemingly transnational character 
of parliamentary discourse may thus also be misleading: foreign parliaments 
and political events provided parliamentarians with a never-ending source 
of examples from a variety of temporal and spatial contexts that could be 
used in arguments to advance particular points in particular domestic 
debates and do not necessarily reect a deeper knowledge, understanding or 
even a genuine interest in a foreign case as a model to be followed.26 As Kari 
Palonen has emphasised, when translated and thereby transferred, concepts 
are simultaneously oen changed, either intentionally or unintentionally.27 
Onni Pekonen has shown how Finnish journalists and parliamentarians 
made use of foreign examples and concepts to advance particular goals in 
Finnish political disputes, to support diering interpretations of domestic 
political questions and to provide competing contexts in order to dispute 
suggestions by political rivals. A foreign example could be used to introduce 
an innovation but also to support an established practice or to demonstrate 
why a reform should not be adopted because of its obvious disadvantages.28 
Henk te Velde has noted that, while elements of political culture or 
discourse are oen transformed when transferred from one national context 
to another, their foreign origin may also be intentionally concealed.29 e 
covert use of foreign examples thus also needs to be considered, and this is 
facilitated by an awareness of the prevailing links between political cultures 
in the period studied. Transfers were much more likely from the German to 
the Swedish or Finnish political cultures than the other way around or than 
from Britain – at least until 1919.
Transnational discursive interaction between parliaments and the press 
deserves attention as it has tended to be neglected in nation-state-centred 
research on post-First World War reforms,30 although it was of course only 
26 See Leonhard 2011 and Ihalainen 2016a and national case studies in the volume 
Parliament and Parliamentarism (2016).
27 Palonen 2014, 145.
28 Pekonen 2014, 29, 44.
29 te Velde 2005, 208.
30 See Alapuro 1988, Andræ 1998, Brusewitz 1964, Carlsson 1985, Gerdner 1966, 
Gruhlich 2012, Gusy 1997, Haapala 2010b, Kirby 1986b, Lindman 1968, Machin 
2001, Mylly 2006, Nyman 1965, Olsson 2002, Pohl 2002, Polvinen 1987, Seils 
2011, Turner 1992, Upton 1980, Vares 1998 and Vares 2006, for instance.
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one aspect of the discursive processes of reform: national contexts were 
oen decisive. Parliamentary debates on constitutions in 1917–19 were oen 
to a great extent comparative, but the genuine understandings of foreign 
contexts was oen lacking. Each national debate built on a selection of 
arguments and discursive practices borrowed from other national contexts 
and made an abundant use of deliberate comparisons between similar 
constitutions and political events in other countries. Foreign examples were 
used selectively – rhetorically – to support particular arguments and goals 
in current domestic political struggles, alternative interpretations from 
foreign countries providing a means to redene the prospective future of 
the speaker’s own political community. 
Transnational transfers, as far as they occurred, were based to a great 
extent on pre-war connections. ey were restricted but not prevented by 
the war, however. e German press was dependent on news in the press 
of the Entente or that of neutral states.31 Even the British press was subject 
to censorship as far as copy sent via post or cable was concerned, but the 
control did not concern leading articles, and the editors were skilful in 
circumventing attempts by the authorities to stop ‘Bolshevik propaganda’, 
for instance. e British parliament was expected to avoid risky topics, but 
even though some discussion about the violation of parliamentary privilege 
emerged, its reports were not subject to censorship, and parliamentary 
reports continued to be published with a degree of self-censorship by the 
major papers throughout the war.32 is was true of all countries: debates 
in both national and foreign parliaments were reported more extensively 
than in any medium in the twenty-rst century, even though sometimes 
very selectively and with a bias. 
e press debates in Germany, Sweden and Finland33 cannot yet be so 
extensively analysed using digitised databases as those in Britain; in the 
British case it is easier to complement reform debates with a longer-term 
analysis of press debates (sections 6.1. and 7.1). ree groups of politically 
oriented newspapers representing predominantly conservative (e Times, 
Neue Preußische Zeitung [also known as Kreuz-Zeitung], Aonbladet, 
Hufvudstadsbladet), liberal (e Manchester Guardian, Berliner Tageblatt, 
Dagens Nyheter, Helsingin Sanomat) and socialist (e Herald, Vorwärts, 
Social-Demokraten, Työmies/Suomen Sosialidemokraatti) points of view in all 
four countries have been consulted on relevant dates before and aer major 
constitutional debates in the parliaments. ese do not cover all parties or 
points of view, of course, but they provide suciently representative samples 
of parliamentary reporting and commentary. As Onni Pekonen has pointed 
out, newspapers constituted a forum in which parliamentary debates were 
prepared and subsequently extended. Arguments presented in newspapers 
could be taken up in parliamentary debates and the arguments presented in 
31 Fuchs 2008, 33.
32 Rose 1995, 20, 27–30.
33 Finnish newspapers of 1917–20 became available online only aer the referee 
round of this book.
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these elaborated in press articles.34 However, in wartime public discourse, 
it was governments that rst set the parliamentary agenda,35 which then 
governed the press debates to a great extent; there was little public debate 
that was independent of ministries and parliaments going on in the media in 
the period studied. is fact also supports the prioritisation of parliamentary 
over journalistic sources in this study. 
e constitutional reforms in dierent European countries and related 
conceptualisations of democracy, the people and parliamentarism increased 
considerably in inter- and transnational interaction between historically 
related and competing political cultures with diverse experiences of 
parliamentary government. e Russian Revolution catalysed this 
transnational debate. Despite translations published in the press discursive 
transfers from Russia remained limited and depended on the intensity 
of transnational links with Petrograd. e Russian Revolution at rst 
intensied and inspired national debates on democracy especially on the 
le and was then used by all political groups to dene what democracy 
should stand for in national contexts by providing an example of an 
undesirable kind of democracy. e Russian Revolution also played an 
indirect role in redenitions of parliamentarism by openly challenging – in 
the form that Lenin gave to it since April 1917 – ‘bourgeois’ and ‘Western’ 
parliamentarism with a soviet system initially invented by anarchists and 
syndicalists. As Eric Hobsbawm has argued and this volume empirically 
demonstrates, the Russian Revolution advanced parliamentary democracy 
in Western Europe by transforming most Social Democratic parties from 
oppositional to governmental forces that emphasised their moderation in 
order to distinguish themselves from the Bolsheviks. Social Democratic 
participation was, furthermore, increasingly accepted by the older elites in 
order to contain revolutionary trends.36
e parliamentary models of countries other than Russia were much 
more inuential, certainly. Comparisons between Sweden and Germany 
and Finland and Germany were particularly frequent in the smaller national 
parliaments. For Finland, eighteenth-century rather than contemporary 
Sweden was a major point of comparison as result of the entangled history of 
the two polities; for Sweden, the failure of the Finnish democratic parliament 
provided an essential warning example. Aer the Entente won the war, both 
countries turned increasingly to the British model. By 1919, however, the 
national constitutional debates of the four studied countries, interconnected 
by the impulses created by the war and the Russian Revolution aer 1917, 
34 Pekonen 2014, 30.
35 Archival sources related to the executive preparation of dra constitutions, 
ministerial preparation for debates, or the activities of individual politicians 
would be worth studying but fall outside the scope of this project as result of 
the large number of discussed cases, the extent of the parliamentary and public 
debates analysed and the focus on the comparative and transnational elements 
rather than the details of national processes of decision-making. Cf. Roitto 2015, 
48, 392.
36 Hobsbawm 1994, 84.
23
1.2 Towards a comparative and transnational history of political discourse
had ended up with transfers from Russia being consciously limited and 
a decrease in comparisons with other parliamentary democracies as well. e 
debates and the applied vocabularies were increasingly nationalised, which 
le the impression (also expressed in later national historiographies37) that 
each reform had been a national aair only marginally inuenced by what 
was happening at the same time elsewhere. is interconnectedness and 
variation between the national and transnational deserves more attention.
e research strategy applied in this study will be explained in more 
detail in section 1.3, aer a review of the state of the art in comparative and 
transnational history and further justication for the selection of the four 
countries studied here in the following section. Lastly, the structure of the 
study will be explained in section 1.4.
 
1.2  Towards a comparative and transnational history  
 of political discourse
Nation states have traditionally been regarded as natural units for historical 
analysis. By contrast, comparative – let alone transnational – analyses of 
past political processes have remained rare, especially in the eld of the 
history of ideas. Aer comparative, international and transnational turns 
in recent decades, however, historians increasingly agree that research 
should be extended beyond national histories to include a consideration 
of the similarities and dierences between various national contexts and of 
human interaction across national frontiers together with the common and 
particular conditions of historical phenomena.38 
e nation-state-oriented nature of much historical research has 
aected the study of the formation of national constitutions; indeed, 
many such studies are rather dated, written before the above-mentioned 
methodological turns and oen authored by non-historians such as law 
scholars.39 Newer comparative approaches to the history of European 
political and legal cultures, too, have continued to favour nation states as 
units of comparison.40 is is wholly justied given that nation states have 
37 Grotke & Prutsch 2014, 8.
38 Paulmann 1998, 649, 684; Kocka 2003, 40; Cohen & O’Connor 2004, ix–xii; 
Baldwin 2004, 3; Sluga 2004, 103; Grew 2006, 105; Friberg, Hilson & Vall 2007, 
717–37; Neunsinger 2010, 3. For comparative and historical sociology, see Ragin 
1987.
39 See Bogdanor 2003, Botzenhart 1993, Brusewitz 1964, Gerdner 1946, Grosser 
1970, Gusy 1997, Huldén 1989, Jyränki 2006, Kluxen 1985, Lindman 1935, 
Nyman 1965, Rauh 1977, Sihvonen 1997, Stjernquist 1993, Trippe 1995, von 
Sydow 1997, for instance. 
40 Leonhard 2001; Müller 2002; Ihalainen 2005; Koselleck, Spree & Steinmetz 2006; 
Leonhard 2008; Ihalainen 2010; Kekkonen 2016; cf. Kari Palonen’s study in 
political theory of the comparative conceptual and rhetorical history of politics 
as an activity based on the analysis of nine topoi. Such an analysis views national 
contexts as ‘secondary’ and enables the comparison of parallel cases originating 
in dierent national and linguistic contexts. Palonen 2006, 10–11, 23, 83–4; 
Ihalainen, Ilie & Palonen 2016.
24
1. Introduction
determined the political conditions of the past to a great extent.41 e 
comparative history of constitutions, although it supports the selection of 
nation states as objects of analysis,42 may however lead to the deconstruction 
of some of their assumed particularity. Comparisons between simultaneous 
nation-state-level debates carried out by the same historian on the basis of 
parallel primary sources and taking into consideration their mutual links 
can challenge ways of thinking that have been considered self-evident in 
national historiographies.43 e comparative and transnational history of 
ideas may reveal similarities and dierences in attitudes and ideologies, 
explaining why certain political concepts were interpreted similarly or 
dierently in dierent national contexts and regimes. e study of the 
communication, diusion, crossing, importation, translation, borrowings, 
transfers, appropriation, imitation and rejection of ideas between nations 
also helps us to understand the circulation of ideas between political cultures 
and across national borders,44 and increases our awareness of the entangled 
nature of national pasts. 
Transnational history emphasises history beyond nations, analysing 
links between them and interaction across boundaries and complementing 
comparative history;45 it is argued here that one cannot be studied without 
another. While interest in the transnational history of concepts has 
increased, motivated by a growing awareness of the transnational nature 
of political debates and the practice of translating political concepts in the 
modern world, empirical studies in conceptual history oen still focus 
on individual nation states. A previous comparative study of eighteenth-
century debates on democracy and popular sovereignty in Britain and 
Sweden has led the present author to conclude that the parliamentary and 
public debates studied here and the connected intellectual changes were 
to a considerable extent transnational, each national debate building on 
conceptual innovations introduced in other national contexts and making 
an abundant use of explicit comparisons between similar constitutions.46 
It has been suggested that various versions of parliamentarism began to 
inuence each other at the constitutional level more extensively in the 
post-Second-World-War period,47 but interaction between parliamentary 
institutions and constitutional debates had clearly already existed in the 
eighteenth century and was particularly signicant in the late 1910s as well, 
as will be demonstrated in this volume. 
41 Fredrickson 1995, 5690; Cohen & O’Connor 2004, xvii; Cohen 2004, 61; Kocka 
& Haupt 2009, 19. 
42 Kocka 2003, 41; Green 2004, 46; Sluga 2004, 103–4, 108, 111; Grew 2006, 102; 
Neunsinger 2010, 3–4, 9, 12; see Ihalainen at al. 2011; On the danger that the 
focus on nations determined the results, see Werner & Zimmermann 2006, 46, 
or reinforces national dierences, see Friberg, Hilson & Vall 2007, 717–37.
43 Cohen & O’Connor 2004, xx; Haupt 2007, 709–10; Steinmetz 2007, 19; Ihalainen 
& Palonen 2009; Kocka & Haupt 2009, 4.
44 Cohen 2004, 59; Sluga 2004, 108, 112; O’Connor 2004, 140, 142; Petrusewisz 
2004, 153–4; Grew 2006, 110; Saunier 2012, 81.
45 Sluga 2004, 109; Miller 2004, 126; Armitage 2004, 171; Saunier 2013, 2.
46 Ihalainen 2010.
47 von Sydow 1997, 13.
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e comparative and transnational (related, transfer, connected, shared 
or entangled) history of parliaments and transfers between them has its 
methodological challenges and limitations. e challenges include the 
prevailing emphasis on the temporal uniqueness of historical topics and 
the strictly context-bound understanding of meaning in historical research. 
Historians are suspicious of abstractions, generalisations and theories, seeing 
them (oen with good reason) as misrepresentations or simplications of 
the complexity of the past. It is dicult to dene categories that are valid 
through time and space without overemphasizing similarities at the cost of 
particularities. Historians working on comparative history consequently 
oen focus on just two or three cases in order to allow sucient consideration 
of national contexts and discussion of details that are unique to the cases 
being studied.48 Comparative research should, furthermore, lead to the 
discovery of new information about both national histories and larger inter- 
or transnational phenomena.
e sources used may frequently have been produced dierently in the 
countries of comparison, or parallel sources may not even exist in the rst 
place – parliamentary sources and the party press being important exceptions. 
In the presentation of the ndings, argumentation about broad historical 
phenomena and more general patterns must be reconciled with sucient 
references to contexts and details, in the way that historians working on 
national cases alone would expect. At the same time, however, the temptation 
to reinforce orthodox interpretations of national historiographies needs to 
be avoided49 and something substantial must be said about the inter- and 
transnational aspects.
In this study, the key categories of the political discourse of the studied 
period are subjected to semantic, pragmatic, textual and discourse analysis 
on the basis of uniform sources in their appropriate political contexts 
instead of attempting any universally valid denitions. e four cases here 
are limited in terms of time, topics and sources and analysed mostly in their 
national contexts so that generalisations can be based on a sucient number 
of empirical cases.
Some abstraction and decontextualisation is needed in comparative 
history, but in this work it is mainly postponed to the conclusion. As 
common, long-term and coherent patterns of historical development 
emerge, generalisations become possible as long as they are based on 
several ‘empirical’ individual cases. It is worth considering how and why 
these general patterns vary from one society to another. Similarities and 
dierences between national cases are discussed in order to clarify and 
understand historical phenomena in single cases better – to deepen our 
understanding of what is central in each case and to reveal attitudes, 
meanings and developments that would otherwise go unnoticed or be 
48 Kocka 2003, 44; Haupt & Kocka 2004, 24–6; Cohen & O’Connor 2004, xx; 
Baldwin 2004, 1-3; Yengoyan 2006, 3, 7, 9; Grew 2006, 100, 106; Haupt 2007, 703; 
Neunsinger 2010, 14. 
49 Paulmann 1998, 651; Cohen & O’Connor 2004, x, xvi–xvii; Green 2004, 50; 
Pedersen 2004, 91–2; Miller 2004, 124; Grew 2006, 102; Neunsinger 2010, 14.
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considered natural. Seemingly peripheral and less known national cases 
– such as the Finnish – oer alternative narratives that help to understand 
discursive processes that contribute to the rise of crises of legitimacy and 
the reconstruction of that legitimacy aer crisis in other political cultures 
as well. is leads to reections on causal explanations as well,50 suggesting 
critical factors or autonomous variables that explain dierences between 
nations and possibly help to rene interpretations of national history.51
A major benet of transnational comparative history is that it permits 
one to distance oneself from the ‘self-evident facts’ of national history in 
a way that enables new conceptualisations, demonstrates the relevance of 
sources, methods and interpretations applicable elsewhere and perhaps 
explains dierences and particularities, including connections and 
entanglements between the cases.52 Historical phenomena can be identied 
more clearly and then analysed so that similarities and dierences and 
possibly causal explanations may be discovered.53 e choice of particular 
units of comparison must be justied, dierences in historiographical 
traditions understood and the logic of the comparison problematised. 
Causal explanations can be sought from a variety of perspectives, including 
alternatives that were not considered by contemporaries or by later historians 
but which can be pointed to in other parallel national cases.54 is implies 
an ability to break away from conventional (nationalist) interpretations55 
and perhaps a move towards post-nationalist history. Working comparisons 
customarily challenge assumptions that have been taken as self-evident 
(for national, ideological or other reasons), pointing (counterfactually) at 
contingency and alternative paths of development and relativising national 
narratives that tend to overemphasise dierences. Institutions that national 
history takes as self-evident – including constitutions – can be problematised 
through parallel histories that add to our understanding of the transnational 
aspects of development.56 
Comparative history has been sometimes criticised for being excessively 
analytical in viewing the compared cases as independent units and 
dismissing their interconnections.57 e originally French study of the 
history of cultural transfer may help to explicate how transnational links and 
networks – as manifested for instance in the presence of linguistic minorities 
in parliaments, for example Swedish-speakers in the Finnish parliament, 
or in the transnational networks of radical socialists or leading academics 
– led to the transmission and translation of concepts and ideas from one 
50 Kocka 2003, 40–1; Baldwin 2004, 11, 14–15, 18; Green 2004, 42; see also Miller 
2004, 115–16; Petrusewisz 2004, 149; Grew 2006, 105–6, 126; see also Yengoyan 
2006, 4.
51 Fredrickson 1995, 587.
52 Kocka 2003, 41; Miller 2004, 124; Grew 2006, 105; Kocka & Haupt 2009, 20–1.
53 Haupt 2007, 700; see also Grew 2006, 104.
54 Haupt 2007, 700, 703; Grew 2006, 104; Miller 2004, 115.
55 Grew 2006, 105.
56 Cohen & O’Connor 2004, xvi, xvii; Cohen 2004, 64, 66; Petrusewisz 2004, 149; 
Grew 2006, 113.
57 Kocka 2003, 43.
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national context to another. Interdependence, transnational inuences and 
similarities among the national cases are considered throughout this study 
and are dealt with in separate subsections. Histoire croisée, entangled history, 
with its emphasis on the multiple points of view available to contemporaries, 
reminds us of the existence of interaction between the objects of comparison, 
such as shared legal systems (in Sweden and Finland) or common academic 
tenets (manifested in criticism of parliamentarism in all the countries 
studied) and direct connections between the institutions of various states,58 
and of course between cosmopolitan individuals who could focus on 
similarities or dierences between societies in order to support particular 
historical trajectories in their national context.59 Even if comparative history 
and entangled history have had slightly dierent interests, the interrelations 
between the cases need to be considered as possible factors in explaining 
discovered similarities and dierences.60 Entangled history helps us to avoid 
explaining developments by means of purely indigenous factors without 
paying proper attention to wider historical contexts and transnational 
networks.61 Transnational history has an obvious contribution to make to 
the study of interconnected parliamentary discourses and constitutional 
debates. An example of the solutions adopted here is the comparison of 
constitutional disputes in Sweden and Finland – two historically related 
smaller nation states with long traditions of representative government 
and emerging parliamentary cultures – over a relatively brief period within 
which not only the national contexts but also the transfers between these 
political cultures, as well as between them and two leading great powers, 
Britain and Germany, are taken into consideration while still bearing wider 
European patterns in mind. Swedish and Finnish national histories become 
thereby integrated to general European history.62
Constitutions – like nation states – are not natural units but the results of 
long-term processes of discursive construction and state building that have 
taken place in inter- and transnational interaction between related political 
cultures, centres and peripheries. Following Andreas Wirsching, we can 
talk about a constitutional culture as ‘the sum of the subjective attitudes, 
experiences, values, expectations and thought as well as the (objective) 
actions of the citizens and groups, the bodies of the state etc. in relation 
to the constitution as a public process’.63 Constitutions as ‘public processes’ 
have been reformulated by national communities, oen as a result of 
dramatically changing internal and/or external political circumstances. To 
understand denitions of ‘democracy’, ‘the people’ and ‘parliamentarism’ in 
the context of the late 1910s, the processes of the discursive construction of 
these concepts need to be studied not only at national levels but also with 
58 Haupt & Kocka 2004, 31–4; Werner & Zimmermann 2006, 32, 35; Haupt 2006, 
147–8; Haupt 2007, 712–14.
59 Saunier 2013, 5.
60 Kocka 2003, 44; Neunsinger 2010, 17.
61 Neunsinger 2010, 6–7.
62 See Saunier 2013, 139.
63 Wirsching 2008, 372–3.
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regard to inter- and transnational connections. is also involves an attempt 
to deduce how the transfers between constitutional debates took place, were 
used for diering purposes in dierent argumentative contexts or were 
denied or obstructed. 
Comparative or transnational studies in parliamentary history64 
or constitutional history65 have been few, though an awareness of the 
importance of taking transnational perspectives into account and focusing 
on transfers between political cultures has been on the rise.66 In Germany, 
Reinhart Koselleck and his pupils have published some works on comparative 
constitutional and political history from the point of view of conceptual 
history. In these, they pay particular attention to the unique political 
processes in various national contexts. e history of transfers, translations, 
imports, further developments, exports and implicit comparisons within 
the past language of politics play a role in their analyses, but the national 
contexts continue to be seen as primary.67
Existing studies on the constitutional reforms of the late 1910s oen focus 
on the course of events in national cases without analysing related discursive 
processes or making comparisons between thematically, synchronically and 
ideologically linked constitutional debates in various national parliaments. 
Transitions to parliamentary government based on democratic surage have 
been seen as nation-specic, even though the transitions in 1917–19 took 
place simultaneously in several north-western European polities.68 Instead of 
a mere comparison of separately treated national contexts, the transnational 
64 An older tradition of comparing the structures and functions of parliamentarism, 
though not its language, is represented by Schmidt 1977, 137–87, and Kluxen 
1985; Schönberger 2001 has focused on structural comparisons between British, 
French and German parliamentarism. e more recent works Möller & Kittel 
(eds) 2002, and Recker (ed.) 2004, do not analyse parliamentary discourse. 
Nor does Dittmar Dahlmann 2014, 33–65, which discusses the political role of 
parliament in the political process of each warring great power in an enlightening 
way but lacks any deeper comparison and only refers to parliamentary discourse 
at a general level. Kari Palonen’s comparison of procedural texts represents 
a novel approach to the political theory of parliaments. Palonen 2014, 55. One 
of the rst attempts to analyse parliamentary history comparatively and with the 
consideration of language is provided by Ihalainen, Ilie & Palonen 2016. Further 
volumes are under preparation by Henk te Velde and Tobias Kaiser.
65 A good example of comparative constitutional history is Gusy 2008 (ed.), 417–18, 
though one written by legal scholars rather than historians, which oen implies 
a normative perspective, as pointed out by Grotke & Prutsch 2014, 8. Finnish 
and Russian revolutionary legislative practices have been compared from the 
perspective of legal studies, without an interest in long-term constitutional 
discourses, parliaments or transnational links, in Borisova & Siro, 2014, 84–113. 
Kurunmäki, Nevers & te Velde 2018 will provide a longer-term comparison with 
regard to the concept of democracy.
66 te Velde 2005, 206; Pombeni 2005; Marjanen 2009, 240, 243; Pekonen 2014. 
Recent illustrations of a comparative history that includes transnational elements 
are Grotke & Prutsch 2014, 8–9, Leonhard 2011, Leonhard 2014 and Stråth 2016.
67 Koselleck, Spree & Steinmetz 2006, 412–14; Steinmetz 2007, 23–5; Steinmetz et 
al. 2013.
68 See, for instance, Gusy 2008a, 418; Schönberger 2009, 43, 45.
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character of the transition towards democratic parliamentarism calls for 
historians to carry out a transnational analysis as well.69 
Previous evolutionary developments towards democracy and parlia-
mentarism at the national level were signicantly accelerated by the First 
World War, the rst global catastrophe of the twentieth century.70 e war 
experience became a force that mobilised and politicised the public in an 
unprecedented way, and this politicisation turned into calls for extended 
political participation. Most European societies were exhausted by the war 
and began to reconsider older loyalties, identities and conceptions of the 
proper political order. Diculties in the war eorts gave rise to demands for 
increased democratisation and parliamentary involvement in the scrutiny 
and implementation of policies – sometimes including foreign policy and 
the notion of parliamentary representation in international relations as 
well.71 Major transnational inuences followed in spring 1917: the Russians 
provided an example of a revolution against a monarchy and then of a world 
revolution in the Bolshevik sense. At the same time, the Western powers, 
with US President Woodrow Wilson in the lead, increasingly adopted 
‘democracy’ as their unifying war aim, declaring that the Allies were 
‘making the world safe for democracy’ with their struggle, emphasising the 
right of self-determination and nally demanding democratisation from 
the Germans before agreeing to a ceasere. is unifying war aim and fears 
of revolution gave momentum to democratisation and parliamentarisation 
in many countries, including the Western powers themselves (Britain), 
neutral states (Sweden and Finland) and Germany. Even the British and 
French adopted the American concept of democracy,72 which constituted 
a major transnational discursive turn. When a ceasere was agreed in 
November 1918, a unique moment for the reorganisation of the political 
order was at hand, and these nation-state-centred reforms concerned not 
only Germany but many smaller European states as well. e years 1918 
and 1919 consequently appeared for contemporaries major advances in 
parliamentary democracy. Britain introduced an electoral reform in 1917–
18, providing a  model for countries in which reforms had been debated 
69 In the eld of transnational history, the closest recent project has been Geyer 
2011, 187, 192, but Geyer focuses on the revolutionary process and not on 
constitutional questions or parliaments as potentially transnational arenas. 
What is relevant here is that the German Revolution, too, should be seen as 
part of a global wave of unrest, strikes and revolutions. Correspondingly, the 
fragmentation of the European constitutional reforms of 1917–19 also deserve 
attention. An older tradition of structural comparisons between social systems 
in Britain and Germany is represented by Schmidt 1977. Congleton 2011, 
bypasses the analysis of political discourse and applies rational-choice models 
and quantitative data connected with generalising overviews of constitutional 
history to interpret (not very convincingly) rule-based governance in England, 
Sweden, Germany, and some other countries. Colley forthcoming will provide 
an analysis of constitutional development within the British Empire.
70 Möller 2002, 5, building on George F. Kennan.
71 Götz 2005, 273.
72 Dodd 1923, 120.
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but not yet realised. In post-war Europe, almost every new constitution 
recognised popular sovereignty as a foundation for political power, 
introduced universal and equal surage, emphasised parliamentarism in 
the eld of legislation and increased the responsibility of the government to 
parliament.73 e constitutional choices made in the aermath of the First 
World War had many far-reaching consequences: they would determine for 
a considerable time (especially in the cases of Britain, Sweden and Finland) 
the basic structure and rules of each polity and thereby aect future 
legislation and political development. In Germany, the development would 
not be so straightforward, but democratisation and parliamentarisation 
nevertheless took place with the introduction of the Weimar Constitution. 
Comparative constitutional history ideally starts with phenomena which 
the people of the age being studied themselves regarded as comparable. e 
original international (and potentially transnational) nature of discussions 
on similarities and dierences between political systems can then be 
reconstructed and analysed.74 Interrelations between Germany, Sweden and 
Finland (and increasingly also between these countries and Britain from 
late 1918 onwards) are shown by the primary sources to have played major 
roles especially in the Swedish and Finnish debates. Comparisons between 
Britain, Germany, Sweden and Finland were incorporated on the basis of 
explicit references in parliamentary debates to constitutional circumstances 
in another of these countries or the potential relevance of the other country 
as the source of cultural and political models (or of warning examples) 
as suggested by secondary literature. Recent historiography (especially 
German) on constitutional debates in the immediate aermath of the First 
World War was also used as a source of methodological inspiration. 
While the German case of transition to parliamentary democracy in 
1917–19 has been analysed with some attention being paid to parliamentary 
debates as well,75 this is not the case with the other three countries. German 
research, inspired by the historical trauma of the failure of the Weimar, 
provides a starting point for analysing similar debates on democracy, the 
people and parliamentarism in the other three countries. Such comparisons 
bring new light to the German case as well, showing which ways of thinking 
were common to the Germans on the one hand and the Swedes, the Finns 
and even the British on the other and which were indeed particular to 
Germany. For instance, how did the discursive strategies of the leading 
political parties dier in countries with longer representative traditions 
from those in Germany, which experienced a more radical transformation 
in the period studied here? Comparative history, which is more established 
in Germany than in any other European country, has tended to focus on 
comparisons between Germany, Britain and France, oen leading to 
conclusions that Germany was either dierent from or similar to the other 
73 Kaelbe 2001, 49–53; Wirsching 2007, 9, 16; Gusy 2008b, 16–17; Pyta 2008, 86, 
93; Wirsching 2008, 371; Geyer 2011, 188, 194, 196, 218. Cf. Kaelbe’s claim that 
a common European concept of democratisation was lacking.
74 Cohen 2004, 65.
75 Pohl 2002; Bollmeyer 2007.
31
1.2 Towards a comparative and transnational history of political discourse
two Western great powers with established parliamentary democracies.76 
Alternatively, Germany could well be compared with political cultures that 
were historically more closely connected to Germany, namely Sweden and 
Finland, which in the late 1910s were in many respects German cultural 
‘hinterlands’. Sweden and Finland shared with Germany intellectual currents 
starting from the Lutheran Reformation and continuing with the Protestant 
Enlightenment77 through to nineteenth-century national romanticism, 
nationalism and academic trends in most elds of the human sciences. 
In the early twentieth century, a community of Germans and Swedes 
was constructed in many elds through the joint rejection of British or 
French culture.78 Moreover, the landowners in Sweden formed a dominant 
conservative political group not unlike the Junkers – even to the extent that 
Sweden was sometimes called ‘the Mecklenburg of the North’,79 and there 
was a movement supportive of German warfare during the First World War 
both in Sweden and in Finland.80 Some long-term cultural similarities and 
connections, which were at their strongest in the aermath of the Civil War, 
were manifested in both the Finnish parliament and in Reichstag debates, 
which justies the appellation of Finland as ‘a little Prussia’. Both of these 
Nordic countries were either about to ally themselves with Germany during 
the war, as the king and the right in Sweden had long contemplated doing, or 
actually did so, like Finland in 1918 when accepting a German intervention. 
e anti-Russian panic connected with Bolshevism and the anti-American 
criticism with regard to excessive internationalism that were seen as typical 
of Germany,81 were common in Sweden and Finland, too. 
On the other hand, there were also major long-term dierences between 
the German and the Swedish and Finnish political cultures, the most 
obvious being the tradition of the representation of the free peasantry in 
the Swedish and Finnish parliamentary institutions since early modern 
times, and the potential for arguments based on political history that this 
created, the consequent higher political awareness of the lower orders, the 
strong traditions of constitutionalism and legalism and the established 
legitimacy of a government in which the representatives of the citizenry 
had at least nominally participated.82 How these convergent and divergent 
features of German, Swedish and Finnish political cultures functioned in 
the revolutionary period of 1917–19 deserves further attention. In German 
research, similarities between the simultaneously formulated Finnish 
constitution and the Weimar constitution as republican, democratic and 
based on the duality of power have sometimes been recognised.83
Even independently of obvious diachronic and synchronic connections 
and frequent explicit references to Germany in the Swedish and Finnish 
76 Kocka & Haupt 2009, 5.
77 Ihalainen 2009.
78 Muschick 2001, 180.
79 Brandt 2008, 166.
80 Schuberth 1981.
81 Geyer 2011, 189.
82 See Ihalainen 2015 for details.
83 Endemann 1999, 15.
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constitutional debates, the inclusion of the German case is important because 
of the extensive secondary literature on the background and content of the 
Weimar Constitution that German historians and constitutional lawyers have 
produced over the past few decades.84 Germany has been frequently included 
in comparative studies in a number of elds of historical research – because 
of a strong German awareness of the need to explain the national history in 
the European context.85 No such research oering comparative perspectives 
and an emphasis on the post-First-World-War constitutional debates in 
a parliamentary context is available from the other countries – not even for 
the otherwise much studied British parliament.86 Wartime, exceptionally 
consensual attempts to strengthen the legitimacy of parliament and limited 
reformulations of British ‘democracy’ become visible in the international 
comparative context. is context includes the uses of ‘democracy’ and 
‘Prussianism’ in the war propaganda of the Entente and international 
comparisons carried out by the contemporaries. e German research 
provides methodological inspiration and some ready objects of comparison. 
On the other hand, this study places German constitutional debates within 
a broader European and more particularly northern European context. It 
shows how the pressures of Western propaganda played a role in attempts 
to democratise and parliamentarise the Prussian political order. Yet such 
inuence turned the key concepts party-political, potentially treasonous 
or in need of nationalisation. Germany has been rarely compared with the 
Scandinavian countries,87 and even comparisons with Britain have oen 
concerned areas such as industrialisation, classes and political movements 
– i.e. structures and processes rather than experiences of political change 
and ideological transfers.88 Britain and Germany have been contrasted in 
some previous studies on parliamentarism, though not from the perspective 
of parliamentary discourse.89 Contrasting them continues to be worthwhile 
provided that Britain is not seen merely as a normative model,90 particularly 
as its regime diered from the continental ones. In some respects, however, 
the two countries were perhaps not so dierent, and there were also 
transnational links between their debates that relativise Britain’s status as 
a model (see section 7.1). 
Comparative studies should not halt at merely contrasting the great 
powers as major parties of the First World War. Alternative, internationally 
less well known but equally interesting, ways to parliamentary democracy 
84 Rauh 1977; Gusy 1991; Gusy 1993; Gusy 1997; Beyme 1999; Llanque 2000; 
Mergel 2002; Pohl 2002; Bollmeyer 2007; Wirsching 2007; Gusy 2008 (ed.); 
Schöne & Blumenthal (eds) 2009.
85 Paulmann 1998, 652; Cohen 2004, 57. is is especially true of social history. 
86 See Close 1977, Lenman 1992, Musolf 1999, Machin 2001, Seaward 2002, 
Bogdanor 2003 and Lyon 2003.
87 See, however, Götz 2001.
88 Kocka 1996, 54, 57.
89 Möller & Kittel (eds) 2002; Recker (ed.) 2004; Wirsching (ed.) 2007.
90 For a related application of Begrisgeschichte, see Reimann 2000, 10–12, 24, 
which has used the press and the eld post to compare British and German 
wartime discourses. 
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existed. e units of comparison in this study therefore include two separate, 
albeit connected in multiple ways, nation states, Sweden and Finland, which 
experienced constitutional crises to diering degrees. e comparability 
between these two political cultures is oen considered self-evident as result 
of their obvious historical links.91 However, their comparability was not always 
explicitly stated by those who lived in the era studied here and has also been 
overlooked by later scholars who focus on the late 1910s.92 e continuous 
connection between the Swedish and Finnish legal traditions, political 
semantics and political cultures aer 1809 – and the status of the Finnish state 
as a descendant of early modern Sweden – have been emphasised by several 
Swedish and Finnish historians who work with a long-term perspective.93 In 
the Swedish and Finnish cases, the comparison here focuses on language use 
in two representative institutions that had a common historical background, 
similarities in procedures and highly parallel political roles.94 e goal is 
to understand both similarities in conceptualising constitutional issues in 
a revolutionary era – arising from the trajectories of common early-modern 
experiences and continuing cross-national connections – and dierences 
arising from the two countries’ separate national experiences aer 1809, 
divergent transnational connections and the dierent national contexts 
in the late 1910s. A long-term diachronic survey provided a hint about 
what would be an appropriate research period,95 but it also turned out to 
be necessary to extend the synchronic analysis by roughly two years to 
enable both sucient contextualisation and the consideration of diachronic 
change.96 
e selection of Britain, Germany, Sweden and Finland for comparison 
unavoidably aects the conclusions that are drawn.97 However, only countries 
that went through major constitutional transformations that were actively 
debated in their parliaments in the studied period are worth comparing. 
Other national parliaments could, of course, have been included were there 
no limits to time and resources. For the British, as we shall see, the dominions 
constituted major objects of comparison, and the Germans certainly looked 
towards France. In the Swedish debates, references to Denmark and Norway 
occurred as a result of the fact that these, too, were Scandinavian monarchies 
with representative and parliamentary governments and had recently 
implemented constitutional reforms – in Norway with the introduction of 
universal surage in 1913 and in Denmark with the introduction of female 
91 Junila, & Westin (eds) 2006; Jansson 2009; Halonen, Ihalainen & Saarinen 2015.
92 See von Sydow 1997, 17, who emphasises parallel developments in Danish, 
Norwegian and Swedish parliamentarism and recognises the related nature of 
the Nordic constitutions but bypasses Finland. Cf. Eskola 2011 and Jakobsen & 
Kurunmäki 2016 who recognise comparability.
93 See especially Jansson 2009, 10–11, 244–6, 330; Ihalainen & Sundin 2011, 192.
94 Institutions are easier to compare than many other objects, but they may still 
have dierent functions in dierent countries. Grew 2006, 100. is is as true of 
parliaments as of any other institution.
95 Ihalainen 2013.
96 See also Haupt & Kocka 2004, 26–7.
97 Baldwin 2004, 17.
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surage in 1915.98 Norway was an object of comparison mainly for Swedish 
reformists, whereas the right was disappointed with the way Norway had 
been parliamentarised in the course of the nineteenth century and the fact 
that it had le the personal union between the two countries in 1905. In 
Finland, the eighteenth-century Swedish constitution was a natural starting 
point for the debates.99 Contemporary Sweden was avoided as result of 
a  regional dispute over the Åland Islands, whereas Norway served as an 
alternative source of examples both for the reformists and the conservatives. 
e republican models of France and sometimes the United States were 
referred to mainly in spring 1919 as alternatives to the German-oriented 
monarchical discourse of the autumn of 1918. Switzerland provided 
a further model of an original republican constitution that was favoured by 
the far le in both countries, but its form of direct democracy appeared to 
most as inapplicable in other national contexts. 
ere were not many other objects of comparison, and from the Swedish 
and Finnish point of view Germany and Britain provided the major external 
rival political models. For both Swedish and Finnish parliamentarians, 
the original representative government of Britain and the restricted 
parliamentary element within the constitution of imperial Germany had long 
been relevant for constitutional comparisons.100 While Sweden and Finland 
remained culturally connected with Germany, there had also been sources 
of alternative political trends from France and the economically increasingly 
important – and politically similar (as some liberals suggested) – British 
model, even though the British case was still oen seen as too exceptional.101 
By 1919, however, Britain had won the war, and this increased the appeal 
of its polity among the Scandinavians. A rapid (if not always very well 
informed) re-evaluation of the Anglo-American model and the reduction of 
references to Germany followed. Sweden moved from German to Western 
political models aer erce ideological confrontations over democracy. 
ough Swedish and Finnish constitutional solutions depended to a great 
extent on the course of the war and on German debates, they diered from 
them as for the readiness of the right to experiment with democratisation. 
However, even in the interwar period Germany remained culturally the 
most inuential external power. 
Britain provided the best-known model for parliamentary government 
globally and an object of comparison with the Age of Liberty of the mid-
eighteenth century that was used in Sweden to construct a narrative of ancient 
Swedish democracy, the continuities of which are challenged by this study.102 
Despite newspaper reports on British parliamentary proceedings in the late 
nineteenth century,103 Britain remained politically and culturally remote to 
most Swedes and Finns. Even though there were Anglophiles among the 
98 Jakobsen & Kurunmäki 2016. 
99 Ihalainen 2015.
100 Ihalainen 2010; Pekonen 2015.
101 Ihalainen 2016a.
102 See Ihalainen 2010 on the historiography of eighteenth-century ’democracy’.
103 Pekonen 2014; Jakobsen & Kurunmäki 2016.
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political elites and even though Anglophone examples were sometimes cited 
in Swedish and Finnish debates on parliamentary reform, fewer politicians 
possessed a command of the English language than of German or French. 
Furthermore, as Vesa Vares has pointed out, the Finnish political elite could 
choose between several alternative objects of political identication: there 
was the British and Scandinavian model of a monarchy combined with 
a gradual introduction of parliamentarism, the German monarchical model 
of controlled democracy and the eastern European alternative of outright 
authoritarian rule.104 I argue in this book that radical political discourses 
adopted from Revolutionary Russia and legalist responses contributed to 
a more erce confrontation on democracy and parliamentarism in Finland 
than in the other countries and to the rise of a crisis of independence: the 
legitimacy of parliamentary government deteriorated, a cycle of violent 
parliamentary discourse, civil war and Prussian reaction followed, and 
nally a republican compromise was made under external pressures. While 
Finland became internationally a warning example of a failed democracy 
in spring 1918, foundations for what would much later be called a ‘very 
sustainable’ polity were nevertheless laid in spring 1919.
e British model rose in favour in Sweden and Finland from 1918 
onwards, but it did not supplant the German one. e elites of the three 
countries remained connected by similar educational backgrounds, shared 
German as an international language and were linked by travel, studies, 
work and ideological trends. e people of the time in Finland and Sweden, 
especially on the right, admired German culture and regarded their own 
countries and Germany as comparable. e shared cultural background 
allowed translations and the transfer of terms and values from German to 
Swedish and Finnish. Even Finnish, despite belonging to a dierent linguistic 
group, to a great extent gave the same semantic values to key cultural, 
social and political concepts as German did. Furthermore, in 1917 all three 
political systems were still characterised by the duality of government, an 
overwhelmingly monarchical constitution and doubts about excessive 
parliamentarism.105 Even many Swedish and Finnish leists were inuenced 
by the German debates. For many Social Democrats especially in Finland, 
Karl Kautsky’s uncompromising and ‘orthodox’ version emphasising the 
inevitability of a revolution and transition to socialism was the original 
model.106 His democratic justication of parliamentarism as an instrument 
for advancing the cause of socialism also mattered. It was based on hopes 
that a transition to socialism would be realised through universal surage, 
as a result of which a well-organised Social Democratic working class would 
rise. e revolution would come when the circumstances were suitable for 
it; there was no need to actively make one. e workers would be able to 
control the administration and carry on their class struggle through the 
parliament. In Eduard Bernstein’s revisionist socialism, followed especially 
by the Swedish Social Democrats, democracy was both a means and an 
104 Vares 1998, 324–5.
105 Ihalainen 2016a.
106 Hentilä 2015, 151–2.
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end. Rosa Luxemburg, on the other hand, rejected parliamentarism as 
an historical form of class rule by the bourgeoisie. Participation in such 
politicking hindered the transition to a socialist society as it ignored the 
revolutionary potential of the masses. Parliament could hence be no more 
than a forum for socialist agitation that would with time be removed as 
a result of an intensied class struggle inside and outside the parliament.107 
Peter Baldwin has urged Scandinavian historians to replace conventional 
histories of Nordic particularity with such comparisons with Germany, 
which, he argues, has been deliberately excluded from the Scandinavian 
historical consciousness since the Second World War. An alternative 
national (or even Anglophone) research orientation has followed not 
only as a result of methodological nationalism but also for ideological 
reasons. According to Baldwin, the exclusion of the German connection 
has been part of ‘the welfare whiggery of a Social Democratic reading of 
history’, which sees modern Sweden as the teleological goal of a national 
historical progress and even as a universal target of historical development. 
Comparisons with Germany would not only reveal similarities but also the 
insular and particular nature of many Scandinavian developments that arose 
out of unique and not universally valid circumstances, Baldwin suggests.108 
Comparisons between Sweden and Britain indicate both similarities and 
dierences,109 as the historical experiences of these two countries have been so 
dierent; comparisons with Germany, by contrast, might show considerable 
similarities.110 is study puts Baldwin’s suggestion into practice not only by 
comparing two Nordic countries with Germany but also by making Finland 
a point of comparison for Swedish history. e comparison needs to work 
both ways so that Sweden is not simply seen as a norm followed by Finland 
aer a delay; rather, the Finnish case is used for a deeper understanding 
of political development in Sweden. Finland as ‘another Sweden’ aer 1809 
shows that the development of Sweden proper was not the only possible 
one; that Sweden, too, remained traditional in many ways; and that Finnish 
developments mattered more in Sweden in 1917–19 than has been generally 
recognised. 
e following chapters will show that the combination of Britain, 
Germany, Sweden and Finland works extremely well in the comparative and 
transnational analysis even though the inclusion of four cases has produced 
a more extensive and comprehensive study than was rst intended. Before 
proceeding to the analysis, some further explanation of the methodology 
used will help to show how the analysis has been focused and delimited.
107 Kirby 1986b, 7; Hewitson 2001, 760; Jörke & Llanque 2016. 
108 Baldwin 2004, 3, 5–6; see also Neunsinger 2010, 11 for a comparison between 
Germany and Sweden between the world wars; Ihalainen 2010 and Ihalainen 
2015 on Swedish particularity in the eighteenth century; Ihalainen et al. 2011. 
109 Friberg, Hilson & Vall 2007.
110 See Götz 2001. 
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1.3  Discourse-oriented political history based on parliamentary  
 sources
e research for this book has been inspired methodologically by a new type 
of political history that analyses communication and a variety of interlinked 
discourses as central elements of political processes, institutions, events and 
actions.111 I have considered the connections between words and deeds in 
politics112 and the related mobility and physical experiences of the historical 
agents. In the interpretation of the use of language as political action I have 
paid considerable attention to the biographies and the psycho-physical 
experiences of the parliamentarians. I have analysed politics primarily 
(though not solely) as discursive processes taking place simultaneously 
on dierent horizontally and vertically linked planes and forums and in 
dierent times (historical trajectories) and places (multi-sitedness) – so 
that a variety of actors are seen as constructing, reproducing and contesting 
policies in interaction with each other and with the political process.113 In 
practice, this means contextualising and comparing content, and conducting 
a textual and conceptual analysis of parliamentary and press debates 
on constitutional reforms, the goal being to reconstruct competing and 
ideologically motivated understandings of the constitutional implications 
of the war and the revolutions as well as alternative conceptualisations of 
democracy, the people and parliamentarism. Instead of a mere comparison 
between separately treated national histories, I have also paid attention to 
transnational aspects of constitutional discourse, in which parliamentarians 
as nationally and internationally connected political actors contributed to 
transfers between political cultures. I shall now proceed to explain these 
methodological starting points in further detail.114
is study is based on a so version of social constructivism that 
analyses language and discourse but does not see them as determining what 
could be thought, said or done. e linguistic, cultural, discursive, spatial, 
mobile, material and transnational turns in the human sciences are all seen 
as reconcilable with a new political history whose central starting point 
has been the incorporation into research of political discourse as a form 
of political action. e linguistic and discursive turns have emphasised the 
signicant role of the use of language side by side with structures, institutions 
and practices in most aspects of politics and have called for an analysis of 
the actual language of past political discourse in its proper contexts and 
with appropriate attention to agency. ey suggest that the social world is to 
a great extent (though not solely) constructed and constituted by symbolic 
111 Bollmeyer 2007, 18–19; Steinmetz 2011, 4–5; Leonhard 2011; Steinmetz 2013.
112 See Palonen 2014, 11, on Quentin Skinner’s intellectual history, and 126 on 
rhetorical studies of parliamentary debates.
113 For a more extensive discussion, see Halonen, Ihalainen & Saarinen 2015. On an 
application to conceptual history, see Friberg 2012, 21.




systems, and above all by language. Politics in general and parliaments in 
particular can hence be approached as being based primarily on the use 
of language and communication.115 ese approaches to political and 
parliamentary history do not claim to be all-embracing or to deny the 
need to simultaneously study agency, events, structures, institutions and 
practices; rather, they emphasise an aspect of politics that is essential for 
an understanding of political processes. eir analyses are built to a great 
extent on the results of more conventional political history. In this study, 
data from national biographies have been used to contextualise all speech 
acts but are not explicitly referred to in order to avoid an excessive number 
of references to mainly background information.
e seeming methodological gap between the study of political action 
(as traditionally studied in political history) and political discourse (as 
conventionally studied in the history of ideas) can be overcome when 
politics in the past is seen as essentially (though not exclusively) discursive 
and competing understandings of politics viewed as being reected by 
discursive tensions.116 Instead of the mere analysis of the causes and 
consequences of past political change, we should also be interested in the 
discursive processes that gave rise to diering and ideologically contested 
views of policy questions117 and sometimes explain the course of more 
physical political action as well. is kind of history of argumentation 
concentrates on the processes of development in the meanings of political 
terms and concepts as applied in a number of arguments by representatives 
of several political groups when they encounter new political situations, as 
Jörn Leonhard has put it.118
Such a process-like understanding of political discourse is particularly 
applicable to the parliament, which, according to Kari Palonen, should 
be seen as ‘the paradigmatic institution for political deliberation’119 and 
as oering ‘options … for political action by means of speech, debate and 
procedure’.120 Markku Peltonen has emphasised the rhetorical and adversarial 
nature of the English tradition of parliamentary speaking.121 According to 
Cornelia Ilie, as well, power relations in parliaments are discourse-shaped 
so that ‘the struggle over the use of language’ should be taken ‘as a concrete 
manifestation of the struggles for power’: power can be gained, challenged, 
competed for, defended and consolidated through the use of language. Facts 
115 On political culture, see Ihalainen & Sennefelt 2011 and Leonhard 2011, 245. In 
Germany, ‘the cultural history of the political’ has been discussed by Stollberg-
Rilinger 2005, 10–11, 22, 24. A linguistic turn in English-language research on 
German political history was suggested by Childers 1990, 335–6, 358. Recent 
developments in parliamentary history towards conceptual history include 
Ihalainen, Ilie & Palonen 2016. See also Ihalainen & Palonen 2009, 33.
116 Leonhard 2011, 249; Halonen, Ihalainen & Saarinen 2015, 14; Ihalainen and 
Saarinen 2015, 34.
117 Ihalainen and Saarinen 2015, 33.
118 Leonhard 2008, 18.
119 Palonen, Rosales & Turkka 2014, 3.
120 Palonen, Rosales & Turkka 2014, 5.
121 Peltonen 2013, 7.
39
1.3 Discourse-oriented political history based on parliamentary sources
tend to be shaped by language, whereas language change is based on the real 
situation. is is to say that parliamentary language aects and is aected by 
ongoing political transformations elsewhere in society.122
Politics is analysed here as a discursive process that has taken place on 
dierent horizontally and vertically linked levels and forums simultaneously 
and in dierent times and places,123 the focus being on national parliaments 
but with press debates (and through research literature other potentially 
connected debates) also being considered. is entails particular attention 
to historical trajectories and to the multi-sitedness of past political debates. 
Dierent layers of political discourse (historical trajectories) may have come 
together and merged at the same time into a point, a nexus, which has given 
rise to new political discourses.124 Policies have taken shape as a variety of 
actors have reinforced and potentially reformulated them in interaction 
with each other and the political process.125 
e physical life experiences and recollections of past political actors as 
‘historical bodies’ formed in particular social spaces, as well as their mobility 
between dierent spaces, call for particular attention in the analysis as they 
may have conditioned the use of language.126 Attention is paid here to the 
role of individuals as political agents by taking into account the simultaneity 
and reexivity of all of their psycho-physical experiences and ongoing 
actions. Individual political agents oen created concrete links between two 
or more discourses at the national level as well as between dierent national 
discourses transnationally.127 e most obvious examples are provided by 
Hjalmar Branting of the Swedish Social Democrats and some Finnish Social 
Democrats who had contacts with the Bolsheviks, but equally noteworthy 
are scholarly networks of conservative professors and Swedish and Finnish 
liberals sharing a world-view with British, French or German liberals. 
Spatiality and mobility refer to the simultaneity of a large number of 
contexts, practices and concepts moving in time and space. e notion of 
multi- sitedness supports the transnational turn in this eld of historical 
research:128 multi-sited and potentially transnational debates, and constitu-
tional debates in particular, have been typical of parliaments. e focus 
on the process-like nature of parliamentary discourse invites attention 
to interaction within and between political parties and the movement of 
discourses in time and space, including trajectories from the past, links 
with other debates and references to the future. An individual contribution 
to a parliamentary debate can be seen as a nexus of historically layered, 
multi-sited and transnational policy discourses so that dierent ideological, 
national, international and transnational historical and current discourses 
come together and give rise to new discourses in a parliamentary debate. 
122 Ilie 2016, 134, 143.
123 Halonen, Ihalainen & Saarinen 2015, 3.
124 Halonen, Ihalainen & Saarinen 2015, 17, inspired by Scollon & Scollon 2004. 
125 is is an application of Hornberger & Johnson 2007, 509–32.
126 Scollon & Scollon 2004.
127 Halonen, Ihalainen & Saarinen 2015, 17.
128 Halonen, Ihalainen & Saarinen 2015, 15.
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e debaters, through their active use of language, participate in a variety of 
discursive processes. 
is multi-sitedness and multi-layeredness of parliamentary debates 
calls for a longer-term and parallel analysis of parliamentary debates and 
the consideration of a variety of forums within one national debate, in other 
words the inclusion of a selection of extra-parliamentary debates. Even if 
the focus is on parliamentary discourse as a form of political activity, other 
discourses moving in time and space and potentially interlinked with this 
as well as physical political actions need to be considered. is also leads to 
a focus on individual parliamentarians as political agents linking political 
discourses that have taken place in various forums. ese connections 
have been created by ideologies, religions, parties, the press, associations, 
academic traditions, visits abroad, family ties, friendships etc. Typical 
instances would be a Swedish MP with work experience in Germany, 
France and Britain and another who knew the Archbishop of Canterbury, or 
a Finnish MP born in Ingria and uent in Russian attending revolutionary 
assemblies in Petrograd and then taking the train to Helsinki to speak in the 
Finnish parliament about the future constitution. 
e production of a new political history in this study has entailed writing 
comparative and transnational histories of political discourses. It consists in 
the study of the multi-sited and potentially interconnected contributions 
to political discourse made by individuals and political groups in several 
European countries with comparable and partly entangled national histories. 
Attention is paid to spatiality and mobility in discourse – in addition to 
historical semantics, conceptual history (as represented by Reinhart 
Koselleck129 and his pupils), historical pragmatics and the analysis of speech 
acts in the history of political thought (as advocated by Quentin Skinner130 
and ‘the Cambridge School’ in general). Whereas Anglophone research on 
the history of political thought emphasises the role of individuals in doing 
things in unique speaking situations, continental conceptual historians 
pay more attention to the functioning of communities, continuities in the 
contexts of political speaking and the recycling of political language. ese 
slightly diverging conventional styles of studying the history of political 
discourse are seen here as complementing rather than competing with each 
other as they merely focus on dierent aspects of the multidimensional 
phenomenon of the language of politics.
e comparative and transnational analysis of constitutional discourse 
in this study focuses on the very essence of representative government 
–  parliamentary sources, which record institutionalised debates between 
political actors. Due to multiple contemporary perspectives included 
by them they provide fruitful sources for the analysis of the alternative 
denitions of the values of political communities. Speaking is a major form 
of political action in parliaments, which are founded on the rhetorical 
principle of dissensus and argument in utramque partem or pro et contra 
about every item on the agenda. e debaters can ‘parliamentarise’ any 
129 Koselleck 1972, xvi–xvii. 
130 Skinner 2002.
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political concept, construct alternatives and discuss various denitions. 
Parliamentary debates contain concrete conceptualisations carried out 
by political agents themselves in connection with decision making on 
constitutions and reactions from fellow parliamentarians. ey clarify 
opposite alternatives rather than lead to consensus. ey can be analysed by 
focusing on conceptual moves, innovations and interventions as well as on 
references to past examples, the application of dierent historical layers of 
concepts and selective comparisons with contemporary political systems.131 
Speaking for and against issues on the agenda oen led to the expression 
of strongly contrasting understandings of the political reality. Teun van Dijk 
has argued that parliamentary debates on alternative political solutions 
– especially in historical moments characterised by the polarisation of politics 
and ongoing shis of paradigms – are revealing about the diverse party-
political agendas of the time. According to Cornelia Ilie, parliamentarians, 
when trying to inuence the audience’s beliefs and opinions, discursively 
problematise and potentially reshape prevailing conceptualisations of 
political values on which decision making in the polity is based.132 While 
conceptual innovations can be borrowed from outside the parliamentary 
chamber (from media debates, for example – and may also be introduced 
back into these so that parliamentary discourse extends beyond the 
representative institution),133 they may also arise out of the acute needs of 
the actual moment of speaking in parliament, sometimes even being coined 
without advance planning as a reaction to an interjection, for example. 
Parliamentary debates nevertheless remain linked to physical political 
realities outside the chamber in a number of ways.
1.4  e structure of the analysis
is study of the understandings and conceptualisations of transitions 
towards parliamentary democracy aims at reconstructing and analysing in 
a synthetising way the prevailing values and alternative solutions held by 
the British, German, Swedish and Finnish parliamentary elites and reected 
in their use of language between March 1917 and July 1919. In a close 
reading of the major constitutional debates in the four countries, I have 
paid attention to both general historical semantics and to distinct speech 
acts in which the basic values of the political community and its future 
prospects as a (potential) parliamentary democracy were dened through 
the use of the terminology of democracy, the people and parliamentarism. 
Explicit disputes about the meanings of related key concepts have received 
further attention. Technical questions concerning elections such as the 
limits of surage were le outside the study (including the concepts of 
131 Palonen 2008; Ihalainen & Palonen 2009, 19–21, 32–3; Ihalainen 2010; Palonen 
2010, 1, 3, 5 156–72; Palonen 2012, 21; Palonen 2014, 13, 24, 106–7, 139; 
Ihalainen 2014; Ihalainen & Saarinen 2015; Ihalainen 2015.
132 Van Dijk 2003; Ilie 2016.
133 Ilie 2016; Harvard 2016.
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representation, mandate, election, surage, the electorate, voting, majority, 
minority, government, opposition, party and faction).134 In order to grasp 
contemporary understandings of the inuence of the war and revolution 
on political life, uses of these key concepts were also analysed. References 
to foreign examples were registered to enable the analysis of inter- and 
transnational interaction. 
Even though in Britain, Germany and Sweden (and in many other 
European countries, though not in Finland, where it already existed) the 
period 1917–19 involved the introduction of women’s surage as well, 
a conscious choice was made not to focus specically on the gender aspects 
of constitutional reforms here. Many contemporaries, aer all, did not 
automatically associate women’s surage with democracy.135 is study 
rather considers possibilities for political participation in parliamentary 
polities for both men and women on equal terms. Such a choice does not 
stand for any deprecation of the gender aspect; it arises from a desire to avoid 
the repetition of already existing analyses of the introduction of women’s 
surage into national parliaments,136 which cannot be deepened within the 
connes of this study. Gender is considered as an analytical category in cases 
where the parliamentarians themselves explicitly associated it with the war, 
revolution, democracy, the political role of the people or parliamentarism 
– at times quite extensively especially in the British and Swedish parliaments 
(see subsections 3.1.2, 3.1.5, 3.1.6, 3.3.4, 3.3.4, 4.1.3, 4.1.4 and 7.3.4), 
occasionally also in German and Finnish parliaments. 
e structure of this book has three dimensions: time, national contexts, 
and the debates surrounding a key concept (democracy, the people, 
parliamentarism). Chronologically, the book is divided into seven chapters, 
the central ve each discussing constitutional debates over roughly half 
a  year – although there is exibility in the timings so that thematically and 
contextually coherent series of debates have not been split up. e basic 
structure runs so that British, German, Swedish and Finnish debates are 
discussed (always in this order) for the rst and second half of 1917, the rst 
and second half of 1918 and the rst half of 1919. ere were dierences 
in the timing and intensity of the debates, and hence the extent and source 
basis of the sections dier. Comparisons and cross-references are made 
throughout the text when appropriate, while generalisations and abstractions 
have mainly been saved for the conclusion. Each country-specic section is 
opened with (i) a subsection reviewing the state of research in each country 
134 See Palonen 2010. 
135 Kurunmäki 2015, 32, 48.
136 See Purvis & Stanley Holton (eds) 2000, Gullace 2002 (who has also made use 
of parliamentary debates and the press), Smith 2005 (who has studied ‘surage 
discourse’ as concerning women’s surage from the point of view of women only) 
and Gottlieb & Toye (eds) 2013 for the British case. See Sulkunen, Nevala-Nurmi 
& Markkola 2009 and Adams 2014 for historiographical reviews of the eld and 
comparative studies. Adams argues that nationalism rather than feminism gave 
rise to women’s surage.
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and contextualising the debates at the national level. is is followed by up 
to four subsections discussing (ii) debates on the political impact of the 
war and revolutions as well as the principal international comparisons and 
transnational connections of the debates, (iii) competing conceptualisations 
of democracy, (iv) alternative arguments on the political role of the people 
and (v) rival understandings of parliamentarism. In the conclusion, this 
division is followed by an explication of similarities and dierences and 
a discussion of causal factors. Here, generalisations are formulated and some 
nation-specic ndings rising from the comparison and the consideration 
of transnational aspects pointed out. 
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2.  National backgrounds of constitutional  
 disputes from spring 1917  
 to summer 1919
2.1  e standstill in the British constitutional reform before  
 and during the war
Considerable constitutional tensions on the need for a further widening 
of surage and the parliamentarisation of the government (in the sense of 
increasing the powers of the lower house) were typical of British politics 
at the beginning of the twentieth century. e key issues concerned the 
extension of manhood surage beyond 60 per cent as legislated in 1884, 
female surage as demanded by a militant suragist movement and opposed 
by equally principled anti-suragists, proportional representation as applied 
in a growing number of other countries and the need to reform or restore the 
House of Lords. Women’s surage dominated the debate as unenfrachised 
men were passive in claiming their political rights in comparison with 
the vocal and well-to-do suragettes. Later research137 has also prioritised 
the gender perspective from the women’s point of view. Proportional 
representation was supported by some MPs from all parliamentary parties. 
e Lords had already passed a bill on its introduction in local elections 
and was ready to extend it to the national level in 1918, but the Commons 
did not adopt these reforms. Most importantly, the Liberal government had 
forced through a Parliament Act in 1911, cutting the political power of the 
upper house. On the other hand, it preferred to avoid any technical changes 
in the electoral system that would benet the Labour Party, the prospective 
competitor of the Liberals, preferring to focus on welfare reforms to obviate 
Labour advances rather than on the extension of parliamentary government 
through increased proportionality of representation – a tactic not entirely 
unlike that used by German governments. e Liberal government did 
introduce a compensation for MPs,138 which of course made the post more 
accessible. e Conservatives, for their part, were uninterested in a surage 
reform as it did not suit to their elitist understanding of the British nation, 
and as they willingly opposed any Liberal reform.139
137 See note 136.
138 Machin 2001, 125–6.
139 Müller 2002, 320.
45
2.1 The standstill in the British constitutional reform before and during the war
In the Parliament Act, the constitutional relationship between the two 
Houses of Parliament was radically redened so that the possibilities for 
the House of Lords to postpone legislation were considerably decreased. 
e length of parliaments was reduced from seven to ve years and the 
relationship between the Crown and the government more clearly dened. 
Some politicians even regarded these changes as a transition from an 
unwritten to a written constitution, but in reality this was just a further 
stage in the constitutional evolution that was typical of Britain. e reform 
of 1910–11 in any case constituted a major precedent for that of 1917–18 as 
it demonstrated the growing self-condence of the Commons in relation to 
the Lords. With its unilateral bill of April 1910, the Commons had declared 
that the Lords would no longer be able to reject or make amendments to 
economic bills or postpone legislation already passed by the lower house 
for longer than three parliamentary sessions or two years. e 1910 general 
election and the Liberal ministry’s threat to create hundreds of pro-reformist 
peers by making use of the royal prerogative forced the Lords to accept this 
reform against their will. e compromise solution saw the veto rights of the 
Lords limited but its composition untouched – one proposal having been 
that it should be replaced with a chamber elected by a popular vote. Surage 
in elections for the Commons was not reformed either, so that forty per cent 
of adult males and all women remained outside the franchise.140 
Despite its limitations, Vernon Bogdanor has argued that the Parliament 
Act made the British parliamentary system increasingly unicameral. 
Representative government became associated with the House of 
Commons, and the political role of the Lords tended to be marginalised,141 
though the upper house retained its status as a forum for value debates. e 
consequences of the act were soon felt in parliamentary decision-making: 
the Lords rejected three bills in 1912–13 but rarely intervened thereaer, 
recognising the new power-sharing realities. e peers would continue 
to challenge governments in more limited elds, oen related to specic 
issues concerning the countryside. Otherwise they would adopt the role 
of examining and revising bills passed by the Commons.142 As we shall 
see, some vestiges of the old system would still be heard in 1917 and 1918, 
however, with the speakers in both houses either lamenting the radicalisation 
of the Parliament Act or calling for its further radicalisation.
e transition to ‘lower house parliamentarism’ was dicult for 
many Conservatives to accept. e reform, despite its limits, gave rise to 
considerable constitutional tension, many Conservatives opposing the 
changes to the bitter end, claiming that the Lords (rather than the Commons) 
constituted the real representatives of the people. Some even threatened, 
at least rhetorically, a civil war in support of the former parliamentary 
system.143 is political crisis concerning the legitimacy of parliamentary 
140 Close 1977, 893; Machin 2001, 130–3; Walters 2003, 197, 228; Bogdanor 2003a, 
4–5, 23; Dahlmann 2014, 55.
141 Bogdanor 2003b, 690.
142 Walters 2003, 210–13.
143 Müller 2002, 48; Saunders 2013b, 76–80.
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government was further deepened by the extensive strikes that preceded the 
outbreak of the First World War in Britain, the ongoing violent campaign 
of the suragettes and plans for Home Rule for Ireland.144 Previous research 
shows that when it entered the war in 1914, Britain was by no means a stable 
parliamentary polity that the Continentals would readily imitate.
Even the British participation in the war was not so self-evident as that of 
most Continental powers: the Liberal ministry and party, which had ruled 
since 1910 with support from minority parties, were divided during the war, 
and there was opposition in Parliament to involvement in the Continental 
troubles. e ministry lost two of its le-wing Liberal members to an 
extra- and intra-parliamentary peace opposition when the war broke out. 
is opposition was also supported by the Union of Democratic Control 
(founded in September 1914 to oppose secret diplomacy and to advance 
peace negotiations, national self-determination and free trade) and the small 
Independent Labour Party, which emerged as a part of the transnational 
division of the labour movement into revisionist social democrats, who 
supported involvement in the war and were generally willing to cooperate 
with bourgeois reformist forces, and future communists, who rejected 
parliamentarism as an outdated strategy and expected support from the 
Russian Revolution. Views on the democratisation of Germany would 
become a further issue dividing the Labour Party aer 1917. However, the 
British Labour Party, unlike most Continental labour parties, was not split 
as a consequence of the war. Despite disagreements the radical inuence 
within it remained modest. For the Conservatives, by contrast, the war gave 
a new patriotic motivation, enabling them to move on from their heated 
anti-Home Rule campaign and disagreements surrounding the reform of 
the Lords. In order to ensure that the Continental war would not directly 
reach Britain, the British government received extensive wartime powers 
and the support of a party truce that allowed it to intervene in the economy 
and civil liberties in unprecedented ways, including the oppression of the 
pacist opposition.145 All in all, the British political system of the late 1910s 
was not that dierent from those of the other war-faring nations, discourse 
on nation legitimating wartime politics such as in Germany,146 the major 
exception being the principal controlling position of the Commons over the 
government, a feature that was lacking especially in Germany. 
In the spirit of a political truce, the Liberal government sought a broader 
parliamentary basis and managed to recruit Conservative and Labour 
ministers in May 1915. A general election, which should have been held 
in accordance with the Parliament Act by December 1915, was postponed, 
and the Commons elected in 1910 – insofar as its members were not on 
military service  – continued to work. As German critics of parliamentary 
government of the British and French type also implied, Parliament had 
144 Dahlmann 2014, 56; Leonhard 2014, 212.
145 Webber 1988, x; Cook 1988, 63; Weckerlein 1994, 15; Berger 1994, 8; Ball 1995, 
58–9; Smith 1997, 61; Collette 1998, 2; McCrillis 1998, 10; orpe 2001, 37; 
Wrigley 2009, 91; Pugh 2011, 100; Dutton 2013, 64–78; Leonhard 2014, 213.
146 Müller 2002, 353–4.
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little actual inuence in making major political decisions during the war: 
the British ministry dealt with wartime problems through administrative 
measures. ings became more complicated, however, when no major 
military victory was won and the Coalition failed to restore peace. In the 
meantime, the Conservatives were becoming the leading party in Parliament 
through gains in by-elections and consequently became the decisive force 
in the new coalition. Together with an awareness of unenfrachised men 
and women serving patriotically in the army and armaments industry, 
this development tended to make both the Conservatives and the Liberals 
more interested in the possibility of an electoral reform. Such a reform was 
debated in the Commons from 1915 onwards, but a clear turning point 
was only reached in late 1916, when bad electoral successes in by-elections 
had made it impossible for the Liberal Prime Minister H. H. Asquith to 
continue. In the so-called ‘Nigeria Debate’ of November 1916, Conservative 
backbenchers withdrew their support for the Coalition, which forced the 
Conservative leader Bonar Law to look for alternative solutions for the 
ministry. King George V asked Law to take over the premiership, but he 
declined in the lack of sucient cross-party support. As an election would 
have been very dicult to organise in the midst of escalating ghting, and 
as Asquith refused to join a government led by Law, the King nominated 
a government of all parties under the leadership of David Lloyd George 
(Liberal).147 Only some of the Liberals and Labour supported Lloyd George, 
but he could count on Conservative backing instead148 – once again a state 
of aairs that aected the course of the reform and subsequent elections. In 
these circumstances, however, a surage reform introduced by the Coalition 
would not be simply a party-political manoeuvre as all parties were to some 
extent divided over the war, support for the current ministry and the nature 
of the reform.
In Parliament, Unionists (Conservatives) and Liberals now both had 272 
seats, Labour 42 and the Irish National Party 84. In Lloyd George’s coalition 
government, the Conservatives had a majority, headed by Chancellor 
of the Exchequer and Deputy Prime Minister A. Bonar Law. ey also 
held the Foreign Oce, Home Oce, War Oce, Admiralty and other 
important ministries. e Liberal prime minister had won the support 
of the majority of the Conservatives through his proven resoluteness in 
decision-making and his abilities as a public speaker. Such broad support 
was decisive for a successful electoral reform. A determination to introduce 
constitutional changes, too, was easier to demonstrate in wartime with 
only a few men coordinating decision-making within the war cabinet and 
the special circumstances justifying extraordinary measures in this eld 
as well. e good working relationship between Lloyd George and Bonar 
Law made it easier to agree even on previously controversial questions 
like this one. In practice, however, the Conservatives were the stronger 
partner, thanks to their unanimous support for total warfare. ere was 
147 Ball 1995, 55, 58, 60; Cook 1988, 66; Pugh 2002, 153, 155; Lyon 2003, 398–9; 
Morrow 2004, 154, 224; Dahlmann 2014, 58.
148 Becker 2014, 25.
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also a rising conception among them that the party might actually benet 
from a wartime reform. e Liberals, by contrast, were split, with Asquith 
as Leader of the Opposition, even though he did not actively oppose the 
government on issues such as electoral reform. e Labour Party, headed 
by William Adamson, remained rather marginal in comparison with Social 
Democrats in many other countries,149 and the Irish Nationalists frequently 
concentrated on Irish aairs only.
An electoral reform enfranchising soldiers and female workers seemed 
possible under the wartime coalition as a means of encouraging the war 
eort. It was far from clear, however, that the reform would be launched 
in the name of ‘democracy’, a term that was not yet generally used to 
dene the British political system. It was more common to talk about 
popular or parliamentary government. Democracy, when not rejected as 
the unrealisable power of the masses, had been generally considered no 
more than one of the three elements of a balanced mixed constitution, 
and the notion of popular sovereignty had emphasised the origins rather 
than the active use of power. In popular radical discourse ‘democracy’ had 
nevertheless been used since the 1830s and 1840s to challenge the degree of 
reforms.150 Only the late nineteenth century had seen the rise of a broader 
understanding of democracy as an essential part of British parliamentarism, 
partly through the inuence of the USA, the political system of which 
had become increasingly characterised by the term in the course of that 
century. In Britain, a turn towards a more positive understanding of 
democracy took place from the 1880s onwards,151 though no agreement 
about Britain being a democracy emerged, and the concept with its multiple 
meanings became an object of controversy and rhetorical redescriptions 
especially by those Conservatives who remained unhappy with the reforms 
of the early 1910s.152 is battle over denitions continued in 1917–18 and 
was intensied by the trans-Atlantic Wilsonian ‘democratic’ turn in war 
propaganda.
e British political elite talked about democracy during the rst half 
of the war quite dierently from the way they did in the second. Scepticism 
rather than optimism about the functioning of democratic institutions 
had been typical of British discourse before the war – something that 
Continental anti-parliamentary politicians readily echoed. Britain was 
‘free’ and ‘constitutional’, no doubt, but was it a ‘democracy’? Only the war, 
and especially the discursive turn of 1917 in war propaganda, supported 
a change in the attitudes of the political elite as to the desirability of 
democracy. According to Lloyd George himself, the cause of democracy 
had not originally been among the reasons for British involvement in the 
war, but democracy had become a goal of future policies during the war. He 
himself had rather used the phrase ‘popular government’ in accordance with 
149 Ball 1995, 60–1; Pugh 2002, 155–6.
150 Ihalainen 2010; Innes & Philp 2013, 2–3; Philp 2013, 102; Innes, Philp & 
Saunders 2013, 115.
151 Saunders 2013a.
152 Saunders 2013; Saunders 2013b, 74, 77.
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British traditions of dening the political system and would continue to do 
so until he was assured of an election victory in late 1918. Ernest Barker, 
on the other hand, had already justied the alliance between Britain and 
France in 1914 by appealing to democracy as a basic political attitude and 
arguing: ‘France, like England, is a democracy. France is one of the greatest 
democracies in the world.’ German war propaganda was, at the same time, 
challenging ‘Western’ democracy (see section 3.2 for details). Lloyd George 
and his colleagues gradually began to defend democracy internationally aer 
the entry of the United States into the war, which suggests that the discourse 
on democracy gained popularity in Britain as a pragmatic means of nding 
a common denominator with the United States, the engagement of which in 
the war was eagerly hoped for and the current president of which favoured 
the rhetoric of democracy. In March 1916, Richard Haldane, 1st Viscount 
Haldane and a former Lord Chancellor, had given an interview to American 
journalists urging America, as a democratic country, to involve itself in a war 
that was expected to produce ‘a great democratic advancement’ in Europe 
and the world more generally. In 1917, the United States, having made the 
decision to join the war as a reaction to total submarine warfare by Germany, 
came forward using a similar vocabulary and speaking about a joint ght for 
democracy. e breakthrough of this discourse in war propaganda gradually 
caused the British to proceed towards an increasing use of references to 
democracy153 also in connection with domestic reforms that had not been 
initially conceptualised in that way, and, in time, to sometimes question 
the correspondence of existing political structures with the principles of 
‘democracy’ – however that term might be dened. 
Despite long traditions of parliamentary rule and the development of 
parliamentarism in relation to sovereignty, representation, responsibility 
and deliberation,154 no clear doctrine of parliamentarism either existed 
in Britain before the First World War. e war therefore contributed 
signicantly to redening the essentially contested concepts of democracy 
and parliamentarism in Britain as well,155 as part of the continuing 
discursive processes of constructing democracy and parliamentarism.156 
e constitutional change of 1917–18 originated to a great extent from 
domestic debates about the necessity to nally hold the postponed general 
election, to create an electoral register for that purpose and to proceed to 
a proper electoral reform as well.157 e special circumstances of the war, 
however, enabled the achievement of a unique cross-party consensus on 
constitutional changes. is was foreign to the usual British government-
versus-opposition divisions.158 In the sections on Britain, we shall analyse 
the dynamics of parliamentary debate on reform159 in these circumstances 
153 Llanque 2000, 106–107, 110–11; Jeerys 2007, 8.
154 Seaward & Ihalainen 2016.
155 Llanque 2000, 112.
156 Ihalainen, Ilie & Palonen 2016, 6, 12; Ihalainen 2016a, 19–20.
157 Blackburn 2011, 38–40.
158 Norton 2011, 7, 15–16.
159 Debates on women’s surage have been analysed in a helpful way by Gullace 
2002.
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from a conceptual, comparative and transnational points of view unlike 
those of previous research.
2.2  Universal male surage in Germany. Prussian executive power  
 and scepticism about parliamentarism
e degree of democratisation and parliamentarisation of the German polity 
before the First World War has long been the subject to scholarly debate (see 
section 4.2 for details); the unied country had already introduced equal and 
universal male surage in national elections in 1867 – long before Britain, 
Sweden or Finland – but had distinguished between democracy in that sense 
and the parliamentarisation of government both in theory and in practice.160 
Despite the seemingly democratic surage and a federal national parliament 
side by side with regional state parliaments, the German constitution, 
dominated under Wilhelm II by the conservative Prussian political culture, 
did not support a parliamentary or democratic regime. is diers from the 
ideal of governmental responsibility to parliament as sometimes expressed 
in the liberal Frankfurt Parliament (1848–9)161 but such a critical attitude 
to parliaments was mainstream in Northern Europe, including Sweden and 
Finland until 1917. 
James Retallack has argued that all areas of German political life were 
regulated by authoritarian structures, practices and ways of thinking that 
obstructed political reform,162 whereas Margaret Lavinia Anderson has 
maintained that the German electoral culture was gradually becoming 
more participatory and democratic in comparison with Western powers. 
is happened, according to her, thanks to prevalent legalism,163 a further 
feature linking Germany to Sweden and Finland. e majority vote in 
federal elections nevertheless limited the representation of the Social 
Democrats in the Reichstag, and their inuence had also been suppressed 
with anti-socialist and social security legislation, measures that were widely 
admired among conservatives in the north of Europe. e other parties were 
doubtful about reforms, wishing to retain their seats in the Reichstag. e 
Chancellor was only to a limited extent accountable to the Reichstag, while 
the heads of governmental departments remained responsible to the Kaiser 
only. e Kaiser led the army, decided on war and peace, appointed civil 
servants, convened the Reichstag and promulgated laws. e Bundesrat, in 
which the regional states were represented and which had executive powers 
as well, bypassed the Reichstag as the supreme authority of the Reich, and 
within this body Prussia alone could veto any decision. Within Prussia 
itself, the continuance of a three-class franchise based on the amount of 
taxes paid by the voters (oen compared in the Swedish debate with their 
40-grade franchise scale) and the use of the federalist system to prevent 
160 Gusy 2008a, 421.
161 Botzenhart 1974, 790–3. 
162 Retallack 2006, 10.
163 Anderson 2000, 19–20.
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reforms maintained a conservative political order. While Prussia had been 
the leader in modernisation in the mid-nineteenth century, by the 1910s its 
political system, which included an upper house (Herrenhaus) consisting 
of noblemen and lacking equal popular representation,164 appeared as 
a  barrier to political reform in Prussia and the extension of the powers 
of the Reichstag in Germany as a whole – even more so because not only 
Prussian conservatives but also many liberals were sceptical about the rule 
of the masses165 and parliamentarism. As Andreas Biefang has pointed out, 
parliamentary government was rejected by the bourgeois parties as not 
serving their power-political interests, and even by the Social Democrats, 
who, though recognising the progressive features of parliamentarisation, 
would have rather seen the parliament replaced with a system that would 
not so clearly serve the interests of the bourgeoisie as they considered it 
to be doing.166 Even moderate socialists in the north of Europe thus found 
support to their scepticism about parliamentarism from Germany.
e Prussian political culture remained dominant since the Kaiser was 
also the King of Prussia, the Chancellor was the Prussian Prime Minister, 
and Prussian ministers prepared proposals for the federal Reichstag. e 
Prussian political elites were nationalistic and militaristic and generally 
admired the former chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who had prioritised 
the use of sheer power over discussion in politics – all attitudes shared by 
the ‘conservative international’ in Sweden and Finland. Kaiser Wilhelm II 
himself despised parliamentarism and preferred to have around him ocers, 
civil servants and noblemen who shared his views. e inhabitants of the 
smaller states, liberals and Catholics did not necessarily identify themselves 
with this Prussian order,167 but their inuence in the Reich was limited as 
a result of the established political structures. 
At the same time, the voter turnout in elections had risen from the 
51% in 1871 to 85% in 1912, which reects the rising mobilisation and 
politicisation of the electorate: there was clearly an interest in politics among 
the public. A working relationship between the parliament and the public 
sphere was also gradually emerging. e legitimacy of the Reichstag was 
based on its broad popular basis and increasing publicity through debates 
and interpellations in which diverse interests could be expressed and which 
were widely reported in the press. Nevertheless, in concrete policy decision-
making, the role of the Reichstag remained marginal. It participated in the 
legislative process and in the approval of the budget, which grew rapidly 
in these years, but not in decisions concerning the actual governing of 
the country. No governmental responsibility to the parliament or ecient 
parliamentary control of government existed. Furthermore, the German 
164 e debates of the Prussian parliament have not been analysed in this study, 
which focuses on the national levels. However, British, Finnish and Swedish 
observers were aware of the debates of that important representative institution 
as well. For Prussia, see Müller 2002.
165 Spenkuch 1998, 551–2.
166 Biefang & Schulz 2016.
167 Ullrich 2010, 161–5; Winkler 2006; Dahlmann 2014, 43–4.
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public debate did not esteem the representatives’ work very highly, nor 
indeed did they themselves. Parliamentary matters were oen seen as 
secondary to the administration and the army.168 
e prospects for the parliamentarisation of government were thus 
poor in pre-war Germany. In 1912, an article in a National-Liberal paper 
complained about concealed parliamentarism (Kryptoparlamentarismus), 
criticising what it saw as the growing role of the parliament in German 
politics. According to its author, the political parties of the Reichstag did not 
really aim at the common good but rather advanced the particular interests 
of trusts, cartels and syndicates.169 Since parliamentary government was 
lacking, parties had no need for compromises, which tended to support 
the advancement of particular interests and the use of violent rhetoric in 
parliamentary debates. is was an understanding of parliamentarism that 
many members of the Swedish and Finnish political elites also shared, both 
on the le and on the right. 
e nature of German parliamentary life had nevertheless changed to 
some extent as a consequence of the parliamentary election of 1912, which 
made the Social Democrats the largest parliamentary group for the rst time. 
eir share of the votes reached 34.8%, giving them 110 representatives out 
of 397. In the eyes the old elite, the growing strength of the socialists appeared 
as a threat to the established balance of power. As a reaction, the political 
inuence of extra-parliamentary forces tended to increase further.170 It was 
dicult for the conservatives and liberals to rethink their conception of the 
Social Democrats as being potentially revolutionary even though most Social 
Democratic leaders had already rejected the Marxist revolutionary goals of 
the original party programme. Eduard Bernstein, for instance, wished to 
see socialism as a constant process of negotiation in which parliamentary 
cooperation with other parties was needed. A change in the attitudes of the 
other parties only started when they saw the cooperative, even patriotic, 
stance of the Social Democrats during the war.171 On the other hand, some 
radicalism survived among the le-wingers of the party, and so did old 
prejudices among the right and centre parties. 
e attitudes of the German (and Swedish and Finnish) old elites can be 
contrasted with those of their counterparts in Britain, where the aristocracy 
and bourgeoisie may have paid more attention to the demands of the 
(numerically fewer) socialists as a result of the sovereign status of Parliament 
in the political system in order to prevent a rise in electoral support for the 
Labour Party, a common call for all conservatives. In the German polity, 
where the Reichstag did not play a decisive role in the political system and 
bureaucracy dominated, it was easier for the aristocracy and bourgeoisie 
just to disregard the socialists,172 even though counter-measures were also 
taken there. e political inuence of the Reichstag was, in any case, not 
168 Pohl 2002, 6; Bollmeyer 2007, 60–1; Ullrich 2010, 161–5.
169 Seils 2011, 68–9.
170 Bollmeyer 2007, 67; Seils 2011, 70; Dahlmann 2014, 44.
171 Berger 1994, 41; Seils 2011, 58–9; Gerwarth & Horne 2013, 67–8.
172 Seils 2011, 21.
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increased or the chancellor made more accountable to it before or during 
the war.173 is more authoritarian, non-parliamentary political tradition is 
also reected in the fact that while in Britain the civil government retained 
supremacy over the armed forces in wartime, no clear supremacy over, 
or even parliamentary supervision of, the armed forces existed even in 
peacetime Germany. e majority of the Reichstag once called for a vote 
of no condence in the government of eobald von Bethmann Hollweg 
concerning the way in which army matters were handled, but the Chancellor 
did not resign.174 is situation diers particularly from British conceptions 
of parliamentary government. e only pre-war innovation strengthening 
the nominal importance of the German parliament was the introduction of 
the right of interpellation in 1912,175 which activated parliamentary debate 
to some extent. 
e older hypothesis of a silent process of parliamentarisation in 
German politics before the First World War has been questioned in more 
recent research. While some scholars continue to nd evidence of such 
a  development (see sections 4.2 and 6.2), others have concluded that 
support for a stronger political role for the Reichstag remained limited. e 
le-liberals supported parliamentarisation but they, too, were unwilling to 
join the pre-war demands of the Social Democrats for a reform that would 
change the constitutional monarchy into parliamentary government. For 
many German liberals, a ‘truly’ constitutional government implied that 
the emperor chose the chancellor aer taking the will of the parliament 
into consideration. A proposal to make the chancellor accountable to 
the parliament was consequently rejected by the centre and right parties. 
Illustrative of the attitudes of these parties is a tendency within not only 
the Conservatives but also the Zentrumspartei (Catholic Centre) and the 
National-Liberals to use the term Parlamentsherrscha176 (parliamentary 
supremacy) in parliamentary debates with a highly negative connotation. 
All these groups and constitutional lawyers were reluctant to reject 
constitutional monarchy (which was widely admired outside Germany) and 
wanted especially to prevent any development towards a parliamentarism 
of the abhorred French or British types. In pre-war Germany, the socialists 
were le practically alone with their demands for constitutional changes.177 
Some of them were strongly pro-parliamentary and were suspected of 
aiming at a British or French type of parliamentarism. On the other hand, 
for many socialists parliamentarism provided only the means to bring about 
reform and perhaps even revolution rather than any ultimate goal in its own 
right.178 
e attitudes of the German parties of the centre diered not only from 
those of most British Liberals but also from the stances of the Swedish 
173 Dahlmann 2014, 44.
174 Seils 2011, 73; Dahlmann 2014, 44.
175 Seils 2011, 73.
176 A very similar term was repeatedly used by the Finnish conservative Kaarle 
Rantakari in 1917. See section 3.4.5.
177 Kühne 2005, 314; Seils 2011, 72; Biefang & Schulz 2016, 69.
178 Hewitson 2001, 754, 776; Biefang & Schulz 2016, 9.
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and Finnish centre groups. In Sweden, the Liberals and Social Democrats 
cooperated consistently for years to extend surage and to parliamentarise 
government. In Finland, the Social Democrats and the majority of the 
liberals and the centrist Agrarian League turned out to be republicans in 
their constitutional views but became divided in their understandings of 
the proper extent of parliamentarism during 1917. In Germany, the Social 
Democrats and the liberals voiced some related constitutional reform 
demands from spring 1917 onwards, and some of the parties would cooperate 
in the Weimar Coalition, but not consistently or whole-heartedly in the case 
of the Catholic Centre and many right-liberals. Unifying features between 
Germany, Sweden and Finland include the consistent Social Democratic call 
for the introduction of parliamentary government (with the exception of the 
Finnish Social Democrats, who turned to anti-parliamentary discourse in 
November 1917 and to extra-parliamentary violence in January 1918) and 
the fear of the dominance of the parliament, which was very strong among 
the monarchist right in all countries. As we shall see, the links between the 
groups in each of the two ideological camps justify the claim that there 
existed two, even three, competing transnational ideological networks in 
this period. 
e outbreak of the First World War in early August 1914 was not 
a matter for the parliament in Germany: war and peace remained for the 
emperor to decide. e Reichstag never debated the reasons for Germany’s 
entry into the war; it rather debated loans needed to nance the war.179 
Nevertheless the events of August 1914 constituted a watershed in domestic 
politics: before the outbreak of the war, the German population had been 
divided by class, regional and denominational conicts, but aer the general 
mobilisation such divisions mostly went underground, and the population 
was taken over by the feeling of being of a united ‘community of the people’ 
(Volksgemeinscha, discussed in section 7.2) engaged in a common battle. 
A party truce, known as the Burgfrieden, between the political parties and 
within the Reichstag was proclaimed. While the political debate in pre-war 
Germany had been shaped to some extent by calls for constitutional reforms 
and disagreements over the proper nature of the polity, such issues were now 
pushed aside.180 e Kaiser welcomed the members of all political parties 
but the Social Democrats to his palace, symbolically convening a national 
community inspired by patriotism.181 However, the exclusion of the Social 
Democrats is evidence of the continuing ideological divisions, which would 
not be removed by the war or even by the peace and the construction of 
a new polity aer it.
Nevertheless, even the excluded socialists and those liberals who had 
been calling for the parliamentarisation of government, the introduction 
of female surage and the abolition of the three-class franchise in Prussia 
aligned themselves in August 1914 with the prevailing mood of support for 
the war eort. e Burgfrieden received concrete expression in the Reichstag 
179 Seils 2011, 138.
180 Llanque 2000, 12. 
181 Seils 2011, 132–5.
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session of 4 August 1914, when Hugo Haase, the parliamentary party leader 
of the Social Democrats and ideologically inclined to the le, declared 
the support of the Social Democrat MPs for the defence of the fatherland 
against ‘Russian despotism’.182 is ‘spirit of 1914’ caused some reformists to 
deplore the party truce, claiming that it was tantamount to ‘waging war for 
the Prussian franchise’.183 
e Reichstag approved the loans for nancing the war by an over-
whelming majority. In practice, it transferred much of its limited constitu -
tional rights to the Bundesrat, which was controlled by the princes of the 
German regional states. e Bundesrat was empowered to issue emergency 
laws that were binding on all levels of civil government. e Reichstag no 
longer held public plenaries, and a new election could not be expected as 
long as the war continued. Even though it retained its parliamentary control 
in principle, the Reichstag only met twice a year to approve war credits and 
did not veto any of the over 800 orders issued by the upper house during 
the war.184 Despite restrictions, some parliamentary publicity continued to 
be maintained by the press, and this news was also followed in countries 
such as Britain, Sweden and Finland; this maintained transnational links in 
political debate across the front lines of the war.
Civil politics tended to become brushed aside in the German wartime 
system. Not even the chancellor had much say concerning the conduct of 
the war as political power was to a great extent taken out of the hands of 
the civil government and transferred to the General Headquarters. e 
leaders of the army, in late 1916 Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendor, 
exclusively coordinated the military eort. However, there did emerge some 
pressure for the government to take over the command of the military in 
1916. Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg was more prepared than the General 
Headquarters to negotiate with the Entente, but he was unable to prevent 
the launching of total submarine warfare in early January 1917 – a measure 
that was predicted to provoke the United States into joining the war.185 
Outside Germany, such military leadership would be interpreted either 
as a demonstration of the admirable strength of the Prussian system or as 
a further aspect of its boundless militarism.
As a result of the deliberate transition of power to other political, or 
rather military, institutions, the Reichstag was a peripheral arena during the 
rst half of the war. However, its importance began to rise as a result of 
two factors: Firstly, the strengthening involvement of the German state in 
social policies called for legislation to be passed by the Reichstag. Secondly, 
the visibility of the Reichstag in the public sphere continued to increase,186 
which gave the impression that the institution was nevertheless actively 
involved in the political process. Its formal budgetary power was retained. 
In December 1916, the originally planned slogan Dem deutschen Volke (To 
182 See Huber (ed.) 1990, 138. Becker 2014, 27; Dahlmann 2014, 45.
183 Wehler 2003, 45. 
184 Chickering 2004, 34; Dahlmann 2014, 45.
185 Becker 2014, 27; Leonhard 2014, 207.
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the German People) was added to the pediment of the Reichstag building.187 
All these suggested to the public that the Reichstag really mattered.
Nor was the constitutional debate at a complete standstill. Already in 
autumn 1914, the le had begun to call for a constitutional reform that 
would increase governmental responsibility and improve the representation 
of the people. Eduard David of the SPD then suggested that the working 
class deserved reforms as compensation for its wholehearted support for 
the war eort188 – a point heard at some stage in most European combatant 
countries. Some Social Democrats protested outspokenly from June 1915 
onwards: Eduard Bernstein, Hugo Haase and Karl Kautsky questioned the 
war goals of the government as irreconcilable with a defensive war. Little 
by little this peace opposition within the Social Democrats grew from 15 
to 40 per cent of the parliamentary group. Some, like Georg Ledebour, also 
sympathised with the radical Zimmerwald International, which convened 
in Switzerland in September 1915. In this meeting of radicals, V. I. Lenin 
advocated turning the inter-state war into an international revolution and 
civil war for the rights of the oppressed.189 He did not initially nd many 
supporters, but these began to emerge in all the countries studied here 
during the years that followed.
Discursively, the political role of the people was being activated in 
Germany. Reinhart Koselleck has pointed at how Volk tended by 1918 to 
become an agreeable and uniting concept for all parties independently 
of their otherwise conicting ideologies reected by concepts such as 
‘fatherland’ and ‘patriotism’, ‘nation’ and ‘democracy’ or ‘social democracy’, 
‘revolutionary masses’ and ‘international’.190 According to Heiko Bollmeyer, 
Volk continued to have specic connotations in Reichstag debates during 
the war. It was not so much connected with the term ‘nation’, which for 
many Germans had a foreign, French, connotation. e MPs rather spoke 
about ‘the German people’ (das deutsches Volk) in the sense of a national 
fellowship or collective community united by a common language and 
cultural ties.191 In the German (and likewise the Swedish and Finnish) 
debates on the constitution, das Volk (and correspondingly folket and kansa 
respectively) was a dominant term. Speakers of all political groups referred 
to das Volk to legitimise their goals or delegitimise political demands 
made by other politicians. Many speakers also liked to refer to ‘our people’ 
(unseres Volk).192 While this concentration on the unity of the political and 
the ethnic, linguistic and cultural community may appear as a specically 
German phenomenon when compared with French and British slightly more 
pluralistic concepts of the nation and the people, it does nd resemblances 
in other northern European states, including Sweden and Finland. And in 
the wartime political discourse, even some British references to a unied 
people were not so dierent from it.
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As long as the German political parties believed in victory and approved 
the war nances, emphasising the unity of das Volk, Chancellor Bethmann 
Hollweg and the General Sta had nothing to fear from the Reichstag. 
However, this wartime consensus was fragile and deteriorated from 1916 
onwards as a result of the continuing unsuccessful war eort. By the end of 
that year, a fundamental conict between the parliament and the government 
was emerging. ere were general strikes in Berlin, Bremen and Stuttgart 
aer Karl Liebknecht, a radical socialist leader, had been convicted and sent 
to prison in June 1916. Continuous food shortages also led to a weakening 
ghting spirit throughout the population.193 
With the people’s motivation for waging the war apparently waning, the 
relationship between the Reichstag and the government also became more 
confrontational as liberals and Social Democrats started to cooperate in 
challenging the executive power. In October 1916, they demanded more 
say in foreign policy decision-making. Hans Sivkovich of the Progressivists 
asked whether foreign policy should continue to be conducted in secret 
cabinet meetings or instead controlled by the elected representatives.194 e 
Main Committee (Hauptausschuss) of the Reichstag was then made into 
a decreased plenum, which was supposed to control the running of the war.195 
e Social Democrats started to openly express their desire for a transition 
to a parliamentary system based on universal surage.196 Noteworthy are 
the simultaneity of the activation of the constitutional debate in Britain 
and Germany and the initiation of their reform processes well before the 
external impulses created by the Russian Revolution and the American 
entry into the war. Further national and transnationally linked disputes 
would follow during the rst half of 1917. In the sections on Germany they 
will be analysed in a comparative context, Germany being contrasted with 
not only Britain but also Sweden and Finland.
2.3  Prolonged disputes on surage and parliamentary government  
 in Sweden
e joint interest of the Social Democratic Labour Party (SAP) and the 
Liberals in demands for universal surage, the parliamentarisation of 
government and the redenition of the relationship between the two 
chambers of the parliament was characteristic of early twentieth-century 
Swedish domestic politics. In all these questions they had e Right 
(Högern) as their common opponent.197 e Social Democratic Labour Party, 
established in 1889 and closely linked to the trade unions, had retained its 
original socialist programme, but in practice it turned under the leadership 
of Hjalmar Branting, the rst MP of the party, towards reformist, revisionist, 
193 Seils 2011, 189.
194 Bollmeyer 2007, 93–4.
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non-revolutionary and parliamentary strategies supportive of the state. In 
this respect, it resembled its German and even its British counterparts rather 
than its Finnish sister party. e party enjoyed growing support among 
workers and less a
uent people more generally. It campaigned especially 
for universal surage to advance reforms and was ready to cooperate with 
reformist bourgeois parties for that purpose.198 From the 1890s onwards the 
Social Democrats began to increasingly aim at democracy in a representative 
form. Yet Jussi Kurunmäki and Anna Friberg have shown that only the First 
World War led to a breakthrough of the rhetoric of democracy in the Swedish 
parliament,199 which suggests dependence on transnational inuences from 
Germany and the Entente also in this respect.   
e Swedish Liberals, ready to cooperate with the Social Democrats 
despite the fact that the parties competed for some of the electorate, found 
most of their supporters among the middle class, the free churches, the 
temperance movement and much of the urban press. e Right, supported 
by the traditional elite – much like the British Conservatives, the Prussian 
right and the Finnish Party and Swedish Peoples’ Party in Finland combined 
 – consistently opposed extensions of surage as irreconcilable with the 
established political system and its party interests. It has been argued, 
however, that their leader Arvid Lindman would prevent more conservative 
forces within the party from continuing to block reforms, the impetus 
for which gained speed in Sweden, too, in the immediate aermath of 
the First World War – though, as we shall see, this was to a greater extent 
than generally recognised due to external factors related to the German 
defeat in the war. Because e Right had previously been ready to make 
only very limited concessions on the extension of surage, the Social 
Democrats had twice used a general strike to advance reform. e failure 
of these attempts and the cooperative and parliamentary line of the Social 
Democratic leaders, not unlike that of their counterparts in Germany, led 
to a division of the Swedish labour movement into moderates and radicals, 
the more leist socialists being increasingly ready for a revolution to achieve 
immediate democratisation and transition to a republican constitution. 
e war, too, strengthened the division into the le and the right within 
the Swedish Social Democrats. Zeth Höglund of the leists attended the 
Zimmerwald conference in 1915, and the radicals socialised with Russian 
revolutionaries staying in Stockholm, including the famous Alexandra 
Kollontai, who later had close contacts with Finnish radical socialists as 
well. e le-socialist press turned to unashamedly revolutionary, even 
Bolshevik, language at times, emphasising the class struggle and predicting 
the outbreak of a proletarian revolution.200 In this respect, far-le discourse 
in Sweden resembled that of mainstream Social Democracy in Finland. 
At the same time, according to Aleksander Kan, not only the radicals but 
198 Hentilä 1979, 303–6; Molin 1992, xviii.
199 Kurunmäki 2008; Friberg 2012, 82–3.
200 Birgersson, Hadenius, Molin & Wieslander 1984, 87–9; Molin 1992, xxi; Kan 
1999b, 97; Hadenius 2008, 26–8, 30–3, 35. For the major arguments of the debate 
on universal surage during the preceding twenty years, see Möller 2007, 51–61.
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also the moderate Swedish Majority Social Democrats remained better 
connected with Russian socialists than any other socialists outside Russia 
– including the Finnish socialists. ey were becoming increasingly divided 
ideologically, with the radical Swedish far-le supporting the Bolsheviks 
and the Finnish Reds, the mainstream Swedish party associating itself with 
the opponents of such radical groups.201 
Much as in Finland, where universal surage had been implemented in 
1906 but social reforms mostly postponed, revolutionary radicalism arose 
among the Swedish far le as a reaction to reform proposals being repeatedly 
voted down by the parliament and as a result of inspiration from German 
and Russian revolutionary radicalism.202 e degree of radicalisation and 
ideological confrontation in parliamentary debate remained lower in 
Sweden than in Finland, however. Ever since 1911, the Majority Social 
Democrats had successfully cooperated with reformist bourgeois forces to 
advance their goals, distancing themselves from Kautskyist doctrines other 
than the expectation that the revolution would arrive once the time was 
ripe.203 eir language was socialist, but moderately so.
In 1909, Arvid Lindman’s conservative government had given in to 
demands for a limited surage reform that introduced universal male 
surage and proportional representation for the lower chamber but kept 
the nomination of the upper chamber by regional assemblies elected 
through regulated surage with forty categories of voters. e point of the 
reformist conservatives had been to retain the political inuence of the 
conservatives by conserving this electoral system and the old constitution, 
although some hardliners had been ready for extra-parliamentary action to 
oppose compromises,204 rather as in Britain at that time. e Liberals, who 
had oen regarded the British parliamentary system as their model, had 
failed to carry out such a reform even though they had planned to introduce 
universal surage and cut the power of the upper chamber.205 e rightist 
leaders, though they opposed democratic surage and admired the political 
system of Williamite Germany, possibly already understood in 1909 that 
universal surage would need to be introduced sooner or later. However, 
as the analysis that follows will show, their anti-reformist discourse in the 
parliament continued almost unchanged until late 1918. In the established 
system of surage based on taxation, the number of the enfranchised was 
growing automatically thanks to increased incomes among large sectors 
of the population and high ination – a point oen made by conservative 
circles. Aware of the long-term risks of the exclusion of the working class 
from politics, the leaders of e Right have been viewed as having looked 
for ways to abolish limitations on surage in a controlled way that would 
benet their party, just as in Britain. is would explain their readiness 
for proportional representation: it would hinder the rise of radicalism. 
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Universal surage had applied to men over 24 in the election for the 
Second Chamber since 1909, though legislation continued to limit the right 
to vote in many ways. Dierent rules for the First Chamber ensured the 
continuity of the dominance of the conservatives there, e Right gaining 
60 per cent of seats as opposed to only 25 per cent in the Second Chamber, 
the composition of which already reected the election results reasonably 
well and guaranteed the le (including the Liberals in the case of Sweden) 
a  majority there. A modest step towards parliamentarism had also been 
taken before the war when a Liberal government headed by Karl Staa had 
been nominated against the express wishes of King Gustaf V, an obdurate 
critic of parliamentarism.206
e reform of 1909 had obviously been a partial one, and confrontations 
between the le and right over electoral reform continued until the outbreak 
of the war. e monarchy, army and administration all felt themselves 
threatened by the demands of the le, very much as in Germany. As the 
international situation became tenser, electoral reforms appeared less 
timely, with the bourgeois parties focusing on questions of defence. In 
February 1914, the King addressed a peasant demonstration in a speech 
authored by rightist army ocers and urged the government to strengthen 
the army, thereby challenging the policy of the current ministry. is extra-
parliamentary action provoked a demonstration by the workers, calling for 
‘democratic reforms’ so that the will of the Swedish people would be realised.207 
Hjalmar Branting dened democracy in this context (anachronistically) as 
the central element of the Swedish tradition of representative government, 
which suggests a connection to national historiographical debates and 
not merely to wartime transnational ones. Disagreement on defence 
spending developed into a constitutional conict on parliamentarism 
when the le questioned the legitimacy of the monarchical intervention. 
is confrontation further led to the resignation of Staa ’s ministry,208 
a demonstration of the continuing force of non-parliamentary practices. 
An extraordinary election of the First Chamber was held in March 
1914 to settle the dispute, which led to the parties confronting each other 
on constitutional issues and defence spending. e Right won seats, 
but the Social Democrats also made progress despite some intra-party 
disagreement on parliamentary cooperation with the bourgeoisie. e 
election of the Second Chamber in September 1914, when much of Europe 
was already at war, conrmed this result, but no government with a clear 
parliamentary majority was nominated. Sweden was governed until 1917 by 
Hjalmar Hammarskjöld’s rightist ministry, which consisted of civil servants 
and lacked party backing, e Right being unwilling to get more directly 
engaged in governing the country, and the le not wishing to support an 
openly rightist government. During the rst three years of the world war, 
Sweden thus continued to be governed in traditional ways, emphasising 
the role of the monarch and keeping delicate matters secret, in the spirit of 
206 Molin 1992, xx; Möller 2007, 54–5, 57, 59, 63–4, 72; Hadenius 2008, 31, 34.
207 von Sydow 1997, 108; Möller 2007, 65; Hadenius 2008, 35–7.
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61
2.3 Prolonged disputes on suffrage and parliamentary government in Sweden
the Instrument of Government of 1809 and not unlike the contemporary 
German constitutional monarchy. As Rudolf Kjellén, a political scientist and 
active Rightist parliamentarian put it, ‘the true will of the people’ was best 
interpreted by an autocratic ruler who remained in close symbiosis with 
his people. Aer the election of autumn 1917, however, the king would be 
forced to nominate a government supported by a parliamentary majority, 
which meant the rejection of the monarchical interpretation of the old 
constitution in favour of the parliamentarisation of government.209 
Despite the seeming consensus within the Swedish political elite during 
the war, there were disagreements on foreign policy, especially aer 1916, 
when a quick German victory appeared increasingly unlikely. e Prime 
Minister and the King were known to sympathise with German policies, 
and Rightist intellectuals such as Carl Hallendorf, Karl Hildebrand, 
Rudolf Kjellén and many others insisted that Sweden should support the 
Germanic cultural battle against the Slavic peoples in the east and reject 
American, British and French propaganda concerning democratisation 
and parliamentarism. e increasingly Anglophile Social Democrats and 
Liberals, by contrast, challenged the pro-German trade policies of the 
Swedish ministry, denounced the possibility of Sweden allying itself with 
Germany and had nothing against exploring the possibilities oered by the 
democratic and parliamentary ideals of the West, seeing them as analogical 
with native traditions of representation.210 e constitutional division of the 
warring parties would consequently have a major transnational impact in 
Sweden towards the end of the war, as we shall see.
e constitutional debates of the 1910s nominally concerned inter-
pretations of the Instrument of Government of 1809 and the extent of the 
royal prerogative. Social changes seemed to have undermined much of the 
basis of this constitution. However, republican views were mainly limited to 
the Social Democrats, who had made the abolition of the monarchy a party 
goal in 1911. Radicals such as Carl Lindhagen had put forward a motion for 
a republican constitution in 1912 and 1914, but the party leader Hjalmar 
Branting opposed such changes as long as the king did not openly violate the 
spirit of the constitution: the monarchy would die out anyway once universal 
surage was achieved.211 e Social Democratic Party could not agree on the 
concept of democracy either: the majority considered universal surage, not 
a revolution, the best way to achieve democracy, which led in practice to the 
exclusion of the revolutionaries from the party. In spring 1917, leist Social 
Democrats, inspired further by the ongoing Russian Revolution, broke away 
209 von Sydow 1997, 113–15; Möller 2007, 67; Hadenius 2008, 38–9, 41.
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from the mainstream Social Democrats,212 an action that in hindsight can be 
seen as facilitating evolutionary political development in Sweden.
e Swedish constitution, though in principle still based on the Instrument 
of Government of 1809, had experienced major transformations during 
the two rst decades of the twentieth-century. In principle, the monarch 
alone continued to make decisions on state aairs. In practice, however, 
monarchical inuence had varied depending on the ruler. Developments 
towards parliamentarism had been consistently opposed by the monarchs, 
and hence Sweden was still neither a democracy nor a parliamentary 
government at the beginning of 1917. e government had nevertheless 
become more dependent on the parliament. It had been united by party 
political confrontations between the Liberals and e Right as well as by 
friction between the Liberals and the King. At the same time, the prevailing 
electoral and parliamentary system made reforms hard to carry out as this 
would have required the agreement of both chambers. In practice, the First 
Chamber, with its more united conservative opinion, continued to exert its 
dominance with regard to reform issues. But the growth of the working class 
was challenging the constitution as the number of voters grew as a result 
of the tax limits for surage remaining unchanged despite increases in 
incomes. In 1907–9, universal surage for men had been introduced in the 
election of the Second Chamber, while the election of the First Chamber had 
been reformed to the extent that no more than forty votes could henceforth 
be awarded to a single voter. Proportional representation had also been 
adopted in all elections. Despite such minor reforms, to contemporary 
leists, the Swedish system appeared old-fashioned, resembling that of 
Prussia, and in need of an immediate revision.213 e fate of such a reform 
would turn out to be very dependent on the course of international aairs 
– and events in at least Russia, Germany and Finland as well. In the sections 
on Sweden we shall explore the complexities of the reform debates in 
wartime comparative and transnational contexts.
2.4  Finland – a grand duchy of the Russian Empire with 
 exceptionally broad surage but no parliamentary government 
e Finnish transition to more democratic and parliamentary government 
is of particular interest in an international comparison in that the country 
pioneered universal surage for both men and women in Europe. In 
constitutional debates elsewhere, Finland consequently provided either 
encouraging or warning examples with regard to extended surage. However, 
in 1917 the country failed in the aermath of the Russian Revolution, 
which oered it a chance for independence, to move peacefully over to 
parliamentary democracy and experienced instead the ercest disputes 
on the meanings of democracy and parliamentarism. A parliamentary 
212 Möller 2007, 68–70.
213 Nyman 1965, 8–10, 18–23; Nyman 1966, 71, 74–5; Sveriges konstitutionella 
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democracy only emerged gradually aer a civil war and a major turn in 
international aairs caused by the end of the First World War and the defeat 
of Germany.
In a radical parliamentary and electoral reform introduced in the context 
of the First Russian Revolution of 1905 – and dependent on the preceding 
Russian defeat in the Russo-Japanese War – the Finnish representative 
institution had suddenly turned from an archaic four-estate diet into 
a  modern unicameral parliament, the Eduskunta. is new parliament 
was evidently inspired by the model of the Norwegian Stortinget.214 It was 
also supported by a general endeavour, backed by Western intellectuals, to 
demonstrate the progressive potential of Finland to defend its special status 
within the Russian Empire. Universal surage including both men and 
women in elections for the Eduskunta (unlike those for the Imperial Duma, 
in which the Finnish representatives never sat) was introduced, one goal of 
female surage being simply to double the size of a small nation in the sea of 
peoples that made up the Russian Empire. Aer rapid political mobilisation, 
the rst 19 female MPs in the history of the world were elected side by side 
with 181 men in the rst election in 1907. e most surprising feature of the 
election was, however, the sudden rise of the Social Democrats to become 
the largest socialist group in any parliament with their 80 seats.
By 1917 the country already had 10 years of experience of the new 
unicameral parliament, which had been elected with great expectations for 
reform but had, under renewed Russian restrictions on Finnish autonomy, 
failed to deliver what many voters were hoping for. Many of the leading 
politicians in 1917 had been members of the Parliamentary Reform 
Committee in 1906. e conservative Swedish People’s Party had been 
represented by Emil Schybergson and R. A. Wrede, the conservative but 
social reformist Finnish Party by J. K. Paasikivi, the liberal Young Finns 
by E.  N. Setälä, K. J. Ståhlberg and Santeri Alkio (now the leader of the 
Agrarians) and the Social Democrats by Yrjö Sirola and Edvard Valpas. e 
Social Democrats took little part in the Reform Committee owing to their 
sceptical attitude towards the upper classes, who, they believed, just wanted 
to dilute democracy. ey had spoken for a national constituent assembly 
and striven for a political system dominated by the parliament – both of 
these goals were central among the Social Democrats’ demands in 1917 as 
well. Edvard Valpas had begun to build connections with the Russian Social 
Democrats, whose revolutionary ideas and potential takeover in Russia 
encouraged reformist demands and feelings of dependence on Russian 
developments in Finland, but whose anarchism was foreign to most Finnish 
socialists who were conscious of dierences between Russian and Finnish 
circumstances. On the Finnish non-socialist side, the liberals had already 
been divided in connection with the parliamentary reform into advocates 
of far-reaching parliamentary democracy (Ståhlberg and Alkio), on the 
one hand, and supporters of the traditional dualism of government (Setälä) 
on the other.215 In a sense, the constitutional confrontations of 1917–19 
214 Mylly 2006, 124, 130–2; Jyränki 2006, 22, 24.
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had been present since at least 1906 and were only reactivated by the new 
Russian Revolution.
In connection with the rst parliamentary election of 1907, both the 
Social Democrats and Agrarians (radically anti-elitist by international 
standards) had challenged the traditional elite by appealing to popular 
antagonism towards the upper classes. is strategy provoked an interest 
in politics among lower-class voters, and it radicalised expressions of 
discontent,216 which would lead to the corresponding radicalisation of 
political discourse. e lower classes had entered the Finnish parliament to 
an extent not seen in the other countries of comparison: their spokesmen 
immediately won nearly half of the seats in the Eduskunta. While in the 
old Estates, only ten per cent of the members, mainly those of the Peasant 
Estate, had had little or no or education, this group was extended to nearly 
half of the new MPs. is would not be quite so signicant as feared by the 
old elite given that the powers of the parliament remained strictly curtailed: 
the Russians never recognised any sovereignty of the Finnish parliament; 
new legislation could only be adopted if it was promulgated by the Tsar as 
the Grand Duke of Finland; the parliament could be dissolved by the Tsar at 
any time; strong provisions for minority protection in constitutional issues 
made postponements easy; no ministerial responsibility to the parliament 
was established; and much of the elite remained critical of a quarrelling and 
class-based parliament. As a result of its failure to implement reforms, the 
legitimacy of the Eduskunta deteriorated rapidly in the eyes of the public, 
and voting rates declined. e Eduskunta served rather as a forum for free 
debate on national aairs,217 a lot like the Reichstag in Germany. Since no 
ministry could be formed by the parliamentarians, they did not see any 
reason for compromise, and this led to heated ideological confrontations 
in parliamentary debates, which in turn were one-sidedly reported and 
commented on in the dierent party newspapers. 
e rst sessions of the Eduskunta already saw verbally violent plenary 
debates, in which party conicts were brought into the open. No working 
parliamentary majority could be formed. e political weakness of the 
parliament was embodied in the unlimited power of the tsar to dissolve it, 
and repeated elections diminished the initial trust in the parliament as an 
organ that represented the people. Major dierences in understandings of the 
aims and methods of parliamentary work also remained evident. e Social 
Democrats rejected ‘bourgeois’ and elitist conventions of parliamentary 
speaking and behaviour as limiting their freedom of action. ey continued 
to agitate using methods they liked and addressing the reading public rather 
than the chamber, many of the MPs being editors themselves. Edvard Valpas, 
for instance, pointed to August Bebel of the German Social Democrats as 
his model because of the latter’s readiness to attack the values of bourgeois 
society.218 Valpas, who was in principle in favour of parliamentary methods, 
216 Mylly 2006, 259.
217 Haapala 1995, 231; Jyränki 2006, 21, 24; Tikka & Karonen 2014, 229–30.
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recommended the use of interjections during debates, something he 
discovered in the records of foreign parliaments.219 Noteworthy here are 
this transnational adoption of procedural practices by social democratic 
parliamentarians and shared understandings of the parliament as a means 
of advancing reform or revolution rather than as a goal itself.
Finland remained part of the Russian Empire until the Bolshevik 
Revolution of late 1917. e eighteenth-century Swedish constitutional 
tradition in its authoritarian Gustavian form was still observed in Finland, 
and this, together with the measures of the Russian administration, kept 
the political inuence of the parliament within strict bounds. e pre-war 
international tensions led to the reinforcement of Russian pan-imperial 
policies, including a suspension of the Swedish constitution of Finland, 
which from the Finnish point of view represented a form of Russication. 
Despite both passive and active opposition to Russian limitations on Finnish 
autonomy, only a few activists strove for full independence before late 1917. 
Finland had, aer all, beneted from a long peace, had access to Russian 
markets, experienced rapid progress in the development of Finnish-language 
culture as a counterbalance to the Swedish heritage, was not required to 
send soldiers to the Russian army, and until 1917 actually proted from the 
First World War in economic terms. 
Despite its seemingly democratic parliament, Finland remained an 
essentially monarchical polity, as it had been under Sweden since medieval 
times; it cannot really be said to have been ‘the spearhead of state democracy 
in Europe’ merely on the basis of women’s surage.220 It was only with the 
Russication measures imposed since 1899 that anti-monarchical and 
republican ideas had been awakened in some circles. More generally, 
republican and democratic ideals only became relevant as a consequence 
of the fall of the Romanovs,221 and these could hence be regarded by the 
right as Russian or socialist imports. Among all the political groups, Finnish 
political discourse remained dependent on transnational inuences, the 
monarchists nding a model in the Prussian and Swedish constitutional 
monarchies, the socialists in Russian and German Social Democrats and the 
liberals from dierent directions. 
e Russication measures had strengthened previously established 
feelings of the separateness of Finland from Russia. e special status of the 
country was based on the inherited Swedish constitutional, legal, political 
and cultural tradition, actively defended by all political groups but most 
openly by Swedish-speaking constitutionalists, who were ready for passive 
resistance to Russication, and more cautiously by the conservative Finnish 
Party, which preferred appeasement.222 While for the Svecomans (members 
of a nationalist movement of Swedish-speakers in Finland) connections 
with Sweden were important in order to maintain the Scandinavian cultural 
heritage as a counterweight to the Russian administrative practices, the Old 
219 Pekonen 2014, 222–3.
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Finns (the party of the Fennomans, a group that represented a corresponding 
Finnish nationalist ideology) tended to see the union with Russia as a means 
to advance Finnish-speaking culture in relation to Swedish language and 
culture.223 eir ideological inspiration originated from German national 
romanticism rather than from Sweden. At the same time, the Fennomans 
were sceptical about the application of foreign models to Finland as they 
believed that the country should rather endeavour to reach a higher cultural 
level on its own. e liberal Young Finns, by contrast, preferred to look to 
other European countries (including France and Britain) to nd instances of 
democratic reform.224 What united the Old Finns and the Young Finns was 
an emphasis on procedure as an essential element of parliamentary politics, 
especially under universal surage.225 e parliament should be seen as an 
honourable institution based on rules in the spirit of the Swedish tradition 
of constitutionalism and legalism. e Finnish-speaking bourgeoisie shared 
with the Swedish People’s Party an understanding of the parliament as a 
forum where the common good and traditions of the nation could be 
discussed and defended226 and where the observance of rules of procedure 
supported the legitimacy of policy-making. is legalistic attitude, together 
with the idealisation of Germany as an advanced nation, explains to a great 
extent the formation of a united bourgeois front in 1917 despite social 
dierences and disagreements on language policies.
As for the Social Democrats, their ideological inspiration originated 
likewise from German-speaking countries. In principle, they prioritised 
parliamentary politics in the spirit of ‘Western’ social democracy, which 
distinguished them initially from the Russian revolutionaries.227 Even 
though the party manifesto of 1903 emphasised the need of the proletariat to 
be aware of class contrasts, to avoid cooperation with bourgeois parties and 
to ght internationally against capitalism,228 it was moderate in comparison 
with the programme of the Austrian Social Democrats, approved by Karl 
Kautsky, a leading German theorist of the socialist movement. According to 
Kautsky, the proletariat should try to take over political power by winning 
a parliamentary majority and then declare a socialist revolution aiming 
at democracy.229 e manifesto of the Finnish Social Democrats made no 
mention of democracy and implied the sovereignty of the people only by 
emphasising popular representation through the parliament. It rather 
viewed the workers as the proper rulers.230 
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According to the Kautskyist deterministic conception of history, the 
transition to socialism would be unavoidable. While waiting for this 
transition, the Social Democrats could participate in parliamentary work 
– despite the obvious impotence of the Finnish representative institution 
– provided that they emphasised continuing the class struggle, used the 
parliament as a forum for agitation and maintained a distance from the 
bourgeois parties. At the same time, the party was creating a class-conscious 
mass movement, and the parliamentary election of 1916 was productive 
in this respect as the number of socialist MPs rose from 80 to 103 out of 
200. Unlike most Social Democratic parties, Bernsteinian revisionism or 
‘minister-socialism’ had no place in this party, which did not hesitate to 
proclaim militant class hatred to win votes. A willingness to engage in extra-
parliamentary activities was also present: the Red Guards (a paramilitary 
force that later constituted the Red army in the Finnish Civil War) had 
already become active in some localities in the aermath of the rst Russian 
Revolution,231 so it was nothing new in 1917. 
At rst, for Finnish socialists revolution was a concept that mainly 
concerned a new revolution in Russia, although aer 1905 Otto Wille 
Kuusinen could already envision revolutionary developments in Finland, 
too, so that ‘the rule by the people in the state’ would be realised. In 1911, 
the party agreed on the goal of seizing political power from the bourgeoisie 
and, together with the workers of the other capitalist countries, realising 
‘the revolutionary goal of social democracy to end all class power and 
exploitation’.232 is programme was to be applied in the constitutional 
confrontations of 1917, inspired by the radicalising revolutionary discourses 
of the time. 
e reform demands of the party were radical, in response to grass-
roots activism. Jari Ehrnrooth, who has analysed the discursive struggles 
within the pre-war Social Democratic movement, has challenged previous 
interpretations of the history of the Finnish labour movement which fail 
to explain why the Social Democrats rejected their parliamentary strategy 
in favour of violence against a parliamentary majority.233 e Kautskyist 
concept of revolution as unavoidable when the time was ripe may have 
been dominant in printed texts and in agitator training, but Ehrnrooth has 
shown that at the micro-level such orthodox Marxism tended to be rejected, 
under the pressure of a people who wished to hear more radical talk. e 
grass-roots level was not so interested in the parliament as a medium of 
revolutionary reform, nor did it see anything procedurally or historically 
wrong in extra-parliamentary activism as a reaction to experienced or 
imagined injustices.234 In the countryside, the revolution was expected to 
come from Russia and to be realised in Finland through a general strike. 
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Such views may have been rejected by the party leaders and many members 
of the parliamentary group,235 but they nevertheless inuenced them in the 
revolutionary atmosphere of 1917. Discourses of class hatred and revenge 
arising from everyday experiences and the obvious ineciency of the 
parliament as an institution of reform ourished.236 ey were supported 
by the notion of the Finnish bourgeoisie cooperating with the tsarist 
government to stop socialism, by wartime contacts to Russian revolutionary 
workers and soldiers237 and also by the party press which (actually in the 
case of all parties) translated Russian revolutionary speeches word for word. 
e radicalisation of the Social Democratic parliamentary discourse in 1917 
was evidently inuenced by micro-level policy discourses that were familiar 
to the party elite and were shared and accelerated rather than conned by 
them in the revolutionary atmosphere of that year, with further inspiration 
coming from the Russian Bolshevik revolutionaries.238 Revolutionary 
experiences made the MPs talk in ways that sounded to their non-socialist 
audiences as Bolshevism.
Confrontations with the bourgeois parties over constitutional issues also 
had a long history. Kautskyist ideas included parliamentary sovereignty, the 
principle of majority rule, the notion of the representatives being bound 
to the mass of the people and the party as delegates and an understanding 
of universal surage as the means to reform society. e primary duty 
of every Social Democratic MP was thus to advance the interests of the 
working class rather than some unspecic common good, and certainly 
not bourgeois interests. e parliament was a site in which the will of the 
majority of the people was realised by voting: it ‘put power in the hands of 
the people’. When the pace of reform proved modest as a result of the lack 
of parliamentary government, the use of minority provisions and the upper-
chamber-like Grand Committee as an ‘organ of obstruction’ employed 
by the non-socialist parties and the imperial veto, the Social Democrats 
became increasingly critical of parliament as an institution of betrayal. ey 
tended to conclude that universal surage with its limitations and majority 
rule were insucient in advancing the cause of the workers in comparison 
with the revolutionary activities of 1905–6. Revisionist and parliamentary 
ideas became overshadowed by those of the class struggle and class hatred, 
particularly as Kautsky had also provided a description of a crisis of 
parliamentarism that might lead to a revolution. Parliamentary deliberation 
was of value only insofar as it advanced the cause of the majority of the 
people, which for the Social Democrats was constituted by the workers or the 
proletariat.239 Parliamentary procedure, too, was of secondary importance 
with regard to the realisation of reforms called for by the majority of the 
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people.240 According to Otto Wille Kuusinen, it had been formulated by 
the bourgeoisie in ways that violated democracy.241 Indeed, one conclusion 
was that the entire Finnish government was undemocratic and it was hence 
questionable to participate in such a regime at all.242 
In transnational socialist debates, the Finnish Social Democrats were 
relatively isolated,243 and they tended to become increasingly so during 
the First World War. e Finns openly rejected revisionism of the type 
represented by Hjalmar Branting as the underestimation of class boundaries 
and hence the creation of links with Scandinavian socialists. e German 
revisionist thinkers did not nd much support in the Finnish party, 
either. On the other hand, nor were the anarchical methods used by the 
Russian revolutionaries to ght the ‘backward’ conditions in that country 
regarded as applicable to Finland, and aer 1907 distance to the Russian 
party was maintained. e Russian socialists, for their part, had diculties 
in understanding the parliamentary dimension of the Finnish party, while 
the notion of the separate statehood of Finland united the parties. Contacts 
with Russian socialists were based mainly on the activities of a few Finnish 
Bolsheviks and on personal encounters with revolutionaries in Petrograd 
and Finland. ese activities included helping V. I. Lenin to hide in 
lodgings around Helsinki and to travel through Finland in disguise. Russian 
revolutionaries could meet and scheme freely in Finland – including the 
rst meeting of Lenin and Stalin in Tampere in 1905 – which enabled the 
formation of links between individual socialists but did not necessarily 
increase the Finnish socialists’ understanding of Bolshevik tenets and 
dierences between Russian socialists: they took Lenin as a social democrat 
among others. ey also had limited contacts with the international wartime 
activities of German and Scandinavian Social Democrats and remained 
badly informed about the divisions that the war had caused among socialists 
in various countries. ey learned about the Zimmerwald movement 
– constituted by the pacist and leist minorities of socialist parties – via 
Swedish leist Social Democrats who had contacts with Swedish-speaking 
socialists in Finland and through the Bolsheviks. Edvard Valpas (the editor-
in-chief of the party organ Työmies, the largest socialist newspaper in the 
world with up to 88,000 subscribers) read German and French socialist 
papers, while K. H. Wiik visited German and Swedish Social Democrats 
in 1915 and together with Yrjö Sirola travelled in May 1917 to Stockholm, 
where they met Friedrich Ebert and Eduard David of the Swedish SPD in 
an attempt to win support for Finnish self-determination, albeit with little 
success. Only the far le seemed to understand them. Hjalmar Branting 
criticised the Finns for their indierence to the international revolution and 
the war and their excessive concentration on national issues. Karl Kautsky, 
Zimmerwald socialists and even the far le in Sweden were annoyed about 
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the Finnish Social Democrats prioritising the sovereignty of the Finnish 
parliament over the internationalist socialist cause.244 
It has been suggested that the Finnish socialists became increasingly 
Kautskyist, emphasising the class struggle and revolution.245 In the lack of 
support from the German or Swedish socialists, who were mostly revisionist, 
the Finnish socialists, supported by the native micro-level radical tradition 
and dominant revolutionary discourses of the Russian type, were rather 
approaching the Russian Bolsheviks in their stances.246 Kautsky would in 
fact soon be criticising Lenin for deviating from the original teachings of 
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels with his application of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat, while Lenin considered Kautsky a traitor. Kautsky defended 
non-militant methods, including democracy as a means of building socialism 
and parliament freely chosen by the people as a means of controlling the 
government.247 
In Finland, the sudden transnational revolutionary tide of democracy 
and republicanism of spring 1917 had a major eect on the political debate. 
It was felt particularly strongly because of the absolute majority which the 
Social Democratic Party had won in the election of 1916, aer an anti-
revisionist campaign in which the bourgeoisie had been attacked both for 
their alleged anti-reformism and for economic speculation that had caused 
food shortages.248 e rhetoric of class hatred had been heard previously 
and was being intensied before Finland actually experienced any serious 
shortages. Contrasts between the malicious rich and the oppressed poor 
had even been emphasised in a children’s book,249 and thus such agitation 
fell on fertile soil. e existence of a discourse of class hatred made it easy 
to exaggerate physical hardships and overinterpret the malicious intentions 
of the political enemy, which made a dierence in comparison with other 
countries experiencing food shortages. e debates in the Eduskunta, too, 
had been characterised by one-sided declarations about the supposed good 
of the people, deep divisions between political parties and an unwillingness 
to compromise.250 Each party could carry on preaching its own truth with 
little risk of being held responsible as a power-holder, since there was no 
parliamentary government. Once responsibility was given to the parties 
in spring 1917, the practices and rhetoric of the impotent parliament were 
244 Upton 1970, 9–12; Kirby 1974, 65–6, 75, 77–9; Soikkanen 1975, 148, 152, 164–8, 
191, 215–16; Kirby 1976, 99–100; Kirby 1986a, 149–50; Kirby 1986b, 142–3, 165; 
Polvinen 1987, vol. 1, 116; Ketola 1987, 13–14, 17, 26, 44, 82, 124–8; Kujala 1989, 
316–17; Soikkanen 1990, 84–5; Heikkilä 1993, 386–7; Alapuro 2003, 537; Eskola 
2011, 13, 16, 18; Haapala & Tikka 2013, 110.
245 Rinta-Tassi 1986, 497; Hentilä & Hentilä 2016, 100; cf. Ehnrooth 1992 as cited 
above.
246 Ketola 1987, 130.
247 Kautsky 1918b, chapters 3–5, repeating his statements from 1893 and 1900; 
Kautsky 1919, chapter 8; Winkler 1999, 3; Hentilä 2015, 152.
248 Lindman 1968, 9; Upton 1980, 38–9. e same accusations appeared in 
connection with the election of 1917. Rinta-Tassi 1986, 40.
249 Kirby 1986, 162.
250 Pekonen 2014, 320. 
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continued, leading to political tensions caused by hate speeches getting out 
of hand and parliamentary government being destroyed before it was even 
established. e sections on Finland aim at understanding this discursive 
process in the particular national and international circumstances of 1917 
and to evaluate its impact on the process that led to a civil war.
Aer this review of constitutional tensions before 1917, it is time to 
move on to empirical analyses of the constitutional debates between spring 
1917 and summer 1919. In 1916, the legitimacy of both the political and the 
military leadership and the functioning of the political systems had become 
increasingly questioned in all four countries. Leaders had been changed in 
Britain, France and Germany, whereas in Russia a clash between a stubborn 
tsar and a divided political elite began to seem unavoidable. e people in 
all countries were becoming increasingly impatient about the ongoing war 
with the constant demands for new resources and huge human losses.251 
Measures were expected that would strengthen the say of the people at large. 
In spring 1917, many of the dams of restrained discontent would break, both 
in the great powers and in connected smaller states, to the extent that some 
contemporaries talked about a ood or wave of democracy. e continuing 
and ever more total war, a revolution producing a system change unseen 
since the French Revolution and the entry of the United States into the war 
with promises to secure democracy seemed to be changing the course of 
world history. ese transnational impulses gave rise to a wide variety of 
expectations and hopes among contemporaries, including both negative 
and positive visions of the future of democracy and parliamentarism. 
Especially in spring 1917, these visions would be transnationally linked to 
an unprecedented extent.
251 Leonhard 2014, 609–10, 614.
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3.  The spring of democracy in 1917:  
 The new constitutional scene created  
 by the prolonged war, the Russian 
 Revolution and the American 
 intervention 
3.1  Britain: e wartime situation used to force through  
 a postponed reform  
3.1.1  A continuing constitutional crisis 
In Britain, the unforeseen total war had cooled down the heated 
constitutional dispute caused by the establishment of lower house 
sovereignty with the Parliament Act of 1911 and by the Irish Home Rule 
Bill of 1914. e severity of the confrontation had even led the Conservative 
critics of the Liberal government to use expressions like ‘a civil war’ to 
describe it and to challenge the authority of Parliament.252 e outbreak of 
the First World War and the consequent party truce had saved the country 
from a deepening constitutional crisis, but it had le certain underlying 
constitutional disagreements unsolved, including a long-running debate on 
women’s surage. 
During the war, parliamentary legislation had mainly served the purposes 
of the war eort. At the same time, the totality of the warfare increased 
awareness of the need to reform surage and perhaps Parliament more 
generally – either to strengthen popular representation and the legitimacy 
of Parliament or to restore the pre-reform political order. e extension of 
surage was increasingly used in patriotic speeches to engage the people 
in a common struggle. Universal male surage had come to be seen as 
undeniable as a result of the sacrices of soldiers of all classes, while the 
contributions of women to ammunition manufacturing and other sectors 
of society decreased Conservative resistance to female surage.253 However, 
Conservative political discourse continued to combine reactionary ideas 
with seemingly progressive ones,254 for instance justifying women’s surage 
by appealing to patriotic and Christian values rather than principles of 
equality. ere was no full certainty about the sincerity of the Conservative 
conversion.
252 Saunders 2013b, 66, 78–9.
253 McCrillis 1998, 11; Machin 2001, 130–1, 139–42. 
254 Webber 1986, 8.
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e reform process had been launched by the War Cabinet in late 1916 
– aer a contentious parliamentary debate on the register of voters – with 
a call for an extraordinary inter-party Speaker’s Conference. e Coalition 
wished for a consensual proposal on a moderate reform, and the task was 
given to James Lowther, the long-serving Conservative Speaker of the House 
of Commons. e alleged aim of Lowther’s Conference, which consisted of 
ve peers and 27 MPs representing all the major parties, was to seek an 
impartial solution.255 e mandate and representativeness – and hence 
legitimacy – of the Conference continued to be questioned by the opponents 
of the reform, however. ey were unhappy with the parliament that had 
been elected in 1910 and was responsible for destroying the position of 
the House of Lords in their quest for further reform. Nevertheless, the 
recommendations of this Conference for universal surage for men and 
the extension of franchise to married and over-30-year-old women and the 
redistribution of parliamentary seats, which were published on 27 January 
1917, constituted a turning point in the British reform process.256 On the 
other hand, schemes for proportional representation and the alternative 
vote system, also proposed by the Conference, were postponed and, in 
practice, abandoned. 
is reform would seem to have made progress as a result of domestic 
pressures inherited from pre-war constitutional confrontations and 
increased by the unifying war experience. However, the British reform was 
also inuenced by inter- and transnational developments. e decision to 
bring the bill to Parliament at the end of March 1917 rather than immediately 
or shortly aer the proposals of the Conference was obviously inuenced 
by the course of international aairs. e debate shows that British MPs, 
too, were transnationally connected, though more with America and the 
dominions than Europe. eir debates were aected by the state of war 
especially now that the United States – whose president Woodrow Wilson 
had raised ‘making the world safe for democracy’ into a war goal – was 
expected to nally join the war. Germany was increasingly criticised in 
Allied war propaganda for the militarism of the Prussian political system, 
and Russia was experiencing a supposedly democratic revolution. e rst 
reading of the Representation of the People Bill took place in the context 
of these developments and recalled parallel constitutional debates in the 
German, Swedish and Finnish parliaments of the time, though this has gone 
unnoticed in British research. e debates in the Commons on 28 March 
and 22–23 May 1917 were in many ways parallel to surage debates in 
Sweden on 21 March, 14 and 27 April and early June 1917. On 29–30 March, 
the German Reichstag addressed the old question of reforming surage in 
Prussia. At the same time, Finland, which in principle already possessed 
a democratically elected parliament, began to debate the possibilities for 
a parliamentarised government.
255 McCrillis 1998, 12; White & Parker 2009, 3–4, 10. e Speaker’s Conference 
consisted of 13 Conservative, 13 Liberal, four Irish Home Rule and four Labour 
MPs or peers.
256 McCrillis 1998, 13.
74
3. The spring of democracy in 1917: The new constitutional scene
e Russian Revolution gave rise to some speculation in the British press, 
and a supportive internationalist Marxist mass meeting was held in London 
on 24 March.257 However, more important for the British debates was the 
American entry into the war. Once the US joined in early April, democracy 
was increasingly claimed to be the common denominator and war goal of the 
Entente.258 Pressures to democratise domestic policies in Britain increased: 
the country’s major ally was a proclaimed democracy, and democracy was 
also expected to make progress in Russia, a previously autocratic ally. e 
British domestic political discourse on democracy was inevitably aected 
by these changes. e concept had been in use before, but a comparison 
between references to democracy in March and May 1917 on the one hand 
and in December 1917 and early February 1918 on the other demonstrates 
the eects of Wilson’s propagandistic language of democracy on British 
conceptualisations of democracy in domestic politics. e rst eects were 
felt in the debates in May. By the end of 1917, democracy was increasingly 
used in British parliamentary discourse on the reform, and the concept was 
politicised in domestic political battles, initially by the Irish nationalists. 
Ideological dierences in usage would remain: the Conservatives talked 
about democracy mainly with a view to retaining the established order, 
the Liberals of the Coalition addressed the question of democracy more 
extensively only aer ensuring their hold on power, and from 1918 onwards 
Labour increasingly challenged the government with calls for reform in the 
name of democracy.
e Representation of the People Bill was radical compared with the 
history of gradual cautious reform in the nineteenth century and in view 
of the controversies that the Parliament Act had already provoked. It was 
made possible by the exceptional wartime circumstances. e Liberal prime 
minister Lloyd George wanted to have a clear but suitably restricted and 
timed reform that would enable him to declare a new election at the right 
moment for the Coalition Liberals. On 26 March 1917, over two months 
257 e Herald, ‘Great Russian Rally in London’, 31 March 1917. e meeting, which 
had been organised by George Lansbury, the editor of e Herald, (Cowden 
1984, 11) attracted 7000 participants and adopted a resolution in which ‘the 
true democratic forces in Russia, headed by the class-conscious proletariat 
struggling for its revolutionary class-aims [should] carry through the complete 
democratisation of the country’. e Herald published a call for ‘the democracy of 
England’ to demonstrate its sympathy for ‘the democracy of Russia’, monopolising 
democracy in a Marxist fashion to the proletarian cause. e Herald bypassed 
parliamentary debates on extended surage and rather speculated on ‘a German 
Revolution’ that would liberate the masses from ‘the Prussian Junker class’ (‘Aer 
the Revolution’, 31 March 1917). On 7 April 1917, it claimed that ‘e Revolution 
at the Albert Hall’ had been ‘epoch-making: it marked a turning-point in the 
mood, the spirit, the activities of our country’ towards ‘a revolution in the 
political, social, and economic life of the British Commonwealth’.
258 e American military representative emphasised the view that ‘the present 
war is one of democracy against [the] autocracy’ of the Central Powers, which 
were seen as striking at ‘the very existence of democracy and liberty’. e Times, 
‘Trotsky’s Diplomacy’ and ‘War Aims of U.S.’, 5 December 1917.
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aer the publication of the report and the ensuing hesitation,259 and roughly 
two weeks aer the outbreak of a revolution in Petrograd, the prime minister 
decided to proceed – at a time when other governments or parliaments were 
also engaged in constitutional issues.  e bill was introduced by H.  H. 
Asquith, a former prime minister who had previously opposed female 
surage and now led the Liberal opposition in Parliament, which suggests 
that the dierent Liberal factions and their Conservative allies considered 
the moment right and that the choice of the speaker was intended to reect 
a more general change in political opinion. In press reports, Parliament was 
thanked for aiming to solve this old party-political controversy and a general 
approval of the bill was anticipated.260 e government’s proposal to introduce 
the bill was, aer a substantial debate, approved with a clear majority 
(341–62). Many former opponents appeared to have become convinced by 
the united war eort about the necessity of universal surage (including 
women’s surage). e party leaders had already committed themselves 
with the Speaker’s Conference to carrying through the compromise,261 but 
the debate nevertheless addressed the principles of the British constitution 
and deserves to be subjected to a comparative conceptual analysis. 
While the proposal passed even more clearly through its second reading 
on 22–23 May, the debate reveals that the redenition of parliamentary 
representation remained far from unproblematic. e context of the reform 
would change considerably during the long committee stage before the 
third reading, the debates of the Lords and the consideration of the Lords 
amendments between December 1917 and February 1918. Comparisons 
with the other three countries and the consideration of transnational links 
in what follows help us to see to what extent the British reform process and 
the attitudes of its participants were unique to Britain and in what respects 
they repeated general ideological models and were part of a broader 
constitutional transformation, even indeed of a transnational process of 
constitutional change. Let us rst review the MPs’ understandings of the 
impact of the war on the political system and then analyse the implications 
for democracy, popular participation and democracy. 
3.1.2 Creating ‘a new Britain’ consensually in a time  
 of war and revolution 
e political implications of the war were strongly felt. In Britain – just as in 
Germany – a nation involved in total warfare was the context in which the 
reform was interpreted, though the interpretations diered in the former, 
an established parliamentary polity, from those in the latter, a constitutional 
monarchy where scepticism about parliamentarism prevailed. Several 
actively serving ocers contributed to the British debates, and numerous 
civilians also emphasised the unique nature of the ongoing conict and 
259 Grigg 2003, 106.
260 e Times, ‘Reform by Consent’ and ‘Electoral Reform’, 29 March 1917; e 
Manchester Guardian, ‘Government and Electoral Reform’, 29 March 1917; ‘e 
Coming Franchise Bill’, 30 March 1917.
261 Machin 2001, 142–4.
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its fundamental inuences on the British polity. e war experience was 
generally represented as having united the national community, but the 
conclusions to be drawn from this varied: either the reform had been made 
necessary by the war, or it was considered undesirable to have a constitutional 
controversy at that time.262 
e latter, opposing, view, supported by a Unionist minority, was that 
success in warfare should be prioritised and unrealistic aspirations for an 
immediate reform abandoned. Arthur Salter, an ocer and a leading lawyer 
who had expected the backing of up to 140 Unionists but was disappointed 
with much more limited support, stated: ‘We are standing upon the 
threshold of the greatest crisis of the greatest war in all history. We must 
win victory, if not peace, in the next few months.’263  In his view, the survival 
of the nation called for a complete concentration on the war eort instead 
of debating for several months about a constitutional reform of secondary 
importance.264 Salter recognised the redenition of the relationship of ‘the 
sailor and the soldier’ to the state as a necessary compensation for their 
services,265 and other Conservative opponents could also see enfranchising 
soldiers (not necessarily women) as timely in the relatively near future, 
but they considered the timing wrong.266 Salter’s further suggestion, which 
went back to the constitutional confrontations of the early 1910s, was that 
a crisis resembling a civil war might arise as a consequence of constitutional 
revisions: they might be taken by extra-parliamentary extremists (the 
far le rather than the ultra-Conservatives) as ‘the trumpet of domestic 
war’.267 Henry Craik (Scottish Unionist), the MP for Glasgow and Aberdeen 
Universities, saw it as ‘not only a crime but criminal folly to plunge this House 
and the country and every constituency into an angry controversy which will 
turn their attention from the aairs of the War’.268 ese minority Unionist 
arguments were forcefully rejected by the majority of the Commons,269 but 
their expression constituted an axiomatic part of the British parliamentary 
decision-making process.
During the May debates, Colonel Robert Sanders, a Conservative 
assistant whip who was leading the opposition of rural counties to the 
decrease in the number of their seats, ignored the compromise on the bill 
and put forward an amendment stating that the ministry, Parliament and 
262 e Times, ‘Reform by Consent’, 29 March 1917.
263 Hansard, Arthur Salter, 28 March 1917, c. 479; e Manchester Guardian, 
‘Premier Rejects P.R.’, 28 March 1917.
264 Hansard, Arthur Salter, 28 March 1917, c. 472–3.
265 Hansard, Arthur Salter, 28 March 1917, c. 472.
266 Hansard, Arnold Ward (Conservative), 28 March 1917, c. 496–7. Ward was son 
of Mary Augusta Ward, a founder of the National League for Opposing Women’s 
Surage. Gullace 2002, 167–8.
267 Hansard, Arthur Salter, 28 March 1917, c. 479–80; also Lowe, 28 March 1917, 
c. 482. 
268 Hansard, Sir Henry Craik, 28 March 1917, c. 550–1.
269 e Times, ‘Electoral Reform’, 29 March 1917.
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the people should focus on the war instead.270 Hugh Cecil (Conservative) 
– son of a former prime minister, MP for Oxford University and a militant 
opponent of Liberal constitutional policies and hence suspected of leading 
the opposition this time, too271 – presented a pseudo-parliamentary view, 
claiming that the wartime prevented MPs from appropriately scrutinising 
the reform and that it was wrong of the executive power to press for it.272 
Henry Wilson-Fox (Conservative) added that Parliament and the nation 
had not been able to consider the proposed ‘dangerous experiments’ 
properly owing to restrictions to political meetings, while the Commons 
had demonstrated an unacceptably ‘lethargic attitude’ (not all MPs were in 
attendance that morning) towards such changes.273 
However, the Unionist opponents were a declining minority,274 and the 
majority of the party had decided to go for a reform that was expected to 
favour the Conservatives in elections aer a ceasere. Supporters of the 
reform consistently used the extraordinary momentum created by the war as 
an argument. However, Halford Mackinder (Scottish Unionist), the Director 
of the London School of Economics, who at the time was working on a book 
on the politics of reconstruction, saw the war as having unbalanced the 
constitution, increasing the power of Parliament in principle but that of the 
government in practice. e reform, he believed, would prevent to a post-
war crisis:275
We all admit that we are coming to a time without parallel. We have had to adopt 
very powerful, and perhaps arbitrary, rough, crude methods in order to render 
this country capable of dealing with this great crisis of war. We have to face the 
fact that the crisis aer the War will be equally dicult, and that there will be 
equally crude methods of equipping us with machinery, unless we do what we 
did not do before the War.
Both the opposition and the Coalition liberals presented the reform as a way 
of preparing for peace. e current Parliament had been prolonged from 
1915 onwards, and the current electoral register was outdated. According 
to H. H. Asquith, an election based on the pre-war register would lead to 
a Commons that would lack ‘even the semblance of real representative 
authority’;276 what was needed was a reformed electorate ‘which represents 
270 Hansard, Robert Sanders, 22 May 1917, c. 2144–6; also Harry Hope, 23 May 
1917, c. 2412; e Manchester Guardian, ‘Electoral Reform’, 23 May 1917; Turner 
1992, 215–16.
271 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Electoral Reform’, 24 May 1917.
272 Hansard, Hugh Cecil, 22 May 1917, c. 2187–8; see also Arnold Ward, 23 May 
1917, c. 2425–6.
273 Hansard, Henry Wilson-Fox, 23 May 1917, c. 2339–40; e Times, ‘e Reform 
Bill’, 24 May 1917. e point was played down in e Manchester Guardian, 
‘Electoral Reform’, 24 May 1917. 
274 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Electoral Reform’, 24 May 1917,
275 Hansard, Halford Mackinder, 28 March 1917, c. 512.
276 Hansard, H. H. Asquith, 28 March 1917, c. 463.
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the considered opinion and will of the nation as a whole’.277 Prime Minister 
David Lloyd George himself went in for crusading nationalistic rhetoric 
when he argued – in a speech in which he appeared as ‘the prophet of a new 
political era’ and was cheered by the MPs throughout its duration278 – that 
Britain should be ready to show to the world the way forward aer the 
war. e new parliament to be elected immediately aer the ceasere had 
a global mission:279 
[It will] have to settle questions which will practically determine the course of 
things, not merely in Great Britain and in the British Empire, but very largely 
throughout the world for generations to come.
e prime minister said – aer an interruption criticising his gendered 
language – that it had become impossible to exclude from surage ‘the men 
and the women that had made the new Britain possible.’280 e real-political 
argument was carried further: the war had created unique circumstances 
for realising this reform; it was better to solve the controversial issue in time 
and not when it would be too late and potentially productive of civil strife 
resembling that of the early part of the decade:281
You will not have time, but suppose you had, suppose you had nothing to do but 
pass a Franchise Bill aer the peace, . . . We can ght all these questions, not in 
an atmosphere of War, but in the freer atmosphere of peace, a more encouraging 
atmosphere for political controversy. All the regrets, and all the controversies of 
the past, which have been kept under with great diculty during the three years 
of war, will then have a full and free play. What a prospect!
is meant that the exceptional wartime party truce was to be used to solve 
a constitutional question that had become over-politicised in peacetime. 
Edward Shortt, a lawyer, a Liberal and a member of Lloyd George’s cabinet, 
was cynically realistic when he stated: ‘We have a war, and we know 
therefore that we must accept in these times things which we should not 
be prepared to accept in normal times.’282 Bonar Law, the Conservative 
leader and Chancellor of the Exchequer, supported his government partner 
by conceding: ‘We are going to have a new world when this war is over.’283 
ere was thus no going back to the pre-war world, even for Conservatives. 
A constitutional reform was needed as the entire polity – and the environment 
in which it found itself – had changed as a consequence of the war. is fact 
was recognised by the British Conservative leadership, although it remained 
in the interest of the War Coalition to ensure continuity in its hold on power. 
277 Hansard, H. H. Asquith, 28 March 1917, c. 465–6; also Sir John Simon (Liberal), 
22 May 1917, c. 2201; also George Wardle (Labour), 23 May 1917, c. 2366.
278 e Manchester Guardian, ‘e Coming Franchise Bill’, 29 March 1917.
279 Hansard, David Lloyd George, 28 March 1917, c. 488.
280 Hansard, David Lloyd George, 28 March 1917, c. 489.
281 Hansard, David Lloyd George, 28 March 1917, c. 494.
282 Hansard, Edward Shortt, 28 March 1917, c. 551.
283 Hansard, e Chancellor of the Exchequer, 28 March 1917, c. 557.
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And they could count on such continuity in the patriotic atmosphere of 
wartime.
According to the leaders of the Labour Party, too, spring 1917 was ‘a most 
opportune moment’ for surage reform; as J. R. Clynes, a Labour MP and 
trade unionist, stated: ‘e War period has been used, I think rightly used, 
in many quarters in order to try to compose and conclude dierences which 
we found dicult to discuss and settle during times of peace.’284 Despite its 
having been a major tragedy for the national community, the war was also 
seen as oering a dynamic moment for reform. For the British Labour Party, 
which was represented in the War Coalition by Arthur Henderson and 
was optimistic about electoral advances, the war even constituted, at least 
rhetorically, a chance to bridge rather than underscore class distinctions, 
a view that diers radically from contemporary Social Democratic discourse 
elsewhere (especially in Russia and Finland). According to Clynes, the war 
had increased the willingness to make compromises and oered Britain, 
unlike most countries engaged in the war, ‘the best and not the worst time 
to face facts and try to come to a conclusion’.285 e stance of this leading 
British Labour politician was an ostentatiously constructive one, though 
the party organisation had decided that the proposal made at the Speaker’s 
Conference only met the party’s minimum demands.286 More radical claims 
would need to wait, despite any temporary enthusiasm inspired by of the 
Russian Revolution.
Conservative and Liberal ministers and the Liberal members of the 
opposition opposed postponements. Sir George Cave (Conservative), the 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, summarised the feeling that ‘the 
spirit manifested in this War by all classes of our countrymen has brought us 
nearer together, has opened men’s eyes, and removed misunderstandings on 
all sides’.287 Discursively playing down class confrontations that complicated 
constitutional reforms in most countries, Cave maintained: 288 
[I]t is only during a war that these questions are reduced to their true perspective. 
e consciousness of the existence of graver issues renders agreement on such 
matters as electoral reform not only possible but imperative. I confess that 
I  contemplate with intense dislike the prospects of engaging aer the War in 
a series of barren wrangles. . . . I would like to get these questions behind me, and 
to be free to deal with the bigger things with which we shall be faced.
In order that the political system would be ready to focus on the post-
war reconstruction, the issue of reform just needed to be solved. Sir John 
Simon, a lawyer with ministerial experience and now an opposition Liberal, 
likewise argued that the war had an immense importance for ‘the immediate 
and the more distant future of our own people and our country in the 
284 Hansard, J. R. Clynes, 28 March 1917, c. 528.
285 Hansard, J. R. Clynes, 28 March 1917, c. 529.
286 Pugh 2010, 118.
287 Hansard, Sir George Cave, 22 May 1917, c. 2134–5.
288 Hansard, Sir George Cave, 22 May 1917, c. 2143–4.
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domestic sphere . . . , questions which will require the most authoritative 
treatment from the most representative bodies’.289 e war had created 
a  unique possibility to settle the long-standing constitutional disputes in 
a spirit of good will and to design a political machinery by means of which 
future political problems could be solved. It would have been much more 
complicated to try and introduce a parliamentary reform aer the war.290 
e war experience had changed the political system for good, and the 
representativeness of the decision-making bodies needed to be guaranteed. 
Legislating on surage in wartime was indeed ‘a piece of national work not 
unconnected with the War’ as it aimed at a ‘fairer distribution of power’ and 
was thereby supportive of the war eort.291
Opposition complaints about the wrong timing of the bill caused Herbert 
Samuel, a former Liberal home secretary, to point out that it always seemed 
to be the wrong time for those who did not dare to state aloud that they 
rejected the extension of surage. Samuel viewed the reform as a technical 
war legislative measure that would prepare the British Empire for victory 
and peace:292
We shall never drive home the victory which I know we are going to obtain unless 
we are prepared for peace when it comes, . . . you must have a representative 
Parliament. A representative Parliament can only be represented if the electors 
are those who are really and truly qualied aer a great war to return Members 
to this House. I agree that all those who have taken part in this War must be 
electors of the new Parliament which is destined to settle the foundations of our 
great Empire. erefore, it is our absolute duty during this War, and part of what 
I conceive to be war legislation. 
Walter Long – the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who had played a key 
role in converting other Unionist leaders over to the side of the reform 
by appealing to the future of the party293 – pushed the argument further, 
implying that, once the bill was passed, the war would be won with power 
‘derived from the people’. is conceptualisation of a militaristic people’s 
power oered a nationalistic substitute for the rather more American 
concept of democracy and one that was persuasive for ultra-Conservatives 
as well. Britain would prevail over Germany thanks to her unity, which 
would stem from up-to-date popular government:294
289 Hansard, Sir John Simon, 22 May 1917, c. 2199–2200.
290 Hansard, Sir John Simon, 22 May 1917, c. 2201–2; see also Sir Gordon Hewart, 
the Solicitor General, 22 May 1917, c. 2239.
291 Hansard, Sir John Simon, 22 May 1917, c. 2201; also George orne, 23 May 
1917, c. 2414. 
292 Hansard, Herbert Samuel, 22 May 1917, c. 2182–3, see also Sir William Bull, 22 
May 1917, c. 2212; e Times, ‘e Reform Bill’, 24 May 1917; e Manchester 
Guardian, ‘Electoral Reform’, 24 May 1917.
293 McCrillis 1998, 12.
294 Hansard, Walter Long, 23 May 1917, c. 2438.
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We shall have to meet our enemies, and must be prepared with the power which 
we can only derive from the people. Let us be fortied by the strength which only 
a contented and satised people can give to the Government of the country. Let 
us realise that, blessed, as we have been, above all the nations of the world in our 
relief from internal dissensions, strife, and trouble, yet the world is full of anxiety 
and diculty, and those people will be wise and prudent who take time by the 
forelock, and give their country those reforms which will make us strong and able 
to do our duty in the day of peace.
is was an argument on the strengths of a parliamentary democracy that 
was considered seriously by German debaters as well, as we shall see in 
section 3.2.
However, there was no denying that constitutional tensions still existed. 
A major opposition Conservative argument against reform was that the 
constitutional status of the Lords, which had been altered by the same 
parliament in 1911, should also be restored.295 Arthur Salter complained 
‘our Constitution [has] been incomplete and in suspense’ since 1911.296 Only 
the restoration of the right of veto to the upper house and its rearmation 
would make democratic surage possible. Aneurin Williams (Liberal), 
a  reformist member of the Speaker’s Conference, also addressed the 
intensity of constitutional conicts aer the Parliament Act of 1911 and the 
Irish Home Rule Act of 1914:297
I realised that there were before the country several matters of the greatest 
importance which had very nearly brought us to the verge of civil war before 
this war broke out, and at any rate relieved us from that terrible danger of civil 
war. I realised also that these great questions must either be settled on a national 
basis now or very soon, or that aer the War is over they will again plunge us into 
violent and most disastrous controversy.
is characterisation of the atmosphere in the Speaker’s Conference suggests 
the continuing impact of the constitutional crisis of the early 1910s. By 1917, 
the war had assuaged open confrontations, bringing most Liberals and 
Conservatives to the same side in the reform debates. However, it was their 
awareness of the continuing existence of tensions that made the political 
elite agree on the settlement. Williams’s statement suggests that even in 
Britain constitutional compromises were, to some extent, seen as a means of 
avoiding civil war; this corresponded to some extent with a latent civil war 
in Germany in 1919, a feared civil war in Sweden in 1918 and in Finland the 
threat of a civil war in 1917, an actual one in 1918 and a repetition of this in 
1919. Updated parliamentary representation of the people was prioritised 
and extra-parliamentary means for settling political disputes rejected. e 
adoption of this view parliamentarised Britain further and was expected to 
295 is was also the view of the party leaders. McCrillis 1998, 14–15.
296 Hansard, Arthur Salter, 28 March 1917, c. 478; see also Francis Lowe, 28 March 
1917, c. 484 –5, Ernest Pollock, 28 March 1917, c. 501, and John Gretton, 23 May 
1917, c. 2355.
297 Hansard, Aneurin Williams, 23 May 1917, c. 2330.
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strengthen the people’s trust in parliamentary democracy. e leaders of the 
Conservative, Liberal and Labour parties appeared to be exceptionally united 
about the timing and content of the reform, a consensus that marginalised 
the Unionist opposition within the Conservative Party. Britain diered 
from Germany, Sweden and Finland (and from its own parliamentary 
traditions) in the consensual advance of the constitutional reform. is 
smooth progress was mainly due to changes in Conservative attitudes (or 
expressions of them) produced by the war.
Unlike other parliaments, much of this debate was independent of any 
relationship with the rest of the world, building on shared assumptions about 
an exceptional British political tradition. e understanding of the British 
political system as a global ‘progressive’ model298 and the relative ignorance 
of – or indierence to – developments in continental Europe contributed 
to selectiveness in British international references. Some familiarity with 
Continental constitutional debates are nevertheless obvious in the speeches 
of a number of representatives of the Labour Party and a few Liberals; 
Conservative thought, on the other hand, remained focused on the British 
Empire.
For the Labour Party, the ideology of which contained internationalist 
elements, the war had initially proved divisive, with some pacists 
denouncing it while the majority supported the war eort. Aer May 
1915, the party had participated in coalition governments; in other words, 
Labour had been integrated to the polity much more eciently than 
Social Democrats in the other three countries – the Swedes and the Finns 
attempted integration in 1917 with very dierent results. ough moderate 
and barely socialist, the British Labour Party, too, was aected by the 
revolutionary spirit of spring 1917. Arthur Henderson, a Labour leader 
and a minister without portfolio until August 1917, visited Russia in June 
to demonstrate British Labour support for the government of Alexander 
Kerensky. He certainly did not turn into a revolutionary in Petrograd and 
indeed was rather disillusioned about the possibilities of Russia being able 
to carry on the war without undergoing another revolution – an assessment 
that led to tension within the Coalition, whose other members wanted 
to keep Russia as an ally. Labour representation in a peace conference in 
Stockholm in May-June 1917 was likewise viewed with suspicion by the 
other parties, as the meeting was attended by radical socialists from several 
countries (including Germany, Sweden and Finland). e surage reform, 
by contrast, was a commonly accepted project of the Coalition, and Labour 
expected the number of working-class voters to increase dramatically as 
a result of it.299 When defending it, the British Labour Party, unlike the 
Continental Social Democrats, did not use internationalist arguments, 
obviously in order to avoid any association with the Russian Revolution and 
the radical Zimmerwald International and thereby create friction with its 
Coalition partners.
298 On the rise of this notion in Britain and Prussian counter-arguments to that 
national case in the late nineteenth century, see Pombeni 2005, 225–6. 
299 Kirby 1986b, 152; Pugh 2002, 158–61; Pugh 2010, 119.
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Most British MPs shared an understanding of the British political system 
as a universally valid global model, a view that strengthened a dierent kind 
of internationalism – one based on the protection of the interests of the 
British Empire. An opposition Conservative argument against the reform 
was that the imperial Parliament should have considered the implications of 
constitutional changes for the Empire and the wider world. For Arthur Salter, 
Britain was ‘the keystone of the Alliance’, the strength of which depended on 
the unity of the British as ‘[t]he trustees of interests which transcend even 
the Kingdom and the Empire’.300 Salter was recalling traditional beliefs in the 
global historical mission of Britain: she defended liberty both in Europe and 
all over the world. e British constitution was, by implication, a universal 
property that could not be so lightly changed. 
e counterargument was that, since the British constitution provided 
a model for the world, it needed to be updated. Walter Long (Conservative), 
who was in no way an advocate of progressive political views but saw the 
reform from the point view of the Empire, pointed to the pressures that the 
dominions imposed on Britain with regard to surage:301
ey are looking anxiously to the old land. ey know that some part of our 
Constitution here is old, and as they think, worn out. ey are asking us this: ‘Are 
you going to put yourself on the same solid foundation on which we rest? Are 
you going to clear your decks so that the moment this War is over you can face 
and settle those great Imperial problems.
Such transnational – or rather imperial – references were always selective, 
vague and interpretable in various ways: they could be used to argue either 
against or for the introduction of universal surage. Mainly dominions with 
populations of British origin were seen as relevant in such arguments, though 
they, too, might appear as too dierent to provide conclusive evidence.302 
Leslie Scott (Conservative) pointed out: ‘We are the Mother of Parliaments. 
We are here to set an example to the British Empire,’ whereas the dominions 
could not make demands of the British Parliament.303 William Burdett-
Coutts (Conservative) contrasted ‘this democracy of ours at home’ with ‘the 
great democracies of the Dominions’, with the latter looking at ‘the Mother 
of Parliaments as the model’ and likely to be disappointed this time.304 
Speakers might cite examples of technical electoral details taken from 
the dominions or the United States that they just happened to be familiar 
with in order to support their arguments. Joseph Walton (Liberal) admired 
the universal surage of the ‘democratic communities’ of Australia and 
New Zealand, which (like many parts of the Empire but not Continental 
300 Hansard, Arthur Salter, 28 March 1917, c. 481.
301 Hansard, Walter Long, 28 March 1917, c. 521.
302 Hansard, Richard Chaloner, brother of Walter Long, 28 March 1917, c. 526
303 Hansard, Leslie Scott, 4 July 1917, c. 1153.
304 Hansard, William Burdett-Coutts, 22 November 1917, c. 1411.
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Europe) he had visited.305 Alfred Mond, a Liberal businessman, considered 
these dominions together with Canada and the United States to be relevant 
models of the successful introduction of women’s surage,306 whereas 
the Conservatives Arnold Ward and Sir Stuart Coats took the rejection 
of female surage and female passivity in elections in some US states as 
evidence against female surage.307 George Reid (Unionist), the former 
prime minister of Australia and an archetypical political agent, who had 
travelled within the British Empire and whose mobility connected national 
political debates within it, presented Australia as ‘an advanced democratic 
community’ that was worthy of British emulation.308 is caused other MPs 
to refer to Australia as well. 
Continental examples were even more selective and controversial than 
those referring to the dominions. e smaller European states rarely appeared 
as relevant objects of comparison – or disappeared behind vague phrases 
like ‘one or two European States’.309 e Belgian model of proportional 
representation was for Ramsay MacDonald no more than an ‘idea which 
is in the air, epidemic’.310 According to the former Labour leader, it would 
be best to keep to British ‘political methods, practices, machinery, and 
ideas’ and to reject ideas that it was ‘absolutely meaningless to apply to our 
particular system of Government’.311 No social democratic internationalist 
accompaniment to the typical internationalism of the labour movement 
was to be heard in the British parliament; Labour’s party-political interests 
lay in obtaining a majority through the existing system. A Liberal MP 
might likewise state that ‘we need not go all round the world’ for models,312 
a statement that illustrates the limits of British Liberal internationalism.
On the other hand, some Liberal supporters of proportional representa-
tion did look across the English Channel. John Bertrand Watson, a lawyer, 
argued that it had been successfully introduced in countries such as Belgium, 
Switzerland, Sweden and Finland.313 Aneurin Williams, the Treasurer of 
the Proportional Representation Society, being a Welshman, listed small 
305 Hansard, Sir Joseph Walton, 19 June 1917, c. 1707–8.
306 Hansard, Alfred Mond, 19 June 1917, c. 1714–15; also Minister of Blockade 
Robert Cecil (Conservative), 19 June 1917, c. 1731–2.
307 Hansard, Arnold Ward, 19 June 1917, c. 1746–7; Sir Stuart Coats, 19 June 1917, 
c. 1728–31. 
308 Hansard, George Reid, 23 May 1917, c. 2368.
309 Hansard, Joseph Compton-Rickett. 19 June 1917, c. 1726.
310 Hansard, Ramsay MacDonald, 22 May 1917, c. 2229–30; also Leslie Scott 
(Conservative), 23 May 1917, c. 2364.
311 Hansard, Ramsay MacDonald, 22 May 1917, c. 2230, 2233.
312 Hansard, omas Palmer Whittaker (Liberal), Chairman of the Select Committee 
on Parliamentary Procedure, 4 July 1917, c. 1166.
313 Hansard, John Bertrand Watson, 22 May 1917, 2168. e Finnish example of 
proportional representation would not convince a Conservative such as Richard 
Barnett, who considered it as relevant for the British parliament as any from 
‘Nova Zembla or Lapland or some other country’. 22 November 1917, c. 1477. 
By 26 November 1917, Barnett simply replaced ‘Finland’ with ‘Lapland’ in order 
to reject any comparison. e persuasive force of Finland as a model for surage 
should clearly not be overinterpreted.
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‘democratic nations’ such as Switzerland, Belgium, Finland, Sweden, 
Wurttemberg, (white) South Africa and Tasmania as examples. In the United 
States and the British colonies, too, proportional representation was making 
progress, and the Netherlands, Russia and Rumania had recently adopted 
the system.314 ese were for Williams ‘the leading countries of the world’ 
and demonstrated that proportional representation made governments 
strong by ‘really representing the people’.315 is was hardly an argument 
that was acceptable to most MPs, who regarded the British tradition and 
the Empire as sucient sources of examples.316 Some French and German 
parties, too, were known to be supportive of proportional representation,317 
but that did not really count. 
Women’s surage was another subject to which conicting foreign 
examples were applied. One opponent referred to the USA and Australia as 
examples of ‘hysterical’ women disrupting military decisions, while Finland 
provided an example of a country where both sexes voted but where no 
national military force existed,318 meaning that the polity was pitifully weak, 
even feminine. Reginald Blair (Conservative), who had seen active service 
in France and had entered Parliament as an opponent of women’s surage, 
pointed out that patriotic Frenchwomen, who were just as supportive of 
the war eort as their British sisters, were not demanding the vote.319 For 
Henry Craik (Scottish Unionist), too, Britain and France were established 
democracies that were in no need of such surage.320 e Paymaster-General 
Joseph Compton-Rickett (Liberal), by contrast, speculated in June 1917 about 
the possibility that Germany would experience a revolution like the Russian 
one and introduce female surage.321 is indicated that there was a real 
expectation of change in the enemy country. Generally speaking, examples 
taken from the dominions were more general among both reformists and anti-
reformists than any European ones; imperial internationalism dominated 
over any European. Britain was seen to have her own tradition of popular 
government and democracy; it was not dependent on foreign examples.
3.1.3  Cautious Labour and Liberal democrats versus  
 patently democratic Conservatives
Despite the proposed constitutional change, which could have been 
interpreted to mean a major step in the ‘democratisation’ of parliamentary 
government, ‘democracy’ was not the concept by which the Representation 
of the People Bill would be primarily described, even though the press 
314 Hansard, Aneurin Williams, 22 May 1917, c. 2250. Proportional representation 
was a major goal of Irish Protestants.
315 Hansard, Aneurin Williams, 23 May 1917, c. 2331.
316 See the suggestion by Hansard, Leslie Scott, 23 May 1917, c. 2362.
317 Hansard, Aneurin Williams, 23 May 1917, c. 2325.
318 Hansard, Sir Frederick Banbury (Conservative), 19 June 1917, c. 1646–7. 
319 Hansard, Reginald Blair, 22 May 1917, c. 2216. e same point was made by 
Mary A. Ward in e Times, ‘Woman Surage’, 23 May 1917.
320 Hansard, Sir Henry Craik, 22 May 1917, c. 2237.
321 Hansard, Joseph Compton-Rickett,19 June 1917, c. 1727.
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had occasionally emphasised democracy as an ideal for which the war was 
being fought. e Western Allies were, aer all, by proclamation ghting on 
the side of democracy. e ‘democratisation’ of surage and government, 
however, was something that concerned Germany only.322 Democratisation 
did not yet possess the academic connotations given to it in Anglophone 
political science much later in the twentieth century. 
At the same time, Conservative arguments against the reform were 
not infrequently based on rhetorical redescriptions323 that presented the 
established system of representation as democratic. In the May debates, 
William Burdett-Coutts, a successful businessman familiar with American 
political discourse, opposed the reform selectively using the language of 
representative democracy. Conservatives had used this strategy in the early 
1910s, suggesting that it was they who were defending true democracy 
against questionable constitutional changes. According to Burdett-Coutts, 
the War Coalition was acting in ‘a spirit of dictatorship’ with the result that 
the British system was moving towards ‘autocracy’; this was hard talk as 
the war eort had increasingly been dened as a ght against Prussian 
autocracy. According to Burdett-Coutts, the claims of the government 
about the representative nature of the preparation of the bill demonstrated 
‘how far a War Government can get from the fundamentals of a democratic 
Constitution’. e ‘unconstitutional’ means of the executive struck ‘at the 
foundations of a democratic Government based on the representative 
principle’, and this endangered ‘Parliamentary Government’.324 Burdett-
Coutts was the rst to explicitly describe the British constitution and 
government as ‘democratic’ in the context of the reform debates. He was 
acting as an historical body connecting political debates across the ocean 
– though for argumentative purposes changing the Wilsonian rhetoric of 
democracy beyond recognition. Burdett-Coutts was doing what fellow 
Conservatives had done before the war when they presented themselves as 
defenders of democracy against a government that was about to destroy it. 
is oppositional attempt to take over ‘democracy’ provoked a defender 
of the bill, too, to speak more explicitly about the meaning of democracy. 
For Herbert Samuel, democracy in Britain would remain one of a limited 
type. It connected Britain with other polities (now in particular with that 
of allied Russia) that were going through constitutional changes. However, 
the British reform distinguished itself from that in Russia in that Britain 
was seeking a regulated democracy within an evolutionary system and was 
hence in no need of a corresponding revolution:325
322 Müller 2002, 326–7. e Manchester Guardian wrote on 29 March 1917 about 
a necessary conict between the Hohenzollerns and other Junkers on the one 
hand and democracy on the other. It did not refer to the British reform as 
‘democratisation’ and would not do so in 1918 either.
323 A rhetorical redescription of a concept aims at a reinterpretation and is oen 
based on renaming, changing its range of reference or re-evaluating its normative 
nuances. Palonen 2015. For related polemical techniques used by conservatives 
to oppose democratisation, see Hirschman 1991, 6.  
324 Hansard, William Burdett-Coutts, 22 May 1917, c. 2173–6.
325 Hansard, Herbert Samuel, 22 May 1917, c. 2186.
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You do not have a revolution in Russia for nothing. You nd that the democracies 
of the world are thinking, always thinking. A democracy is one of the nest 
things you can have if, for the moment, you can guide its thoughts. 
As a Jewish activist concerned about the Russian refugee problem, Samuel 
had taken an interest in Russian aairs. In his case, as in the case of Burdett-
Coutts, transnational connections with another great power played a role in 
the discursive constructions of democracy. However, Samuel was careful to 
point to the inherent instability and associated shortcomings of democracy 
and thus shared the scepticism of it that prevailed in the international 
theoretical debate. As we shall see, the German debate would make use of 
any such Western doubts about democracy.
is brief exchange on democracy was the only noteworthy one in the 
British Commons in spring 1917. Only a few Conservative critics of the 
reform occasionally referred to democracy; this should be contrasted with 
the central position occupied by the concept in the war propaganda. It also 
diers from the much more extensive debates on democracy in the other 
three parliaments during the rst half of 1917. However, a political debate 
on democracy did emerge in Britain, too, in late autumn 1917, when the 
Irish problems were brought up and the Lords’ amendments were made 
in early 1918, but an extended debate had to wait. Democracy was not 
yet regarded as a concept that could be used to describe the reform of the 
British parliamentary system in spring 1917, as one might have assumed. 
Rather, it remained a matter that was discussed in passing in international 
comparisons brought up by transnationally connected MPs; it did not, 
despite the occasional use of the term in pre-war reform debates, constitute 
any major normative political concept used in competing ways to dene the 
future of the nation’s own polity.
At least before Woodrow Wilson’s speech to the Congress on 2 April 
1917, which brought democracy forcefully onto the ideological agenda 
of the Entente, when he declared that ‘[t]he world must be made safe for 
democracy’ through the cooperation of democratic nations, democracy 
was not a concept by means of which the British parliamentary elite would 
have conceptualised their constitution.326 Still in May one of the few MPs to 
identify himself with the concept of democracy was the Liberal Willoughby 
Dickinson. Dickinson claimed to have been ‘ying the ag of democracy’ 
himself in calling for universal surage and set out to describe the universal 
political rights that democracy required: ‘[R]eal democracy cannot be 
established on a proper basis unless you recognise the principle that a vote 
is not a privilege that we choose to give to this man or that man, but is a right 
which he is entitled to claim, as much as the right of individual liberty.’ For 
Dickinson, universal surage was a basic premise of all future democracy. 
He was also the only speaker to use the verb ‘democratise’ in this context.327 
Democratisation, as we have seen, was not yet a generally held goal of the 
British reform.
326 See Reimann 2000, 283, on democratic liberties, however.
327 Hansard, Willoughby Dickinson, 23 May 1917 c. 2397.
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e impact of Wilsonian rhetoric was nevertheless felt in British 
wartime discourse328 and in Parliament. is suggests that a transnational 
shi in political discourse towards an emphasis on democracy – which was 
essentially of American rather than Russian revolutionary or Continental 
European origin – did have an eect in Britain, albeit only very gradually. In 
his maiden speech on 22 May, John Bertrand Watson (Liberal), inspired by 
Wilson’s words and wartime patriotism, atteringly praised Prime Minister 
Lloyd George for ‘waging a great ght for democracy.’329 is phrase explicitly 
associated the British engagement in the war with the government’s policy 
to extend surage. Aneurin Williams placed Britain in a larger group of 
‘democratic nations’ in arguing for proportional representation.330 On the 
following day, e Manchester Guardian wrote about a landmark in political 
history turning Britain ‘towards the recognition of true democracy’331 and 
argued for extended surage as ‘part of the democratic ideal for which 
we are ghting’.332 Herbert Samuel had already regarded democracy as 
such a self-evident dening feature of the British political system that he 
had characterised its major institutions as ‘democratic’ and stated that the 
reform concerned ‘the problems of democracy and government’.333 is is an 
example of the interaction that was typical between parliamentary debates, 
the press contributing to transnational Anglophone wartime discourse.
Even though democracy had been connected with aspects of the British 
political system in the eighteenth century334 and increasingly from the 1880s 
on, and even though, as we saw, the Conservatives had presented themselves 
as champions of true democracy in the early 1910s, the discourse on domestic 
democracy had been dormant during the war. Wilson’s speech inspired 
some British Liberals and later on other parliamentarians to conceptualise 
both the ongoing military conict and the parliamentary reform at home as 
interconnected advancements of democracy. Such a conceptualisation linked 
the British constitutional change to the broader transnational development 
even though it primarily emphasised the war eort of the Entente.
Even so, few Labour or Liberal MPs used democracy as a programmatic 
concept to promote the reform, which le the Conservative opponents of 
the bill the chance to employ it themselves. Labour’s continuing passivity 
in both Parliament and the press,335 in comparison with Social Democratic 
328 See Reimann 2000, 281, on the press and parliamentary discourses aecting 
private discourses in this respect. 
329 Hansard, John Bertrand Watson, 22 May 1917 c. 2168. e suragist leader 
Sylvia Pankhurst had praised Lloyd George as a ‘democratic’ man in March, 
aer the proposal on women’s surage.  e Manchester Guardian, ‘Premier and 
Women’s Surage’, 30 March 1917.
330 Hansard, Aneurin Williams, 22 May 1917, c. 2250–1.
331 e Manchester Guardian, ‘e Electoral Reform Bill’, 23 May 1917.
332 e Manchester Guardian, ‘e Electoral Reform Bill’, 23 May 1917.
333 Hansard, Herbert Samuel, 23 May 1917, c. 2343, 2346.
334 Ihalainen 2010.
335 Neither did e Herald of 31 March 1917 call for ‘democracy’ in the British 
context; democratic advances were rather expected in Russia and Germany. 
However, on 7 April the paper reported a meeting in which bureaucratic attempts 
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discourses in Germany, Sweden and Finland, arose from its desire to avoid 
association with the Russian Revolution as long as the direction of the revolt 
remained uncertain; the party prioritised governmental cooperation over 
expressions of ideological enthusiasm. Just days before the May debates, 
the French government had forbidden the attendance of French socialists 
at the Stockholm peace conference, in which Russian revolutionaries were 
known to be active, and the British government would soon follow suit.336 
e only Labour MP to talk about democracy was Ramsay MacDonald 
from the pacist opposition. is party ideologist conspicuously despised 
the radicalism of the Russian Revolution and – in opposing proportional 
representation stated a preference for a democracy based on a political 
intelligentsia over majority democracy, for which the Social Democrat 
leaders in the other countries studied here were campaigning:337  
Democracy does not consist of counting noses; it consists of intelligence, activity, 
and enthusiasm, and upon the counting of that political vitality upon which 
progress depends. . . . I am very strongly in favour of a system of election which 
will give its due inuence to the vitality of politics as apart from the mere 
counting of noses.
MacDonald seemed to be happy with ‘the national representation of this 
House’, which would allow ‘the will of the nation’ to be heard,338 especially 
once universal surage was introduced. At the same time, Labour hoped 
that the majority vote would permit them to win seats from the Liberals, 
and the unpopularity of MacDonald’s pacism threatened his own seat 
(which he would lose in the general election in December 1918). Labour 
would adopt a more explicitly socialist programme only in summer 1918. 
us, for these party-political, personal and ideological reasons, the party’s 
cautious rhetoric of democracy distinguished itself from Continental Social 
Democratic discourse in 1917. 
e strongest arguments for Britain as an established democracy were 
heard from Conservative circles. Building on the argument of the early 1910s 
that they defended the cause of democracy, the Conservatives provided an 
alternative to potentially revolutionary denitions. e same strategy of 
rhetorical redescription would be used by the Swedish right up to 1918 to 
oppose universal surage and by the Finnish right in 1918–19 to obstruct 
the rise of a parliamentary republic; it was to some extent also used by the 
German right, which simply rejected democracy. 
‘to silence and cripple the democracy’ would be stopped; the democracy standing 
in the Marxist sense for the working classes. e paper demanded that claims 
by British politicians to be ‘the leaders in democracy in the world’ be put into 
practice at home. e parliamentary debate and division of 28 March only came 
up indirectly in e Herald’s ironic descriptions of an indecisive and servile 
Commons, an expression of its deep lack of trust in Parliament.
336 Wade 2000, 172. Hjalmar Branting, too, denounced the Lenin’s ventures in 
connection with the Stockholm conference. Kirby 1986b, 90.
337 Hansard, Ramsay MacDonald, 22 May 1917, c. 2227.
338 Hansard, Ramsay MacDonald, 22 May 1917, c. 2229–31.
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British Unionist opponents of the reform used the positive senses of 
democracy against their allegedly democratic political rivals. Sir Henry 
Craik (Scottish Unionist) mentioned that Britain had already been making 
such progress towards democracy that no reform was needed. e gradual 
nature of democratic development should be maintained:339
Does anyone think that the Reform Bill is really going largely to increase or aect 
the main stream of democratic movement that has asserted itself long since in 
this country far too strongly to be gainsaid? . . . Our stream of democratic feelings 
is passing on easily and safely without let or hindrance. 
Given the constitutional opposition by the Conservatives in the early 1910s, 
many in the party had adopted the role of defenders of democracy in the 
sense of maintaining the established British political order and allowing 
‘democratic feelings’ to be expressed but opposing sudden reforms – an 
attitude also known as ‘Tory democracy’. Such an intention is visible in 
Craik’s parallel between Britain and France as polities in no need of major 
reform: ‘Let us look at the country where democracy rules as it does here. 
Let us look to that closest of our Allies, France. ere, as here, democracy 
is safe, needs no guarantees, needs no defence.’340 Democracy stood either 
for one of the undeniable elements of the traditional mixed constitution or 
for a ‘democratic movement’ consisting of the political groups of the lower 
classes advancing their interests; it did not stand for the political system 
as a whole. Craik was saying that Britain already had enough democracy, 
suggesting that democratic forces had already become dominant in society, 
and insisting that no further extension of the status of this democracy was 
needed. In opposition Conservative reasoning, if constitutional changes 
were introduced, they should restore the practices preceding 1911. Colonel 
John Gretton complained that, aer the Parliament Act, the Lords lacked 
the political power that belonged to the second chamber ‘in the principal 
democratic countries of the world.’341 Similar arguments for bicameralism 
as a condition for proper democracy were oen heard in the Swedish First 
Chamber, which was dominated by the right. 
e Unionist opponents’ employment of the rhetoric of democracy 
certainly did not mean that they were giving up their struggle against 
extended surage. Rhetorically, they presented themselves as defenders of 
democracy while nevertheless opposing what they considered excessive 
changes in the political system. eir rhetoric probably indicated a willingness 
to adapt themselves to an expected increase in the use of the language of 
democracy rather than the advocacy of the political reforms that it might 
imply: traditional and novel ways of thinking continued to appear side by 
side in conservative discourse. e British discursive turn, nevertheless, 
represented a signicant shi in that mainstream Conservatives no longer 
opposed reform, while the minority, too, articulated their opposition 
339 Hansard, Sir Henry Craik, 22 May 1917, c. 2237.
340 Hansard, Sir Henry Craik, 22 May 1917, c. 2237.
341 Hansard, John Gretton, 23 May 1917, c. 2355–6.
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through the language of democracy. is turn took place earlier than in the 
other studied countries and can be contrasted with German rightist outright 
rejections of all democracy, Swedish rightist scepticism of democracy and 
the Finnish monarchists’ opportunistic redenitions of a monarchical 
constitution as democracy.
e British Conservatives, too, continued to have doubts about democ-
racy and even representative government. John Gretton’s comment is 
revealing of the party’s enduring cynicism; representative government was 
acceptable mainly as a means of legitimating government with popular 
consent in the lack of a better system:342
Representative government is not a logical institution. It cannot be argued 
or justied on logic. It is merely a convenient and useful method of carrying 
on government, claiming the assent of the people to the proceedings of the 
government of the day and exercising control upon the proceedings of the 
Government which the people disapprove of. e whole thing is convenient and 
has been generally accepted, but it is not logical.
Gretton’s concepts of representative government and democracy did not 
stand for a representative mass or majority democracy; he remained an 
advocate of the traditional representative government of the elite. 
e deliberate use of ‘democracy’ to oppose reforms is even more visible 
in the proposal of the National League for Opposing Women’s Surage for 
‘a democratic settlement of the controversy’ by subjecting female surage to 
a referendum aer the war.343 e proposal was quoted by Arnold Ward, whose 
mother, a major anti-suragist, published a letter in e Times on the very 
same day rejecting the handing over of ‘political sovereignty’ to the other sex 
as undemocratic and unconstitutional.344 Just as amongst the Swedish right, 
the Conservative opponents of the reform abused appeals to a referendum 
or a new election to stop or postpone reform. e same tactic had been 
used by the British Conservatives during the disputes around the Parliament 
Act. Ward further suggested that if such a referendum were not held, the 
opponents of women’s surage would use ‘every legitimate Parliamentary 
means’ to torpedo the reform.345 Such readiness to appropriate not only the 
concept of democracy but also that of parliamentarism in order to oppose 
reforms was something that the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Walter 
Long, a leading Conservative who had recognised the Parliament Act of 
1911 and accepted the new reform as well, rejected as ‘violent obstruction’.346 
e Conservatives were thus divided over the extent and means by which 
the extended surage should be opposed, the mainline being ready to make 
concessions within a system that they believed, on the basis of their wartime 
experiences, would ensure continuous electoral support.
342 Hansard, John Gretton, 23 May 1917, c. 2356.
343 Quoted by Hansard, Arnold Ward, 23 May 1917, c. 2426–7.
344 Mary A. Ward, e Times, ‘Woman Surage’, 23 May 1917.
345 Hansard, Arnold Ward, 23 May 1917, c. 2426–8.
346 Hansard, Walter Long, 23 May 1917, c. 2429.
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Nevertheless, genuine reconsiderations of the meaning of ‘democracy’ 
were also taking place among the Conservatives. Colonel Henry Cavendish-
Bentinck advised the leaders of his party, aer it had already made a strategic 
decision in that direction, to ‘cultivate friendly relations with the great 
forces of democracy’. ‘Democracy’ was still used to refer to an element of 
the constitution or to the masses of the people rather than to any dominant 
form of government, but a readiness to welcome mass democracy in the 
spirit of ‘Tory democracy’ was nevertheless evident. Once the Conservative 
Party allied itself with ‘the forces of democracy’ and set out to promote the 
welfare of the people, this aristocrat argued, it would win ‘a great and glorious 
future’.347 e Conservative mainline turn to democracy was thus explicitly 
announced in May 1917 and would lead to success in the general election 
of late 1918. Wartime experiences of patriotism and cross-class cooperation 
and the feeling that the victory had been won together, contributed to this 
change of attitudes. is shi was earlier and more distinct than a similar 
change among the Swedish right, who remained unwilling to give up their 
dominant position until the fall of the German monarchy. e Finnish right, 
though reformist and viewing itself as the champion of the cause of the 
people, interpreted Social Democratic policies in 1917 and 1918 as arising 
from a wrong kind of mass democracy but were forced to rethink their stance 
aer the fall of the Prussian system and the need for recognition from the 
Entente powers. e German right, by contrast, never voiced any readiness 
to approve democracy during the constitutional ferment of 1917–19.
3.1.4  Creating a ‘Parliament of the people’ while   
 avoiding a ‘constitutional revolution’ 
As we saw in subsection 3.1.2, the British debate remained relatively 
independent of that in other countries. However, the outbreak of the Russian 
Revolution had an eect on it, even if the timing of the Representation of the 
People Bill probably depended more on the preparatory process launched 
in late 1916 and the American entry into the war than on reactions to the 
upheaval going on in Britain’s ally in the east. Owing to the considerable 
geographical distance and dierences in the political cultures, the British 
were interested in the implications of the Revolution for the British war 
eort, not in its eects on the political order at home, the far le being the 
only exception. No revolutionary party of notable signicance existed, so it 
was hard for most to see how the Russian Revolution could change Britain; 
in Berlin, Stockholm and Helsinki, the Russian transformation next door 
was observed with greater enthusiasm or concern. Nevertheless, aer the 
Bolshevik Revolution, the potential implications for domestic politics were 
seen more distinctly in Britain as well.
When the opposition leader Arthur Salter claimed that the Representation 
of the People Bill would disrupt relations with the Allied nations, someone 
347 Hansard, Henry Cavendish-Bentinck, 23 May 1917, c. 2409. In his Tory 
Democracy (1918), Bentinck would complain about the decline in nationalism 
and paternalism. McCrillis 1998, 29.
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interrupted him by shouting: ‘What about the Russian Revolution?’348 
e interpellator’s implication was that constitutions were changing 
internationally and that the political role of the people was changing 
transnationally. In the March debates, the MPs were wary of drawing 
conclusions about the meaning of the Russian Revolution for the world 
– and for Britain – as so little was yet known about it. e concept of 
‘revolution’ was nevertheless in the air. A Conservative opposed to any 
revolutionary change applied the term to what the British government was 
doing, basing his argument on the initial decision of the Conservative party 
organs to question the mandate of the current parliament to introduce such 
a change:349 According to Arnold Ward, the War Cabinet was attempting 
to impose a revolution on Britain by unfair means, aer rst changing its 
mind. Ward quoted Lloyd George’s speech from 1915, in which he had 
stated: ‘I cannot conceive of a revolution of this character being introduced 
into our Constitution without the opinion of the country being asked 
upon it denitely.’350 is intertextual reference, a device always available 
to parliamentary debaters seeking a line of argument that could be revived, 
made the Prime Minister contradict himself. Ward’s seemingly democratic 
Conservative conclusion was that the revolution should be halted and the 
proposal subjected to a referendum aer the war, or at least made an issue 
in a new election.351 
Aer Ward’s rhetorical redescription of revolution, other Conservative 
anti-reformists made use of the concept to describe in derogatory terms 
what was happening or might occur in Britain. If revolution in Britain 
was to be avoided, why did the government intend to introduce ‘the most 
disastrous and revolutionary measure that could be conceived’ by proposing 
the extension of franchise to women? For the nobleman Richard Chaloner, 
this was ‘the greatest revolution which has ever happened in any country of 
the world’ as it meant that the female majority would take over power from 
men many of whom had died in the war.352 Sir Henry Craik suggested that 
the British government had understood the recent events in Russia wrongly, 
there being no need for a revolution like the Russian one as Britain was not 
an autocracy:353
If there were great changes necessary in this country, if we were curbed under 
a military or bureaucratic autocracy or an aristocratic or Imperial autocracy, 
it might be necessary to do what our great Ally in Russia has done – out those 
chains by revolution. But does anyone think at this moment that this country has 
its political instincts curbed or its liberties checked? . . . Do we think that this 
country’s democratic interests are being set aside?
348 Hansard, Arthur Salter, 28 March 1917, c. 473.
349 McCrillis 1998, 14–15; Evans 2000, 87.
350 Hansard, Arnold Ward, 28 March 1917, c. 499–500; see also P. Magnus, 28 March 
1917, c. 538; see Saunders 2013b, 78, for similar pre-war claims.
351 Hansard, Arnold Ward, 28 March 1917, c. 500.
352 Hansard, Richard Chaloner, 28 March 1917, c. 526.
353 Hansard, Sir Henry Craik, 28 March 1917, c. 549–50. 
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e juxtaposition of the Russian Revolution and women’s surage in Britain 
was a rhetorical ploy, suggesting that the War Cabinet was bringing about 
a revolution for the wrong reasons. 
e Russian Revolution was present in Walter Long’s reformist 
Conservative contribution in March in a more implicit way – connected 
with the impact of the war in general. For Long, Britain was a fortunate 
country which had experienced no revolution since 1688 but had developed 
its political system evolutionarily through moderate reforms. e reform at 
hand concerned the involvement of all the people in the political process in 
order to strengthen the legitimacy of Parliament:354
Great events have happened. If we are wise, we shall retain all the blessings that 
we have got, and we shall, I believe, get many new ones. But if we are going to 
face these great problems, Imperial and domestic, it will only be possible if we 
make this House, so far as it is possible, really representative of the people of 
this country. Let them feel that they have a grievance, let them feel that you have 
refused a reform of a moderate character when the reform was possible, and 
you will have a discontented House of Commons and, what is worse, a highly 
discontented people, who will refuse to recognise your right to act in their name 
or decide these great issues for them.
e reform, if supported by the opposition Conservatives, would remove 
political discontent among the people, who were in principle capable of 
turning the balanced system from the path of evolutionary development 
onto that of revolution. While the Conservatives were holding this internal 
debate on revolution in March, the Labour MPs made no explicit reference 
to the Russian Revolution even though (or perhaps precisely because) their 
supporters were enthusiastic about it.355 e Liberals were not excited by the 
event at all. 
In May, a couple of Conservative opponents continued to criticise the 
government proposal as revolutionary. According to Sir Frederick Banbury, 
Member for the City, the government was proposing ‘a greater revolution’ 
than any previous surage reform at a questionable time.356 Ramsay 
MacDonald from the Labour opposition was now ready to insinuate that 
a real revolution of the Russian kind, ‘the doctrinaire illusions’ of which were 
constantly in the news,357 might reach Britain if this reform failed. According 
to MacDonald, ‘the people outside’ were concerned about concrete problems 
which they expected Parliament to solve eectively. If this did not happen, 
an actual revolution might come about:358
354 Hansard, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 28 March 1917, c. 521.
355 orpe 2001, 37; Wrigley 2009, 91. 
356 Hansard, Sir Frederick Banbury, 23 May 1917, c. 2387, 2392; also Lord Hugh 
Cecil, 22 May 1917, c. 2187.
357 See e Manchester Guardian, ‘Russian Democracy’s Peace Aim’, 22 May 1917.
358 Hansard, Ramsay MacDonald, 22 May 1917, c. 2222. e Herald had written 
about an incipient revolution on 7 April, and on 26 May it would complain about 
‘an eete Parliament’ that had ‘abdicated its functions’.
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Is this House of Commons going to waste month aer month . . . with the sorry 
spectacle of wrangling over questions of franchise when these tremendous vital 
problems are being fought outside. As a matter of fact, you will have a revolution 
if you try that game. . . . [Y]ou are going to have the country rising up and telling 
you to be gone. 
In the exceptional consensual atmosphere of spring 1917, when only a few 
Conservatives were critical of the proposed reform, this was a provocative 
use of language, particularly as even moderate socialists tended to be 
suspected of revolutionary endeavours. MacDonald was making use of the 
same tactic that such reformers had in their possession everywhere: the 
extreme le might attempt a revolution if the proposals of the moderates 
were not accepted. e Finnish Social Democrats were making this point 
throughout 1917 in order to force the non-socialist parties into concessions; 
the Swedish Social Democrats did so in 1917 and 1918 in order to push 
through the surage reform; and the German Social Democrats emphasised 
the undesirable alternative of the far le in spring 1919. MacDonald argued 
that in comparison with the possibility of a real revolution, the bill on the 
table was not going to ‘bring about very revolutionary results.’359 Some 
Conservatives, he claimed, were exaggerating the degree of constitutional 
transformation and were increasing the risk of a real revolution with their 
unyielding opposition.
is hint of revolution gave rise to Conservative condemnations. Sir 
Henry Craik explained again that no need for a revolution of the Russian 
kind existed in Britain, which, unlike other countries, had long traditions 
of liberty and democracy making evolutionary, peaceful progress.360 e 
accelerating dynamics of the parliamentary debate led to the clarication of 
the arguments on both sides: other speakers continued to imply that the lack 
of a reform reconstructing the relationship between the people, Parliament 
and the government could lead to more revolutionary developments, or 
alternatively to oppose such a reform as revolutionary. Britain might not 
be that dierent from other nations in the post-war situation: possible 
upheavals might destabilise the established political order and institutions 
like Parliament. Without indulging in any openly Marxist or anti-
parliamentary argumentation, George Wardle (Labour), Parliamentary 
Secretary of the Board of Trade, considered the changes brought about by 
the war so fundamental that ‘a real constitutional reform’ had become timely 
to restore the legitimacy of Parliament:361
e War has thrown institutions, ideas, and opinions all into the melting-pot, 
and we want to get the people of the country absolutely associated with this 
House in all its proceedings, and unless we can get the people with us there will 
be changes of another and worse character eected. I believe in constitutional 
reform. I believe that you can associate the people and the House of Commons 
359 Hansard, Ramsay MacDonald, 22 May 1917, c. 2224.
360 Hansard, Sir Henry Craik, 22 May 1917, c. 2237.
361 Hansard, George Wardle, 23 May 1917, c. 2367.
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and the Government together, and that the more closely you associate the people 
with this House the more certain will it be that the Government and the people 
will tend more and more to become one.
Provocations from both sides were leading to clearer arguments, albeit still 
reasonably moderate and constructive ones, explaining leist revisionism 
in a way that remained acceptable to the Conservative allies in the War 
Cabinet. In Wardle’s vision, Britain would strengthen legitimacy and avoid 
revolution by carrying out an immediate surage reform and creating 
a stronger association between Parliament, the government and the people. 
Wardle, who had earned the respect of the right with his full support for the 
war eort, justied his argument with conventional references to historical 
examples of parliamentary reforms rather than with any socialist ideology, 
but still pointing out that revolution and violence could be expected from 
the people if a proper reform was not carried out. Labour pressure was 
formulated using the constitutional history of the nation in a way that was 
challenging and persuasive at the same time:362
[I]f this franchise reform is not to meet with, as has so oen happened in the past, 
a dead wall of opposition, which has provoked strong feeling to such an extent 
in the country on all these occasions hitherto we have had the burning spirit of 
revolution spread among the people and there has actually had to be bloodshed 
before franchise reform was carried; if we do not want to provoke that result we 
must face things in a calm atmosphere with a desire to have these things settled. 
e people will demand it.
Wardle, like revisionist Social Democrats elsewhere, represented the people 
as a potentially active agent in the process of constitutional change. e 
proposed reform, would give the House of Commons ‘a new glory and 
a new position in the minds of the people’363 provided that the people did 
not need to engage in revolutionary activities. Parliamentary government 
would just be made more popular.
Wardle’s point contributed to a cross-party spirit among the defenders of 
the bill: it was followed by a call from William Hayes Fisher (Conservative), 
Parliamentary Secretary for the Local Government Board, for the creation 
of ‘a Parliament of the people’ (as opposed to the current parliament) that 
would be able to deal with future problems without a danger of confrontation 
with the people.364 is provides an illustrative example of the dynamics of 
the parliamentary debate, in which a discursive attack was answered with 
a counter-attack that led to more radical joint denitions across party 
lines of what the entire constitutional change was about. e process of 
parliamentary debate in Britain allowed the majorities of the le and the 
right – both sitting in the War Coalition – to construct a compromise. 
A  decisive background factor was that the Labour leaders had been 
362 Hansard, George Wardle, 23 May 1917, c. 2367–8.
363 Hansard, George Wardle, 23 May 1917, c. 2368.
364 Hansard, William Hayes Fisher, 23 May 1917, c. 2380.
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eectively integrated into the wartime government – unlike in Germany or 
in Finland, where the parliamentary reform process failed fatally in 1917. 
Cooperation in a coalition removed extreme ideological arguments from 
the debate and supported attempts to nd common denominators. Even 
leading Conservatives might call for the creation of ‘a Parliament of the 
people’, recalling Lloyd George’s controversial People’s Budget in 1909. is 
was something that no representative of the German, Swedish or Finnish 
right, who on principle did not cooperate with socialists, would do. e 
attitudinal transition of the British right into an era of mass democracy had 
proceeded further than in the other three countries, and this was built on 
experiences of compromise with the Labour Party, which had collaborated 
in government from 1915 on.
3.1.5  A new Parliament – ‘a mirror of the nation’ engaging 
 the citizens and placing its trust in the masses
A ‘Parliament of the people’ had become the goal of the British War Coalition. 
All the parties participating in the Speaker’s Conference had in principle 
agreed on the creation of a parliament that would be both trusted by the 
people and able to carry out the massive legislative tasks that were expected 
aer the war. As H. H. Asquith (Liberal) put it when introducing the bill, 
‘the nation’ should be given ‘a truly representative House of Commons, 
capable of dealing, and dealing eectively, with the many gigantic problems 
which it will have to face and solve’.365 e proposal would lead to the 
creation of ‘an authentic and authoritative exponent of the national will’ in 
solving the post-war crisis.366 Such deliberate wartime usage of the collective 
concept ‘national will’ diered from the conventional British understanding 
of parliamentary politics as confrontational resulting from the plurality of 
interests and views that were involved in it. e emphasis on ‘the nation’ 
rather than ‘the people’, too, underlined this impression of an unanimity of 
opinion. Even though the British concept never reached the inclusiveness of 
the Swedish or Finnish or especially the German concepts of the will of the 
people, the war also strengthened British ways of thinking about a uniform 
national community with one will – although such a community did not, of 
course, necessarily support parliamentary democracy. 
e ideals of parliamentarism were not to be questioned in Britain. At 
the opening of the May debates, George Cave (Conservative), the Secretary 
of State for the Home Department, introduced the bill as a move towards 
‘the ideal of representative Government’, in which Parliament was ‘a mirror 
of the nation’.367 e government emphasised the stability of the British 
system in comparison with Europe since 1832: it had been reformed 
through gradual evolution rather than revolutions of the Continental type. 
e suggested extension of surage would, again, free ‘this country from the 
365 Quoted by Hansard, H. H. Asquith, 28 March 1917, c. 465–6.
366 Hansard, H. H. Asquith, 28 March 1917, c. 471.
367 Hansard, Sir George Cave, 22 May 1917, c. 2134; the notion of ‘a faithful mirror 
of the whole nation’ was repeated by John Bertrand Watson, 22 May 1917, 
c. 2167.
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civil turmoil which we have seen during that period in almost every country 
in Europe’.368 All Conservatives were expected to be proud of a unique 
parliamentary polity which had grown gradually and consensually towards 
greater perfection. e reform at hand suited this view, distancing Britain 
from unwanted revolutionary anarchy and reinforcing its model status in 
the world.369
Conservative lawyers dened the bill as aimed at realising a more proper 
representation of the people in Parliament. Ernest Pollock considered it 
necessary to establish ‘a fair mirror of what the thoughts and feelings of 
the people are’.370 For party leader Bonar Law, whose business background 
had helped to modify the aristocratic image of the party, the reform was 
about developing ‘constitutional and Parliamentary government’ so that it 
could ‘represent the feeling of the people as a whole.’371 Law had lost two 
sons in the war, which had made him highly aware of the sacrices of all 
classes of the people and of their expectations of representation. e same 
wish for a more representative Commons was put in even stronger terms 
by a Conservative who had fought in the war himself: Major E. F. L. Wood 
declared: ‘is House ought to regain the leadership of the nation, which, 
in my opinion, it is in danger of losing.’ e Coalition’s ‘bold scheme of 
reform’ would constitute ‘the foundation stone of your post-war policy.’372 
e restoration of the power of the Commons was to take place not only in 
the eyes of the people but also in relation to the government, the power of 
which had grown during the war. 
Henry Cavendish-Bentinck went furthest in emphasising the urgency 
of strengthening the political engagement of the people. is aristocratic 
but reformist Conservative was convinced that ‘never in the history of 
this country was it more important that the Government of the country 
should be broad-based upon the people’s will’ and Parliament ‘thoroughly 
representative of the people’.373 Building on what he had read in the papers 
and experienced in the eld, Cavendish-Bentinck sketched a pessimistic 
scenario in which ‘the power and the sovereignty of this House’ were being 
questioned and a further concentration of power in the person of the prime 
minister and the bureaucracy without their being constantly answerable 
to Parliament was being planned.374 Cavendish-Bentinck, who also talked 
about an alliance between the Conservatives and democracy, was the only 
MP to explicitly take up parliamentary sovereignty and governmental 
responsibility. 
ere was total disagreement among some opposition Unionists in their 
interpretations of the popular will. According to Arthur Salter, a surage 
reform carried out by the parliamentary elite at a time of war would give 
368 Hansard, Sir George Cave, 22 May 1917, c. 2134.
369 See Seaward & Ihalainen 2016.
370 Hansard, Ernest Pollock, 28 March 1917, c. 505–506.
371 Hansard, e Chancellor of the Exchequer, 28 March 1917, c. 559.
372 Hansard, Edward Frederick Lindley Wood, 28 March 1917, c. 547.
373 Hansard, Henry Cavendish-Bentinck, 23 May 1917, c. 2408–9.
374 Hansard, Henry Cavendish-Bentinck, 23 May 1917, c. 2408–9.
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rise to deep ‘popular exasperation’. In Salter’s traditional ‘country’ rhetoric, 
the parliamentary politicians and parties appeared to be in opposition 
to the people and the soldiers. He also questioned the representativeness 
of the views of the local political elites, with whom the parliamentarians 
communicated, regarding the people, suggesting that the opposition 
knew better what the people wanted.375 is constructed contrast between 
a  parliamentary majority supporting the bill and the supposed views of 
the people at large recalled images from the early 1910s, when the Liberal 
government had been accused of preventing the Lords from acting as a truer 
representatives of the people than the Commons could be. 
Ernest Pollock (Conservative) responded by insisting that ordinary 
soldiers viewed the reform as a more useful piece of legislation than many 
other laws passed during the war. Whereas some soldiers might consider 
the closure of Parliament best for the nation, the parliamentary elite needed 
to explain to them that ‘while they are ghting we are engaged in giving 
them something which will be useful to them when they return home’.376 
Despite the divide between the people and Parliament, ‘the people at large’ 
wanted Parliament to solve the old disputes on surage. A crisis concerning 
the legitimacy of the entire parliamentary form of government might arise 
if the Commons was not sensitive to interpreting this will of the people; 
there was the risk that ‘the impatience will be extreme’ and ‘the people will 
turn from us in disgust.’377 e nation could not aord to let the people 
reject Parliament. is had become the conviction of the majority of the 
parliamentary Conservative Party by spring 1917, despite some remaining 
bitterness over the Parliament Act.
Halford Mackinder (Scottish Unionist) likewise viewed the reform as an 
opportunity for ‘a more general compromise aecting the whole political 
machinery’ so that the political system would be capable of focusing on 
solving more concrete problems aecting the lives of the people. is had to 
be done as ‘it is an entire mistake to imagine that they [the people] have lost 
interest in politics’; they were just ‘taking quite a dierent interest in politics’ 
than the parliamentarians themselves.378 A failure to reform the constitution 
would endanger not only the political future of individual parliamentarians 
but, much more grievously, that of the British political system as a whole, 
including Parliament and the monarchy. According to Mackinder, the 
atmosphere was favourable for compromise between the politicians and 
should be used to solve constitutional disputes. Such a compromise was, 
indeed, ‘important to us far more than it is to the masses of the people of 
this country.’ It was to duty of the politicians ‘to adapt our Constitution to 
the new time’.379 One implication of this was that the Lords also needed to be 
375 Hansard, Arthur Salter, 28 March 1917, c. 476, 481.
376 Hansard, Ernest Pollock, 28 March 1917, c. 503.
377 Hansard, Ernest Pollock, 28 March 1917, c. 504.
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reformed.380 Commander Josiah Wedgwood, an independent Liberal radical, 
made a related point when he suggested that ‘representative government’ 
demanded the reform; otherwise the people would lose interest and be 
deprived of ‘eective action in politics’, which might lead to ‘Parliamentary 
institutions’ being challenged by ‘the direct action . . . of a minority’.381 is 
reects a rising concern about the direction that the Russian Revolution 
might take. Reform was needed to prevent a revolution or – as Caradoc Rees 
(Liberal), Parliamentary Secretary for Home Oce, put it – to make every 
citizen ‘take a keen interest in politics’.382
A further noteworthy feature in the debate is the recognition of the 
essentiality of publicity for parliamentary government. e relationship 
between parliamentary debates and publicity had changed profoundly since 
the late eighteenth century. Aer prolonged defences of the parliamentary 
privilege to deliberate in secret, most of the British parliamentary elite 
had recognised the role of public debate as a necessary part of the 
parliamentary decision-making process, an element that constituted much 
of the legitimacy of parliamentary politics.383 e war had naturally changed 
the implementation of this principle: ocial censorship, despite the free 
reporting of parliamentary proceedings and the liberation of editorials from 
control, did not allow the normal functioning of the public debate; much of 
the press, in supporting the war eort, also tended to defend the domestic 
policies of the government.384 e British parliamentarians continued to 
recognise the signicance of public opinion in wartime to a greater extent 
than their colleagues elsewhere. However, they drew their own political 
conclusions as to what the current trend of public opinion was. According 
to the Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, the opinion of the public on 
women’s surage had changed as a consequence of the war and so had that 
of the majority of parliamentarians.385 Two years previously, he had still said 
that the ordinary methods of democracy were not applicable to publicity in 
wartime.386 At the same time, opposition Conservatives were not so certain 
about this change in public opinion and maintained that any necessary 
public debate on the reform was likely to lead to controversies that should 
be avoided in wartime.387 Hugh Cecil, who had already fought against 
the Parliament Bill, complained that the circumstances of the war had 
marginalised public opinion as a necessary extra-parliamentary element of 
the decision-making process:388 
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Under normal circumstances you have the Cabinet preparing a Bill. You have 
Parliament discussing it at length. You have a vigilant public opinion outside 
noting what Parliament is doing and assisting in criticising it, and the like. 
We have no public opinion at present. en how are you going to get this Bill 
properly criticised by all those various sorts of people interested in it in dierent 
parts of the country? . . . Now at present nobody will pay the slightest attention 
to it. ey are inevitably concerned with the War.
Cecil, though opposed to extended surage, was touching on the very 
point of the legitimacy of representative parliamentary government: it 
included the participation of the press in the legislative process and through 
the press the public at large. e public could assist in developing a bill 
through an interactive discussion, but such a debate was impossible in 
the circumstances of a total war. Frederick Banbury likewise argued that 
there was no excitement in the press about the reform as everybody was 
concerned with the war and remained unfamiliar with the content of the 
debate – particularly as the press did not dare to challenge the government 
on such a key issue during the war.389 is was certainly true, and it was used 
by the opposition as argument to obstruct the reform.
Claims about the lack of a public debate caused some supporters to 
oer evidence of the extra-parliamentary popularity of the bill,390 and 
some asserted that there was indeed ‘an intelligent discussion of these great 
problems in the Press’ going on.391 Herbert Samuel (Liberal), a spokesman 
for women’s surage, asked whether ‘any expression of public opinion 
of any moment in any portion of the nation’ which would oppose the 
parliamentary attempt to solve the constitutional issues could be shown. 
Should Parliament fail to nd a solution, ‘the opinion of the nation at large’ 
would take it as a demonstration of the incompetence of Parliament, and 
‘Parliamentary institutions themselves would be brought into contempt.’392 
To put it another way, public opinion was present despite the war, and it 
put pressure on Parliament to introduce the reform and thereby earn its 
legitimacy. Harry Hope (Conservative) concluded with a related point that 
the House of Commons needed to bring ‘the public opinion of the country 
. . . more into direct contact with this House’. is meant taking ‘the people 
into our condence . . . [and] establish[ing] the Constitution on a sound 
basis.’393 e majorities of both leading parties thus interpreted public 
opinion as being in favour of the agreed policy of reform.
Parliament should be truly representative of the people, and public 
opinion should be in contact with Parliament, but what exactly would the 
political role of the citizens be? While any debate on citizenship was meagre 
and focused on the need to extend the concept to include women, there 
were several Conservative assurances of the competence of British citizens 
389 Hansard, Sir Frederick Banbury, 23 May 1917, c. 2386.
390 Hansard, Cecil Cochrane, 22 May 1917, c. 2208.
391 Hansard, George Reid, 23 May 1917, c. 2369.
392 Hansard, Herbert Samuel, 23 May 1917, c. 2345; cf. Samuel’s complaint about the 
lack of interest in the bill in the press. e Times, ‘House of Commons’, 24 May 
1917.
393 Hansard, Harry Hope, 23 May 1917, c. 2416.
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to exercise the right to vote (the essence of citizenship) since the basic 
education of the people had been much improved.394 Henry Wilson-Fox 
(Conservative) was positive that the people in Britain constituted a thinking 
electorate ‘competent to consider and take an interest as citizens in the great 
public questions of the day, and who will give you a Legislature which will 
be worthy of the country and the people’.395 Henry Cavendish-Bentinck 
recommended with elevated rhetoric that Parliament should ‘throw open 
widely the gates of liberty’ as ‘liberty will be justied of its children, and 
we may look forward to the future with condence and hope.’396 Opening 
the gates of liberty stood for the introduction of universal surage, 
including women, and trust in its positive eects on the political system. 
Such condence in the people at large in building a better future was rarely 
expressed by the members of the right in any of the other studied countries. 
at the British Liberals had come to share this view by 1917 is not so 
surprising, even though many among them had only recently changed their 
views on women’s surage. George orne, an old campaigner for women’s 
surage, asserted that both sexes had ‘exhibited . . . citizenship in the highest 
possible form’ during the war and were now, with the bill, enabled ‘to carry 
on their citizenship in time of peace’. He insisted that ‘our future and our 
destiny depend upon our broadening the base of the people’s condence 
in this House of Commons’.397 Herbert Samuel accused the opponents of 
the bill of being ready to ‘deny the rights which ordinary citizens should 
have’,398 while Aneurin Williams declared that the parliamentarians wanted 
to ‘represent all our citizens’.399 Samuel’s optimistic message to the political 
elite was that they should ‘take the mass – the good and bad – and trust 
to them, and, in the long run, they will prove trustworthy’.400 His practical 
advice was that the reform could be supported not only by speeches but 
also with ‘opportune silence’ during the committee stage.401 is represented 
a rhetorical attempt to curb parliamentary deliberation. 
e prospects for the reformed parliamentary polity were depicted in 
overwhelmingly positive terms. It was part of the ocial line of the War 
Cabinet that a major change in political life was unavoidable as a consequence 
of the war. H. H. Asquith, a former opponent of female surage, recognised 
that women would play a more considerable role ‘in the new order of things 
– for, do not doubt it, the old order will be changed’.402 Prime Minister David 
Lloyd George went beyond the gender issue in drawing conclusions about 
the fundamental change that the war had already brought about in British 
394 Hansard, George Welsh Currie (Scottish Unionist), 28 March 1917, c. 534. Currie 
would later move to the Labour Party.
395 Hansard, Henry Wilson-Fox, 23 May 1917, c. 2336.
396 Hansard, Henry Cavendish-Bentinck, 23 May 1917, c. 2409.
397 Hansard, George orne, 23 May 1917, c. 2415–16.
398 Hansard, Herbert Samuel, 22 May 1917, c. 2181. 
399 Hansard, Aneurin Williams, 23 May 1917, c. 2329.
400 Hansard, Herbert Samuel, 23 May 1917, c. 2346.
401 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Electoral Reform’, 24 May 1917.
402 Hansard, H. H. Asquith, 28 March 1917, c. 469–70.
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politics, arguing (over)optimistically not only that ‘there has been a new 
temper created in this country’ but also that:403  
there will be a new temper created by the peace, a new determination, a new 
spirit, not the spirit of party-wrangling and conict, but the unity which you have 
had during the War will be transposed to, will be infused into the eorts of peace. 
ough it was a rhetorical manoeuvre, the Prime Minister’s argument 
illustrates how fundamental were the political changes that the war was seen 
to have brought about. e political parties were a commonplace object of 
criticism; party politics would, in Lloyd George’s propagandistic vision, be 
avoided aer the restoration of peace. e people might even take over from 
the parties:404
[T]hey do not mean that the tremendous question of the reconstruction of this 
country and this Empire shall be entrusted to the control of any party machine. 
ey mean to take it into their own hands.
e Prime Minister, although very much a party politician aiming at re-
election, was challenging the political elite and especially the opposition in 
populistic terms. is speech act aimed at constructing consensual support 
for the current government. Such an anti-party attack did not go totally 
unopposed: Leslie Scott (Conservative) set out to defend ‘the party system 
as essential to the good working of all democratic institutions’.405 
e Unionist opponents did not share the optimism of the government. 
Arthur Salter spoke ironically about ‘an augury for the future of the happiest 
kind. We are witnessing the dissolution of the old order, and as soon as 
the War has ended we shall look about us in a new world’.406 Henry Craik, 
too, conceded that ‘we know that aer the War things will be changed, and 
nothing will be as before’.407 Bonar Law, the Conservative leader, responded 
by emphasising the immense possibilities which would be opened to 
Britain once the war was over, if only the reconstruction could start under 
a settled constitution. e momentum created by the war was to be used 
because ‘Conferences of this kind would be condemned for the future’.408 
Leslie Scott believed in the nation being able to build ‘national prosperity, 
happiness, and well-being in the future’ given that the reform would provide 
adequate representation for all ‘in the process of moulding the new life of 
the nation that we call reconstruction’.409 Henry Cavendish-Bentinck went 
furthest in forecasting a major turn in the British political culture: people 
all around the country had started to realise ‘newer and wider sympathies 
403 Hansard, David Lloyd George, 28 March 1917, c. 495.
404 Hansard, David Lloyd George, 28 March 1917, c. 496.
405 Hansard, Leslie Scott, 23 May 1917, c. 2362.
406 Hansard, Arthur Salter, 28 March 1917, c. 471.
407 Hansard, Sir Henry Craik, 28 March 1917, c. 550.
408 Hansard, e Chancellor of the Exchequer, 28 March 1917, c. 558.
409 Hansard, Leslie Scott, 23 May 1917, c. 2359, 2361.
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and possibilities of a community of aim which is utterly beyond the ideas of 
the old oligarchy’.410 Cooperation with such new forces would aect politics 
and social life positively.411 e other parties did not need to get engaged 
in a debate with the Conservative sceptics since most of the Conservative 
speakers, having selected extended surage as their party strategy, were 
arguing so consistently for the reform of parliamentary government.
3.1.6  The committee stage during a campaign  
 for amendments 
In early June, extensive debates in a committee of the entire Commons 
started. Conservative opposition had by no means withered away, and the 
Unionists now focused actively on amending the bill.412 Much discussion 
concerned technicalities, such as the qualications for citizenship, the 
redistribution of seats or the realisation of representation in constituencies. 
In the public debate, the lack of which had been lamented, all this was 
overshadowed by news from the battleelds,413 which strengthened doubts 
about how necessary and popular the reform actually was. Under war 
censorship and a rising awareness of a potentially spreading transnational 
revolution, no extensive public debate for and against a constitutional 
reform ever emerged. As some speakers had insinuated, it was in the interest 
of the political elite, once they had reached a compromise on the extension 
of surage, to pass the bill among themselves, without too many appeals 
to extra-parliamentary publicity. And as Vernon Bogdanor has pointed 
out, the public had mainly been interested in the controversial question of 
female surage and had le the questions of male surage, proportional 
representation and the constitutional status of the Lords to the political 
elite to decide.414 Hence the impression given by the parliamentary debates, 
too, was that the MPs considered it their duty to design a working political 
system for the people to employ aer the war through the privilege of voting.
British political history has mainly focused on the stances of the parties on 
extended surage. As we also saw in the analysis above, the bill was a source 
of controversy particularly for the Conservatives. Many in the party, as in its 
sister parties elsewhere, had initially been opposed to suggestions to extend 
surage and continued to hold divergent views on the need to support the 
reform. ough some speakers had declared their trust in the masses in 
accordance with the line of the party leadership, they were not so sure about 
the possibilities of educating the newly enfranchised sections of the people 
politically (though some saw the existence of possibilities for this415) and 
thereby restraining democratic excesses that might include rising taxes, social 
410 Hansard, Henry Cavendish-Bentinck, 23 May 1917, c. 2410.
411 Hansard, Henry Cavendish-Bentinck, 23 May 1917, c. 2410.
412 McCrillis 1998, 15–16, 19.
413 Machin 2001, 142–4.
414 Bogdanor 2003a, 27.
415 e Bolshevik Revolution gave rise to a discussion about the relationship 
between democracy and education. e Times, ‘An Educated Democracy’, 20 
December 1917.
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programmes, demagoguery, revolution and even dictatorship. However, 
many British Conservatives reconsidered their stands on democracy earlier 
than their ideological brethren on the Continent: in the end only 40 MPs, 
mainly from the countryside, voted against the bill. e majority believed 
in Conservative support among the soldiers, many were moving towards an 
acceptance of limited female surage, and several were genuinely touched 
by the patriotism exhibited by the workers during the war. It also seemed 
obvious that the reallocation of constituencies – agreed between Liberal 
and Conservative party ocials in order to prevent competition within the 
Coalition – would aect Conservative seats in a positive way. During the 
committee debates, many wanted to bring up features of the old electoral 
system that had been favourable for them, including plural voting on 
economic grounds and university constituencies, rather than the principle 
of universal surage or the nature of the future parliamentary polity.416 As 
some Liberal back-benchers wanted to do the same, there was a lot of intra-
party debate in addition to the usual inter-party confrontations, a situation 
that tended to frustrate the government.417 e press, for its part, mostly 
focused on the success of the parliamentary performances rather than on the 
substance of the arguments,418 which certainly did not encourage a public 
debate on the principles of democracy and parliamentarism.
e British surage reform has understandably oen been discussed 
from the perspective of gender. In this analysis, questions of gender have 
been viewed only insofar as the parliamentarians regarded them as directly 
aecting the nature of the future political community. e issue of female 
surage had been postponed by the war: it had, in fact, already received 
majority support in the Commons before the war but had divided the parties 
and hence remained unresolved.419 For many Conservatives, the gender issue 
remained relevant in 1917: voting women continued to be – despite all the 
arguments of female contributions to the war eort and the growing support 
for female surage – a spectre to be opposed. e Liberals, by contrast, 
wanted to see a simultaneous extension of surage to both men and women. 
However, many Conservatives, too, were becoming increasingly condent in 
their stands in favour of surage reform, whereas the opponents were losing 
faith as a consequence of indications in the press, the party organisation and 
the army that public opinion was strongly in favour of women’s surage. By 
late spring 1917, even many anti-suragist peers began to consider that it 
was hopeless to oppose the majority of the Commons on this issue.420 e 
conversions may not have been entirely sincere421 but perhaps it would make 
more sense to try to win the women over to the Conservative side instead. Ian 
Machin suggests that women’s surage was introduced in order to prevent 
416 Close 1977, 895, 908, 917; Ball 1995, 63; Pugh 2002, 157, 172–3.
417 Turner 1992, 216.
418 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Electoral Reform’, 23–24 May 1917.
419 Machin 2001, 126.
420 Close 1977, 904–5; Machin 2001, 126.
421 Gullace 2002, 187.
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the expected revival of this old and (in the circumstances of ghting for 
‘democracy’, as the war propaganda claimed) internationally inconvenient 
problem aer the war. An age limit of 30 on female surage was needed to 
ensure Conservative support as well.422 We might also regard limited female 
surage as a measure designed to prevent revolutionary tendencies: women 
were expected to think about their male relatives at the front and vote 
Conservative, whereas among the combatant men there might be radicals 
who were sympathetic to revolutionary demagogy.
Nor was universal male surage an easy political right for the 
Conservatives to award. Even if they did not say so aloud, they were 
particularly concerned about indications since the start of the Russian 
Revolution that support for the Labour Party was rising as a reection of the 
spreading revolutionary mood, and they assumed that any extension of the 
franchise would benet the Socialists. It was thought that a Labour victory 
would lead to growing demands for social reforms that would jeopardise 
Conservative interests and should therefore be resisted with measures such 
as the introduction of proportional representation in large cities423 or with 
selective female surage. 
However, few Conservatives accepted being labelled as ‘defenders of 
the old world’ and openly opposed the reform; this was in contrast to the 
adoption of similar self-description by the German, Swedish and much of the 
Finnish right. David H. Close has suggested that it was their fear of Labour 
that made many Conservatives assent to the reforms of 1917.424 In much the 
same way, the Finnish right had opposed further parliamentarisation out of 
a fear of a Socialist majority but nally agreed to a republican compromise 
in 1919; the Swedish right would reduce their resistance to universal surage 
in November 1918 when they saw reform as the only option for securing 
their remaining interests; and much of the German right would stay quiet 
in the Weimar Assembly, allowing the republican constitution to be passed 
without actively backing the project. e British Conservative strategy of 
conning socialism was successful and guaranteed a gentler transition to 
parliamentary democracy than continued opposition would have done.
As far as the views on revolution, democracy, the participation of the 
people and parliamentarism are concerned, the committee stage brought 
little that was new to the plenaries of the spring. Some points – mainly 
concerning the continued opposition of a minority within the Conservatives 
and summarising the main counterarguments – are nevertheless worth 
making. ere was a clear tendency to obstruct the process by excessive 
repetition of the same arguments. ese were: 
(1) ‘We do not want a revolution.’ Some Conservatives continued 
to insist that the introduction of women’s surage stood for a revolution 
(potentially of the Russian kind) and that the current Parliament, elected 
in 1910, had no mandate to introduce the bill, so it should be postponed 
422 Machin 2001, 140.
423 Close 1977, 905–906. 
424 Close 1977, 910.
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till aer the war.425 Joseph Compton-Rickett, a Liberal who supported the 
reform, on the contrary, considered it necessary for Britain to participate 
in the transnational ‘revolutionary and complete’ change of franchise that 
was taking place.426 A Conservative reformist like Robert Cecil answered the 
opponents with a further rhetorical redescription, suggesting that the anti-
suragist attitude against women’s surage entailed ‘a complete revolution 
in the institutions of our country’.427
(2) ‘No majority- or female-dominated democracy.’ John Rawlinson 
(Conservative), MP for Cambridge University, while viewing Britain as 
a ‘democracy’ among other democracies, called for the strengthening of the 
upper chamber in the fashion of the United States and France as a safeguard 
against the negative consequences of reform.428 In the British context, this 
stood for the repeal of the Parliament Act of 1911. Another repeated claim 
derived from the concept of ‘democracy’ was that a stable government 
demanded the concentration of political power in the hands of those who 
possessed physical force, i.e. men capable of military service. e opponents 
of women’s surage, who included some individual Liberals, refused to 
give the supporters the sole right to call themselves ‘true democrats’ or to 
accuse the opponents of ‘Prussianism’. One counter-argument was that the 
government’s proposal was not democratic as it did not award surage to 
men and women on the same terms.429 Aer the reformists started to defend 
their cause with increasing appeals to the advancement of democracy, 
thereby politicising the concept, their opponents came up with further 
details which in their eyes failed to full the demands of such a concept of 
democracy. At the same time, both Liberal and Conservative MPs spoke 
in an increasingly positive tone about ‘democracy’ as a political system.430 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary Leo Amery summarised the majority 
Conservative view, one which was evidently shared by most Liberals as well: 
while this critic of Woodrow Wilson was not so sure whether the war was 
being fought ‘for democracy against autocracy’, he conceded that the war 
and post-war reconstruction would ‘put democracy on its trial’. Amery’s 
conclusion was that ‘[w]e have to be experimenting, we have to try to nd 
ways and means of bringing democracy up to date with the immense needs 
of the time’. Without the suggested reform, Britain would ‘either end in 
revolution or in the wholesale disgust of the people of this country with 
Parliament and democratic institutions’.431 Democracy simply required an 
425 Hansard, Sir Frederick Banbury, 19 June 1917, c. 1640–1. 
426 Hansard, Joseph Compton-Rickett, 19 June 1917, c. 1726–7. 
427 Hansard, Robert Cecil, 19 June 1917, c. 1736. 
428 Hansard, John Rawlinson, 7 June 1917, c. 476; a group of democratic countries 
was cited by Charles Hobhouse (Liberal), who even characterised Germany as 
a democracy ‘so far as the nominal franchise goes’. 25 June 1917, c. 97. 
429 Hansard, Alexander MacCallum Scott (Liberal), 19 June 1917, c. 1690; see 
Ramsay MacDonald (Labour), 19 June 1917, c. 1691–9 questioning the logic of 
the argument.
430 See Joseph Compton-Rickett above and Robert Cecil (Conservative), 19 June 
1917, c. 1734–6.
431 Hansard, Leo Amery, 4 July 1917, c. 1198.
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update of the British form of parliamentary government; it was not so much 
an issue of imposing the British political system on Germany (which Amery 
had become acquainted with during his travels). Liberal reformists, in turn, 
might advise the opponents to universal surage to give up their unfounded 
appeals to the will of the people and suggestions that Britain already was 
a ‘democracy’. Alfred Mond dened the concept: ‘By democracy’, he claimed, 
‘is meant that the people shall send to Parliament those whom they desire 
to represent them.’432
(3) ‘is is not real parliamentarism.’ Hugh Cecil, an old opponent of 
Liberal constitutional amendments, continued criticisms of the dire state 
of ‘the self-respect of the House of Commons’, claiming that ‘[u]nder the 
present Government there is no reality of Parliamentary government’ as 
Parliament was expected to simply pass any decree issued by the government. 
For Cecil, the current British parliament appeared to be no better than that 
of the French under Napoleon III, a state of aairs that questioned much of 
the value of the institution: ‘[T]here is to be a pretence of discussion which 
despots have always liked to give to the sham Parliamentary institutions 
which have existed.’433 Even though it was exaggerated for the sake of 
argument, Cecil’s point demonstrates genuine concern over the development 
of parliamentarism in the circumstances of the world war. Such concerns 
were, however, much greater in the camp of the leading enemy, the German 
Reichstag, to which we shall now turn.
3.2  Wartime demands for the democratisation  
 and parliamentarisation of Imperial Germany 
3.2.1  The German polity in a profoundly transformed  
 world
e German political system was more fundamentally aected and changed 
by the First World War than that of any of the other three. In addition to 
internal pressures of previously unsolved constitutional tensions and the 
great sacrices required by the total war from all classes of the people, 
external pressures challenging the German political order exerted by the 
enemy great powers played a role in the constitutional transformation; the 
process was forced to become transnational. Even though German scholars 
generally rejected the claims of the Entente about the need to liberate the 
Germans from their ‘autocratic’ political system, they had to admit that such 
propaganda successfully blackened the reputation of the Prussian order and 
might split the German home front as well.434 In that sense, the German 
public and political elite tended to increasingly view the war as one about 
political systems, including democracy and parliamentarism, not only about 
‘culture’ versus ‘civilisation’.
432 Hansard, Alfred Mond, 4 July 1917, c. 1217.
433 Hansard, Hugh Cecil, 6 June 1917, c. 179–80; see Garrigues & Anceau 2016.
434 Bruendel 2003, 155.
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Police reports on the mood of the people had revealed rising indierence 
and dissatisfaction among the population. On 28 March 1917, a day before 
the demands for reform were brought up at the Reichstag, Max Weber 
famously argued in Frankfurter Zeitung that the soldiers who had fought 
the war should also have a say in the reconstruction of the fatherland aer 
the conict, thus linking sacrices in the war to political participation and 
making an exceptional theoretical intervention in favour of a reform. e 
standstill in the constitutional debate, which had followed the Burgfrieden 
of the German parliamentary parties in August 1914 and which had been 
wavering before, could no longer be maintained. e country was struggling 
under military and economic diculties that called for the reconsideration 
of the decision-making structures, which were tending to degenerate further 
in wartime.435 In previous German research, contemporary parliamentary 
debates on the political implications and connected press debates have 
received little attention, however, as Reichstag has not been regarded as the 
forum where political decisions were made.436 
On 30 March, some papers reported that President Wilson would soon 
address the Congress about the necessity of declaring war on Germany.437 e 
participation of the United State seemed to portend a change in the course of 
the war, though the Central Powers did not rate its military capability very 
high. e US involvement was a direct result of the total submarine warfare 
which Germany had been waging since January. German attempts to bring 
Mexico into the world war also played a role in provoking the American 
involvement. Even though the appropriateness of such strategic choices 
was not openly questioned in the German parliament, unhappiness with 
the consequences increased criticism of the executive and the very limited 
possibilities which parliamentarians had to scrutinise their actions. e 
running of the German economy, too, had led to constitutionally exceptional 
solutions that had started to provoke criticism: the parliamentarians felt that 
even the parliamentary power to decide on the budget had been to a great 
extent lost. 
More constitutional challenges were emerging. e revolution in 
Russia, with Nicholas II abdicating on 15 March 1917, immediately gave 
rise to a constitutional debate in Germany as well. While the dierences 
between the Russian and German polities were considerable and the two 
countries had been enemies for over two and a half years, there were 
parallels, especially in the case of Prussia: the imperial thrones had been 
held by second cousins; inuential land-owning nobility had formed the 
backbone of the state bureaucracy in both countries; and, Germany, too, 
had a representative institution, during the elections for which promises 
of democracy and reform had been given but had produced few changes 
beneting the citizens. In a  similar way to the situation in Russia, the 
435 Morrow 2004, 213; Leonhard 2014, 737–8.
436 Bollmeyer 2007 and Seils 2011 are exceptions but with a dierent analytical 
interest.
437 Berliner Tageblatt, 30 March 1917.
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Reichstag had remained marginal in scrutinising the executive power. 
From spring 1917 on, however, aer a  hard winter, which had given rise 
to hunger demonstrations, the Reichstag became more actively involved in 
the political debate. At the same time, the German Social Democratic Party 
was split when the Independents, who had opposed the continuation of the 
war credits, le the party. e Majority Social Democrats responded in the 
party’s central organ Vorwärts by calling for the extension of parliamentary 
inuence and an electoral reform in Prussia.438 e le was clearly becoming 
active in demanding reforms in Germany as well.
e involvement of the United States, as the largest republic of the com-
batant nations, in the battle against Germany, increased the constitutional 
character of the war further. e war, which had started as a result of great 
power tensions, was increasingly seen as a ght between democratically 
and autocratically governed states. German war propaganda had also 
contributed to this view ever since 1914 by emphasising the war as a ght 
against the West and democracy.439 U.S. President Woodrow Wilson stated 
in a speech to the Congress on 2 April 1917 that it was a goal of the United 
States to defend peace and justice in the world against selsh and autocratic 
power. In Wilson’s view, the war had begun as a result of dynasties and small 
elites serving their own interests and ambitions at the cost of those of the 
people. e battle against the Central Powers turned highly ideological when 
the US President described it as being fought for the universal values of 
democracy and the rights of the oppressed: the pronounced intention was to 
make the world ‘safe for democracy’. Aer the Russian Revolution, such an 
emphasis on the advancement of democracy did appear as an increasingly 
credible argument in dening the objectives of the war.440 e political 
systems of the Central Powers had been openly challenged with suggestions 
that they did not serve the interests of the people and worked against the 
supposedly universal values of democracy. What added to the seriousness 
of the challenge was that Wilson was not merely an American Democratic 
politician recycling the rhetoric of his party: in his academic work he had 
carefully studied German political theory441 and knew his enemy well.
Andreas Schulz and Andreas Biefang have argued that the Reichstag had 
been increasingly developing into a forum of public debate even though its 
controlling powers had remained limited.442 During the war, it had – despite 
its engagement in much legislation and budgetary matters – tended to 
become marginalised. In late March 1917, the National-Liberals and the 
Catholic Centre introduced an initiative to change the constitution and to 
create permanent committees for foreign aairs and constitutional issues. 
e motivation for this reconsideration of the role of the parliament was that 
the contribution of the entire German people to the war eort implied that 
438 Dahlmann 2014, 46.
439 Bavaj & Steber 2015, 17–18; Llanque 2015, 70–1.
440 Llanque 2000, 107; Seils 2011, 213–14; Leonhard 2014, 671–2.
441 Leonhard 2014, 656. 
442 Biefang & Schulz 2016.
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their views should also be heard to a greater extent.443 e Catholic Centre 
wished to see the German people educated politically so that they would be 
able to think for themselves in elds such as foreign policy; eventually they 
would also be able to participate in foreign policy through the parliament.444 
Such views, found in the writings of Arthur Ponsonby and in Swedish and 
Finnish leist discourse as well, reected a general desire, arising from 
the pre-war crisis, to extend the control of representative government to 
foreign aairs. is control might include the founding of foreign aairs 
committees and the democratisation of recruitment to foreign ministries, 
but its realisation in the late 1910s remained very limited.445 In Germany, 
the demands led rst to the establishment of a parliamentary constitutional 
committee on 30 March 1917, a couple of weeks aer the outbreak of the 
Russian Revolution, two days aer the introduction of the Representation of 
the People Bill in the British parliament and a week before the US declaration 
of war. 
e decision of 30 March reected the increasingly dicult situation on 
the home front and pressures to open a constitutional debate despite the 
war. As soon as the new Constitutional Committee convened, it adopted the 
abolition of the Prussian unequal and indirect franchise, which was based 
on a three-class division of taxpayers, as its main goal. Chancellor eobald 
von Bethmann Hollweg responded by introducing a proposal for a change 
in the Prussian surage law, and on 7 April, a day aer the US declaration of 
war, the Kaiser delivered an Easter message in which he promised to bring 
in direct and secret elections in Prussia aer the war. is was a response 
both to the claims of the Allied war propaganda about Prussianism and to 
the alternative oered by the new revolutionary regime in Petrograd. In 
practice, the reform was prevented by resistance from the Kaiser, the Prussian 
representative institutions, leading executives and the military leaders, who 
despised the Chancellor for forcing the Kaiser to make such a promise.446 
e Prussian Landtag and Herrenhaus regarded electoral questions as being 
their prerogative, not that of the Reichstag or the executive powers of the 
Reich. e overwhelmingly dominant position of Prussia within the Reich 
made any progress in constitutional issues at the national level dependent 
on the decisions of these representative bodies. Despite such obstacles to 
constitutional reform and its actual postponement, serious suggestions 
were already made and preparatory measures taken in spring 1917. ese 
debates took place almost simultaneously with surage reform debates in 
the British parliament, the reintroduction of the question of electoral reform 
in the Swedish parliament, and the reconvening of the Finnish parliament 
to discuss constitutional issues in a post-revolutionary situation. As I shall 
show, all these debates were highly intertwined as a result of the war and the 
transnational impacts of the Russian Revolution.
443 Especially Adolf Gröber of the Catholic Centre was active in the Reichstag in 
voicing this view. Cited in Seils 2011, 194–6. 
444 Boden 2000, 40. 
445 Götz 2005, 267.
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e spring of 1917 was one of ferment in German party politics, especially 
on the le, which was divided at an early stage. While the conservative 
leaders of Germany were helping Lenin to return to Russia via Germany, 
Sweden and Finland (a very concrete transnational instance of mobility 
leading to meetings with far-le socialist politicians on the way), hoping 
that he would initiate a more radical revolution there, bring the new regime 
down and increase Russia’s readiness for peace, socialist opposition at home 
in Germany was becoming increasingly active. e Social Democrats had 
been divided over cooperation with the bourgeois parties with regard to 
support for the war eort. At the end of March 1917, the Social Democratic 
organ Vorwärts called for cooperation that would produce ‘the political 
rearrangement of the German Reich’,447 emphasising the capability of ‘the 
large parties of the le’ for joint action.448 Disagreement over support for the 
war nevertheless led to a mixed group of anti-war, far-le and revisionist 
parliamentarians breaking away and founding the Independent Social 
Democratic Party of Germany (USPD) on 6–8 April 1917. e new party 
was loyal to Marxist traditions but did not set concrete revolutionary 
goals.449 is division of the German Social Democrats was symptomatic of 
divisions among socialists elsewhere as well: a comparable split had taken 
place in Sweden in late February, before the Russian March Revolution, and 
was formalised in May 1917. In Finland, by contrast, there was no such split. 
In the meantime, the importation of Russian revolutionary discourses to 
the country radicalised the Social Democratic Party further.450 In wartime 
circumstances, the party became discursively associated with the Russian 
Revolution to a degree that diered from its previous history – and especially 
with the Bolsheviks who were the only organised Marxist group that strove 
for a dictatorship of the proletariat.451 In the meantime, links to Western 
Socialists remained weak and distance to German and Swedish Majority 
Social Democrats was growing. 
e German Social Democrats had constituted a major model for 
Swedish and Finnish Social Democrats – as they had been for the Russian 
socialist revolutionaries until 1914.452 In its Erfurt program of 1891, ‘classical’ 
Marxism had constituted the theoretical basis of the German SPD; this 
embodied a natural process of revolution between oppressed and oppressor 
leading nally to the creation of a democratic society. However, by the 
1910s German revisionists, headed by Eduard Bernstein, no longer believed 
in such a general law and looked for more cooperative ways to introduce 
reforms. ey became increasingly opposed by radicals who continued to 
hold to Marxist principles. e revisionists aimed at changing society by 
political and parliamentary means, preferably through a majority in the 
Reichstag and possibly together with other political parties. e radicals, 
447 Vorwärts, 29 March 1917.
448 Vorwärts, 31 March 1917.
449 Krause 1975, 35, 91; Seils 2011, 181. 
450 Soikkanen 1990, 87.
451 Liebich 1999, 21.
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not only in Germany but also in Sweden, Finland and elsewhere, rejected 
the idea of parliamentary politics as a means to achieve social justice and 
rather counted on the extra-parliamentary class struggle as the agent of 
progress.453 e concepts of revolution and democracy thus stood for 
very dierent things within the German le: the German Majority Social 
Democrats did not regard a violent revolution as essential for a transition to 
democracy, whereas for the Independents in Germany, the far le in Sweden 
and a considerable majority of Social Democrat speakers in the Finnish 
parliament, a revolution like the one launched in Russia oered a promise of 
a democratic society – ‘democratic’ in the sense of the rule by the proletariat 
or the working class generally. 
From 1916 onwards, the majority of the German Social Democrats had 
demanded constitutional reforms as compensation for cooperating with 
the executive and the bourgeois parties. By spring 1917, they were publicly 
calling for the abolition of the unequal three-class franchise in Prussia. e 
vague reform promises with which the Chancellor and the Kaiser responded 
only caused disappointment within the labour movement, and demands for 
reform were intensied. In July, the Catholic Centre, the Progressivists and 
the Socialists called for a compromise peace, challenging the conservatives 
and nationalists, which brought the crisis of the legitimacy of the Prussian 
order into the open nationally and internationally. However, during this 
crisis it soon became clear that the executive power and army leaders would 
not allow major reforms to take place while the war lasted. 454 It would be 
only aer the expected fall of the German army in September 1918 and the 
abolition of the monarchy in November 1918 that the realisation of these 
reforms became possible. Even if the debates of spring 1917 changed little 
in Germany, they reect prevalent views among the political elites and 
they contributed signicantly to the transnational constitutional debate 
especially in Sweden and Finland.
3.2.2  Implications of the war, the Russian Revolution and  
 the British reform for the German constitution 
In March 1917, aer over two and a half years of total war, awareness of the 
profound inuence of this particular struggle on all the engaged societies 
was high among German parliamentarians. e war had started in a spirit 
of national superiority, with the nation rallying around the monarchy and 
the well-ordered German state, one that was also admired by many in other 
countries, not least in Sweden and Finland. By 1917, an increasing number 
of politicians believed that the war, which aected everyone and altered the 
social dynamics of society, would inevitably change the German political 
system as well. Even Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg recognised that the war 
experience was likely to lead to a restructuring of domestic politics, though 
he did not specify its implications. 
In practice, both foreign and domestic policy had been run under the 
imperial prerogative in wartime Germany. Yet the Reichstag had already 
453 Seils 2011, 58–9; Jörke & Llanque 2016, 266–7.
454 Pohl 2002, 12–13; Becker 2014, 27–8; Dahlmann 2014, 46–8; Leonhard 2014, 
738.
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touched on constitutional questions when discussing new war legislation 
in November 1916. Eduard David, a Bernsteinian revisionist who was 
chairing the parliamentary group, pointed out that the Reichstag had given 
away most of its political powers since the outbreak of the war but now the 
time had come to demand them back.455 David pointed to the enduring 
inequality of Prussian citizens in terms of voting rights and declared that 
the war had demonstrated that the workers should nally demand equality 
in representation. e opposition to such a demand was undeniable, he 
conceded: it came from those in Prussia who did not realise that a new era 
was dawning as a consequence of the war and that this new era required 
a new spirit in Germany, including the rethinking of the interrelations 
between citizens.456 Ewald Vogtherr, representing the anti-war minority, 
presented a similar challenge by complaining about the tendency to 
exclude the Reichstag and thereby the German people from involvement 
in the political process.457 No more extensive constitutional debate took 
place in the Reichstag in late 1916 as the parties of the centre continued to 
demonstrate their patriotism.458 Friedrich von Payer, the chairman of the 
parliamentary group of the Progressive People’s Party, who advocated strong 
parliamentarism on the basis of his experience in Wurttemberg, was the 
only one to recognise that the rights of the Reichstag had been bypassed 
without due consideration.459 
ough such reformism achieved little, it is noteworthy that these calls 
for reform followed the launch of planning the surage reform in Britain in 
October 1916. e state of war brought into the open related domestic political 
problems in the two major warfaring nations, as Vorwärts observed.460 e 
debates were also intertwined in that news from the enemy country was 
observed with keen interest, even if there was some delay in its delivery 
via the Netherlands.461 Furthermore, legislative measures that might bring 
out comparisons with Germany were not reported in the rightist press. e 
readers would merely be told that the Commons had approved the proposal 
of an all-party conference ‘concerning various questions of electoral reform 
and supporting female surage’,462 while Social Democrat readers learned 
that the British government had campaigned intensively for the reform, 
that this had increased respect for the Prime Minister, that opposition in 
Parliament had been smaller than expected, and that the majority of the 
Unionists were ready for a compromise.463 e nature of the communicated 
news clearly depended on party positions.
455 Verhandlungen, Eduard David, 29 November 1916, 2168.
456 Verhandlungen, Eduard David, 29 November 1916, 2171.
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e German constitutional debate became more intense in late February 
1917, aer the compromise of the British Speaker’s Conference had been 
reached on 26 January but before it was introduced as a bill in Parliament, 
and also before the outbreak of the Russian Revolution. e British model 
as such was hardly germane since Anglophobia was common in German 
wartime discourse. Britain was seen as aiming at the destruction of Christian 
monarchical values,464 and the British parliamentary system of government 
was generally rejected as the ‘English malady’ of liberalism.465 Nevertheless, 
awareness of the British plans encouraged the German reformists to use it 
in justifying their cause: if the constitution could be revised in an enemy 
country despite the war, the Germans would certainly be able to do the 
same. In connection with a budgetary debate on 23 February 1917, the anti-
war leist Social Democrats pointed again to the existence of constitutional 
problems that called for an immediate solution. Georg Ledebour, a former 
London correspondent, reported about the developments in Britain, 
complaining that the German government continued to dismiss all claims 
for political rights by the people and that it responded to all criticism with 
mere empty promises. Urgently needed surage reforms at the level of both 
the Reich and the individual states (especially Prussia) were being constantly 
ruled out with appeals to the wartime situation. ere was also a strange 
tendency among German MPs themselves to downplay the political role 
of the parliament.466 e allied country of Austria provided Ledebour with 
a warning instance of how a parliament and thereby the rights of the people 
could be ignored in wartime decision-making. On behalf of the anti-war 
Social Democratic Labour Community, Ledebour declared that they would 
continue to ght ‘for the rights of the people’ against politicians possessed 
by a war psychosis.467 is insinuation about the lack of true defenders 
of popular rights was evidently directed at the Social Democrats, too, as 
supporters of the war eort. e attack from the far le forced the SPD to 
respond: Friedrich Ebert, the leader of the party, promised that they would 
continue consistently to speak out for the political rights of the German 
people and especially the workers.468 Pressures on the SPD to take more 
concrete measures to further reform as a compensation for its patriotic 
support for the war eort were growing as a result of the split in the le. 
But cooperation with the parties of the centre was needed before the reform 
could be advanced.
e executive were aware of the pressures for reform as a response 
to the war eort – and perhaps of the desire to show that Germany was 
no worse than Britain in considering the political rights of its citizens. 
e three major European powers against which Germany was ghting 
– Britain, France and Russia – were generally recognised as relevant objects 
464 Stibbe 2001, 4–6. Stibbe has not considered the continuing admiration of 
German Anglophiles in his book.
465 Leonhard 2006, 211.
466 Verhandlungen, Georg Ledebour, 23 February 1917, 2368–9.
467 Verhandlungen, Georg Ledebour, 23 February 1917, 2369.
468 Verhandlungen, Friedrich Ebert, 23 February 1917, 2369.
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of comparison in constitutional questions. e constitutional aspect could 
no longer be bypassed once even the Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg had 
recognised the challenge which the Western powers posed to Germany.469 
On 27 February, he joined the debate with the obvious aim of reintegrating 
the Social Democrats in the common front. e Chancellor dened the 
war as a battle for the life and future of the Reich. It would be decisive 
for later parliamentary debates that the progressive rst minister – who 
had held vacillating views on Prussian surage reform, having rst made 
a proposal for it in 1910 but later withdrawing it under political pressure 
– now conceded that the war had led to the emergence of ‘a new era with 
a renewed people’ and recognised that it was time to consider ‘the right 
political way to express what this people constitutes’ – even though such 
a redenition of political rights was not intended to recompense the people 
for their sacrices.470 Bethmann Hollweg’s ambiguous expressions of what 
might be understood as the representation of the people in the sense of 
either the monarchy or the parliament representing the people (recalling 
the doctrine of the duality of government) did not necessarily imply 
launching a constitutional reform. Bethmann Hollweg, who wished to be 
on good terms with all sides, evidently wanted to please the reformists. 
However, he proceeded to dampen down overly optimistic expectations of 
an immediate reform by emphasising the variety of political, economic and 
social problems that called for a solution aer the war and that could only 
be solved by maintaining ‘the internal strength of our state’ that had been 
created by the war.471 e unity of the political community remained the 
ultimate goal of all constitutional reconsiderations, and it was hoped that 
this argument would persuade even the right to make some concessions. 
Unity stood for nationalism centred on the Prussian monarchy rather than 
for any new democratic polity created through reform.472 
Bethmann Hollweg’s strategy of pleasing everyone found support: 
the chairman of the parliamentary group of the Catholic Centre and the 
chairman of the Main Committee, Peter Spahn, who held conservative 
values, responded by emphasizing the support of the entire German people 
for the monarchical constitution as the principle on which the relationship 
between the people and the government would be continue to be based in the 
future.473 Otto Wiemer, chairman of the Progressivist group and a member of 
the Prussian lower chamber, went on to describe the political consequences 
of the war for the German people in words that at rst sight were supportive 
of the established order. According to Wiemer, the awareness of the people 
concerning matters of state had increased as a  result of their wartime 
experiences. e reformist argument was hidden in a sentence that claimed 
that the German people also possessed an increased desire to participate 
in aairs of state. is was to say that the possibilities for the people to 
469 Verhandlungen, eobald von Bethmann Hollweg, 27 February 1917, 2375.
470 Verhandlungen, eobald von Bethmann Hollweg, 27 February 1917, 2375. 
471 Verhandlungen, eobald von Bethmann Hollweg, 27 February 1917, 2375.
472 Verhandlungen, eobald von Bethmann Hollweg, 27 February 1917, 2375.
473 Verhandlungen, Peter Spahn, 27 February 1917, 2380.
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express their political opinions should be increased. Wiemer concluded that 
a change to a democratic constitution had become inevitable in Germany.474 
A month later, the debate on this issue would deal with the future 
prospects of the German polity more extensively. On 29 March 1917 – three 
weeks aer the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, a day following a debate 
in the Prussian Herrenhaus, in which the Conservatives had rejected further 
democratisation and parliamentarisation475 and, incidentally, one day aer 
the rst plenary reform debates in the British House of Commons – the 
Reichstag debated the issue of electoral reform in Prussia in connection with 
what was supposed to be a budget debate. Gustav Noske, a Social Democrat 
journalist who was known as a defender of the authority of the parliament, 
drew more challenging conclusions about the constitutional implications of 
the war experience, conclusions that were very similar to those drawn by 
British, Swedish and Finnish parliamentarians. 
Vorwärts would characterise Noske’s speech as reective of the ‘pulse of 
an onward-rushing time’ that required ‘the political rearrangement of the 
Reich’. It reported that the Chancellor was criticised for his inability to see 
clearly the signs of the era.476 In Noske’s description of the state of the world, 
the foundations of all the countries participating in the war were being 
shaken. e war portended a major upheaval in the fates of peoples and 
states, leading to ‘a restructuring not only of Europe but of the world’, which 
suggested that a global transformation (if not revolution) was at hand. For 
all the new things that would emerge out of the war, a horrible price was 
being paid in human lives and the sacrices of ordinary citizens. Noske’s 
conclusion was that a major constitutional restructuring of Germany, as 
a result of the war, could no longer be postponed.477 Everyone understood 
that this meant the immediate introduction of an electoral reform in Prussia. 
Noske drew a daring parallel between Germany and Russia, drawing 
far-reaching conclusions from the fall of ‘the sinister absolutist system in 
Russia, the bulwark of all reactionary action’, which its ruler had desperately 
attempted to revive through warfare.478 e implication was that the 
German monarchy was trying to do the same. In Russia, ‘the proletarian 
masses’ no longer supported the war eort but stood rmly and clearly on 
the side of the Revolution.479 Noske then proceeded to discuss the need to 
increase the speed of constitutional reform in Germany. is suggestion of 
an interconnection between the circumstances of the two hostile countries 
provoked express protests from the right.480 
Noske quoted a previous promise by the Chancellor to legitimate the 
reform demands: the future of Germany required the recognition of 
474 Verhandlungen, Otto Wiemer, 27 February 1917, 2399–400.
475 is was reported also in e Times, ‘Prussian Electoral Reform’, 30 March 1917. 
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476 Vorwärts, 30 March 1917. Berliner Tageblatt, 30 March 1917, reporting Gustav 
Stresemann’s intertextual reference to the Chancellor’s own words.
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the political rights of the people as a whole, including the broad masses. 
Noske’s conclusion was that it was in the interest of the Reich to nally 
start preparations for reform. Prussianism was a problem, however: many 
in the Herrenhaus wanted to get on with waging the war and opposed all 
constitutional changes at the level of both individual federal states and the 
Reich as a whole. As a consequence, economic progress in Germany had 
not been followed by the needed political reforms.481 Noske challenged the 
Prussian Herrenhaus and the right in the Reichstag by declaring that it was 
in the Reichstag, elected by universal male surage, that ‘the language of 
the German people and German life was to be heard’.482 e Chancellor still 
seemed to be rejecting the call for a profound constitutional reform either 
during the war or immediately aer it on the assumption that such a reform 
would cause unnecessary disputes and take attention away from practical 
political questions.483 According to Noske, the Social Democrats were not 
ready to wait until the war was over for a new approach to constitutional 
reform, particularly as the reform in Britain had just got under way.484 e 
reform needed to be realised immediately now that the enemy had launched 
its own. e constitutional histories of the two great powers became thereby 
intertwined – in the end in a fatal way for German democracy. 
On the second day of the debate, Eduard David (SPD) interpreted the 
Chancellor’s speeches more optimistically, seeing a readiness to proceed 
with reform despite the war. For David, the willingness of the government 
to appoint a new committee to discuss constitutional relations between 
the Reichstag and the government was a step forward.485 He repeated the 
provocative suggestion that the Russian Revolution had direct implications 
for Prussia: the Prussian political elite could no longer appeal to the Russian 
model in postponing electoral reforms. David even drew an ironical parallel 
between the opposition of the Prussian parliament to surage reform and 
the failed parliamentary reform of 1905–6 in tsarist Russia: ‘e Prussian 
Duma has now happily managed to isolate itself from all the world.’486 is 
was an implicit suggestion that the isolated political culture of Prussia had 
led Germany to the state of aairs in which it currently found itself. e same 
day’s issue of Vorwärts, for its part, reported on the rise of the Finnish Social 
Democrats to govern the country with a Social Democrat parliamentary 
majority. It likewise reported about the introduction of female surage in 
Britain, a further sign that the times were changing elsewhere in the world.487 
On the Prussian and more generally conservative side, the timing of the 
Social Democrats’ calls for reform was malevolently associated with noxious 
inuences from abroad imported by treasonous countrymen. It was, aer 
481 Verhandlungen, Gustav Noske, 29 March 1917, 2839.
482 Verhandlungen, Gustav Noske, 29 March 1917, 2839.
483 Verhandlungen, Gustav Noske, 29 March 1917, 2840.
484 Verhandlungen, Gustav Noske, 29 March 1917, 2840.
485 Verhandlungen, Eduard David, 30 March 1917, 2908.
486 Verhandlungen, Eduard David, 30 March 1917, 2904. e alleged ideological 
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all, an old Bismarckian practice to regard the constitution as unchangeable 
and to view dissenting social groups as enemies of the Reich.488 Associations 
with the intensication of the Allies’ war propaganda on Western democracy, 
the concomitant reform in Britain and most seriously the outbreak of the 
Russian Revolution were dicult to avoid – if not yet in March 1917 then 
certainly by the time of the appearance of a rightist theory that the war had 
been lost as a result of a domestic conspiracy of the Social Democrats and 
their allies.
e awareness of what was going on British politics – resulting from the 
traditional German interest in the British polity as an alternative political 
system, the ties between the royal families and the fact that Britain was 
the leading enemy – remained high. German parliamentarians were well 
informed about what Prime Minister Lloyd George had said in the Commons 
on the Russian Revolution and its implications for the war eort as well as 
about links between British and Russian socialists.489 British policies could 
also be presented as a model for what the German government should do. 
Noske did not hesitate to declare, on the day following the rst reading of the 
Representation of the People Bill in the House of Commons, that Britain was 
planning to change its electoral system in the middle of a war and to extend 
surage so that most women would also be allowed to vote. e British 
example demonstrated that claims about the impossibility of an electoral 
reform during a war were unfounded. Noske’s conclusion could not have 
been clearer: ‘In this case the Chancellor might learn from the enemy.’490 
Such a provocative admonition would not be forgotten by the right.
Noske’s arguments in support of immediate electoral reform resembled 
those presented by the British government: he justied an early electoral 
reform by the good impression it would make ‘on the masses of the people 
in the country’, raise the morale of the troops in the eld and – once the 
soldiers returned home from the trenches – remove any feelings that they 
were third-class Prussians and citizens of the Reich. Discontent was already 
rising among the masses of the people, and the German government could no 
longer disregard this.491 As in Britain, a central Social Democrat justication 
of the reform was recognition of the sacrices which the soldiers and the 
people at large had made for the war eort. Another common feature was 
concern about a rising resentment of politicians among ordinary people. 
e Prussian political order was thus being challenged with appeals to both 
Russian and British examples and with suggestions that a development 
like that which had happened in Russia might happen in Germany as well 
– if the government did not choose the British line of reform. In Social 
Democratic circles, parliamentary discourse had clearly reached a high 
degree of transnationality.
e Social Democratic Party being already split, the supporters of the 
war no longer could (or wished to) prevent the leaders of the far le from 
488 Ullrich 2010.
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speaking. e far le, whose supporters were unashamedly enthusiastic 
about the revolution in Russia, attacked by using the Chancellor’s failure 
to full his promises of reform. Even the new Constitutional Committee 
would only provide a chance to present various prospects for the future.492 
Hugo Haase, a Jewish lawyer from Königsberg who had defended workers 
in numerous court cases and exposed cooperation between the Prussian 
and Russian secret services, attacked the Chancellor for having failed to 
understand the signicance of ‘the great historical moment when the ames 
of the Russian Revolution lighten up every corner’ and for maintaining 
the Prussian electoral system despite outspoken calls for reform in the 
Reichstag.493 Haase insinuated that the Junkers had triumphed over the 
Chancellor in domestic politics just as they had in the country’s imperialistic 
foreign policy; therefore, what the leading minister oered was no more 
than ‘a slap in the face of the broad masses’.494 
For a dedicated Marxist like Haase, who had actively participated 
in international Socialist congresses, there remained no doubt that the 
Russian Revolution was ‘a tremendous event in world history’, spreading its 
inuence beyond Russia with the message of a victory over despotism that 
liberated all humankind.495 A revolutionary change (or at least reform) was 
becoming possible in Germany as well – even if Haase did not claim that the 
circumstances in Russia and Germany were directly comparable and denied 
the existence of an immediate threat of a revolution at home.496 e concept 
of revolution was of major ideological importance, nevertheless, and Haase 
went on to point out in a Kautskyist vein: ‘Revolutions arise when the social, 
political and psychological preconditions pre-exist; if they are lacking, it is 
impossible to make a revolution.’497 What could be learnt from the Russian 
example was that the revolutionary government there had set it as a goal to 
restructure the conditions of politics so that a future ‘democratic republic’, 
supported even by the Russian bourgeoisie, would be based on ‘the will of 
the people’ and thus on ‘popular sovereignty’.498 What must have sounded 
particularly unthinkable in Haase’s application of the Russian model to the 
German situation was the abolition of the monarchy and the democratisation 
of the military. Demands for female surage and the abolition of the 
Herrenhaus, by contrast, found support from other political groups.499 For 
Haase, the postponement of the introduction of equal surage in Prussia 
to an undened time in the future entailed nothing less than the risk that 
‘the masses in Germany’ would start to ‘talk Russian’,500 which might include 
revolutionary action. Such a suggestion about a possible revolution – a 
suggestion that had been implicitly taken up by leading Social Democrats 
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as well – gave credit to suspicions of treason and strengthened opposition 
among the anti-reformists.
Peter Spahn (Catholic Centre) addressed the need for reform in Prussia 
but did not see the future constitutional solutions in Russia as having any 
implications for Germany. He rather congratulated the Germans on the 
stability of their political system.501 An immediate reform of surage in 
elections for the Reichstag (meaning women’s surage, which he opposed) 
was not a priority for any party and could hence wait until aer the war. Nor 
did Spahn speak in favour of an immediate surage reform at the level of 
the German states. On the other hand, he spoke positively about a reform 
in Prussia at a later stage as it would strengthen the country politically 
both internally and externally so that ‘the political rights of the entirety 
of the people in all of its layers, including its broad masses, would be fully 
recognised, and thereby a joyous contribution to the work of the state 
(staatlichen) would be made possible.’502 e Catholic Centre would have 
liked to allow ‘a powerful and young people to grow forth from its current 
calamity’ and thus maintain Germany as ‘a strong realm and a  strong 
people’ ready to full its duties.503 e nationalist goal of the surage reform 
appeared here in quite similar terms to those used by the majority of the 
Conservatives in Britain: an increase in the political rights of the people at 
large would mean the recognition of their contribution to the united war 
eort and strengthen the nation in military and political terms.
Gustav Stresemann, the reformist chairman of the National Liberals, 
who were supportive of the current war eort, nevertheless opposed the 
Chancellor on the state of the political system.504 Stresemann made use of an 
historical analogy with the Napoleonic Wars, which had brought the Holy 
Roman Empire to an end, in suggesting that the ongoing war, too, concerned 
the future of the German constitution. Idealising the liberal principles of 
1848, he described how the Prussian and German peoples had expected 
a  renewal of their political life aer 1815 but had been disappointed by 
the united reactionary policies of tsarist Russia and absolutist Prussia.505 
is suggested that parallel expectations of constitutional renewal were 
present now, particularly as tsarism no longer existed to support Prussian 
reactionary policies. Another war – that between Germany and France 
–  had also given rise to constitutional changes in the founding of the 
current Reich, but Stresemann did not refer to it here. His conclusion was 
that ‘the new era demanded new justice’, that ‘a reorganisation of things 
in the future’ had become indispensable and that aer the war experience 
the reform of the German system of government could no longer be 
postponed. In Stresemann’s view, this concerned above all the strengthening 
of the responsibility of the executive to the Reichstag506 – in other words the 
501 Verhandlungen, Peter Spahn, 29 March 1917, 2833, 2835.
502 Verhandlungen, Peter Spahn, 29 March 1917, 2832.
503 Verhandlungen, Peter Spahn, 29 March 1917, 2832.
504 Vorwärts, 30 March 1917.
505 Verhandlungen, Gustav Stresemann, 29 March 1917, 2852.
506 Verhandlungen, Gustav Stresemann, 29 March 1917, 2853–4.
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parliamentarisation of the constitutional monarchy. When Stresemann called 
for a rethinking of the relationship between the representative institution 
and the government, he, too, was openly recommending the introduction 
of a principle of ministerial responsibility resembling that pertaining in 
Britain.507 e speedy reform of the Prussian three-class surage system and 
increased parliamentarisation of the Reich thus received support from the 
National Liberal leader in the aermath of the Russian Revolution. 
e Progressive People’s Party likewise saw the war as having necessitated 
a rethinking of political structures. In Ernst Müller-Meiningen’s nationalistic 
rhetoric, the trust of the German people in their army had made it 
possible for the parliamentarians to start planning for a new Germany.508 
is vague reference bypassed all open criticism of wartime policies: for 
Müller, any ‘upgrading’ remained dependent on the outcome of the war. 
For the German Progressivists, the renewal of the parliamentary system 
would obviously mean a more extensive engagement of the parliament 
in building legitimacy for the use of power, while the will of the people 
could still also be channelled through other institutions such as the army. 
eir expressed enthusiasm for parliamentarism was rather subservient 
to the Prussian order and modest by comparison with that of liberals in 
Britain, Sweden or Finland. However, they, too, were ready to challenge the 
Chancellor, the upholders of Prussianism and the Herrenhaus on the issue 
of surage.509 Müller contrasted the readiness of the British higher nobility 
to make concessions to the lower classes when that was necessary (as in the 
Parliament Act of 1911) and their ability to maintain ‘the political leadership 
of the people’ with the failed strategy of the Prussian nobility. According 
to Müller, the majority of the Prussian aristocracy remained incapable of 
making the political concessions that the sacrices of the people in the war 
required and were concentrating instead on safeguarding their privileges.510 
is implied that the Prussian nobility should learn from their British peers, 
who were ready to accept universal surage. Both the German liberal parties 
thus used Britain as a model to challenge the Prussian elite. is was not 
done so explicitly in Sweden, and such comparisons were rare in Finland 
as well.
Not even the National Conservatives denied that the moment when 
major decisions were to be made on the future of the German people as well 
as on the future of the world was at hand, though their understanding of 
the measures that this required diered fundamentally. As far as ‘questions 
concerning the internal political future’ of Germany were concerned, they 
thought that they should be bypassed in a time of war. Count Kuno von 
Westarp, a Councillor of the Prussian High Administrative Court, saw 
a considerable risk of constitutional debates splitting those forces that had 
been united for the war eort.511 e German constitution was not to be 
507 Verhandlungen, Gustav Stresemann, 29 March 1917, 2824.
508 Verhandlungen, Ernst Müller-Meinigen, 29 March 1917, 2843.
509 Paul Michaelis, Berliner Tageblatt, 30 March 1917.
510 Verhandlungen, Ernst Müller-Meinigen, 29 March 1917, 2852.
511 Verhandlungen, Kuno von Westarp, 29 March 1917, 2857, 2857.
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touched; the emphasis should be on solving the conict by winning the war. 
Von Westarp’s argument was not so dierent from those of conservative 
anti-reformists in Britain or Sweden, though in Britain the holders of such 
strictly militarist views were a small minority. As far as surage in Prussia 
was concerned, according to the National Conservatives, it was an internal 
Prussian aair which the Reichstag had no mandate to even discuss. e 
standpoint of the Conservatives on the suggested constitutional reform 
was clear: even if post-war reconstruction entailed huge challenges and 
the rise of new views, they would stand rm and defend their unchanged 
principles.512 As a concession, however, they could accept the nomination of 
a constitutional committee, as long as no major reform was to be planned by 
it.513 e creation of a committee appeared for them as a way to remove the 
reform debates from the parliamentary agenda.
Erich Mertin of the German Reichspartei, a lawyer who also was 
a  member of the Prussian House of Representatives, put this point even 
more outspokenly: the war had provided no reason to rethink surage.514 
e Reichspartei, a party consisting of members of the higher nobility and 
top civil servants that had traditionally supported the chancellors, had no 
desire to parliamentarise the constitution of the Reich or to reform Prussian 
surage. It, too, used comparisons with Britain – but to play down the claims 
of the reformists: the calls for an electoral reform were totally unfounded 
in that German surage was already ‘the freest in the world, freer than 
that in England, the mother of all parliaments’ and was thus in no need of 
extension.515 If some changes in surage were being planned by the enemy, 
that had no relevance for the German constitution, which the conservatives 
could rhetorically describe as already free. e dominance of Britain as 
the object of international comparisons for all parties is interesting, Russia 
being the only other mentioned polity while France and the USA – not to 
mention irrelevant minor powers – were completely ignored.
Only the le and a few liberals in the Reichstag drew the conclusion 
that the electoral reform and parliamentarisation should be advanced 
during the war. e le-liberal Berliner Tageblatt nevertheless celebrated the 
bravery of the Reichstag in the face of ‘the icy silence of ocial gures’, i.e. 
the government, in arguing and voting for the creation of a constitutional 
committee in accordance with ‘the popular will’.516 But what would a German 
democracy based on the popular will look like? at is the subject of the 
next subsection.
512 Verhandlungen, Kuno von Westarp, 29 March 1917, 2857, 2859.
513 Verhandlungen, Kuno von Westarp, 29 March 1917, 2857, 2863.
514 Verhandlungen, Erich Mertin, 30 March 1917, 2921.
515 Verhandlungen, Erich Mertin, 30 March 1917, 2921.
516 Berliner Tageblatt, 31 March 1917.
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3.2.3  The Western democracies and a new democratic  
 order in Germany517
Spring 1917 was when the notion of ‘Western democracy’ became 
conceptualised to a higher degree than ever before – in British parliamentary 
discourse rather modestly as a consequence of American inuences through 
Allied war propaganda; in Germany as a reaction to the vague Allied concept 
of ‘Western’ democracy and its counter-concept Prussianism; and in third 
countries such as Sweden and Finland when the elites needed to choose 
whether they wanted to have democracy of a national, Anglo-American, 
German or Russian type – or no democracy at all. e concept of democracy 
divided Europe by including some political cultures and excluding others, 
the dividing line running primarily between the Western allies and Germany.
In German discourse on the so-called ‘democracy’ of Britain, France, 
the United States and other Western powers, much criticism had arisen 
from the classical notion that democratic systems are prone to being taken 
over by demagogy and public opinion.518 is discourse reached a new 
phase as British and French war propaganda and that of the US President 
Woodrow Wilson increasingly emphasised opposition to Prussianism as the 
war goal of the Allied powers. In the propaganda – and consequently also 
in constitutional debates and domestic policy discourse – the war tended 
to turn into a battle for democracy. Democracy appeared as a universally 
valid form of government with implications for political practice rather than 
as a mere element of representative government. e Allies increasingly 
viewed themselves as ghting under the banner of democracy. is political 
concept would become a uniting and normative concept aecting the self-
understandings of the political elites of the Allied powers. e concept of 
Western democracy, which had been rarely used before, came to unite the 
powers – despite obvious residual dierences in how it was understood. 
Marcus Llanque has pointed out that, seen from a sceptical German 
perspective, Allied war propaganda attacks on the German polity as being 
the opposite to democracy, at a time when the Russian Revolution and the 
planned surage reform in Britain were taking place, could be viewed merely 
as an enemy attempt to alienate the German government and people from 
each other.519 One way to respond was to emphasise the German political 
system as ‘true’ democracy as opposed to the pseudo-democratic systems 
of the West.520 e German le, and to a more limited extent the centre, 
however, seemed to the right to have adopted this enemy propaganda and 
were alienating the government and the people from each other. is tended 
517 An earlier shorter version of this subsection will appear in Kurunmäki, Nevers 
& te Velde (eds) 2018.
518 Llanque 2000, 102; cf. interpretations proposing a longer-term democratisation 
within the German Reich, summarised in Müller 2014, 47–8, who accepts 
contemporary interpretations of Germany as being ahead of its time in many 
elds. Müller even suggests that ‘the civil service already worked during the war 
for a democratic Germany’.
519 Llanque 2000, 214.
520 Stibbe 2001, 171. 
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to be the interpretation even though the message of the reformists was that 
the relationship between the German state and the people should rather be 
reconstructed and strengthened through the democratisation of surage 
and the parliamentarisation of government.  
As a consequence of this external and internal challenge to the Prussian 
political order, democracy became more extensively debated in the German 
Reichstag in February and spring 1917 than in the British House of 
Commons. Before the war, at least the German Social Democrats had been 
interested in discussing the need to democratise the Reich, in view of the 
fact that, although universal male surage had existed since 1867, the real 
inuence of the Reichstag had remained limited. ere was no ministerial 
responsibility to it; it could not supervise the executive power, which 
generally loathed parliamentarism and turned to extra-parliamentary means 
as support for the socialists increased. e Reichstag was made weaker by 
the extensive powers of the Bundesrat, divisions within the parties, the 
inability of the Social Democrats and the liberals to agree on cooperation 
and the lacking esteem of parliamentary work among both the public and 
the parliamentarians themselves. At the same time, the increasing variety 
of state activities and the growth of public spending had made cooperation 
between the civil service and the Reichstag indispensable. Before the war, the 
politicisation of the people had already turned the Reichstag into a forum of 
public discussion where competing interests could be debated, and this had 
increased the expectations projected on it. In the circumstances of spring 
1917, the non-conservative parties found common interests, which to 
some extent concerned the democratisation and parliamentarisation of the 
constitution,521 though their goals remained contradictory. 
e debate on democracy started to come into the open when on 
27 February 1917 the Chancellor himself pointed out that the British 
and French prime ministers were declaring to the world that their goal 
was to liberate Germany from Prussian militarism and ‘to endow the 
German people … with democratic liberties’.522 e Chancellor rejected 
the suggestion that Germany needed to be liberated but could not deny 
the existence of an external ideological challenge to which the German 
parliamentary elite needed to respond. Bethmann Hollweg’s response was 
to emphasise the specically monarchical character of the German polity: 
the German monarchy was not an autocracy; it had its roots ‘in the people 
and its dierent classes’ and was based ‘on the love of free men’.523 
Individual MPs who were ready to challenge the Chancellor’s view of 
the German polity soon emerged: Otto Wiemer of the Progressivists asked 
on behalf of the soldiers returning from the trenches to what extent the 
shortcomings of the prevailing system of government were responsible for 
failing to prevent the military catastrophe in which Germany was involved. 
Making use of the authoritative voice of the soldiers, Wiemer declared that 
‘the development of the state in a democratic direction’ was the only solution 
521 Ullrich 2010, 161–5; Biefang & Schulz 2016.
522 Verhandlungen, eobald von Bethmann Hollweg, 27 February 1917, 2375. 
523 Verhandlungen, eobald von Bethmann Hollweg, 27 February 1917, 2375.
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for the future.524 Just as in Britain, the soldiers in the trenches were presented 
as the most magisterial source of public opinion in determining the proper 
constitutional settlement for the future. As Richard Bessel has pointed 
out, soldiers on leave did eectively inuence public opinion with their 
despondent reports from the front,525 so Wiemer’s argument corresponded 
well with the wartime reality. e Progressivist leader had them speak for 
a future democracy. Wiemer’s vision of the democratic future of German 
political life aer such reforms was optimistic,526 recalling that of reformist 
liberals in the other countries studied here, though otherwise German 
liberals were cautious in their reformism. 
Such liberal calls for democratisation were harshly rejected by the 
Prussian elite. Kuno von Westarp (National Conservatives) totally 
denounced ‘the democratisation of all of our constitution’ in line with enemy 
models as a violation of the monarchical order and the rights of the Prussian 
parliament.527 Such misleading notions had been propagated since autumn 
1916, and now they threatened to nd their way into the minds of the troops 
as well, thereby endangering the battle for the fatherland. An antidote to 
democratisation could be found in ‘the strong monarchical power’, which 
had survived the war and should be maintained.528 
Marcus Llanque has shown how the First World War and Allied war 
propaganda created circumstances in which the critics of the traditional 
authoritarian state (Obrigkeitsstaat) began increasingly to refer to democracy 
as an alternative political system that challenged established German and 
more particularly Prussian notions of a constitutional state. As a consequence 
of the experiences of the war, democracy became an unavoidable concept 
in political discourse for the rst time. e war gave rise to the concept 
of ‘Western democracy’ in German discourse as well: by 1917 it was 
increasingly clear that for the debaters it referred to the political systems of 
Britain, France and the United States as opposed to the German – and more 
particularly Prussian – political order. While ‘Western democracy’ was rarely 
dened, it was nevertheless seen as an alternative to the Bismarckian and 
Williamite order.529 e question for German MPs was whether democracy 
should in the future continue to be rejected as degenerate, whether a more 
developed German version of democracy existed, or whether the Germans 
should reform their polity to better correspond with the supposed ideals of 
‘Western democracy’. 
e very same question was acute for the parliamentary elites in Sweden 
and Finland, too. e rise of this new concept also forced these German 
cultural ‘hinterlands’ to take a clearer stand on what ‘Western democracy’ 
524 Verhandlungen, Otto Wiemer, 27 February 1917, 2400.
525 Bessel 2014, 130–1.
526 Verhandlungen, Otto Wiemer, 27 February 1917, 2400.
527 Verhandlungen, Kuno von Westarp, 27 February 1917, 2404.
528 Verhandlungen, Kuno von Westarp, 27 February 1917, 2404.
529 Llanque 2000, 12–13. Llanque questions the existence of a proper debate on 
democracy in wartime Germany but nevertheless concedes that there was a rise 
in the use of the concept from 1917 on; cf. Bruendel 2003, 19, 109, 241. In the 
Reichstag we can certainly nd some interesting debate.  
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might imply for their political systems. A conservative reaction might be 
that the concept stood for political systems that were in no way applicable to 
the Nordic states, which traditionally looked to the German constitutional 
monarchy as a  model for an economically and culturally strong and well 
organised polity. A shared nationalist one was that the countries possessed 
an immemorial democratic tradition of their own.530 e Swedish and 
Finnish political elites as a whole would soon be forced to rethink their 
relation to the concept, however, as a result of the obvious outcome of the 
war and domestic demands for reform. 
Llanque has emphasised how rapidly the context of the discourse on 
democracy changed in Germany, starting in March 1917. e outbreak of 
the Russian Revolution provoked an international interest in developments 
in Russia and the meaning of democracy there and elsewhere. e British 
government, too, introduced its proposal for an electoral reform, which 
gave rise to expectations for the complete democratisation of the oldest 
of parliamentary governments. Once the United States, as the world’s 
self-declared leading democracy, joined the war and presented the 
democratisation of Germany as a major war goal, the German debate could 
no longer bypass democracy as a mere ‘Western’ phenomenon; the Germans 
had to discuss it in relation to their established political order, which was being 
openly challenged by their enemies. On the side of the Entente, democracy 
could be understood as a uniting ideological concept for the Americans, 
British, French and now also the Russians, distinguishing the Allies from 
the Central powers. It was repeatedly used in declarations that the war was 
about the defence of liberty and democracy. However, the concept remained 
a contested one: while ‘democracy’ was a favoured term in American war 
literature, the French rather viewed themselves as ghting for civilisation. 
As preceding subsections have shown, it also took time before the British 
political elite began to talk about democracy more extensively and politicise 
the concept in the domestic context; that could be done freely only aer the 
war was over. It is, therefore, no wonder that German critics of the Prussian 
political order, too, continued to have problems in relating themselves to the 
rarely dened and patently propagandistic concept of ‘Western democracy’. 
Democracy had certainly not been a dominant dening characteristic of 
Western popular governments before the war, and there had never existed 
a single Western model of parliamentary democracy that could be exported 
to non-democratic states: Britain and France represented dierent varieties 
of parliamentarism, while in the course of the nineteenth century the 
United States had adopted an understanding of itself as the world’s leading 
democracy. e British parliamentary system, which had historically been 
much discussed in Germany, had usually been regarded as unique to that 
country and as being vitiated by a number of shortcomings. e concept of 
democracy, for its part, had been used in Germany mainly by its critics, who 
wished to show what was to be feared from the proposed democratisation.531 
German writers might also react by arguing that democratic ideals had 
530 Ihalainen 2015; Jakobsen & Kurunmäki 2016.
531 Llanque 2000, 102–104, 106, 111–12; Ihalainen 2016a.
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already been realised in particularly German ways that were suited to the 
national context, while the Western politicians who criticised Germany 
were merely defending their own pseudo-democratic systems, the viable 
functioning of which even their own theorists might question.532 e same 
point was oen heard from the academic right in other northern European 
countries as well.
In the Reichstag, the discourse on democracy was actualised in Gustav 
Noske’s famous speech of 29 March 1917 and in Eduard Bernstein’s references 
to ‘the distrust of democracy in the German Reich all over the world’.533 
According to Noske, the Western enemies were justifying the war as a battle 
against ‘the non-liberty and hostility to freedom of the German system of 
government’.534 German ‘non-liberty’ (Unfreiheit) and ‘hostility to freedom’ 
(Freiheitsfeindlichkeit) were contrasted with the vague but overwhelmingly 
positive Anglo-American and French concepts of democracy and liberty.535 
German academia would respond by emphasizing ‘German liberty’ as the 
counter-concept to Western plutocracy and imperialism, though some self-
critical remarks also emerged.536 Noske did not deny the signicance of the 
Western contempt for German political institutions but pointed out that 
‘institutions in the Western democracies’ also had their deciencies.537 e 
use of the concept ‘Western democracies’ recognised dierences between 
the political systems of the Entente and Germany. Noske’s speech implied 
that a constitutional reform in Germany was timely, but it patriotically 
challenged the political systems of the enemies. His proposal was by no 
means to copy the democratic institutions of the Entente but to democratise 
existing German institutions.
More daring than his proposal for a national kind of democratisation 
was Noske’s use of the major Western counter-concept to democracy, 
‘Prussianism’. While criticism within Germany was nothing new, the highly 
pejorative content which the concept had been given in the war propaganda 
of the Entente was thus expressed in Germany too, albeit indirectly. Noske’s 
estimate was that the British and French interpreted the Russian Revolution 
as constituting ‘a blow against reactionary Prussianism’ since they viewed 
the fallen autocratic regime of the tsars and the German polity as similar.538 
Noske rejected such a parallel as unfounded, in view of the fact that the 
Germans enjoyed universal male surage while in Russia surage was 
unequal and indirect and in some ways parallel to the Prussian taxation-
based three-class voting system or the Swedish system of forty tax and vote 
grades. However, Noske pointed out, in line with a warning in Vorwärts 
about Germany ghting against an alliance of democratic peoples, that 
reactionary policies of the Prussian type, including unequal surage, were 
532 Llanque 2000, 114; Llanque 2015, 7475.
533 Reported in Vorwärts, 30 March 1917.
534 Verhandlungen, Gustav Noske, 29 March 1917, 2839.
535 is is exemplied by Frederic Harrison, ‘No Terms with Hohenzollerns’, e 
Times, 27 March 1917, which contrasted ‘Kaiserism’ and ‘freedom’.
536 Stibbe 2001, 169; Bruendel 2003, 156–7.
537 Verhandlungen, Gustav Noske, 29 March 1917, 2839.
538 Verhandlungen, Gustav Noske, 29 March 1917, 2839.
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becoming dicult to maintain now that the country was ‘surrounded 
by democracies not only in the west, north and south but hopefully now 
also in the east, where it will always and evermore have a democracy as 
a neighbour’.539 While Noske was unable to view Germany, despite its 
universal surage in the Reichstag elections, as a full democracy, he saw the 
German constitutional development as bound to an ongoing transnational 
transition towards democracy. He recognised the democratic nature not 
only of Britain and France but also of the Scandinavian constitutional 
monarchies and Switzerland and hoped – like many other optimists in 
March 1917 – that Russia, too, would become a democratic republic aer its 
revolution. Germany, and Prussia in particular, was now practically alone in 
Europe with its limitations to democracy, and it needed to join the trend of 
democratisation. 
Some members of the German Social Democratic Party were thus very 
optimistic about the international constitutional trends of the spring of 1917, 
and this had an inuence on how the prospects for reform were seen among 
the Swedish and Finnish Social Democrats: in spring 1917 both believed 
that the time for surage and parliamentary reforms was at hand. e high 
degree of transnational thinking among the German Social Democrats can 
be seen in Noske’s conclusion that the ongoing democratisation was forcing 
the most resistant political forces into concessions everywhere, the question 
being only which form the inevitable reform would nally take. While any 
Western hopes of the Social Democrats launching a revolution in Germany 
were unfounded, there was no denying the rising pressures for reform in 
Germany.540
Eduard David likewise defended a timely transition to ‘a constitutional 
democratic body politic’ within which the constitutional rights of the 
monarch would be limited even though the monarchy as an institution 
might be allowed to remain;541 this was an important qualication in the 
aermath of the fall of the Russian imperial throne. For David, the transition 
meant, rst of all, the introduction of ‘democratic surage’ in all German 
states.542 David, too, made use of the concept of Prussianism as a counter-
concept to the necessary democratisation. Whereas the suggestion of the 
Entente was that Prussianism was completely contrary to democracy, 
David raised the problem of the dominant position of Prussia within the 
German federation, which meant that the executive powers of Prussia 
and the Reich were the same; it was not possible to simultaneously serve 
the Prussian Herrenhaus and Abgeordnetenhaus, which was elected on 
the basis of the unequal Prussian system of surage, and the Reichstag as 
539 Verhandlungen, Gustav Noske, 29 March 1917, 2839; Vorwärts was quoted in 
e Times, ‘“Vorwärts” on New Russia’, 27 March 1917. e German Social 
Democratic organ saw the emergence of a democratic alliance as foreshadowing 
the Chancellor’s expected speech to the Reichstag. e Herald cited Vorwärts and 
other German socialist papers on 31 March calling for democracy lest Germany 
remain an isolated reactionary state in a democratic world. 
540 Verhandlungen, Gustav Noske, 29 March 1917, 2839–40.
541 Verhandlungen, Eduard David, 30 March 1917, 2902.
542 Verhandlungen, Eduard David, 30 March 1917, 2902.
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the parliament of the entire Reich elected by universal surage. A major 
problem in the German constitution thus continued to be the amalgamation 
of what David characterised as the ‘modern’ constitution of the Reich with 
‘the old Prussian system’. e latter had now been dealt a heavy blow by the 
war.543 In the context of March 1917, from the Majority Social Democrat 
point of view, the kind of democratisation required in Germany was limited 
to the democratisation of surage in Prussia; that would remove much of 
the inuence of Prussianism, increase Social Democratic inuence and 
enable wider democratisation. e voting system for the Reichstag in itself 
appeared to be democratic – even without female surage. e problems of 
parliamentarism were another matter, and we shall return to them below. 
Although limitations to the monarchical prerogative were demanded, the 
institution as such was not attacked. What was revived in the name of 
democracy in the aermath of the Russian Revolution and the opening of 
the British reform debate was the old battle about the Prussian three-class 
surage system.
At the same time, the Majority Social Democrats emphasised their 
patriotism and respect for the established order. David did not accept the 
simplifying representations of Germany as a non-democratic country 
that implied that it was ‘the land of barbarity and backwardness’. David’s 
suggestion was rather that Germany was highly developed but in a particular 
way: the country surpassed the other European great powers in the elds of 
economy, technology, art, science, education and social security. e country 
was, admittedly, lagging behind in its political institutions, which were now 
in need of rapid reform.544 David’s indirect argument was that with the 
democratisation of surage and adjustments to the parliamentary control 
of the executive power Germany would easily remove this backwardness 
and thereby all grounds for Western aspersions and appear as an advanced 
democratic country among the other European nations. His view of the 
advanced nature of German society was widely shared in northern Europe.
Despite the moderate nature of their demands and more widely 
expressed Centrist wishes for an electoral reform, the Social Democrats 
did not receive much support for their calls for further democratisation; 
democracy thus remained a party-political concept. Outside the le, it was 
felt to be problematic as a concept to dene the German polity. e National 
Liberals were not too enthusiastic about adopting political models from the 
West, though their spokesman Gustav Stresemann, a major champion of 
ruthless warfare but also a constitutional reformist, denounced the tendency 
of some members of Reichstag and especially the Prussian Herrenhaus to 
dismiss ‘the democratically governed [federal] states’ as being unable to full 
their tasks as states.545 is statement suggested that Germany was not to be 
dened as a democratically governed country in the Western sense but one 
which could nevertheless learn something from the Western democracies. 
Democratic government created an involvement of the people that evidently 
543 Verhandlungen, Eduard David, 30 March 1917, 2904.
544 Verhandlungen, Eduard David, 30 March 1917, 2009–10.
545 Verhandlungen, Gustav Stresemann, 29 March 1917, 2854.
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made the states strong opponents in war; democracy and parliamentarism 
were thus not simply to be rejected. 
For the right, no need for any democratisation of the suggested kind 
existed. According to Kuno von Westarp of the National Conservatives, 
there was no reason for Germans to change their established monarchical 
constitution merely because Russia had joined the so-called ‘democratically 
governed, liberally administrated countries’. From the rightist point of 
view, there were political forces within Germany – both in the press and 
among the Social Democratic and liberal groups in the Reichstag – who 
talked about constitutional reforms, but the right was determined to ght 
such attempts.546 Albrecht von Graefe, a lawyer and army ocer, likewise 
challenged the Social Democrat claim that the fall of the tsarist regime would 
mean that Germany was surrounded by democracies and would hence be 
forced to ‘fully democratise’ its government. Von Graefe suspected that the 
reformists aimed at creating a republic, in other words were questioning 
the monarchical political order, which for him constituted outright 
treason.547 is determined attitude was familiar abroad as well, including 
countries such as Sweden and Finland, where the right was equally resolute 
not to allow democratisation to go too far – though usually not quite so 
condemnatory of the concept as such. e German right demonstrated no 
sign of compromise in its defence of the established order. In the Western 
press, by contrast, the confrontation of late March 1917 led to predictions 
that ‘the democratisation of Germany will come quickly  . . . sooner than 
the German authorities wish and more speedily than England expects’;548 
to distinctions being made between German democracy and Prussian 
monarchy; and to beliefs in the possibilities of ‘a democratic opposition 
within Germany’ but also, on the other hand, to questions about ‘whether 
the German people really aspire to be democratic or not’.549 Both foreign 
observers and the le in Germany were overly optimistic about a discursive 
turn towards democracy, which, however, for the time being remained only 
a Social Democratic intervention.
3.2.4  The role of a ‘free’ German people and the masses  
 in a new era
Appeals to the people had been typical of German political culture since the 
early nineteenth century: the representatives of the Frankfurt Parliament in 
1848 and 1849 understood themselves as representatives of the people, and 
universal male surage in the Reichstag elections since 1867 supported the 
idea of the parliamentary representation of the people – despite the limited 
powers of the parliament.550 A long tradition of seeing the people as the 
ultimate authority existed, but as a result of the First World War appeals 
546 Verhandlungen, Kuno von Westarp, 29 March 1917, 2859.
547 Verhandlungen, Albrecht von Graefe, 30 March 1917, 2919.
548 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Democracy in Germany’. 30 March 1917.
549 e Manchester Guardian, ‘e Socialist Revolt’, 30 March 1917; ‘e German 
Government and the European Peoples’, 31 March 1917.
550 Biefang & Schulz 2016.
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to the people were rising in an unprecedented manner. ey increased 
particularly in war propaganda, as military leaders tried to mobilise all 
possible resources necessary for a victory through the collective will of the 
nation.551 e concept of the community of the people was gaining ground.
e ideological inuences of the Russian Revolution were also 
immediately felt in  German political discourse. Georg Ledebour of the 
Social Democratic Labour Association (the far le) was inspired by the 
outbreak of the Revolution and spoke for the rise of the people to the 
leadership of the state, demanding the replacement of the monarchy with 
a democratic republic. e republic would be founded on the will of the 
people, a political proposition that challenged the established political order 
of imperial Germany, which was based on a hereditary monarchy. Ledebour’s 
argument was extreme, but the notion of the will of the people was to be 
increasingly used by parliamentarians to legitimate their political demands 
or, alternatively, to reject ideas presented by their political opponents.552 
Gustav Noske (SPD) also took up the growing discontent of the masses 
of the people as a justication for demands for immediate electoral reform. 
For Noske – in a deterministic Marxist manner – it was the people and not 
the monarchy, the leading ministers or the Prussian elite who constituted 
the force that would determine the pace of constitutional reform: ‘e 
speed at which Germany will be modernised does not depend on the will 
of individual persons; it will depend on the will and energy of the masses 
of the people.’553 In British reform discourse, few speakers had so explicitly 
threatened the ruling elite with the possibility of the people taking the 
political process into their own hands if reform was not enacted. In Sweden 
and Finland, the le did not hesitate to suggest that the time for a popular 
initiative of the Russian kind was at hand. 
Gustav Noske suggested that, should the government and the bourgeois 
majority to fail to introduce ‘a democratic reorganisation’ of the German 
political system, a most brutal campaign to determine the issue would 
follow aer the war (not during the war as in Russia). Instead of such 
a struggle over the constitution, ‘the German people’ would need to dedicate 
all its power to healing the wounds of the war. A reform during the war, by 
contrast, would create ‘free paths for a free people in a new era’ and save 
Germany from unnecessary post-war confrontations.554 Vorwärts also cited 
Gustav Stresemann, who had contrasted ‘the spirit of popular defence’ with 
the realities of the Prussian system.555 e Social Democrat argument in 
favour of a surage reform was in many ways analogous to that in Britain: 
the war – and in the case of Germany also the ongoing democratisation in 
surrounding countries – oered a unique chance for introducing a reform 
that would be much more awkward to realise in peacetime. Confrontations 
during the time of post-war reconstruction should be prevented in advance. 
551 Stibbe  2001, 6; Smith 2007, 9.
552 Verhandlungen, Georg Ledebour, 30 March 1917, 2924; Bollmeyer 2007, 87.
553 Verhandlungen, Gustav Noske, 29 March 1917, 2842.
554 Verhandlungen, Gustav Noske, 29 March 1917, 2842.
555 Vorwärts, 30 March 1917.
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e principal actor in reforming the current system appeared to be the people 
rather than the parliament as their representative, which reects a limited 
degree of trust in parliamentarism even among Social Democrats. However, 
in Germany only a minority consisting of the le and some members of the 
centre parties were convinced of the necessity of an immediate reform in 
1917. Among the Social Democrats, a constitutional reform was generally 
presented as necessary for the future of the German body politic, as can be 
seen in Eduard David’s attempt to persuade the centre parties to join the 
reform front. He dened the electoral reform as a starting point for further 
progress by legal means: it would enable ‘a healthy development’ leading 
to the peaceful ‘transformation of our body politic in a more appropriate 
direction’.556 e reform, he asserted, would maintain the Germans as the 
leading civilised nation.557 
Appeals to the will of the people were useful for the German Conservatives 
as well, though for quite dierent reasons: while the Conservatives avoided 
the use of the term ‘popular sovereignty’, they were happy to speak about 
‘the will of the people’ in senses that resembled the concept of a community 
of the people (Volksgemeinscha, see also section 7.2 for an extended 
discussion). e explanation for this conceptual choice is obvious: popular 
sovereignty would stand in direct opposition to the principle of the 
sovereignty of the princes, which the Conservatives by no means wanted 
to give up. e Conservative view was that the will of the people might 
very well correspond with monarchical sovereignty. e emerging USPD 
on the far le, by contrast, used the term ‘popular sovereignty’ to associate 
themselves with the Russian revolutionaries. Nonetheless, in the wartime 
discourse of 1917, the use of popular sovereignty remained rare in German 
debates. e connections between the Volk and the Reichstag were drawn 
conventionally and not in any revolutionary sense.558 
In reality, the Reichstag remained constitutionally too weak vis-à-vis 
the Kaiser, the Prussian bureaucracy and the commanders of the army to 
force though the reforms that some of its leist members envisioned. In 
wartime Germany, much of political power was vested in the army leaders, 
who in the middle of a total war wanted to hear no mention of political 
reorganisation. Indeed, they were unhappy that the Chancellor had not been 
able to prevent the creation of the new Constitutional Committee. When the 
crisis following the increased activity of the Reichstag in constitutional and 
foreign policy issues escalated in July 1917, Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg 
proved unable to mediate between the two sides and was forced to resign.559 
With his resignation, promises of a future constitutional reform went by the 
556 Verhandlungen, Eduard David, 30 March 1917, 2907, 2909.
557 Verhandlungen, Eduard David, 30 March 1917, 2910. Here he was referring 
to the German concepts of ‘Kultur’ and ‘Kulturnation’ that emphasised the 
primacy of tradition and community over individual rather than the British 
or French notion of ‘civilisation’ and its progress and individualism. On the 
war as one of national cultures, see Muschick 2001, 180–1, 214; Pyta 2011, 32; 
Rasmussen 2014, 395–6.
558 Bollmeyer 2007, 91, see also 88–90.
559 Gusy 1997, 5.
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board: there would be no reform or even any major discussion on it before 
the end of the war in autumn 1918.
3.2.5  What would the co-sovereignty of parliaments 
 mean?
e German right was infamous for its contempt of parliamentarism, but 
such views were not unknown among the other German political groups 
either. Despite the ferment caused by the state of warfare, the global impact 
of the Russian Revolution and the entry of the United States into the war, 
constitutional views remained unchanged in this respect among the right 
and even the centre. To some extent the le, too, continued to express 
reservations about Western parliamentarism. e Manchester Guardian 
interpreted the German confrontation of March 1917 as having actually 
arisen from the outspoken denunciation of ‘Parliamentarism, a disease 
which from the beginning of the war had been making insidious progress’, 
the defence of militarism by the Conservative leader Count Heinrich 
Yorck von Wartenburg in the Prussian Herrenhaus and the reaction of the 
Chancellor to it with a promise of reform aer the war.560 
In the Reichstag, the Conservative deputy Albrecht von Graefe 
advocated the traditional duality of the German political system, in which 
parliamentarism might have a balancing but by no means a ruling role: the 
constitution consisted of two independent and equal powers, the crown and 
the representation of the people. is German tradition, which had been 
reinforced by Bismarck, was superior to any form of parliamentarism as 
practised in the West: in this model, the power of the monarch was suitably 
curtailed by the parliament.561 is Conservative constitutional assumption 
was shared by many members of the political elites in Northern Europe; we 
shall encounter it especially among the Swedish and Finnish right, and it 
continued to inuence constitutional thought in these three countries aer 
the constitutional upheaval was over. 
e Social Democrats’ spokesmen, among whom doubts about 
parliamentary work as the proper strategy had existed until the split in the 
party,562 now emphasised the political role of the parliament. As Eduard 
David – who had hoped that the Social Democrats’ support for the war 
eort would open the way to parliamentarisation – put it, ‘the bold step to 
a parliamentary system’ had become necessary, and no one should doubt its 
inevitability any longer. He maintained that ‘the majority of the people’ as 
well as that of the representatives of the people in the Reichstag supported 
the reorganisation of the political system.563 Georg Ledebour, a proponent 
of idealised classical parliamentarism allied with mass action in the Marxist 
sense, complained that the established system did not enable ‘the search 
for communication through argument and counter-argument in the 
560 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Germany and the Russian Revolution’, 29 March 1917.
561 Verhandlungen, Albrecht von Graefe, 30 March 1917, 2919–20; Bollmeyer 2007, 
107.
562 Jörke & Llanque 2016.
563 Verhandlungen, Eduard David, 30 March 1917, 2908, 2910.
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parliament’;564 such esteem for pro et contra argumentation was rare among 
leist parliamentarians of the time. It is worth considering to what extent 
the German leist calls for parliamentarisation in spring inspired Social 
Democratic and Liberal demands in countries like Sweden and Finland, 
where German developments were traditionally followed with great interest. 
As we shall see, the awareness of what was going on in Germany was also 
acute in 1917: the German example was frequently cited as a major argument 
for immediate further parliamentarisation in both countries.
e Catholic Centre, too, was ready to defend the standing of the Reichstag 
even though far-reaching parliamentarism was not one of its goals. Peter 
Spahn was unhappy about how the Prussian Herrenhaus had transgressed 
its constitutional competence in rejecting the engagement of the Reichstag 
in constitutional questions. e Prussians had viewed the aspirations of the 
Reichstag to intrude on the use of executive power (especially in foreign 
policy) as downright ‘revolutionary’, a label that associated it with the 
subversion that had caused the fall of the Russian imperial throne. e 
view of the old Prussian elite had been that ‘the German people deserved a 
better parliament than the current Reichstag could provide’.565 Spahn tried 
to clarify the situation by denying the existence of any tendency among 
the parliamentarians to get involved in the use of executive power but 
defended the rights of the Reichstag.566 Despite this principled defence of 
parliamentary rights, the Catholic Centre, with its conservative values, did 
not actively pursue reform, a fact that was lamented by the Social Democrats, 
who had already received some support from the two liberal parties.567
Gustav Stresemann of the National Liberals, although aware of divisions 
within his party on the issue of parliamentarism, spoke warmly in favour 
of a ‘parliamentary system’ in which ministers and undersecretaries would 
be responsible to the Reichstag.  Stresemann was no uncritical advocate of 
British or French parliamentarism but could not accept the contempt of 
the members of the Prussian Herrenhaus for strengthening the rights of 
the parliament. ey seemed to mistakenly believe that these would violate 
the rights of the monarchy and lead to the implementation of a republic. 
ey accused parliamentarism of creating a system of levelling down, with 
government by lawyers, internal corruption and causing the fall of the entire 
political system. e current war had demonstrated to Stresemann that this 
was not the case, as the conservative Neue Preußische-Zeitung maintained.568 
Britain and France, two great powers with parliamentary systems, had 
proved their strength in the war. e war had indeed demonstrated that 
‘the parliamentary system does oer a strong glue cementing the connection 
between the people, the government and the state’.569 Stresemann supported 
564 Verhandlungen, Georg Ledebour, 30 March 1917, 2923; Grosser 1970, 142.
565 Verhandlungen, Peter Spahn, 29 March 1917, 2831.
566 Verhandlungen, Peter Spahn, 29 March 1917, 2832.
567 See Verhandlungen, Eduard David, 30 March 1917, 2907.
568 Vorwärts, 29 March 1917.
569 Verhandlungen, Gustav Stresemann, 29 March 1917, 2854–5; Vorwärts, 30 
March 1917; see Roussellier 1997, 21, on the success of and challenges to French 
parliamentarism.
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stronger parliamentarism as a link between the people and government: 
parliamentarism made states stronger in warfare, and even Germany should 
make use of this potential weapon. e point was surprisingly similar to 
those presented by all parties in the British House of Commons in March 
and May. Stresemann himself would recall his argument aer the fall of the 
Prussian order. 
Stresemann thus spoke in favour of a closer connection between the 
people and the government via the parliament, though this would remain 
a qualied form of parliamentarism. e chancellor should at least consult 
the party leaders on planned legislative reforms. Such an increase in the role 
of the parliament in the political process would, according to Stresemann, 
in no way violate the rights of the executive power. On the contrary, it 
was likely to strengthen the position of the monarch by showing how 
his government enjoyed the support of the majority of the people – thus 
providing the kind of legitimacy that the British government enjoyed – and 
liberate political energy to benet the state and the war eort. All claims 
about Germany not being ready for increased parliamentarism were, in 
Stresemann’s view, unfounded: he insisted that the war had provided such 
political training for the German people that they were ready to take further 
steps towards parliamentarisation.570 Stresemann thus presented the war as 
a political force that made the introduction of parliamentarism necessary. 
He presented a positive interpretation of parliamentarism that had been 
rare in Continental political discourse; indeed not even all National Liberals 
shared it. Some Finnish liberals may have been encouraged by Stresemann’s 
views on parliamentarisation, while Swedish Liberals were already pro-
parliamentary. 
Other expressions of trust in the potential of parliamentary means 
of proceeding include the le-liberal Ernst Müller’s proposal that the 
international connections of parliaments should be employed more eciently 
to serve the war aims of the nations. e proposal challenged the views of 
Count Yorck, who had questioned the interparliamentary connections of 
national parliaments and complained about their intrusion into the eld 
of royal sovereignty. From the point of view of a Junker with a hereditary 
parliamentary seat (but also a doctor of law), interparliamentary connections 
violated the established constitutional order in that the parliaments used 
them to attempt to become ‘joint sovereigns’. In Müller’s view, the Germans 
should rather make a more ecient use of ‘the parliamentary instrument of 
public opinion’ so that the parliaments would communicate more closely 
with each other and thereby contribute to bringing the combatant peoples 
politically closer to each other. e Germans would do better to learn from 
the Allied powers here: the members of their parliaments had met each other 
in wartime and brought the political views of the representative bodies closer 
to each other,571 with the result that their transnational activities had united 
the Western peoples. A corresponding form of parliamentary transnational 
570 Verhandlungen, Gustav Stresemann, 29 March 1917, 2855–6. 
571 Verhandlungen, Ernst Müller-Meinigen, 29 March 1917, 2843–4.
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interaction among the Central Powers was needed to counter the Western 
powers. is proposal again suggests that parliamentarism was being re-
evaluated among the German liberals and that the internationalism created 
by the need to overcome the enemy could be productive of reform.
For Müller, the basic function of the parliament was not to criticise or 
challenge the executive power but to support it by constructing supportive 
national and international public opinion:572 the parliament could be an 
instrument for the construction of a stronger state and an alliance. However, 
Müller did share some of the ideals of parliamentarism as understood in 
Britain or France: he recognised the role of the parliament as the defender 
of the rights of the citizens against the military; it was a duty of parliaments 
to protect ‘the Magna Charta of the individual freedom of the citizens’,573 
using an expression that linked his reasoning not only to the British 
tradition of parliamentarism but also to pre-war military violations of civil 
rights in Germany. However, Müller was calling for a more extensive use 
of the Reichstag to serve the purposes of the German Reich rather than 
demanding any profound parliamentarisation of government: these were 
only ‘small reforms towards parliamentarisation’, his aim being to revive 
the parliamentary debate. Müller emphasised that the Reichstag possessed 
an understanding of the political situation that made it worthwhile to 
employ it more eciently in serving the military goals of the Reich.574 
Over-interpretations could not be avoided, however: Wolfgang Heine 
(SPD) wrote in Berliner Tageblatt that the German liberals and the Social 
Democrats were united in their recognition of British parliamentarism as 
capable of strengthening the state.575 e newspaper itself also wrote about 
the introduction of ‘real parliamentarism in the Reich’.576 e right was 
certainly provoked by such openly pronounced Anglophilia even if it was 
limited to the admiration of only some aspects of British parliamentarism.
e Social Democrats, the leaders of both liberal parties and to a limited 
extent the Catholic Centre were thus speaking positively about the potential 
of some aspects of parliamentarism to support rather than weaken the 
German war eort. e Conservatives, by contrast, rejected all calls for the 
extension of the political inuence of the Reichstag as incompatible with 
true monarchy. For them, the monarch alone was the proper leader to 
decide the fate of his people. ey did not want a ‘parliamentary regime’ in 
which the monarch would nominate his ministers in accordance with the 
will of the majority of the parliament. Count Kuno von Westarp, a Prussian 
civil servant, considered that it was essential to maintain a clear distinction 
between legislative and executive responsibilities so that the Reichstag 
should continue to be involved in the legislative process and the budget but 
refrain from extending its power to issues belonging to the executive.577
572 On international public opinion and parliaments, see Harvard 2016.
573 Verhandlungen, Ernst Müller-Meinigen, 29 March 1917, 2844.
574 Verhandlungen, Ernst Müller-Meinigen, 29 March 1917, 2845.
575 Berliner Tageblatt, 31 March 1917.
576 Berliner Tageblatt, 31 March 1917.
577 Verhandlungen, Kuno von Westarp, 29 March 1917, 2860.
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Similar views were echoed by Albrecht von Graefe, who questioned par-
liamentarism altogether, insisting that the ministers were the representatives 
of the opinion of the monarch. According to this Prussian civil servant and 
former soldier, if the monarch were forced to choose his ministers according 
to the will of the majority in the parliament, he would totally lose his 
relevance as a political agent. e German constitutional system meant that 
the crown and the representative institution had equal, independent powers 
in forming their opinions. is system would be destroyed if the monarch 
was made no more than an executive dependent on the parliament as then 
the parliament would exercise absolute rule.578 Such a rejection of ‘the 
absolutism of the parliament’ had been the predominant pre-war argument 
against parliamentarisation and would reappear in the Weimar debates on 
a Reichspräsident and the referendum: an institution with authoritarian 
powers was considered necessary to balance the parliamentary system579 
and to maintain the traditional duality of government. A similar argument 
would be heard from the Swedish right throughout this period and from the 
Finnish right still in spring 1919, when a republican constitution combining 
parliamentarism and a strong presidency was planned. 
Erich Mertin of the German Reichspartei put forward an empirical point 
against parliamentary government that was typical of conservative politicians 
elsewhere: parliamentarism was a form of government that belonged to the 
past and was declining; it was not a progressive form of government of the 
future. Its unavoidable decline had been demonstrated by the experiences 
of the war: parliamentarism had also decreased in signicance in countries 
that had previously claimed to have practised it. Coalition administrations 
of those who were considered politically ‘capable’ and growing bureaucracies 
governed in Britain and France, too, so that the era of parliamentarism was 
over in Western Europe as well.580 is weakening status of parliaments 
among the Western powers had been discussed in German political 
literature during the war.581 A general assumption among the right was that 
the Prussian political culture oered a more lasting alternative.
Despite the profoundly antiparliamentary statements of the establish-
ment, the German Social Democrats interpreted the attempts of March 1917 
as a demonstration of the growing inuence of the Reichstag. On 31 March 
1917, Vorwärts declared that ‘the German representation of the people’ in 
the Reichstag had demonstrated its political potential to the entire world by 
determinedly bringing up the necessity of the political reorganisation of the 
Reich.582 
e German constitutional reform would come to a complete stop in just 
a few months’ time, however. Opposition to any far-going reform was heard 
578 Verhandlungen, Albrecht von Graefe, 30 March 1917, 2920. e absolutism of 
the parliament was also rejected by the leading constitutional lawyers of the day, 
including Robert Redslob. Mergel 2002, 40.
579 Mergel 2002, 40.
580 Verhandlungen, Erich Mertin, 30 March 1917, 2921.
581 Llanque 2000, 222.
582 Bollmeyer 2007, 171.
139
3.3 Sweden: Renewed reform demands under the threat of revolution
most outspokenly at the end of May 1917, when the commander of a major 
warship denounced Social Democrat calls for the parliamentarisation of 
the German monarchy along Western lines, suggesting that such reform 
demands stood for collaboration with the enemy and urging his sailors to 
stop such plots against the imperial dynasty.583 We shall return to this strong 
underlying opposition to reform in much of the German and especially 
Prussian polity in section 4.2, aer an excursion into Swedish and Finnish 
parliamentary debates on constitutional questions. e German debates of 
late March and promises of reform from the executive constituted a primary 
point of reference for the Swedish and Finnish MPs when they debated 
their reform needs in the spring and summer of 1917. Conclusions about 
future transnational developments were frequently drawn on the basis of 
the German case: the expected German changes were understood as having 
immediate relevance for the Swedes and Finns as well.
3.3  Sweden: Renewed reform demands under the threat  
 of revolution
3.3.1  The situation created by a repeatedly postponed  
 suffrage reform
Many Swedes had feared a Russian invasion during the First World War, but 
no such intervention ever materialised. e Swedish wartime government 
of Hjalmar Hammarskjöld consisted of civil servants and, prioritising 
the interests of Swedish exports, favoured Germany in its foreign policy. 
Relations with Britain were poor and tended to become worse in the course 
of 1917. Nevertheless, Sweden remained neutral despite attempts by the 
Germanophile court, the Swedish Ambassador in Berlin and several activists 
to bring Sweden into an open alliance with Germany. e pro-German 
line began to gradually weaken when no German victory was achieved 
and the rather more Anglophile le started to confront the government 
over its policies. e le was evidently turning from Germany to Britain 
as the primary political model to follow. Although no open alliance with 
Germany emerged, Sweden had remained a ‘Prussia of the North’ in terms 
of its political culture: the Swedish parliament was accused of being a copy 
of the Prussian representative institution, with its upper chamber (the First 
Chamber) elected on the basis of a taxation-based scale of forty grades. 
Much of the national academy, army, administration and political elite – 
including leading Social Democrats inspired by the German SPD – had 
traditionally had closer connections with Germany than with Britain and 
were hence inclined to sympathise with the war eort of that ‘cultured’ 
nation. e alliance with Germany was indeed primarily cultural rather 
than military or even ideological; just as in the case of Finland, it was based 
on the intertwining histories of the countries. Swedes and Germans (just 
like Finns and Germans) were viewed as natural allies in most areas of life; 
they were defenders of shared ‘Germanic’ values as opposed to those of the 
583 Leonhard 2014, 649.
140
3. The spring of democracy in 1917: The new constitutional scene
barbarians of the east, i.e. the Russians.584 Ethnic notions of belonging to the 
same race were not foreign either, although the Finns were not included in 
them.
is condition of cultural and international relations inuenced the 
postponement of constitutional reforms in Sweden, particularly since all 
elds of Swedish scholarship remained predominantly connected with 
the German debates. e sudden change in the state of international 
aairs created by the Russian Revolution in spring 1917 had an immediate 
transnational impact on Swedish domestic debates as well. A period 
of intense constitutional discussion began aer its outbreak, bringing 
to a  sudden end the so-called borgfred (cf. the synonymous German 
Burgfrieden) – an agreement that the various political groups should refrain 
from domestic political confrontations such as calls for electoral reform.585 
is activation of the discussion carried on pre-war reform debates but also 
saw the importation of new discourses created by the transnational events 
of the Russian Revolution, the British reform and the German Reichstag 
debates. 
A particular national dynamic had been created by the split in the Social 
Democrat parliamentary group in February, before the outbreak of the 
Russian Revolution, when 15 MPs joined a separate leist group.586 While this 
split allowed the far le to express their radical views openly, the revisionist 
stand of the Social Democratic Labour Party was further strengthened 
under the leadership of Hjalmar Branting. e demands of this party 
remained moderate, focusing on universal surage and parliamentarism 
rather than revolution as starting points for reform. e party resembled 
the German SPD in that it was ready for parliamentary cooperation with 
reformist bourgeois forces. In the opening debates of the parliamentary 
session, Social Democrat and Liberal members jointly challenged the Prime 
Minister over food supply questions and trade policies. Even before the 
outbreak of the Revolution in Russia, the ministry was losing credibility,587 
and on 27 March 1917 King Gustavus V was forced to accept the resignation 
of the government.588
e Russian Revolution was reported extensively in the Swedish press 
from 16 to 20 March and received with sympathy not only by Socialists but 
also by many Liberals.589 e rightist press suggested – revealingly – that 
the Revolution was a mere plot planned by the Entente and by the British 
in particular.590 e Right also linked the strengthening of the Swedish 
opposition with this kind of sinister Western plotting aimed at subverting 
ordered government everywhere. e Liberals and Social Democrats had 
slightly dierent visions of the future at this time, the Liberals focusing 
584 Hadenius 2008, 39–41.
585 Olsson 2000, 57.
586 Olsson 2000, 90.
587 Gerdner 1946, 8.
588 Brusewitz 1964, 79.
589 Social-Demokraten, ‘Självhärskardömets fall’, 17 March 1917.
590 Aonbladet, ‘Hård tid’, 16 March 1917.
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on a  change in the domestic government. While their activities were not 
directly linked with the events in Russia, the spread of a revolutionary 
atmosphere in Europe encouraged them to challenge the ministry over its 
tendency to ignore the parliament and the press. e Social Democrats, for 
their part, had diculties in nding a common policy in the aermath of 
their split. While a revolution in an autocratic eastern neighbour was much 
welcomed – with Hjalmar Branting, the internationally exceptionally well 
connected Social Democratic leader,591 heading for a visit to Petrograd in 
a spirit of socialist internationalism – an excessively radical revolution in 
either Russia or Sweden was not the wish of moderate mainstream Social 
Democrats. Despite their diverse interests, the Liberals and Social Democrats 
joined forces to vote against the ministry, an act that contributed to its 
disintegration.592 Cooperation ran more smoothly between these parties 
than between corresponding sister parties in Britain, Germany and Finland. 
e Swedish governmental crisis, which because of its timing was 
observed with real interest abroad, was resolved with the establishment of 
a rightist ministry led by Carl Swartz (prime minister) and Arvid Lindman 
(foreign minister). e parties of the le (which in Swedish political parlance 
included the Liberals) were unwilling to take the risk of a defeat in the 
expected election of the Second Chamber.593 ey wanted the government 
to conclude a trade agreement with Britain and thereby relieve the food 
situation.594 ey considered that electoral reform could be achieved through 
a future election victory. Both the Liberals and the Social Democrats were 
also inspired by transnational encouragement from reformists in Britain, 
Russia and Germany. In the Prussian conservative press, the Swedish Social 
Democrats were seen as aiming at as radical a government as possible, and 
hence the continuation of a non-parliamentary rightist government was 
welcomed;595 this illustrates the reciprocity of the transnational connection.
e initial reception of the Russian Revolution among the Swedish le 
was enthusiastic, but doubts and divisions soon began to emerge: the organ 
of the Majority Social Democrats cut the amount of news from Russia, while 
the leists aimed at augmenting the ‘Russian’ revolutionary atmosphere 
through extra-parliamentary demonstrations.596 e gradually radicalising 
progress of the Russian Revolution contributed to three domestic crises in 
Sweden. e rst, which began beginning on 11 April and involved ination 
and food shortages, gave rise to spontaneous demonstrations around the 
country which were associated in press reports with the revolution in 
Petrograd. Radical socialist papers viewed these protests as a similar form 
of ‘direct action against the government of starvation’. A revolutionary 
moment of transnational mobility, encounters between political agents and 
591 Kirby 1986b, 83–92; Wavrinsky 1917, 206.
592 von Sydow 1997, 115; Andræ 1998, 12–13, 22.
593 von Sydow 1997, 116.
594 Olsson 2000, 59.
595 Neue Pressißische Zeitung, 29 March 1917. Swartz’s studies at the University of 
Bonn were mentioned to emphasise his links with Germany.
596 Kan 1999b, 103, 107–8. 
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transnational transfers followed: Vladimir Lenin and his comrades, who 
had le in Basel Switzerland on 9 April and travelled through Germany 
to Sassnitz and Trelleborg crossed Sweden on their way back to Russia via 
Finland  on 13 and 14 April.597 
Hjalmar Branting was simultaneously returning from his visit to 
Petrograd – straight into a parliamentary debate on surage in local 
elections. e debate took place at the same time as the appearance of 
open extra-parliamentary agitation including hints of a revolution. Erik 
Palmstierna, a leading Social Democrat with an aristocratic background, 
recorded in his diary how people entertained ideas of revolution, which 
caused great concern among the conservatives.598 In an interview given 
during his return journey, Branting stated that the Russian Revolution had 
started ‘an entirely new era’.599 In the parliament, he addressed the members 
using the French revolutionary term ‘citizens’, which made e Right laugh 
at his ostentatious revolutionary enthusiasm.600 At the same time, regional 
newspapers were calling for the defence of ‘Swedish democracy’. Reports 
of hunger demonstrations and the imperial promises of reform in Berlin 
were published, which supported interpretations claiming the existence of 
a transnational moment of transformation: the extension of surage and 
the parliamentarisation of government might soon involve the Prussian 
system, which the Swedish right had regarded as its model. A revolutionary 
atmosphere was spreading at the local level, in the press and in the parliament. 
On 21 April, demonstrators in Stockholm were reported to have cheered 
for a ‘Sweden of the people’ and sung the International in the front of the 
Riksdag. e crowd demanded both a solution to the food shortage and 
‘universal and equal surage in local and national elections for both men 
and women’. Decisively at this stage, the Social Democratic Party leaders 
emphasised parliamentary cooperation with the other parties of the le in 
order to achieve political and economic reform; they rejected such direct 
action. e same policy was reected in the Social Democrat interpellation 
on surage on 27 April, which was accompanied by a joint call for calm 
from Branting and the bourgeois party leaders601. e party thus reacted 
to radicalisation at the local level very dierently from the Finnish Social 
Democrats. As a consequence, confrontations between leist Socialist and 
Social Democrats increased in Sweden, the former demanding a unicameral 
parliament and a republic. Shouts such as ‘Down with the King’ and ‘Long 
live the Revolution’ were heard in demonstrations organised by the far 
le,602 but the Social Democratic Party leadership consistently followed 
a moderate line, keeping radical forces in check or out of the party. e leists 
597 Kirby 1986b, 98.
598 Palmstierna 1953, 4 April 1917, 45.
599 Social-Demokraten, ‘Branting berättar om sin Petrogradresa’, 13 April 1917.
600 Palmstierna 1953, 14 April 1917, 46; Social-Demokraten, ‘En varning och en 
paroll’, 16 April 1917.
601 Aonbladet, 18 April 1917.
602 Palmstierna 1953, 27 April 1917, 52; Andræ 1998, 13, 23, 30, 34–5, 38–9, 50, 100, 
108–109, 112; Olsson 2000, 60–1, 64.
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combined parliamentary interventions with extra-parliamentary action as 
demonstrations of the popular will. In a parliamentary interpellation, they 
challenged the government over the hunger demonstrations and the delaying 
of constitutional reforms. ey did not explicitly demand unicameralism or 
a republic, but their language was nevertheless revolutionary.603 
When the conservative government responded to the interpellation, 
there were some direct anti-parliamentary reactions from the far le. Even 
though the leists constituted only a small minority, it was far from evident 
that Branting’s parliamentary line would automatically prevail against the 
radicals and the demonstrating crowds.604 At the same time, news from 
Russia and Finland gave rise to concerns about the spread of revolution. 
e supporters of council (soviet) government came into the open, and 
the founding of workers’ guards to counter the bourgeois civil guards was 
proposed.605 is could well have led to a radicalisation of the type that took 
place in Finland, and indeed some syndicalists did reject universal surage 
and parliamentarism in favour of direct action.606 For Finnish socialists, such 
radicalisation suggested that not only Russia and Germany but potentially 
Sweden, too, was heading for a revolution. is did not happen, however, 
as the majority of the Swedish Social Democrats chose a parliamentary 
strategy, won considerable electoral support and joined the Liberals in 
a coalition government in the autumn.607 
e campaign of the le for universal surage in local elections, 
originally launched by the Liberals, did not yet lead to reform. e 
government wanted to postpone the issue rather than take measures at a 
time when the direction of the Russian Revolution or the possible reform 
in Prussia was not yet known. Prime Minister Carl Swartz responded to 
the interpellations by ignoring the principle of parliamentarism608 and the 
international trends of democratisation that the le had emphasised. With 
its sixty-per-cent majority in the First Chamber, e Right could easily 
prevent all constitutional reform,609 a situation similar to that prevailing 
in contemporary Germany through Prussian inuence. e constitutional 
standstill continued in Sweden while awareness of the changing world 
around was increasing especially among members of the le. e ideological 
tensions and prevalent transnational ways of thinking can be reconstructed 
on the basis of parliamentary debates, something that has not been done 
systematically in previous Swedish research.
3.3.2 Building ‘dams of ice’ or welcoming the spring  
 in the midst of transnational change 
ough not directly involved in the war, Sweden was experiencing its 
consequences, both economically and in the form of a mounting debate on 
603 Andræ 1998, 51, 97.
604 Andræ 1998, 81.
605 Andræ 1998, 100.
606 Andræ 1998, 103–104.
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the constitution. e degree of internationalism and transnational ways of 
thinking in the Swedish debate was exceptional among the four countries 
studied here: both the socialist groups and the Liberals were inspired by the 
transnational transformative and revolutionary spirit of the times, while the 
conservatives were known to be intellectually connected with German and 
especially Prussian traditions of thought. 
e far le was most possessed by internationalism. As Carl Lindhagen 
of the leists, mayor of Stockholm, put it six days aer the abdication of 
Nicholas II and a week before the British and German parliaments would 
discuss constitutional change, ‘the new time which must come’ aer the 
war required a revision of the constitution.610 Drawing a parallel with the 
German wartime polity, Lindhagen insisted that the ‘General Sta ’ should 
no longer rule Swedish domestic politics and foreign policy611 and that 
exploratory commissions should be sent to Germany, Britain or France 
to study constitutional issues which had become the ‘great question of the 
future’.612 e totality of the war forced Sweden, too, to change and to choose 
between various constitutional models, and the debate focused on whether 
these models were relevant and which one of them was most suitable.
Among the Social Democrats, Harald Hallén, a radical clergyman, agreed 
with Lindhagen’s rejection of the current political order in Europe, using war 
metaphors that emphasised the transnational nature of the war experience: 
‘e work for this new era demands an oensive on the great front, and 
that we on our little northern front also do what we can to participate in 
this work.’613 Such militant socialism provoked the pro-German right to 
wonder who ‘we’ were and what the ‘oensive’ stood for: Did it perhaps 
imply extra-parliamentary action? Hjalmar Branting, too, described how 
‘development takes great leaps in backward countries’, associating Russia 
with ‘our backward country’ and thereby hinting indirectly at a revolutionary 
moment.614 Nils Edén, the Liberal leader, joined the call for a faster tempo 
of reform at a moment which he interpreted as portending a pan-European 
transition towards the direct participation of the citizens in public aairs.615 
e le thus immediately interpreted the Russian Revolution as a moment 
for a transnational constitutional change in Sweden as well.
Unlike in Germany or Finland but a little as in Britain, the expected 
American entry into the war was interpreted by the Swedish le as 
having constitutional implications. Carl Lindhagen presented American 
instruments of ‘popular government’ – including in his view the popular 
initiative, the referendum and the cancellation of the mandate – as models 
that deserved attention. is was exceptional in Northern European 
political discourse, in which doubts about the American system were 
610 AK, Carl Lindhagen, 21 March 1917, 34:3.
611 AK, Carl Lindhagen, 21 March 1917, 34:15.
612 AK, Carl Lindhagen, 21 March 1917, 33:38.
613 AK, Harald Hallén, 21 March 1917, 34:11.
614 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 21 March 1917, 33:46. Social-Demokraten had reported 
on the preceding day about the introduction of female surage in Russia. ‘Allmän 
kvinnorösträtt i Ryssland’, 20 March 1917.
615 AK, Nils Edén, 21 March 1917, 33:48, 50.
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commonly voiced. Lindhagen, who had links with Lenin616 and other leist 
socialists in exile in Switzerland, also idealised the Swiss system, according 
to which the government was formed by a committee of equal ministers 
elected by the parliament.617 e same model was familiar at least to Finnish 
radical socialists and was used by them to challenge ‘bourgeois’ democracy 
and parliamentarism as they were applied in Western Europe. Among the 
Social Democrats, Viktor Larsson doubted the applicability of the American 
system but welcomed the idea of studying it together with the Swiss model 
when Swedish reforms were planned.618 
e Right rejected the Anglo-American models altogether. e historian 
Karl Hildebrand, the former editor of Stockholms Dagblad, was unwilling to 
import American practices but nevertheless conceded that the war had given 
rise to a new constitutional situation so that the Swedes, even if not in acute 
need of constitutional amendments, should watch foreign developments.619 
e Right, on the other hand, emphasised the native tradition of peasant 
liberty in the form of representation in the diets and popular self-government 
at the local level and questioned the applicability of foreign versions of 
democracy and parliamentarism to Sweden.620 Professor Carl Hallendor, 
Rector of the Stockholm School of Economics, who had argued in 1911 that 
‘English’ parliamentarism based as it was on a particular political culture 
could not be transferred to other countries, considered it pointless to explore 
foreign experiences as the native ones were so comprehensive. Switzerland 
was not comparable geographically, and experiences of the referendum in 
America were not promising.621 As far as popular liberty, democracy and 
parliament were concerned, the Swedish tradition was to be followed.
e opposition challenged the government to extend surage in local 
elections in mid-April, aer the British and German debates on constitutional 
reform, the US declaration of war on Germany and the Kaiser’s vague promises 
of rearrangements. e parliamentary debate was preceded by suggestions 
in the press that Swedish right belonged to a conservative ‘international’ 
not unlike that of the socialists, backing the German ideal of the state 
and supporting such wrong kind of internationalism.622 e Liberal paper 
Dagens Nyheter had reported that a new era had begun when ‘Prussianism 
as a whole’ or, provocatively, ‘Kjellén’s Prussia’ (Professor Kjellén had been 
recognised by German academia for his criticism of democracy) – was 
falling apart ‘in this strange spring’.623 e debate was full of international 
comparisons used by the opposition to pressurise the government. Nils 
Edén emphasised the fact that Finland had extended surage in 1906 under 
the Russian tsar, that the Prussian monarch was contemplating removing 
616 Pipes 1992, 392.
617 AK, Carl Lindhagen, 21 March 1917, 33:29, 64.
618 AK, Viktor Larsson, 21 March 1917, 33:33.
619 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 21 March 1917, 33:34.
620 Nilsson 2004, 79–80; Ihalainen 2015.
621 AK, Carl Hallendor, 21 March 1917, 33:38–9; Kurunmäki 2014, 172–3. 
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623 Dagens Nyheter, ‘En ny tid’, 10 April 1917; Llanque 2015, 74.
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the classication of voters and that the British parliament would adopt 
a  reform completing cumulative extensions of surage. Indeed, all the 
other European peoples but Sweden were taking major steps forward.624 
Since Norway and Denmark had already reformed their surage systems, 
Sweden was an island of backwardness that should nally change now that 
even Russia and Prussia were changing. Swedish conservatives should listen 
to ‘the thunderous voices that can now be heard from Russia’. Sweden did 
not need a similar revolution, but the Russian Revolution nevertheless 
demonstrated the impossibility of retaining a regulated surage in an age 
when the principles of liberty and equality were making unprecedented 
progress.625 Both Erik Palmstierna of the Social Democrats and Nils Edén 
of the Liberals referred to the Danish right as an example of realising from 
‘the voices of the time’ that the moment to rearrange the polity had come 
and that anti-reformist policies had to be given up if a revolution was to be 
avoided.626 
Aer the March debates in the British Commons, Social-Demokraten 
had written about a ‘democratic development’ that would in the near 
future lead to a ‘growing, victorious advance of democratisation among 
people in all countries’.627 e war had rendered the forces of democracy 
so strong that no country would be able to stop them.628 e Prussian 
reactionary system could no longer be sustained; the Chancellor and the 
Kaiser were considering the abolition of ‘the Prussian parody of surage’ 
and democratising the Herrenhaus; and calls for parliamentarisation were 
rising in the new Constitutional Committee in Berlin, while in Sweden, at 
the same time, a new conservative government had been appointed.629 In 
the Riksdag, Gunnar Löwegren saw a reform of surage in local elections as 
unavoidable since democratic breakthroughs were taking place ‘everywhere 
in the outside world’, and the examples of Norway, Denmark, Britain 
and France demonstrated that such a reform led to no radical changes.630 
Harald Hallén lamented the fact that the Swedish system of representation 
was regarded by foreigners as analogous to the Prussian,631 which Social-
Demokraten characterised as  ‘the old Prussian Junker rule [that was] under 
increasing pressure from the triumph of democracy throughout the world’.632 
e Swedish right, associated with Prussianism by its political opponents, 
was thus urged to understand that the world was changing: the revolution 
in Russia had arisen out of the suerings of the masses during the war, 
624 AK, Nils Edén, 14 April 1917, 41:14–15, 21.
625 AK, Nils Edén, 14 April 1917, 41:20–1.
626 AK, Erik Palmstierna & Nils Edén, 14 April 1917, 41:54, 56, 58, 70.
627 Social-Demokraten, 30 March 1917.
628 Social-Demokraten, ‘Kejsar Wilhelms påsklöen’, 10 April 1917.
629 Social-Demokraten, ‘Tyska riksdagen inför den ryska revolutionen’, 30 March 
1917; ‘Svenska högerns regering’, 31 March 1917; ‘Kejsar Wilhelms påsklöen’, 
10 April 1917; Dagens Nyheter, ‘Branting har gjort starkt intryck i Petrograd’, 
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630 AK, Gustaf Löwegren, 14 April 1917, 41:22, 25, 27. 
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and a similar rising seemed possible in Germany. Quoting intertextually 
(and ‘trans-parliamentarily’) the records of the German Reichstag and his 
ideological allies to make a transnational point, Hallén related that the 
pacist Hugo Haase had already in 1915 complained about the masses of 
the people suering both from the economic hardships caused by the war 
and the consequent loss of their voting rights as a result of the system of 
class surage. Philipp Scheidemann, an internationally well-known German 
Social Democrat, had similarly pointed out the contradiction between the 
men ghting in the trenches and their lack of the right to vote.633 Now that 
even the Kaiser seemed ready for concessions, now that there was ‘springtime 
in the outside world’ and ‘rolling waves of freedom’ (in rather Wilsonian 
terms) were felt everywhere, the Swedish right should demonstrate 
farsightedness.634 is was ‘a memorable time in Swedish political history 
as far as the inuence of the world war is concerned’, but unfortunately little 
was to be expected from the Swedish right.635 e clergyman went further, 
asking whether e Right did not at all ‘fear a  rebelling spirit among the 
people even in our country’, referring to the food demonstrations and 
suggesting that the Social Democrats were aware of the rising readiness 
of the masses to revolt. Most provocative was his suggestion that ‘Swedish 
democracy’ – an exclusive concept that implied the reformist le as united 
political actors and also embraced the lower classes in a social sense – would 
receive foreign moral and material support if it decided to force through 
a turn to democracy.636 is was a revolutionary suggestion: without an 
immediate reform following the German example, a revolution of the 
Russian kind, supported by foreign socialists, might break out. As we shall 
see in subsection 7.3.3, this threat constituted a revolutionary act that e 
Right would take up again intertextually over two years later. 
e revolutionary atmosphere of the debate of 14 April 1917 intensied 
further when Hjalmar Branting, returning from a visit to Petrograd to 
congratulate the revolutionaries on the victory of the socialist proletariat and 
the birth of a new Russia,637 aer meeting the Finnish Social Democrats in 
Helsinki and writing his speech during the long train journey home, painted 
images of an ongoing global revolution. Here we have a political agent, an 
historical body, whose mobility and experiences in cross-national space 
contributed to transnational transfers, albeit of a selected kind. Branting 
bemoaned the fact that Sweden was ‘a museum of relics with regard to its 
constitution […] in the new era which is banging on the door’.638 He further 
asserted that the world had recently seen ‘the greatest events since the time 
of the French Revolution’: Russia was turning into a democratic republic. 
e expected reforms in Prussia were even more relevant for Sweden: 
633 AK, Harald Hallén, 14 April 1917, 41:32. 
634 AK, Harald Hallén, 14 April 1917, 41:34–5.
635 AK, Harald Hallén, 14 April 1917, 41:35.
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637 Dagens Nyheter, 20 March 1917.
638 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 14 April 1917, 41:67.
148
3. The spring of democracy in 1917: The new constitutional scene
‘[E]ven in the old solidly built state of the Junkers in the south, they have 
begun to feel that the time has arrived when democracy cannot be directly 
rejected or postponed to the future.’639 Sweden, which had sometimes been 
characterised as the ‘Mecklenburg of the North’ owing to the strong political 
position of its landowners,640 also needed to change. Branting considered 
that the signs of the age compelled the Swedish people to look for more 
forceful methods to make surage reform a reality and overcome the 
constant opposition.641 is was a moderate suggestion in comparison with 
Hallén’s, but it was nevertheless a challenge presented in a transnational 
context. Swedish Social Democrats, even more strongly than those in other 
countries, pointed to the revolutionary changes taking place everywhere 
in the surrounding world, which simply forced Sweden to change. Even 
if it was aimed at converting e Right, this discourse was based on the 
genuine beliefs of a moderate internationalist socialist (which was what 
Branting was), especially aer his experiences in revolutionary Petrograd. 
e points were reinforced in the upper chamber: Ola Waldén saw ‘the rule 
of the Junkers’, the alleged ideological allies of e Right, coming to an end 
and the people liberating themselves from tsarism and receiving full civil 
rights, including equal and universal surage in Russia. Such upheavals 
made a reform in Sweden timely, particularly as the Swedes knew how to 
make their voices heard by legal means (i.e. in the German way) so that no 
revolutionary (i.e. Russian) methods were needed.642 is view moderated 
the threat of revolution. 
e transnational experiences of mobility by politically active histori-
cal persons were also noticeable in the contributions of the far le. Carl 
Lind hagen, who had on the preceding day hosted Lenin on his way via 
Sweden and on to Finland,643 was enthusiastic about the current revolution 
remoulding the world. He congratulated the revisionist Branting and the 
Swedish people – somewhat ironically – for having brought revolutionary 
‘breezes’ from Petrograd.644 Fredrik Ström, who had arranged accommoda-
tion for Lenin in Stockholm,645 repeated the point in the upper chamber, 
lamenting the constitutional deadlock in Sweden in comparison with devel-
opments in all of its neighbours and thanking Branting for having brought 
‘very strong eastern winds’ from ‘the country of revolution’. He urged all 
parties of the le (including the Liberals) to prepare for a more concrete 
‘constitutional battle’ instead of a mere battle of words;646 this implied that 
parliamentary debate was a somewhat ineective way to achieve reform
639 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 14 April 1917, 41:66. Branting’s comparison with the 
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and suggested that the manipulation of parliamentary procedure or extra-
parliamentary means might be used instead. Ivar Vennerström, for his part, 
stated: ‘e Revolution is casting its shadow over Sweden, too.’647 As few 
would accept the unpredictable Russian situation as a model, he emphasised 
the Prussian readiness for reform. Now that Norway and Denmark had 
modernised their constitutions, Sweden remained ‘a little museum in Europe 
exhibiting all sorts of bureaucracy’.648 In Carl Lindhagen’s vision, Sweden 
should prepare for ‘an outbreak of spring in all politics’ and ‘a breaking-
up of the ice’, with the people ‘breaking their old fetters’ and ‘plunging into 
something new’.649 is was not a mere application of vernal metaphors to 
describe the transnational revolutionary experience; it was also alluding to 
the Marxist revolutionary agitation linked to the hunger demonstrations 
in Stockholm on the preceding days, to discussions between international 
radical socialists staying in Stockholm and to the passage of Lenin, the 
most radical of Socialist leaders, via Sweden to Russia to prepare an even 
more far-reaching revolution. e revolution that the Kautskyists had been 
expecting had arrived, and it might turn into a more radical change than 
had ever been expected. 
Lindhagen’s vernal metaphors were characteristic of the Swedish 
constitutional debate more generally and especially in the spring of 
democracy in 1917. In addition to being a classical gure of speech 
symbolising revival and transformation, they reected powerful Nordic 
experiences of spring more generally and implied the obvious need for 
a constitutional change in Sweden and the current revolutionary process, 
which the reformist le understood as transnational and unavoidable. e 
use of the spring metaphors made the revolutionary experience concrete 
by building on the climatic realities of March and April 1917: the north 
of Europe (Petrograd above all) had experienced an exceptionally cold 
winter accompanied by famine until temperatures had suddenly risen to 
spring-like gures in early March. People had come out in the sunshine in 
the Russian capital – rst demonstrating, then rioting and nally joining 
in the revolutionary activity.650 A promise of spring aer a dicult winter 
was likewise experienced both physically and politically in Stockholm and 
Helsinki.651 In the minds of the reformists, both le and centre, the change 
turned into a unique experience of an irresistible spring of democracy, and 
this was reected in the use of vernal metaphors. For radical Marxists, the 
passage of Lenin via Stockholm constituted another physical demonstration 
of the arrival of their expected ideological spring. e Russian Revolution 
was experienced and internalised very concretely and the experience 
was expressed with metaphors of spring. e Liberals also used natural 
647 AK, Ivar Vennerström, 14 April 1917, 41:75.
648 AK, Ivar Vennerström, 14 April 1917, 41:46.
649 AK, Carl Lindhagen, 14 April 1917, 41:47.
650 Pipes 1992, 274; Dahlmann 2014, 39; Bessel 2014, 129–30.
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the news of a revolution in Petrograd was con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the cold winter was coming to an end there, too. Nyström 2013, 120, 157.
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metaphors to describe the irresistibility of democratisation, referring to 
spring, waves and dams of ice. 
Among the Liberals, Mauritz Hellberg, the radical editor-in-chief 
of Karlstads-Tidningen, and Otto von Zweigbergk, the editor-in-chief 
of Dagens Nyheter, challenged the historiography of e Right with the 
liberal alternative, suggesting that true Gothic liberty was still lacking and 
that the legacy of the national myth of popular representation since times 
immemorial652 was still being violated in Sweden aer the fall of the ancien 
régime in Russia. e semi-autocratic state of imperial Germany – and 
especially Prussianism – was idealised in both political theory and practice 
by the monarchy and e Right, who dominated the First Chamber just 
as the Junkers ruled the Herrenhaus, neither of which institutions truly 
represented the people. In a comparison of parliamentary systems, Sweden 
appeared as ‘a kind of miniature Germany up here in the north, a solid 
reactionary bastion against our neighbours’ albeit now facing a reform 
thanks to the expected changes in Prussia.653 e progress of this season of 
reform was as irresistible as the coming spring was, and e Right should 
hence study the model of the German reform and stop ‘building dams of ice 
in springtime’.654 e Swedish le was encouraged in their argumentation 
for reform by news of a turn in German politics even more than by the 
Russian Revolution. 
e Right conceptualised this spring quite dierently. Karl Hildebrand, 
a leading Germanophile in Sweden, denied the validity of parallels between 
the political reconsiderations of the Kaiser and Swedish demands to reform 
regulated surage. Such ‘democratic’ circumstances prevailed in Swedish 
municipalities that Sweden was already more advanced in democracy 
and equality than, say, Britain, France or the United States, and Prussia 
would hardly catch up it as a result of its reform.655 In Hildebrand’s view, 
the more radical the events of the surrounding world got, the greater was 
the risk that their achievements would not endure and a backlash of the 
type witnessed aer the French Revolution would ensue.656 According to 
Erik Räf, the demands of the le for ‘a political revolution everywhere in 
our country’ should be simply turned down.657 Ernst Lindblad complained 
about the abuse of the threat of a revolution by leist leaders (i.e. Branting) 
who ran as envoys between Petrograd and Stockholm. eir attempts to 
persuade the Swedish people to believe in the necessity of a revolution of the 
Russian kind were useless as no grounds for deeper discontent existed. He 
claimed that Finnish and Russian workers were just aiming to gain what the 
652 Nilsson 2002b, 88–9; Ihalainen 2015.
653 FK, Mauritz Hellberg & Otto von Zweigbergk, 14 April 1917, 32:22–3, 30–1.
654 FK, Otto von Zweigbergk, 14 April 1917, 32:31–2. Noteworthy is that similar 
metaphors of waves, ood and dams had been used by the Social Democratic 
Philipp Scheidemann to characterise the unavoidability of the reform in the 
German Reichstag in late February. Müller 2002, 294.
655 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 14 April 1917, 41:38, 68.
656 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 14 April 1917, 41:69.
657 AK, Erik Räf, 14 April 1917, 41:63.
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Swedish already possessed.658 Samuel Clason emphasised the fact that the 
Swedish reform had already brought ‘equal surage to the Second Chamber’ 
and the Prussian case was hence not comparable.659 is overlooked both 
the remaining limitations on Swedish surage and universal male surage 
in Reichstag elections from 1867 on. For e Right, the Swedish system 
remained more advanced than any other and therefore in no need of reform.
A new confrontation followed as the interpellations of the Social 
Democrats and the far le that were presented in the parliament in a spirit 
of socialist internationalism interpreted foreign developments as directly 
relevant to Sweden. Hjalmar Branting depicted how ‘[g]lobal events of 
extraordinary extent and scope are revealing themselves before our eyes this 
spring of 1917’,660 thereby emphasising the existence of a universal moment 
of revolution and associating it with the outbreak of spring, both of which 
were concretely visible and also audible in a simultaneous demonstration 
for women’s surage outside the parliament building.661 Aer hearing the 
government’s response, Branting expressed his disappointment that ‘the 
international movement for political equality which is making progress 
all over the world’ and ‘tremors that are greater than anything that Europe 
has experienced for several centuries’ still had not made e Right rethink 
their position.662 Natural metaphors of revolution of an almost Kautskyist 
deterministic type were being used here.663 Branting’s interpretation of the 
state of reform in the European great powers was nevertheless optimistic: 
a stronghold of reactionary politics had fallen in Russia; in Germany there 
was no going back to a country ruled by the Junkers; belief in a democratic 
future had risen in Austria; and female surage had been approved by an 
overwhelming majority in the British House of Commons. Denmark had 
already received a democratised constitution, and the Dutch right had 
conceded the necessity of reform. What the Swedish Social Democrats 
wanted was not ‘Russian methods or Russian solutions’ but a national 
reform664 realised in line with German Social Democracy. Harald Hallén 
pointed out, however, that such strong calls for reform would not have been 
658 FK, Ernst Lindblad, 14 April 1917, 32:24.
659 FK, Samuel Clason, 14 April 1917, 32:35.
660 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 27 April 1917, 50:21; see also Ivar Vennerström, 50:24.
661 Social-Demokraten, ‘Ett imponerande kvinnotåg i Stockholm’, 28 April 1917.
662 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 5 June 1917, 72:5–6.
663 e inuence of Karl Kautsky as a leading Social Democratic theoretician may 
have been felt in the Swedish socialist use of vernal metaphors: reform, if not 
revolution, was unavoidable as a result of natural forces inuencing societies 
globally. On the other hand, some Swedish Liberals, too, liked to use metaphors 
of spring burgeoning (blomstertiden). 
664 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 5 June 1917, 72:5–7. Finland did not appear as a relevant 
point of comparison to Branting despite the simultaneous (perhaps excessively) 
radicalising aims of the Finnish Social Democrats for parliamentary sovereignty. 
Finland might have made an inconvenient comparison given that the country 
had a Social Democratic parliamentary majority aer the introduction of 
universal surage and was nevertheless in a state of crisis. Since the country was 
still part of the Russian Empire, Finnish solutions might also be associated with 
Russian ones. 
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presented in Sweden without the Russian Revolution; the old calls for liberty 
had been revived because the Revolution had ‘shaken the world’ and caused 
‘liberation movements to sweep through societies’.665 e Swedish electoral 
system was simply backward in comparison with the other Nordic countries 
and Europe more generally now that even the Hohenzollerns and Habsburgs 
had recognised the need to take the will of the people into consideration.666 
e far le would not exclude the possibility of the Revolution reaching 
Sweden. According to Ivar Vennerström, the international situation 
demonstrated that a revolutionary wave originating from Russia was 
touching every country and would eventually prevail over the reactionary 
Swedes as well – if not otherwise then through a real revolution.667 Zeth 
Höglund, a leist activist recently liberated from Långholmen prison, 
quoted the historian Erik Gustaf Geijer in suggesting that Sweden was like 
Russia in allowing a revolution to come about and being surprised once 
it nally broke out.668 Informed by the Finnish socialists K. H. Wiik and 
Yrjö Sirola, who had recently visited Stockholm, the far leists also pointed 
to the socialist majority in the Finnish parliament striving for the further 
democratisation and parliamentarisation of the political system.669 Carl 
Lindhagen criticised the Swedes for not following ‘the daughter country 
Finland’ in the introduction of a radical parliamentary reform with 
a  unicameral parliament and universal surage for men and women.670 
Continuing the use of metaphors, Lindhagen foresaw the current Ragnarök 
(in Norse mythology the nal great battle and rebirth of the world, known 
in German as Götterdammerung) of the world war turning into ‘a terrible 
breakthrough’ in the West, too, with consequences identical to those of the 
Russian Revolution.671 Fredrik Ström, the party secretary of the far leists, 
went further still, urging the democrats to crush the First Chamber672 
– a revolutionary declaration to which e Right would later return in 
intertextual references. e far le were quite daring in their predictions 
of a coming revolution; this distinguished them from the Majority Social 
Democrats and their more cautious ideological brethren in Germany, but 
they did not go quite so far as the revolutionary rhetoric of the Finnish 
Social Democrats. is radicalisation of the Swedish far-le nevertheless 
665 AK, Harald Hallén, 5 June 1917, 72:21; quotes from AK, Erik Palmstierna, 5 June 
1917, 72:44.
666 AK, Axel Sterne, 5 June 1917, 72:41–2; Ernst Hage, 7 June 1917, 76:25.
667 AK, Ivar Vennerström, 5 June 1917, 72:12, 14.
668 AK, Zeth Höglund, 5 June 1917, 72:72. 
669 AK, Ivar Vennerström, 5 June 1917, 72:13. 
670 AK, Carl Lindhagen, 5 June 1917, 72:59. Among the Social Democrats, 
too, Värner Rydén looked to both Norway and Finland as examples of how 
unicameralism could be limited with minority provisions or with organs like 
the Grand Committee in Finland, which functioned like an upper house. His 
contacts with Finland suggested to him that such a restriction on majority rule 
actually enabled the conservatives to halt a lot of reform legislation; this led him 
to speak for the preservation of the bicameral system. AK, 7 June 1917, 76:32–3.
671 AK, Carl Lindhagen, 9 June 1917, 78:71.
672 FK, Fredrik Ström, 9 June 1917, 56:48.
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supported a similar trend in Finland as revolutionary forces seemed to be 
active both in Russia and in Sweden, and potentially in Germany, too. 
e Liberals remained rhetorically more dedicated to transnational 
‘waves’ of reform than their brethren elsewhere. eir leader Nils Edén 
viewed Sweden as a participant in the ongoing upheaval, ‘the tremendous 
world events which involve us’, and condemned opposition to reform as 
being against the ‘spirit of the times’.673 Mauritz Hellberg saw the war as 
having brought about ‘a mighty democratic current in dierent countries, 
and even we have been touched by the waves of this current’; historical forces 
were involved so that ‘times of destitution tend to become times of popular 
liberation’.674 British, Danish, Dutch, Finnish and Norwegian examples 
spoke for an immediate introduction of female surage, and so did the 
contribution of Swedish women in wartime.675 e Netherlands should be 
considered a particularly encouraging example as ‘the country has an old 
culture’ unlike the American one and certainly did not have an excessively 
radical constitution;676 female surage was thus not merely an American, 
Finnish or Norwegian peculiarity. ough not threatening a revolution, 
Vice-Speaker Daniel Persson suggested that revolutions were more likely 
to occur in countries in which reforms were opposed.677 is was a leading 
Liberal politician saying that the Swedish right was to blame should Sweden 
experience a revolution.
e Right would not give in to claims of backwardness678 and rather 
denied transnational trends and the relevance of international comparisons. 
Karl Hildebrand again lauded the advanced status of the Swedish polity, 
denying any resemblance between the Swedish and Prussian electoral 
systems because Prussia lagged so far behind. Peripheral countries like 
Rumania would not surpass Sweden with their reforms, he claimed, and 
no one knew what the Russian reforms would lead to.679 On the same day, 
Aonbladet reported that the socialists were taking over in Russia and 
that total chaos was to be expected.680 As for female surage in Britain, 
the model could not be applied to Sweden as Swedish women lacked any 
political education.681 Restrictions on female surage remained in Britain, 
too, whereas ‘none of the great civilised nations [countries with Kultur]’ 
other than Britain had given women the vote. Finland was a smaller country 
(and obviously not so civilised) and found itself ‘constitutionally in a less 
normal situation’; it did not provide an example that was ‘encouraging or 
worthy of imitation’,682 particularly as the extension of surage had led to 
673 AK, Nils Edén, 5 June 1917, 72:18, 20. 
674 FK, Mauritz Hellberg, 9 June 1917, 56:19.
675 AK, eodor Zetterstrand, 9 June 1917, 78:80; FK, Gerhard Halfred von Koch, 
9 June 1917, 56:29. 
676 AK, 9 June 1917, 78:62.
677 AK, Daniel Persson, 5 June 1917, 72:36.
678 AK, Conrad Vahlquist, 5 June 1917, 72:40. 
679 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 5 June 1917, 72:51.
680 Aonbladet, ‘Upplösning i Ryssland närmar sig fullständig kaos’, 5 June 1917.
681 FK, Rudolf Kjellén, 9 June 1917, 56:43.
682 FK, August Bellinder, 9 June 1917, 56:55.
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a socialist parliamentary majority. Rudolf Kjellén rejected the unpatriotic 
internationalism of the le in borrowing ideas from sister parties abroad 
and presenting foreign achievements as their own,683 the allusions being to 
the Social Democrats in Germany (and possibly Finland) and to the Liberals 
in Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway. Dedicated to German 
political theory, he warned about the rise of unreasonable mass power and 
party conicts if ‘Western’ parliamentarism of the French type were to be 
introduced.684 David Norman criticised attempts to persuade the masses to 
believe that Sweden was a leading reactionary country in Europe since the 
current problems were temporary, arising out of the war.685 Erik Räf even 
insinuated that the le aimed at ‘the old time of decadence in Israel’ where 
‘women would prevail over the people’,686 women obviously not belonging to 
the people. Ultra-conservatism evidently had a stronghold in both houses of 
the parliament. Denying transnational change, its supporters succeeded in 
postponing democratisation for the time being.
3.3.3  A global breaking-up of the ice for the forces  
 of democracy?
e conceptualisations and metaphors of democracy were highly divided 
in Sweden in spring 1917. It is noteworthy how dominant the concept of 
democracy and its derivations were in the Swedish debate, not only in the 
reform demands of the le but also in the counter-arguments from e 
Right. Reections of the Wilsonian rhetoric of democracy were heard on 
the same day, 16 March, that the newspapers reported about the fall of 
tsarism. e old debate on surage reform was immediately activated by 
the Russian Revolution with its internationalist impulses. Carl Lindhagen, 
the Marxist Mayor of Stockholm, asked the foreign minister about Swedish 
plans for what he saw as an approaching era of ‘true democracy’ in a new 
world order.687 He called for a constitutional reform that would create 
space ‘for democratic people in democratic regimes’ and for informed 
public participation in self-government. is would be achieved through 
universal surage, the popular initiative and the referendum, all projects 
of the international socialist movement.688 However, Lindhagen viewed 
‘democracy’ in its Western form with a critical eye: the United States also 
showed that not everything was democratic that was called so. For this active 
socialist internationalist inspired by the events in Petrograd, the goal should 
be ‘direct popular rule’ (omedelbar folkstyre) organised in such a way as to 
prevent demagogy from taking over and to secure the political education 
of the people.689 Instead of Western models, the leists argued for the 
Swiss ‘democratic order’. Here they were motivated by Marxist discussions 
683 FK, Rudolf Kjellén, 9 June 1917, 56:43.
684 Brandt 2009, 167; Kurunmäki 2014, 174.
685 AK, David Norman, 5 June 1917, 72:68–9.
686 AK, Erik Räf, 9 June 1917, 78:76, 78.
687 AK, Carl Lindhagen, 16 March 1917, 32:4.
688 AK, Carl Lindhagen, 21 March 1917, 33:28–9; 34:3. ese ideas were discussed 
by Karl Kautsky. Kautsky 1907, 58–60; Häupel 1993, 217.
689 AK, Carl Lindhagen, 21 March 1917, 33:37.
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about that system, Lenin’s exile in Switzerland and the radical Zimmerwald 
movement, which had organised its meetings there and used Stockholm 
as an alternative venue for international activities.690 Ministers were to 
be directly elected by the parliament, a system that diered from ‘the so-
called parliamentary formation of government’, which was ‘the opposite of 
democracy’.691 Finnish radical Social Democrats would argue along similar 
lines later in 1917 to justify their constitutional radicalism.
is far-le view needs to be contrasted with Majority Social Democrat 
visions of a more process-like ‘future democracy’, in which parliamentarism 
provided the key mechanism. Hjalmar Branting set it as the goal of 
democratic development that ‘free and enlightened peoples would decide 
on their fates as far as possible’. e ‘democratic line of development’ would 
gradually lead, thanks to universal surage and majority rule, towards ‘an 
implemented democracy’.692 Branting’s would-be Liberal ally Nils Edén also 
called for a faster pace in ‘the democratic development’.693 
A typically rightist response came from Carl Hallendorf, who redescribed 
the established political order as democracy, speaking about ‘the democracy 
which we have’ and which, he thought, should be developed to create 
an increased political maturity and capability among the masses,694 the 
implication being that much was still lacking in the understanding of the 
nation at large. e inherited Swedish system of representative government 
was presented as a ready-made democracy and hence in no need of radical 
reforms, just minor adjustments.695 
British observers thought (wishfully) that the Swedes would move to 
the side of democracy as a consequence of the Russian Revolution and the 
increasing isolation of Germany.696 In mid-April, the internationalists of the 
Majority Social Democrats were openly ying the ag of democracy. Gunnar 
Löwegren, who had studied in Germany, Britain and France, lamented how 
the Swedes had been le out while ‘today, everywhere outside in the world 
one can see great and powerful democratic trends which have made the 
autocracy of the east fall and have penetrated even a country like Prussia’; this 
made the Swedish situation intolerable.697 e breakthrough of ‘democratism’ 
(demokratismen)698 was visible in every neighbouring country. e Swedish 
right, by contrast, rejected democratic control of the French and British 
type and wanted to maintain the ‘non-democratic’ governmental control 
of ‘democratic institutions’. What was needed was a parliamentarisation of 
the constitution and a democratisation of government to end ‘a parody of 
690 Pipes 1992, 382.
691 AK, Carl Lindhagen, 21 March 1917, 33:64.
692 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 21 March 1917, 33: 44.
693 AK, Nils Edén, 21 March 1917, 33:50.
694 AK, Carl Hallendorf, 21 March 1917, 33:60.
695 See Ihalainen 2015 for a more extensive discussion.
696 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Sweden’, 30 March 1917.
697 AK, Gustaf Löwegren, 14 April 1917, 41:22.
698 AK, Gustaf Löwegren, 14 April 1917, 41:27. ‘Democratism’ had also appeared 
in the American Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary (1913), where it was 
dened as ‘[t]he principles or spirit of a democracy.’
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popular government’.699 For this transnationally connected Social Democrat, 
models of Western democracy and parliamentarism were directly applicable 
to Sweden irrespective of the result of the war. Löwegren believed in political 
progress achieved through parliamentarisation and democratisation as 
political processes: the establishment of democratic institutions at all levels 
would create opportunities for the talents of the people to develop and lead 
to the increase of reason among the masses; it would not produce upheavals 
as e Right claimed.700 ese evolutionary rather than revolutionary 
views diered dramatically from those of most Finnish Social Democrats, 
who emphasised immediate reforms as opposed to advancing democracy 
through education and discussion and who did not view Western European 
parliamentary systems as models for the Finnish constitution.
Hjalmar Branting’s role as a political agent crossing frontiers with his 
mobility and contributing to transnational discursive transfers, becomes 
particularly clear in his contribution to the debate on democracy in 
the Swedish parliament on 14 April 1917. e chairman of the Social 
Democrats had just returned from a visit to Petrograd where he had met 
his old radical socialist contacts from the days of student activism and 
created new links. Branting had encountered a radical but diverse debate 
on democracy in Petrograd and also in Helsinki where he had met Finnish 
Social Democrats.701 During the long train journey, he had authored 
a parliamentary speech and given interviews to Swedish journalists. Soon 
aer the arrival of the train from Haparanda, where he crossed the frontier 
from Finland, he was in the parliament, declaring that the long postponed 
surage reform was ‘a vital issue for the democratisation of Sweden’, 
‘democratisation’ standing for ‘democratic equality with respect to the public 
aairs of state and community’,702 i.e. universal surage for men and women. 
Equal voting rights constituted ‘simple democracy’.703 While those calling 
for ‘a democratic order’ had looked to ‘Western democracies’ (Branting was 
constantly accused by e Right of being a  supporter of the Entente704), 
Sweden’s neighbours were taking steps towards democracy: Russia would 
overtake Sweden as ‘a democratic republic’, and Prussia was also preparing 
for reform. Even if enthused to some extent by his revolutionary experiences 
in Petrograd, the revisionist Branting had written a conspicuously moderate 
speech, in which the denition of democracy did not go beyond universal 
surage, the assumption being that the necessary reforms would follow 
later. Quite clearly, he did not regard the Russian Revolution (and perhaps 
also the plans of the Finnish sister party) as models for the Swedish socialists 
to follow.
699 AK, Gustaf Löwegren, 14 April 1917, 41:24, 27.
700 AK, Gustaf Löwegren, 14 April 1917, 41:26–7.
701 See also Ihalainen 2015, 4–5, on Branting’s abuse of the spatial context during 
the debate.
702 AK, 14 April 1917, 41:63–4.
703 AK, 14 April 1917, 41:66–7.
704 Aonbladet, ‘Hr Branting som krigsaktivist’, 13 April 1917.
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Internationalist revisionism was Branting’s line, but his party also 
kept open the possibility of a more revolutionary strategy to please those 
attracted by radical socialist revolutionary understandings of democracy. In 
terms recalling Marxist discourse, Harald Hallén accused e Right of ‘class 
egoism amongst the ruling clique’705 and indirectly threatened a potentially 
violent insurrection: their opposition would fall in the face of international 
pressures for democracy from the united masses (which could also be called 
a ‘democracy’ in Marxist parlance, as the contemporary British and Finnish 
examples demonstrate). e Russian example showed that this ‘democracy 
(demokratien) can become the complete possessor of its own house’; ‘e 
Swedish democracy’ (demokratien) in the sense of the reformist masses 
would get moral and material support from the international democracy 
if they should decide to force through democracy as a form of government 
in Sweden.706 Hallén’s radical Marxist democracy was based on political 
and social forces, groups of people (the workers) who were prepared to 
take over and, with transnational support, create a democracy (as a system 
of government) to their liking. e socialist revolutionary understanding 
of the rule of the masses as democracy and the rather more Kautskyist or 
revisionist understanding of democracy as a process were combined here; 
what was radical was that the reform or revolution leading to democracy 
might also be eected with support from abroad. Under pressure from the 
far le, there were impulses among the Majority Social Democrats to retain 
some of the threat of possible revolution – and to simultaneously pressurise 
e Right: if you do not accept the moderate reform suggested by us, you 
will get a revolution by the radicals instead.
At the same time, the leists, too, spoke for reform rather than revolution 
– despite Carl Lindhagen’s discussion with Lenin on the days preceding the 
debate. Lindhagen presented the suggested reform as the start of a long 
(peaceful) process of building ‘democratic forms’ for Sweden, the goal of 
cooperation between ‘the democratic parties’ (excluding only e Right) 
being ‘democratic life’ in ‘true democracy’.707 Ivar Vennerström attacked 
the ‘anti-democratism’ (anti-demokratismen) of e Right, introducing 
a  tactical counter-concept to ‘democratisation’.708 Fredrik Ström described 
the transnational reform: ‘People around us are marching towards increased 
democracy,’ whereas nothing was happening in Sweden.709 Rightist anti-
reformism does not seem to have led to any extreme radicalisation of the 
Swedish far le. A sociological explanation might be that many of the MPs 
of the Swedish le were highly educated professionals, some like Branting 
even from upper-class backgrounds,710 arguing against the professionals 
of other parties. is decreased the inspiration for, and the inuence of, 
socialist agitation, especially in comparison to Finland.
705 AK, Harald Hallén, 14 April 1917, 41:32.
706 AK, Harald Hallén, 14 April 1917, 41:36.
707 AK, Carl Lindhagen, 14 April 1917, 41:45.
708 AK, Ivar Venneström, 14 April 1917, 41.
709 FK, Fredrik Ström, 14 April 1917, 32:17.
710 Eskola 2011, 16.
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e Right responded with further rhetorical redescriptions. e historian 
and newspaper editor Karl Hildebrand, who had travelled in Germany 
during the war, presented Sweden as a suciently democratic society, 
building on a conservative version of the Swedish historical narrative of the 
rise of liberty and democracy: both its constitution and ‘the spirit of society’ 
were already ‘far more democratic than in most other countries’; also ‘the 
development in Sweden is much more democratic’ than in republics. Foreign 
constitutions might have ‘democratic intentions’, but they were overshadowed 
by what Hildebrand called ‘democratic spirit’ of Swedish society,711 which 
referred to the traditions of peasant representation and to the extensions of 
surage carried out in the 1900s. Sweden was democratic by denition and 
was experiencing a process of further democratisation as the rising salaries 
of the workers were increasing the number of voters with the result that ‘the 
whole surage system is about to be immensely democratised’.712 ‘A strong 
democratising development’ existed, and ‘democratic inuence’ had been 
extensive. Once this ongoing transformation towards democracy proceeded 
far enough, the formal constitution could also be changed, but that time had 
not yet arrived, Hildebrand declared.713 While e Right rejected immediate 
further reforms as unnecessary, there was a promise of evolution towards 
more democratic forms in the future, which went some way to recognising 
the inevitability of change at least as far as the lower chamber was concerned. 
e upper chamber should not be ‘democratised’ as it was already one of the 
most democratically elected ones in the world.714 ough this may have been 
true in relative terms, such a counterfactual claim shows that the Swedish 
right really believed in the power of redescription.
For the Liberals, democracy was a concept that called for immediate 
reform measures. In Mauritz Hellberg’s view, many conservatives had been 
mistaken in assuming that the war would save European polities from 
democracy; on the contrary, it had made democracy inevitable everywhere. 
If Europe was to see ‘a great democratic wave’ aer the war, the Swedish 
system would need to be changed anyway.715 Otto von Zweigbergk had 
published an editorial in Dagens Nyheter complaining about a plutocratic 
minority denying ‘the “reorientation” in a democratic direction that takes 
place out there in large countries’ and trying to stop ‘the entire democratic 
development’.716 Democratic forces would inevitably overcome the rule 
of the Junkers in Germany as well.717 Speaking in the parliament, he saw 
‘democratic development’ as self-evident, pointing out that even the rightist 
leader Ernst Trygger had recognised the twentieth century as ‘the century 
of democracy’. ere was no way to halt ‘the democratic development’ 
and no sense in ‘assaulting democracy’. What the political theorists of e 
711 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 14 April 1917, 41:38.
712 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 14 April 1917, 41:40.
713 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 14 April 1917, 41:69.
714 FK, Knut von Geijer and Samuel Clason, 14 April 1917, 32:12, 35.
715 FK, Mauritz Hellberg, 14 April 1917, 32:22–3.
716 Dagens Nyheter, ‘Situationsbilder’, 14 April 1917.
717 Dagens Nyheter, ‘Situationsbilder’, 14 April 1917.
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Right should understand was that the deconstruction of Prussianism by 
democratic forces oered the only way to end the war (as President Wilson 
had recently been suggesting).718 A clear Social Democratic and Liberal 
ideological and discursive front on the side of democratisation had been 
formed, and it used transnational references to both Germany and the West 
as its rhetorical weapons.
In a Social Democratic interpellation, no revolution against the 
established order was declared but the rhetoric of democracy was used 
extensively to describe an ongoing transnational process of political change 
and its implications for reform in Sweden. e war had unexpectedly led 
to ‘democratic demands’ by ‘all peoples’ for ‘a radical break with the old 
system’, so that the few would no longer decide for the many.719 e Russian 
Revolution had initiated this ‘democratic wave’ and ‘the breaking-up of 
the ice for the forces of democracy all over the world’ – the processes of 
change appearing as irresistible natural phenomena. is wave had rst hit 
Germany and was inuencing Austria (where the internal political crisis 
would lead to the recall of the Reichsrat in late May) and Hungary (where 
the prime minister would soon resign as a result of the crisis).720 For Sweden, 
these political changes that were expected in the Central Powers were more 
signicant than the Russian Revolution. is ‘general advancement of 
democracy’, added to the fact that Sweden’s Scandinavian neighbours had 
already achieved the full democratisation of surage, meant that ‘a truly 
democratic constitutional revision’ had become unavoidable in Sweden as 
well.721 ‘Democracy’ as an exigent transnational process was brought to the 
centre of Social Democratic policy and the expected reforms in the Central 
Powers (rather than those in Russia or Britain) were used to put pressure 
on e Right for immediate reform. Exploiting the teleological national 
narrative of immemorial democracy, Hjalmar Branting urged e Right to 
participate in a common policy for ‘continued development in our country 
based on democracy as the only alternative’.722 Like conservatives in other 
countries, they should see that ‘[t]he era of democracy has begun and does not 
allow itself to be suppressed’723 and that ‘a constitutional revision [a suitable 
word for a revisionist!] … in accordance with the claims of democracy’, 
that is general and equal surage, had become necessary.724 Axel Sterne, 
a journalist writing in Folkbladet, accused e Right of denying ‘democracy 
what belongs to democracy’ – making use of the double meaning of the 
term – whereas ‘nothing may reign over or alongside the sovereignty of the 
will of the people’.725 Erik Palmstierna, known as ‘the Red Baron’, accused 
718 FK, Otto von Zweigbergk, 14 April 1917, 32:29–30.
719 AK, 27 April 1917, 50:21.
720 AK, 27 April 1917, 50:22.
721 AK, 27 April 1917, 50:22–3.
722 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 5 June 1917, 72:5.
723 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 5 June 1917, 72:6–7.
724 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 5 June 1917, 72:63.
725 AK, Axel Sterne, 5 June 1917, 72:41, 43.
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e Right of ‘class rule’,726 a rather rare usage in Swedish Social Democrat 
discourse in comparison with the Finnish, and interestingly employed here 
by an aristocrat. 
e parallel leist interpellation was more in tune with radical 
Marxist understandings of democracy, containing as it did descriptions 
of ‘the voices of myriad crowds’ crying out their longing for ‘a profound 
democratic constitutional reform’,727 a turn of phrase that had a physical 
counterpart in the extra-parliamentary suragist demonstrations of the 
day. e Social Democrats, more focused on parliamentary work and 
cooperation with Liberals than revolution as a road to universal surage, 
the parliamentarisation of government and reforms,728 avoided so open an 
association with crowd action in order to dispel associations with rightist 
stereotypes; nor, for the same reason, did they take Finland as a model 
for ‘a unicameral system and complete democracy’ as the leists did. e 
latter also referred to the ‘democratic constitutional reform’ in Denmark 
and to German preparations for ‘the democratisation of the constitution’ 
while talking more vaguely about the ‘democratic reorientation’ planned in 
Russia. e point was that only in Sweden were the holders of power hostile 
to ‘the irresistible democratic demands of the time’.729 eir conclusion was 
that every country of any relevance for Sweden was more advanced in the 
democratisation of the constitution. 
By the time of the government response, the far leists had founded a party 
of their own. ough division at home and between the revolutionaries in 
Russia tended to make ‘democracy’ a disputed concept among the socialists, 
Ivar Vennerström paved the way for cooperation in future elections by 
dividing the Swedish parties into a ‘democratic’ bloc, which would agree 
on the direction of ‘the democratic development’ on one side, and e 
Right, who loathed ‘the democracy of Sweden’ on the other, ‘democracy’ 
here referring to the people at large.730 Carl Lindhagen complained of e 
Right wanting to prevent ‘the possibilities of democracy and the people 
of the le from making progress’,731 which likewise implied the identity of 
‘democracy’ and the le (the Liberals included).732 is implicitly recognised 
the possibility of a bourgeois democracy – something that Lenin733 and many 
726 AK, Erik Palmstierna, 5 June 1917, 72:44. e Finnish or German Social 
Democratic movement had not recruited similar prominent representatives of 
the nobility. is reects dierences in the social backgrounds and consequently 
ideologies of the two Nordic Social Democratic Parties. In Britain, too, there 
were some Labour lords who were able to smooth the party’s path to power in 
the eyes of the old elite.
727 AK, 27 April 1917, 50: 24.
728 Eley 2002, 67, 88, 242.
729 AK, 27 April 1917, 50: 24.
730 AK, Ivar Vennerström, 5 June 1917, 72:11–12.
731 AK, Carl Lindhagen, 7 June 1917, 75:5.
732 See, however, Fabian Månsson’s point that ‘democratic parties’ and ‘democracy’ 
were two separate things. AK, 7 June 1917, 75:16.
733 Pipes 1992, 393; Müller 2011, 36.
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Finnish Social Democrats, among others, could not accept.734 e Liberal and 
socialist discourses on democracy would seem to merge in Nils Edén’s claim 
that it was imperative to direct Sweden towards ‘democratic ways’, which 
were ‘the only ways that in the twentieth century can lead to real happiness 
and strength for Sweden and other peoples’.735 What far leists wanted to 
see, however, was ‘a complete constitutional reform, complete democracy’, 
and this included the abolition of the monarchy as this endangered ‘the 
democratic order’ and was potentially ‘antidemocratic’.736 is was an openly 
revolutionary demand. However, the will of the people was interpreted as 
calling for both democracy and parliamentarism.737 Even Zeth Höglund, an 
old revolutionary and a friend of Lenin, who had been elected the chairman 
of the party aer being released from prison, built his argument on the leist 
theory of an ancient Swedish democratic tradition, recognising the existing 
parliamentary representation as ‘the old democracy’.738 us the Swedish far 
le, too, was calling for the restoration of an existing democracy rather than 
a total change of the Swedish political system.739 
e Right turned down all the demands of the le by consistently 
claiming that democracy already prevailed in Sweden and warned about 
going any further, the Russian Revolution providing the best example 
of the consequences. Conrad Vahlquist emphasised the fact that there 
was ‘a  democratic outlook’ in the Swedish parliament, arguing that ‘this 
democratic development’ had taken place under the current constitution 
and without interventions by extra-parliamentary forces.740 Karl Hildebrand, 
too, insisted that ‘plenty of space for a progressive democratic development’ 
existed under the prevailing constitution.741 Professor Carl Hallendor 
warned that there was ‘a much wider democratic dominance among us than 
in most parts of the world’, which it would only produce a plutocracy.742 
Suggestions that the time for ‘a full democratic breakthrough’ had come743 
were refuted by Rudolf Kjellén, a professor of political science who had 
denounced the liberal concept of the state and democracy in his academic 
work, using the term ‘democratism’ pejoratively to describe the policy of the 
le, the contrast with the conservative organic understanding of the state 
and the people being evident.744  
Noteworthy in the debate on unicameralism on 7 June 1917 is an open 
dispute between the Social Democrats and the far le on what should be seen 
as the protection of ‘the democratic heritage of the Swedish constitution’,745 
734 Cf. Ketola 1987 for a contrary view.
735 AK, Nils Edén, 5 June 1917, 72:20.
736 AK, 5 June 1917, 72:11–12.
737 AK, Ivar Vennerström, 5 June 1917, 72:67.
738 AK, Zeth Höglund, 5 June 1917, 72:50.
739 On the alleged thousand-year-old tradition, see Ihalainen 2015.
740 AK, Conrad Vahlquist, 5 June 1917, 72:40.
741 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 5 June 1917, 72:52.
742 AK, Carl Hallendor, 5 June 1917, 72:65.
743 FK, 9 June 1917, 56:18.
744 FK, Rudolf Kjellén, 9 June 1917, 56:45–6.
745 AK, Carl Lindhagen, 7 June 1917, 75:30; AK, Ernst Hage, 7 June 1917, 76:24.
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a history-political notion much emphasised in Swedish constitutional 
discourse.746 ere was clearly, in the words of Harald Hallén, disagreement 
‘over the order of the democratic process of upheaval’.747 Zeth Höglund 
accused ‘the rightist Social Democrats’ of being ready to retain the upper 
chamber as ‘a check on democracy’.748 is accusation oended Harald 
Hallén, who insisted that the Social Democrats only wanted to ensure a 
constitution that would allow ‘a free and unlimited democracy’ to prevail 
aer ‘this democratic breakthrough’.749 ese disputes between socialists 
reect a deepening ideological division and show how the Majority Social 
Democrats had come to hold a revisionist concept of democracy that enabled 
cooperation with the Liberals and were willing to leave further reform for 
the future. e far le retained a more radically socialist understanding 
of democracy although even they did not call for the introduction of the 
dictatorship of the working classes. 
3.3.4  The role of the Swedish people in the reformed 
 polity
e parties of the Swedish le campaigned for universal surage while 
the right simply opposed extensions. A scrutiny of the relationship which 
dierent parties constructed between the people, the state and politics 
indicates general ideological dierences as well as some ways of thinking 
that were peculiar to Sweden. A particular context for the debates on the 
political role of the people was provided by a widely held understanding of 
Sweden as a country in which the Peasants (as an estate) enjoyed a unique 
degree of liberty; all four estates had participated in politics from time 
immemorial – a circumstance that aected the Finnish debates as well. 
While the members of the political elite shared this construction of the 
national historiography, the right and the le drew opposite conclusions for 
its policy implications: e Right maintained that no further reform was 
needed thanks to the continuation of this exceptional freedom, whereas the 
le argued that a reform was needed to restore the popular participation 
that had existed in the distant past and then destroyed by the interest groups 
that were represented by e Right.750 
Aer news of the outbreak of the Russian Revolution and the Wilsonian 
programmatic manifesto to defend democracy, the Swedish far le was 
especially eager to dene what the Swedish people wanted. Carl Lindhagen 
contrasted the work of politicians and parties with the passive role of the 
people, emphasising the contrast between politics as discussed by the 
masses in popular meetings and politics as practised in the parliament. 
Disappointed with the Social Democratic Labour Party, from which the 
far le had recently been expelled, and for the sake of argument idealising 
the American model, Lindhagen spoke for the political education of the 
746 Ihalainen 2015.
747 AK, Harald Hallén, 7 June 1917, 76:27.
748 AK, Zeth Höglund, 7 June 1917, 76:30.
749 AK, Harald Hallén, 7 June 1917, 76:35. 
750 Ihalainen & Sundin 2011; Ihalainen 2015.
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people and their involvement in legislative processes through referenda 
as an antidote to the corruption of Swedish political life.751 Without mass 
education and activation to work for a better future, the people would never 
emerge from their ‘current state of political degradation’ and the world 
from its state of misery. Political parties were from this perspective ‘the 
most dangerous of all associations’ in that they manipulated the political 
information that the people received. Politically educated people respecting 
the ideological liberty of individuals, by contrast, would be able to restore 
reason to politics.752 is was a far le challenge to both the established 
political system and to the Social Democratic Labour Party, contrasting 
theory with the realisation of the will of the people.753 
e Social Democrats were also unhappy with the situation, but in 
a  slightly dierent way: the current Swedish parliament was violating the 
interests of the majority of the people by preventing a surage reform.754 
Nor was the traditional Swedish right of the people to express their opinion 
on matters observed since their representatives bypassed their wishes.755 
Hjalmar Branting recalled the tradition of popular self-government and 
expressed his concern about a growing gap between the parliament and 
the people. Parliamentary representation was to be prioritised over the 
referendum, but the masses were to be kept politically informed and given 
the means to turn the course of politics should the First Chamber continue 
to block reform.756 Otherwise, the Swedish people, too, might be forced to 
seek more forceful means of overcoming the continuous resistance of the 
upper chamber,757 including the possibility of revolutionary action. When 
no progress was made in mid-April, Social-Demokraten interpreted this as 
‘a slap in the face of the Swedish people’ and suggested that ‘the battle must 
now be fought using other means’.758 e paper believed that the masses, 
as a result of the pressures of the war, were readier than ever to demand 
their rights as citizens, but expected the consequent change to take place in 
Sweden by legal means.759 
According to the Liberals, too, Sweden together with several European 
states would need to enable more direct involvement of the citizens in 
politics, possibly by building a direct connection between the people and 
government if the connection between the parliament and the government 
751 AK, Carl Lindhagen, 21 March 1917, 33:36–7; 34:13–14.
752 AK, Carl Lindhagen, 21 March 1917, 33:58–60, 67; 34:12, 15.
753 AK, Fabian Månsson, 14 April 1917, 41:77; FK, Fredrik Ström, 14 April 1917, 
32:17.
754 AK, Viktor Larsson, 21 March 1917, 33:41.
755 FK, Olof Olsson, 21 March 1917, 24:11.
756 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 21 March 1917, 33:45–7.
757 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 14 April 1917, 41:66. Carl Lindhagen ironically 
congratulated the Swedish people on the entry of such revolutionary thinking 
into the country. AK, 14 April 1917, 41:71. 
758 Social-Demokraten, ‘Ett slag i ansiktet på det svenska folket’, 16 April 1917.
759 FK, Ola Waldén, 14 April 1917, 32:27–8.
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did not function.760 Eliel Löfgren challenged German and associated Swedish 
political theory that emphasised ‘the sovereignty of the state’ and ‘the benet 
of the state’ at the cost of ‘the sovereignty of the people’,761 according priority 
to the last-mentioned concept. Mauritz Hellberg regarded the Swedes as 
having all too long been excessively obedient to their rulers,762 and Otto 
von Zweigbergk saw the current parliament as not providing ‘a sympathetic 
representation . . . of the Swedish people’.763 
In their interpellation, the Social Democrats demanded ‘the full right 
for the people to decide on their fates’ and referred in passing to extra-
parliamentary ‘popular demonstrations’ reecting such demands,764 while 
the far leists saw ‘the spontaneous rising of the people’ as being caused not 
only by the failed economic policy of the government but also by ‘politically 
short-sighted wielders of power’ having ‘denied the Swedish people their 
full rights as citizens’.765 For the far le, the strong popular call for reform 
made an immediate constitutional change necessary.766 Nor did the Majority 
Social Democrats shun references to a revolution of the people, even though 
Hjalmar Branting preferred to speak of an international wave of political 
reform and counted on ‘the nation … as an arbitrator’ in the ensuing 
elections.767 Harald Hallén seized on the Prime Minister’s concession that 
in elections the people constituted ‘the decisive factor’ for Swedish politics, 
taking it as recognition of ‘the will of the people as the highest norm for 
the government of the state’.768 A constitutional reform was thus needed to 
maintain the unity of the people and to encourage the masses to carry the 
burden of the prevailing hard times. On the other hand, Hallén challenged 
the rightist supremacy, declaring that the Social Democrats aimed at ‘seizing 
political power’769 and thereby realising ‘the happiness of the people’.770 
According to Erik Palmstierna, the maintenance of national unity called for 
‘the right of the entire people to decide together’.771 e Social Democrats 
were clearly encouraged by the atmosphere of a transnational revolution and 
the challenge of the break-away far le to apply a double strategy to enforce 
the parliamentarisation and democratisation of government: moderation 
dominated most of the speeches, but at times threats of radicalisation among 
the people were also voiced, a strategy that was used in revisionist discourse 
in all four countries. 
760 AK, Nils Edén, 21 March 1917, 33:47–8, 50.
761 AK, Eliel Löfgren, 14 April 1917, 41:25–6.
762 FK, Mauritz Hellberg, 14 April 1917, 32:23.
763 FK, Otto von Zweigbergk, 14 April 1917, 32:31.
764 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 27 April 1917, 50:23.
765 AK, Ivar Vennerström, 27 April 1917, 50:23.
766 AK, Ivar Vennerström, 27 April 1917, 50:25.
767 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 5 June 1917, 72:8. 
768 AK, Harald Hallén, 5 June 1917, 72:21; also AK, Axel Sterne, 5 June 1917, 72:43; 
7 June 1917, 75:18.
769 AK, Harald Hallén, 5 June 1917, 72:24–5.
770 AK, Harald Hallén, 5 June 1917, 72:27.
771 AK, Erik Palmstierna, 5 June 1917, 72:46.
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e far-le challenge not only to e Right but also to the Social 
Democrats became increasingly obvious. Ivar Vennerström depicted the 
Swedish people as being present in the parliamentary debate (through 
parliamentary reports in the press at least), by observing the answer of 
the rightist government: ‘[Y]ou cannot prevent the Swedish people from 
listening anyway, and they listen and at this moment are waiting with 
excitement for what the answer of the Swedish government will be.’772 e 
people were ready to show with ‘mass action’ that the dominance of a few 
rightists had come to an end.773 Zeth Höglund rejected the use of force 
against demonstrators by the police on the same day (reported in Social-
Demokraten as excess violence by ‘the Stockholm Cossacks’774) and, regarding 
a revolution against the monarchy and the upper chamber as an increasingly 
likely option, simplied the political situation into antithetical processes: 
‘e rebirth of the monarchical power in our country has been the death of 
the people. e rebirth of the people will one day become the death of the 
monarchy.’775 For the far le, the demonstrations of ‘the people on the move’ 
served as a major political argument and implied the possibility of a popular 
uprising. Even the Liberals joined in depicting a nationwide movement 
aimed at ‘reforming and deepening the civic right to full self-government’.776 
Vice-Speaker Daniel Persson wanted to restore respect for the parliament by 
taking the will of the people more clearly into account.777 
e Right defended its position by depicting the people as passive 
victims of political abuse rather than active agents in the ongoing political 
ferment. Hans Andersson accused the le of trying to divide the Swedish 
people and agitating for a revolution at a time of international danger.778 
Erik Räf rejected leist understandings of ‘the Swedish people’ by recalling 
the estate-bound concept of ‘the Swedish common people’ or ‘peasantry’ 
(allmogen) as an organic and inclusive concept and suggesting that this 
people actually wanted to cut the inuence of the parties for the benet 
of the state.779 Using the same logic, Karl Hildebrand and David Norman 
questioned the relevance of the demonstrations: they were manifestations of 
‘the so-called popular will’ of one class only.780 
Female surage in particular was opposed by e Right. Samuel Clason 
would exclude women from ‘political battles’ as they lacked ‘an interest in 
politics’ and had more important duties for the state and humanity to full in 
772 AK, Ivar Vennerström, 5 June 1917, 72:10, 15.
773 AK, Ivar Vennerström, 5 June 1917, 72:15–16.
774 Social-Demokraten, ‘Stockholmskosackernas vilda framfart’, 6 June 1917.
775 AK, Zeth Höglund, 5 June 1917, 72:49; also FK, Fredrik Ström, 9 June 1917, 
56:48.
776 AK, Nils Edén, 5 June 1917, 72:18.
777 AK, Daniel Persson, 5 June 1917, 72:36.
778 AK, Hans Andersson, 5 June 1917, 72:28. 
779 AK, Erik Räf, 5 June 1917, 72:30–1.
780 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 5 June 1917, 72:54; AK, David Norman, 5 June 1917, 72:68. 
Ivar Vennerström challenged what he saw as the tendentious rightist use of the 
concept of popular will in AK, 5 June 1917, 72:67.
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other, higher spheres.781 Rudolf Kjellén, a leading political theorist, likewise 
rejected what he saw as the illogical mixture of the political and private 
spheres if women, who lacking any political education, were allowed to vote. 
He proceeded to discuss the state of the Swedish polity in highly gendered 
terms: the problem was that Sweden as a state appeared as ‘neutrum’ among 
other states and would even become ‘femininum’ if female surage were 
adopted, whereas the goal, according to this professor, should have been 
to strengthen its nature as ‘masculinum’.782 However, Kjellén demonstrated 
some readiness to rethink the matter: concerned about ‘the realm’ as the rst 
priority rather than about ‘the people’, he conceded (not unlike Chancellor 
Bethmann Hollweg had previously done in Germany) that ‘the state and the 
people must be reconciled’ by involving the people in the state to a higher 
degree than before. is could be accomplished by making the Swedish 
state ‘a private limited company’ (andelsbolag) in which the shareholders felt 
themselves to be more directly involved – albeit obviously still possessing 
dierent amounts of shares depending on how much they owned. Like some 
British Conservatives, Kjellén concluded that ‘the people are fundamentally 
good’, which meant that one must be ready to make concessions to meet their 
demands, including possibly even women’s surage. Otherwise the people 
would ‘run wild’, and the realm would be destroyed.783 Kjellén’s conservative 
analysis, despite its highly traditionalist tones and even abuse of academic 
authority to the degree of nonsense, opened up possibilities for e Right 
to rethink its position, as in the similar case of the British Conservatives’ 
ultimate capitulation, and thus allowed for a gradual accommodation to 
reform. Aer the election of autumn 1917, there would be a real transition 
to parliamentarism in Sweden, but e Right would rethink its conception 
of the people only later.
3.3.5  Should parliamentarism be seen as the established 
 system, an instrument for creating a better 
 society through debate, or a system to be taken 
 over by the people?
Unlike Norway and Denmark, Sweden did not have a parliamentary 
government when the First World War broke out. Even in March 1917, 
British observers noted that this was not ‘a country governed on purely 
Parliamentary principles’,784 and a Prussian conservative paper hoped that 
it never would be. As long as parliamentarism was lacking, calls for the 
extension of democratic surage oen addressed this question as well. e 
debates of spring 1917 preceded the actual introduction of parliamentarism 
aer the election of the Second Chamber in September, when the rst 
Liberal-Social Democratic coalition founded on a parliamentary majority 
781 FK, Samuel Clason, 9 June 1917, 56:34–5, 37. Such views were challenged by Olof 
Olsson (Social Democrat), who suggested that e Right tended to either see 
themselves as the state or as governing over the state, and as thus being qualied 
to dene what the interests of the state were. FK, 9 June 1917, 56:41.
782 FK, Rudolf Kjellén, 9 June 1917, 56:42–4.
783 FK, Rudolf Kjellén, 9 June 1917, 56:45–7.
784 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Ministerial Crisis in Sweden’, 30 March 1917.
167
3.3 Sweden: Renewed reform demands under the threat of revolution
was nominated, against the wishes of the monarch and e Right. e le 
had expected a change in that direction already in the spring, given the rise of 
domestic pressures and the progress of what, on the basis of news about the 
extension of the political say of the German Reichstag, was imagined to be 
a transnational revolution. But the decades-long debate on parliamentarism 
had changed little thus far; and the old arguments from conservative and 
liberal political scientists and historians continued to be recycled, the 
alternative interpretations being that Sweden already possessed a native 
parliamentarism that could and should not be replaced with any Western 
alternatives (the rightist view), or that Sweden had a thousand-year-old 
native parliamentary tradition that had been destroyed by the higher estates 
in the early modern period and now needed to be revived (the leist view). 
e same historical arguments were also adopted by the two sides in the 
Finnish constitutional confrontation as a result of the continuing application 
of the Swedish legal tradition in that country.785
e Right – opposed to violating what they saw as the Swedish constitutional 
tradition through the introduction of majority parliamentarism – expressed 
their conservative doubts about human nature and society, appealing to 
German and Swedish political theory and historical experience. With 
professor’s authority Carl Hallendor786 concluded that parliamentary 
institutions provided ‘a concentrated display of human inrmities with 
simultaneous elements of the good that dwells in us aer all’.787 is was 
not an anti-parliamentary view as such. Hallendor, who had published on 
parliamentarism, regarded the international ‘criticism of the not insignicant 
mistakes and failures that were to be found in parliamentarism’ as justied 
by the historical experiences of several countries. A major problem was that 
the people tended to ‘overestimate the entire parliamentary apparatus so 
that everything possible is expected to be improved by this apparatus’ and 
to be disappointed with its actual achievements.788 e ird Republic was 
the implicit example here. Hallendor also criticised the shortcomings of 
Danish and Norwegian parliamentarism.789 And even if the British House 
of Commons had since 1867 been an object of considerable interest for 
politicians around Europe and members of European parliaments had taken 
the great parliamentarians of the British type as models, that era was over: 
the power of the representatives that had been lost during the war would 
not be easy to restore in Britain. Hence it was unthinkable that the Swedish 
parliament should now be made the sole possessor of political power.790 
Nothing radical was to be done in the midst of a global ferment; the aim 
should rather be to reinstate the pre-war political order ‘to restore our health 
as much as possible so that we will really be able to function properly in such 
future trials as may come’.791 In Hallendor ’s organic understanding of the 
785 Kurunmäki 2014, 177–8; Ihalainen 2015.
786 Dagens Nyheter, ‘Hr Lindhagens dag’, 22 March 1917.
787 AK, Carl Hallendor, 21 March 1917, 33:53.
788 AK, Carl Hallendor, 21 March 1917, 33:55.
789 Garrigues & Anceau 2016; Kurunmäki 2014, 173.
790 AK, 21 March 1917, 33:55; see also Kurunmäki 2014, 172–3.
791 AK, 21 March 1917, 33:60.
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Swedish ‘living body politic’, the Riksdag remained one powerful institution 
among others, but by no means the sole forum in which decisions should be 
made,792 a view that was shared by many German academics and much of 
the Finnish intellectual elite as well.
Among non-academic rural conservatives, the doubts about 
parliamentarism were even more unyielding, recalling the Junker attitude 
of which the Swedish right was constantly accused by the le. As Erik 
Räf, a landowner, put it, favourable weather conditions for the harvest 
would do more to improve the state of Sweden than useless vindications 
of parliamentarism. Parliamentarism in the sense of mere bavardage was 
counter-productive, weakening the joy of work and undermining the 
foundations of the national economy.793 David Norman, a farmer and 
chairman of the antisocialist Svenska folkförbundet, who regarded the free 
land-owning peasantry as the true Swedish common people, denounced the 
workers’ demonstrations for surage reform for putting ‘improper pressure 
on the parliament’.794 Both of these views question simple trajectories 
between early modern diets and modern parliamentarism; the connection 
was rather constructed by leist academics, most famously by Fredrik 
Lagerroth, and has been maintained in Swedish historiography on the 
eighteenth century.795 Conrad Vahlquist, a more moderate conservative, 
appealed to the commonplace argument that rising incomes were leading to 
the enfranchisement of the workers, which meant that a surage reform was 
already taking place and that any ‘extra-parliamentary’ measures suggested 
by the le were hence unnecessary.796 Reective of the tensions of early June 
1917 is that Baron Erik Palmstierna of the Social Democrats responded by 
accusing e Right of an equal readiness to prosecute ‘extra-parliamentary 
measures’, as had been seen in the pre-war peasant demonstrations and the 
royal pressure used against a Liberal government. Moreover, the present 
rightist government had not demonstrated its claimed ‘parliamentarism’ by 
subjecting its programme to parliamentary scrutiny.797 
e Right held to its view of the established system as healthy parliamen-
tarism of a native kind and rejected extra-parliamentary challenges to it. 
Karl Hildebrand repeated the view that the two chambers were ‘organically 
embedded in our social structure’ and in no need of renovation. e 
agitation by the leist press that misguided the workers into lawlessness, 
disorder, political strikes and other forms of mass action as extra-
parliamentary means of putting pressure on the parliament was in his view 
totally irresponsible.798 Ernst Trygger attacked the Liberals, too, for their 
readiness to break with the conventions of Swedish parliamentarism: the 
Liberals might not run riot in the streets like the socialists or adopt ‘the 
792 AK, Carl Hallendor, 21 March 1917, 33:55.
793 AK, Erik Räf, 5 June 1917, 72:30.
794 AK, David Norman, 5 June 1917, 72:71.
795 Ihalainen 2015.
796 AK, Conrad Vahlquist, 5 June 1917, 72:40.
797 AK, Erik Palmstierna, 5 June 1917, 72:44–5.
798 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 5 June 1917, 72:51, 53–4.
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extra-parliamentary path’ and ‘violence’ to reach their political goals but 
seemed nevertheless ready to use unparliamentary means that were nothing 
short of a violent attempt to overthrow our constitution’. is exaggeration 
was based on the idea that the le might force the First Chamber into 
constitutional concessions by blocking the budget,799 a suggestion that the 
leists had made and one which recalled the measures employed by British 
Liberals to force through the Parliament Act in 1911. e Swedish right thus 
associated the proposed violations of parliamentary rules with open violence 
of the type used in the Russian Revolution, an association, which despite its 
rhetorical character reects the depth of the constitutional confrontation 
– especially at a time when the Russian Revolution was in the process of 
becoming radicalised, political changes were expected in Germany and the 
constitutional direction of the socialist parliamentary majority in Finland 
was causing increasing concern. is rhetorical strategy was the common 
property of the conservatives: the established order represented true native 
parliamentarism but was threatened by the un- and extra-parliamentary 
and hence illegitimate methods employed by the le. At the same time, the 
leaders of the Swedish right clearly maintained deep-rooted doubts about 
parliamentarism in its ‘Western’ British and French varieties. Within a few 
months, however, they would face a ‘parliamentary government’ in the 
leist sense. 
Nor were the far le and the Social Democrats agreed on the nature of 
parliamentarism. On the one hand, there was a joint willingness to extend 
the political say of the parliament into areas such as foreign policy – an 
international Marxist goal reinforced in Sweden by the pro-German policy 
of the government and the Wilsonian interpretation of the causes of the First 
World War.800 On the other hand, there was a division in attitudes concerning 
direct democracy as opposed to representative democracy: while the far 
le welcomed mass action and saw the referendum as an act of ‘popular 
legislative work side by side with parliamentary legislative work’,801 the 
Majority Social Democrats defended parliamentarism as a political process. 
Harald Hallén denounced critical attitudes to parliamentarism and viewed 
‘parliamentary battles’ as more than a mere campaign for power between 
parties: parliamentary debate was rather a battle through which a better 
society was sought;802 this was a revisionist pro-parliamentary view that 
diered not only from that of radical socialists but also from those of some 
foreign Social Democratic parties, including the Finnish one, especially aer 
its radicalisation.803 ere was a tendency among these groups to question 
799 FK, Ernst Trygger, 9 June 1917, 56:49.
800 AK, Carl Lindhagen, 21 March 1917, 33:29.
801 AK, Carl Lindhagen, 21 March 1917, 33:36–7, 58.
802 AK, Harald Hallén, 21 March 1917, 34:9, 11.
803 No similar division into the supporters of parliamentary procedures and the 
critics of existing parliaments as institutions, with the latter being inclined to 
favour direct democracy and potentially ready for revolutionary measures, 
emerged within the Finnish Social Democratic Party in 1917. is led to 
attempts by the moderates in Finland to satisfy the radicals through the use of 
anti-parliamentary rhetoric. Kettunen 1986, 9–10, 24.
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‘bourgeois’ parliamentarism, to doubt the ecacy of mere talking and to 
prioritise methods of direct popular rule. e readiness of the Swedish 
Social Democrats to distinguish between ‘politics in popular assemblies’ and 
‘politics in the parliament’ annoyed Carl Lindhagen, who accused them of 
surrendering to ‘parliamentary politics’ of the bourgeois type.804 Lindhagen 
saw nothing to idealise in the mere parliamentarisation of government in 
the British or French sense since ‘the so-called parliamentary formation of 
government’ was anyway ‘the opposite of democracy’.805 In transnational 
far-le thought on parliamentarism, government should be no more than 
a committee of the parliament, and the parliament could be overruled by 
the people. In the Swedish case, e Right appeared as a particular source of 
problems with its deliberate obstruction to reforms preventing the will of the 
people from being realised. is corrupted the system, increasing the power 
of party functionaries and adding to ‘parliamentary corruption’ even among 
the le.806 Surrendering to bourgeois parliamentarism was not an option for 
the far le, who viewed the Majority Social Democrats as ready to give up 
parliamentarism proper, i.e. ‘the idea based on the self-government of the 
people in the form of a parliament meeting to discuss the aairs of the entire 
country’.807 In these circumstances, extra-parliamentary methods appeared 
as a viable option. Fredrik Ström hence called for the forced extension of 
parliamentary government through budgetary power instead of mere 
discussion ‘to enforce the demands and wishes of the people’; this would be 
‘an open constitutional battle’ to crush opposition from e Right.808 
ere was a connection between ‘democracy and parliamentarism’ for 
most far leists,809 for whom these concepts went together and were the goal 
of the popular demonstrations, but more revolutionary language was also 
heard when Zeth Höglund, an old revolutionary and a comrade of Lenin, 
re-occupied his seat. Höglund accused the government of having employed 
‘unparliamentary’ means against the people by allowing violence to be 
used against demonstrators on the streets of Stockholm instead of dealing 
with their complaints in the parliament.810 Such an alleged rejection of 
the ‘parliamentary’ process would justify the use of violence by the le as 
well, which shows that the radical arguments in Sweden in June were not 
so completely dierent from those in Finland in November 1917. Höglund 
lamented what he saw as the failure of the le to use the parliamentary 
power in its possession and concluded that ‘the merely parliamentary way 
is not enough to carry through the demands of the people but really large-
scale mass action is needed instead’.811 Rejecting the parliament as the forum 
of reform to a previously unheard-of extent, Höglund maintained that the 
804 AK, Carl Lindhagen, 21 March 1917, 34:13.
805 AK, Carl Lindhagen, 21 March 1917, 33:64.
806 AK, Carl Lindhagen, 7 June 1917, 75:5–6, 8.
807 AK, Fabian Månsson, 7 June 1917, 75:15.
808 FK, Fredrik Ström, 14 April 1917, 32:17.
809 AK, Ivar Vennerström, 5 June 1917, 72:12, 67.
810 AK, Zeth Höglund, 5 June 1917, 72:47.
811 AK, Zeth Höglund, 5 June 1917, 72:49–50.
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masses no longer trusted their leaders either within or outside the parliament 
and should hence themselves take the initiative. Such revolutionary rhetoric 
strongly recalls that heard in the Finnish parliament ve months later, though 
in the Swedish case it found no great acceptance. Höglund nevertheless saw 
the inability of the government and the parliament to introduce the necessary 
reforms as justication for a take-over by ‘the parliament of the streets’, 
crying out together with a simultaneous demonstration that was taking 
place outside the parliament building: ‘[L]ong live the mass movement, long 
live the parliament of the street!’812 is speech act, challenging both the 
rightist and Social Democrat-Liberal understandings of parliamentarism 
and rejected by the rightist press as totally inappropriate for its references 
to the chaotic demonstrations of the day,813 constituted the most radical 
moment of the ‘Swedish Revolution’ of 1917. At the level of parliamentary 
rhetoric at least, a few radical socialist leaders seemed ready for a revolution 
a week before the Finnish parliament would begin to debate parliamentary 
sovereignty, a stance that provided a further encouraging model for radical 
Finns. But Zeth Höglund remained a solitary revolutionary; most other 
leist leaders suggested no more than politicking through parliamentary 
procedure to force e Right into concessions. e extent and militancy 
of the revolutionary rhetoric would be quite dierent in the diering 
circumstances of Finland.  
Despite the far le’s accusations that they had accepted the existing 
order, there was deep unhappiness amongst the Majority Social Democrats 
about the prevailing political system failing to produce the reform that the 
people wanted.814 However, they were ready to work within it provided that 
surage was reformed and government parliamentarised. e party leaders 
were hopeful that the party would soon come into power and observed 
moderation in its rhetoric when calling for parliamentarism and indeed 
employed perennial arguments that were downright traditionalist: Hjalmar 
Branting liked to speak about an ancient Swedish tradition of popular 
assemblies that had in the course of social development experienced 
evolution from tings to twentieth-century parliamentarism.815 e powers 
of the parliament originated from the Swedish people, and this demanded 
the maintenance of links between the parliament and the people so that no 
crucial gaps might emerge. e most serious failure of the current political 
system was the lack of ‘an entirely clear parliamentary order’, which allowed 
the government to function without responsibility to the parliament. e 
equal powers of the two chambers also weakened the possibilities for the 
parliament to introduce reforms. What must be done to accomplish ‘Swedish 
parliamentarism’ was to assert the power of the parliament and especially that 
of the Second Chamber, which was elected by the people. Branting’s forecast 
was that proper parliamentarism of this kind would be achieved in Sweden 
in the course of 1917. As for the increased direct popular participation 
812 AK, Zeth Höglund, 5 June 1917, 72:50.
813 Aonbladet, ‘Svaret från regeringsbänken’ and ‘Gatans parlament’, 6 June 1917.
814 AK, Viktor Larsson, 21 March 1917, 33:41.
815 See also Jakobsen & Kurunmäki 2016.
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demanded by the far le, the Majority Social Democrats might welcome 
the principle but rejected the proposal in practice, considering that it called 
for further deliberation.816 An argument voiced by Gunnar Löwegren in 
April indicates that the party leadership – unlike the Finnish socialists and 
the far le in Sweden and Germany – had set Western parliamentarism as 
its goal. Löwegren viewed the Swedish system in its current form as not 
comparable with the parliamentary systems of France and Britain: in France 
both houses were elected through universal surage and no counterbalance 
to parliamentary power existed; in Britain, parliament had a decisive 
inuence over the government. ese features needed to be introduced 
before the Swedish system could be characterised as parliamentary.817 In 
June, Harald Hallén provocatively interpreted the rightist ministry as being 
ready – despite continuous opposition from its own ranks – to recognise that 
parliamentarism concentrated in the lower chamber, as practised abroad, 
was the only political way that was available for Sweden to take.818 is was 
still wishful thinking, but eventually e Right would have to adapt itself to 
parliamentarism aer the election of September 1917. 
While e Right remained reluctant, the far le critical and the 
Social Democrats defensive, the Swedish Liberals spoke at this stage for 
a parliamentarism of the Western European type with an intensity that cannot 
be found among the German or Finnish Liberals. eir papers constantly 
criticised the ‘anti-parliamentary temperament’, ‘anti-parliamentary 
plans’ and the ‘anti-parliamentary building of opinion’ of conservative 
governments and the ‘sensational extra-parliamentary events’ that these 
organised. e Liberals recalled how the rightist leader Arvid Lindman 
had compared parliamentarism with ‘the Trojan horse’ and been unwilling 
to cooperate with the parliament. By March 1917 the Liberal papers were 
already positive that ‘parliamentarism has won’.819 e British parliamentary 
tradition provided them with evidence that the trajectory of the Swedish 
constitutional tradition would inevitably lead to parliamentarism. e 
British system was also accepted as ‘democratic’ even if, up to then, it had 
been based on a small political class and had tended to exclude the masses 
from politics.820 According to Nils Edén, himself a parliamentary historian, 
Britain possessed an ‘ancient parliamentary culture and . . . strong reverence 
for parliamentary power and sovereignty’, and he recommended that 
Sweden, too, adopt a similar kind of ministerial responsibility.821 Coming 
from a leading historian, this shows how the notion of the automatic long-
term comparability of the British and Swedish political systems emerged.822 
816 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 21 March 1917, 33:45–6; see, however, FK, Olof Olsson, 
21 March 1917, 24:11.
817 AK, Gustaf Löwegren, 14 April 1917, 41:24.
818 AK, 5 June 1917, 72:21, 27; Aonbladet, ‘Svaret från regeringsbänken’, 6 June 
1917; Dagens Nyheter, ‘Svaret’, 6 June 1917.
819 Dagens Nyheter, ‘Kontraparlamentariska akter’, 22 March 1917; ‘Hr Swarzs 
uppdrag’ and ‘Systemet Hammarskjölds fall’, 30 March 1917.
820 Kurunmäki 2014, 177–8, on Karl Staa; Ihalainen 2015, 73.
821 AK, Nils Edén, 21 March 1917, 33:48.
822 See also Ihalainen 2015 on the use of history in politics.
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Liberal Anglophilia remained strong in Sweden despite the fact that the 
press reports on the reform debates in the British parliament were very brief 
in comparison with reports from Finland and Germany.823 By summer 1917, 
both the Social Democrats and the Liberals in Sweden had made a clear 
choice in favour Western parliamentarism. is was not the so clearly the 
case in Germany or Finland.
3.4  Finland: e legitimacy of the parliament deteriorates  
 at the moment of democratisation and parliamentarisation 
3.4.1  Sovereignty in the former grand duchy:  
 in the parliament, the government or  
 a Russian-style ‘democracy’?
Finnish political culture combined a long tradition of monarchical gov-
ernment with conventions of the representation of the estates and – from 
the parliamentary reform of 1906 onwards – of the people in a unicameral 
parliament elected on the basis of universal surage (including women). 
Since 1809, Finland had been an autonomous grand duchy in the Russian 
Empire, while still observing applicable regulations of the Swedish 
constitutions of 1772 and 1789 and the Diet Act of 1617 (revised in 1869 
and 1906). In the eighteenth century, these constitutions had reintroduced 
an almost absolute monarchy aer the so-called Age of Liberty (1719–72), 
when the four-estate Diet (including the free Peasant Estate) had played 
a  prominent role in Swedish-Finnish politics.824 Much of the Finnish 
polity of the late 1910s was based on inherited eighteenth-century Swedish 
practices, though parliamentary life and public debate had been activated 
since the revival of the Diet in 1863 and the parliamentary reform of 1906. 
Within the Russian Empire, Finnish political culture was exceptional in 
its ‘Westerness’, which was admired by the Russian liberals and loathed by 
the conservatives; on the other hand, numerous physical links with Russia 
gave rise to transnational transfers from Russia that were unthinkable in the 
other three polities examined in this study.
For the Finnish polity, which combined the conservation of the Swedish 
early-modern legal and political inheritance with radically modern forms 
of representation that had been made possible by external stimuli from 
transnational European debates on parliamentarism and the Russian 
Revolution of 1905, the new Russian Revolution again opened up opportunities 
for alternative constitutional solutions. Once Nicholas II, the Grand Duke 
of Finland, had abdicated, the Romanov monarchy had come to an end 
and the Russian Provisional Government had started to dra a republican 
constitution for Russia, the foundations of the old political order could be 
interpreted as having disintegrated in Finland as well. e introduction 
of parliamentary responsibility of the government, the democratisation 
of local government, the transition to a republican constitution and even 
823 Dagens Nyheter, ‘Underhuset för kvinnorösträtten’, 30 March 1917.
824 Ihalainen & Sundin 2011.
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independence from Russia so that sovereign power would be transferred to 
the Finnish parliament or at least to a domestic government – all of these 
now seemed to be within reach. e revolutionary impact of events in Russia 
on a country which had lacked a revolutionary atmosphere (apart from the 
class hatred agitated by the Social Democrats or the engagement in military 
training in the German army by rightist activists) produced an unforeseen 
struggle for power at all levels. In a radically reinvigorated public discourse, 
democracy – or rather its vernacular translation kansanvalta (the rule by 
the people) which had specically Finnish connotations825 – was generally 
seen as an option that was available for Finland, as indeed it was for many 
other European countries,826 although Finland remained isolated from some 
of the transnational debates in which the parties of countries participating 
in the First World War and even Swedish politicians were engaged. As will 
be shown below, this again had consequences for the dynamics of Finnish 
political discourse. In the Finnish context, it was particularly disputable what 
giving power to the people would mean: a democratically elected parliament 
existed but there was no parliamentary government or local democratic 
administration. Dierent parties had radically dierent conceptions of 
democracy, especially when rule by parliamentary majority – the Social 
Democrats holding 103 out of 200 seats in the parliament aer the elections 
of 1916 – meant rule by a socialist party. 
ere were many dierent understandings of democracy and sources of 
ideological inspiration: revolutionary Petrograd became the most obvious 
source for the socialists, bypassing Berlin, whereas the non-socialist parties, 
825 e word kansanvalta had become a conventional vernacular translation of 
‘democracy’ in Finnish. Owing to its linguistic derivation, it took on a slightly 
dierent tone from the terms for ‘democracy’ in the Germanic languages (though 
it resembled the Swedish folkestyre). Kansanvalta carried connotations of ‘power’ 
or ‘rule’ and ‘the people’ in an ethnic or social sense that were not fully identical 
with democracy in English, German or Swedish. It could refer to the unied 
power of or rule by the Finnish people as opposed to the Swedish people (and 
was hence not a concept that Swedish-speaking Finns would use); to the rule 
by the common people as opposed to that by the higher classes (thus recalling 
the opposition between the people and the intelligentsia emphasised also by 
the Russian concept of democracy); to the rule by citizens as opposed to the 
estates (as the Finnish word for citizen kansalainen is derived from the word for 
an ethnic community kansa); or to the fairness of political and administrative 
processes. e use of the non-vernacular word demokratia tended to carry the 
last, more formal, process-like connotation. Hyvärinen 2003, 83. e Finnish-
speaking debaters had favoured the vernacular translation of democracy as 
‘the rule by the people’ already in the parliamentary reform debates of 1905–6. 
Kansanvalta did not necessarily stand for the sovereignty of the people: it 
could also stand alternatively for the sovereignty of the nation as a whole (thus 
approaching the anti-parliamentary German concept Volksgemeinscha), of 
parliament as the representative institution, of the Finnish-speaking majority of 
the population, of the common people or, in the Marxist sense, of the proletariat 
only. Kurunmäki 2008, 364–5. e connotations of the concept were thus very 
varied and contestable.
826 Vares 1998, 50; Nyström 2013, 124–5.
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while observing developments in Russia, looked mainly to Germany and 
Sweden and to a much lesser extent the Entente. In Finnish parlance, the non-
socialist parties were generally called ‘bourgeois parties’, which reinforced 
the division into two blocs, particularly as the bourgeoisie formed a joint 
body that issued proclamations to the public calling for law and order.827 
In the other countries of comparison, no similar association combining 
the right and the centre against the Social Democrats existed, nor was such 
a strongly legalistic discourse generally employed. is bourgeois insistence 
on obedience to the law was a reaction to the Russication measures of the 
preceding years, and it was reinforced by violations of the law by Social 
Democrat supporters.828 e confrontational discourses of class hatred and 
legalism are among the peculiarities of Finland that deserve more attention 
in the analysis of the political process.
On 20 March 1917, the Russian Provisional Government – following the 
wishes of a delegation of the Finnish parties – reconrmed the validity of 
the Swedish-Finnish constitution, rescinded imperial degrees that had since 
1890 limited the autonomy of the grand duchy and abolished censorship. e 
Finnish parties, however, were polarised by ten years of heated parliamentary 
debate. ey had traditionally followed dierent policies towards Russia 
and, holding radically diering conceptions of the proper organisation of the 
polity and maintaining aforementioned competing discourses, disagreed on 
whether or not promises about a democratic constitution and social reforms 
should have been included in the decree. From the Russian perspective, its 
primary aim was to assuage a strategically important border country next 
to the capital and to ensure Finnish support for the ongoing war eort 
and revolution; no separatism or cooperation with the Germans would be 
allowed, and the state of war remained in force. e meeting of the delegations 
was nevertheless characterised as a ‘new spring’ in Fenno-Russian relations, 
reecting the optimistic revolutionary atmosphere of spring 1917. From the 
Finnish perspective, most promising was the reconvening of the national 
parliament to prepare a proposal for a new constitution.829 Enthusiasm in 
the contemporary press was considerable.
However, instead of the expected period of constitutional and social 
reform, one of constitutional confusion and power struggles followed. e 
course of events has been covered in detail in previous research, though 
not so thoroughly from the point of view of the discursive process in the 
parliament. As Pertti Haapala, among others, has shown, political order 
began to rapidly deteriorate – rst from above in connection with the 
parliament but then increasingly from below among the people, which in 
turn had repercussions on the parliament. From the socialist perspective, 
the Revolution was coming to Finland and opening up chances to achieve 
827 Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Eduskuntaryhmäin waltuuskunta toimimassa’, 18 March 
1917, and ‘Tiedonanto kansalaisille porwarillisten eduskuntaryhmäin waltuus-
kunnalta’, 19 March 1917.
828 Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Senaatin warapuheenjohtajan uusin lausunto’, 14 June 1917.
829 Polvinen 1967, vol. 1, 16, 23, 27; Lindman 1968, 22; Upton 1980, 54–5; Sihvonen 
1997, 19; Haapala 2010a, 60–2.
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the postponed reforms through direct action should formal parliamentary 
politics fail to produce them. e need for reforms in many areas was obvious 
and delays in realising them politicised this need further: the relationship 
with Russia should be rethought, the constitution reformed and the 
circumstances of workers and tenant farmers improved. A major problem 
was the gross discrepancy between a democratically elected parliament and 
the lack of parliamentary sovereignty and responsibility. Disappointment 
with the results of voting and parliamentary reform work was deep, especially 
among the Social Democrats, who expressed this as soon as censorship was 
eased in March. ey contrasted the Social Democratic pro-parliamentary 
ten-year struggle in- and outside the parliament for ‘democratic progress 
and national liberty’ with the reactionary, anti-reformist and downright 
antiparliamentary opposition of the herraspuolueet (parties of the masters).830 
Among the latter parties, the shortcomings of the parliament were explained 
by Russian policies on the one hand and the excessively radical demands 
of the incompetent representatives of the Social Democrats on the other.831 
e Social Democrats now called for the parliamentarisation of the political 
system so that the postponed reforms could be carried through with their 
majority in the parliament. ey also called for a reform of local government 
that would enable universal surage to be introduced there, too. At the 
same time, Finnish towns saw the rise of two sets of authorities, recalling 
the situation in Petrograd: the imperial police force was being replaced by 
workers’ guards. Furthermore, a Parliament (‘eduskunta’) of the Workers’ 
Associations of Helsinki representing 96 associations was formed and 
openly challenged the established city administration,832 both with its name 
and its resolutions. 
e exceptional naming of a local revolutionary body in Helsinki as 
a ‘parliament’ deserves attention, as it reected and tended to add to the 
workers’ scepticism of the national parliament. Since no other institution 
was called by such a name, ‘the workers’ Eduskunta’ implicitly challenged 
the sole authority of the ‘bourgeois’ national parliament, suggesting that 
a local assembly of the representatives of the workers as an interest group 
stood for an authority comparable to that of the national parliament (which 
did have a socialist majority aer all). is alternative ‘parliament’ would 
play a key role once the revolutionary process escalated in late 1917. Even 
though the term ‘soviet’ in the Russian sense was not used, the name of the 
workers’ parliament reinforced the notion of double authorities and could 
be used eectively to question the legitimacy of the national parliament. 
Comparable ‘parliaments’ of interest groups are not known to have played 
any role in Britain, Germany or Sweden in 1917. 
Furthermore, a parliament of the streets was rising: Samu Nyström has 
argued that the streets and squares of Helsinki rather than the press (or the 
parliament) were becoming a dominant political stage, with the city space 
being used by political groups seeking common stands, propagating their 
830 Työmies, ‘Eduskunta. Työwäki ja porvarit’, 17 March 1917.
831 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Vår landtdag’, 16 March  1917.
832 Ketola 1987, 32; Tuomisto 1990, 38; Haapala 2010c, 15; Nyström 2013, 125–6, 131.
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views and exhibiting demonstrations of strength aimed at putting pressure 
on the decision-makers. e national parliament, which was located in 
Heimola House in the middle of this turbulent city space, experienced what 
practically amounted to states of siege at times: for instance on 12 and 14 
July 1917, when the new local government laws were discussed just days 
before an act on parliamentary sovereignty was passed. e confrontational 
relationship between the national parliament and the parliament of the 
streets turned very real when a crowd consisting of Finnish workers and 
Russian soldiers shouted ‘Down with the bourgeoisie’ outside the assembly 
hall, and their chanting could be heard inside.833 e MPs also took up 
these tensions in their speeches. e political initiative was in danger of 
moving from the national parliament to the parliament of the streets834 or 
to the workers’ parliament, particularly as the Social Democratic Speaker 
Kullervo Manner supported the use of the Russian soldiers to pressurise his 
parliament.835 Parliamentary and extra-parliamentary politics confronted 
each other in Helsinki in ways that were familiar from contemporary 
Stockholm but which even more so resembled those used in revolutionary 
Petrograd. ere was also a readiness to employ extra-parliamentary 
measures within the national parliament itself – by its president.
Up to March 1917, Finland had been relatively peaceful during the 
war despite Russian rule under military law, the growing number of 
Russian troops in the country, censorship, a long hiatus in parliamentary 
work and economic diculties resulting from the closure of the Western 
markets. e last had to some extent been compensated for by the economic 
benets resulting from the demands of the Russian market. e calm 
had also been supported by the fact that any political problem could be 
explained as arising from the tsarist Russian rule and not from any Finnish 
policies. Once the imperial power fell and a new Finnish government and 
parliament began to work, expectations for solutions to acute problems 
rose, and a crisis concerning the legitimacy of the state resembling that of 
the war-faring countries and Sweden emerged; this was caused particularly 
by the fact that, as Pertti Haapala has put it, instead of solving problems, 
the Finnish political institutions appeared to be creating new ones. ese 
faltering institutions included the democratically elected but previously 
nearly powerless and discordant parliament, from which quick decisions 
had been expected. Political struggles among the Finns themselves in- and 
outside the parliament tended to politicise the problems of wartime daily 
life and consequently weakened condence in the capability of the political 
institutions to solve the crisis, which further diminished their legitimacy. e 
parliament failed, and equally signicantly, law and order, which had been 
maintained by regular police forces, was replaced by anarchical activities 
and armed guards, who were generally regarded as the defenders of rival 
interests and hence lacked legitimacy with the opposite side. By the end of 
833 Tuomisto 1990, 40; Nyström 2013, 135, 139, 151.
834 Haapala 1995, 12, 220.
835 Soikkanen 1975, 227.
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the year, there would be no power in Finland that was recognised by the 
majority of the citizens, be it the police force or the national parliament.836 
In this section and in section 4.4, we shall focus on the gradual discursive 
deterioration of the Finnish polity at the parliamentary level as it became 
evident in constitutional debates, particularly when compared to parallel 
debates elsewhere. e rise of a confrontational revolutionary atmosphere 
was increased by concrete transnational links between Petrograd and 
Helsinki: there were regular train services that enabled visits both ways, 
and radicalised revolutionary Russian troops eager to demonstrate, commit 
illegalities and intervene in Finnish domestic matters were present in 
Helsinki.837 
e crisis of parliamentary legitimacy in Finland was further complicated 
by the unclear constitutional relationship between Finland and Russia. e 
revolutionary Duma and the Provisional Government viewed themselves 
as having replaced the Grand Duke (the Tsar) as the sovereign authority 
in Finland. e Provisional Government would have given the Finnish 
parliament the right to initiate legislation, vote on the budget and control 
ministers, but it was not ready to recognise it as the representative body 
of an entirely sovereign state; at least foreign and military aairs would 
remain for Petrograd to decide. From the generally held Finnish point of 
view, by contrast, the union between Finland and Russia had been based on 
the Romanov dynasty only, and once that house had fallen, the relationship 
needed to be rethought and the power vacuum created by it in Finland lled 
in. e Finns interpreted the situation to mean either that, since the unlimited 
power of the tsars had ended, Finland should be recognised as an internally 
independent state – even if the Provisional Government continued to hold 
sovereign power – or that, aer the abolition of the monarchy in Russia, the 
Provisional Government no longer had any supreme power over Finland, 
sovereignty belonged to the Finns and it was they who should freely decide 
on how to use it. is did not necessarily stand for full independence: during 
the rst half of 1917, most Finns continued to recognise the authority of 
the Russian government in foreign and military aairs,838 but these views 
became divided and changeable.839 e degree of readiness to proceed to full 
independence varied: fears of the radicalism of the socialist majority in the 
parliament made the bourgeois parties hesitant, while the Social Democrats 
wanted to distance the country from the Provisional Government. By 
November, with a bourgeois parliamentary majority in power in Finland 
and a Bolshevik government in Russia, the parties’ respective views would be 
the exact opposite, with the bourgeois parties supporting full independence 
and the Social Democrats seeking cooperation with the Russian Bolsheviks.
As we have seen, radical rhetoric had been increasing within the Finnish 
labour movement for years and culminated in the election campaign of 
1916, which produced a Social Democratic parliamentary majority. e fact 
836 Kettunen 1986, 85; Haapala 2010b, 58–60; Nyström 2013, 144.
837 Polvinen 1967, vol. 1, 21, 45–6, 48; Eskola 2011, 15.
838 Lindman 1968, 45; Sihvonen 1997, 1–2; Jussila, Hentilä & Nevakivi 1999, 92–6.
839 See Ketola 1987, 56–7.
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that it was supported by revolutionary inuences from Petrograd, explains 
much of the confrontational nature of Finnish constitutional debates during 
1917. Until the Russian Revolution, in the circumstances of war, the socialist 
majority had been of minor political signicance, but rst the March 
Revolution and then the rise of Bolshevik opposition to the Provisional 
Government opened up prospects for the realisation of the postponed 
reforms through this majority; a revolution through the parliament in either 
a Kautskyist or a more radical Marxist sense seemed possible. Kautsky had 
suggested that a socialist parliamentary majority would automatically know 
the right policy to follow. e Bolsheviks, too, were interested in having 
a  radical socialist party that already possessed a parliamentary majority 
in a ‘Western’ country within the Russian Empire.840 e Finnish socialists 
could support the revolution in Russia and help to export it to the West – to 
Sweden, Germany and even Britain. Many of them had concrete contacts 
with Russian revolutionaries at this time, and some of them helped Lenin 
to hide in apartments around Helsinki between August and October 1917. 
Vyacheslav Molotov gave instructions to the Finnish-speaking Bolshevik 
Adolf Taimi on how to work as an emissary of the Revolution in Helsinki. 
It was easy for the Bolsheviks to nd admiration and concrete support for 
their version of the Revolution among Finnish workers, who were used to 
revolutionary discourse – though many Finnish socialists did not speak 
Russian and were still uncertain about the sustainability of the Revolution.841 
e inherent internationalism of the socialist movement was supported 
by a  transnational revolutionary spirit which was much more concretely 
present in Finland than in any of the countries of comparison. 
When Finnish political life suddenly became active in late March 
1917, the constitutional debates recalled those in Britain, Germany and 
Sweden, even though universal surage was no longer an issue and even 
more complex questions concerning sovereignty remained unsolved. On 
26 March 1917, the Provisional Government nominated the rst ever 
Finnish government supported by the majority of the parliament and with a 
nominal socialist majority; this had been agreed on by the Finnish parties. 
e Social Democrats became, in the words of the sociologist Risto Alapuro, 
‘a member of the polity’ but remained unable to realise their policies because 
of the ‘solidly bourgeois’ character of the bureaucracy.842 e all-party 
government was led by the Social Democrat Oskari Tokoi, a workers’ union 
leader who had returned from emigration to America – as had many other 
Finnish Social Democratic activists, which is a further transnational context 
840 Lenin assumed on 24 March that the majority of the Finns were already on the 
side of socialism and should be allowed to develop democracy on their own and 
thereby support the Bolshevik cause in Russia. Polvinen 1967, vol. 1, 56; Ketola 
1987, 72; Palonen 2012, 256.
841 Polvinen 1967, vol. 1, 41–2, 46, 49, 69–70; Kirby 1976, 101; Rinta-Tassi 1986, 
32; Ketola 1987, 70–1; Soikkanen 1990, 90. On 24 March, Lenin’s sister Maria 
Ulyanova visited Helsinki to make a nancial collection on behalf of the 
Bolsheviks.
842 Alapuro 1988, 151. Haapala 1995, 220, also notes their unwillingness to make 
compromises with the bourgeoisie.
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to be considered. Tokoi became the rst socialist head of government and 
acted in ways that revealed to many supporters of the ‘bourgeois’ parties 
the potential consequences of socialist rule. As we have seen, the German 
Social Democratic organ Vorwärts celebrated the creation of a socialist-
dominated government in Finland. e leading newspaper in Helsinki, for 
its part, reported both about the British surage reform and about Social 
Democratic and Liberal expressions of the popular will for an immediate 
parliamentarisation of the German government as a reaction to the Russian 
Revolution.843 Hufvudstadsbladet, the organ of the Swedish People’s Party, 
also reviewed the main arguments of the various political groups in ‘a strange 
debate’ at the German Reichstag.844 
e nomination of a government consisting of Finnish politicians, 
mostly parliamentarians, could from a judicial point of view be interpreted 
as a breakthrough of democracy and parliamentarism in Finland.845 It might 
even be seen as a joint bourgeois and Social Democratic attempt to make 
use of the representative system to achieve social reforms,846 particularly as 
the ministers’ speeches suggested that they were aiming at a parliamentary 
government that would separate Finland from Russia. In reality, however, 
Tokoi’s ministry had been nominated by the Russians; according to the 
constitution, it was not responsible to the parliament; and it lacked the full 
support of the Social Democratic Party847. e government was formed 
because neither the Social Democrats nor the bourgeois parties would allow 
the other side to rule alone; most Social Democrats rejected such a coalition 
with ‘parties that had been deposed by the Revolution in Russia’ as 
irreconcilable with the principle of class struggle and revolution; the Social 
Democrat ministers did not coordinate their actions among themselves 
or with their party; the parties were not committed to the government’s 
programme, each wishing to be in government and in opposition at the 
same time; none of the leading politicians was ready to serve as a minister; 
and Social Democrat ministers were accused of neglecting their political 
responsibilities. e public and especially the supporters of the socialists 
expected rapid social and economic reforms from the government, which 
they considered should reect the views of the parliamentary majority. 
ere were Russian troops in the country whose actions were unpredictable, 
and there was no longer a police force. e expectations failed to materialise 
– owing to food shortages and outbreaks of violence according to the usual 
explanation,848 but also as a result of the exceptionally confrontational 
nature of the political debate in Finland in comparison with that in the other 
countries studied here. A working parliamentary government might well 
843 Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Mieliala Saksassa’, 30 March 1917; Työmies, ‘Englannin 
parlamentti’ and ‘Saksan sisäiset uudistukset’, 31 March 1917.
844 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Tyskland. En märklig debatt i riksdagen’, 1 April 1917.
845 Lindman 1935, 14; Jyränki 2006, 33.
846 Kettunen 1986, 85; Ketola 1987, 41.
847 Työmies, ‘Nykyinen waltiollinen asema Suomessa. Uuden hallituksen muo dos-
ta minen’, 29 March 1917.
848 Lindman 1968, 26, 28, 30, 39; Upton 1980, 60, 68; Haapala 2010a, 62.
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have been able to solve the issue of maintaining order by discussion if there 
had been a readiness for compromise. While in Britain and Sweden, and 
later in Germany, Social Democrat minorities were capable of cooperating in 
government at least with the centre parties, the uncompromising discourse 
of the Finnish Social Democrat majority – strengthened by the importation 
of Russian revolutionary discourse – made this very dicult and tended to 
diminish the legitimacy of all parliamentary government.
According to Risto Alapuro, the spontaneous reorganisation of the police 
at the local level in spring 1917 obscured dierences between the public and 
private maintenance of order. e mobilisation of the workers at the local 
level led to a growing distance from the parliamentary Social Democratic 
Party and favoured extra-parliamentary action. e parliamentary party 
was not fully supportive of the government, but the workers at the local 
level would not necessarily remain supportive of the party if it failed to 
achieve the promised reforms, as Pauli Kettunen and Osmo Rinta-Tassi 
have pointed out.849 Consequently, according to Samu Nyström, the Social 
Democrat parliamentarians tended to reect changes in volatile public 
opinion in their reform demands.850 A working parliament fully integrating 
the Social Democrats with other political groups (as in Britain or Sweden or 
even Germany by this time) might have provided a forum in which various 
problems could have been constructively deliberated and then removed 
from the agenda aer a vote; however, Finnish parliamentary discourse 
was confrontational and became increasingly so under the inuence of 
revolutionary discursive models adopted from Petrograd.
When the Finnish parliament elected in 1916 convened for its rst 
session in April, Social Democrats were elected to the positions of Speaker, 
Vice-Speaker and Chairman of the Constitutional Committee, which led 
Pravda to express hope for support from Finland for the Russian working 
class851 as the rst socialist takeover of a Western parliament seemed to 
have taken place. In speeches made in the opening sessions, optimism 
and expectations of a free, revolutionary and democratic Russia giving 
freedom (if not yet independence) to Finland prevailed.852 Calls for full 
internal independence (still excluding foreign and military policy) based 
on Professor Rafael Erich’s interpretation of the eighteenth-century Swedish 
constitution, which from the Finnish legal perspective remained in force, 
were increasing. e transition of the royal prerogative to the Finnish 
government was supported by all parties, but they disagreed on whether this 
transfer should be made in cooperation with the Provisional Government 
in Russia. Only some bourgeois activists called for full independence, while 
the bourgeois moderates wanted to wait and see. e Social Democrats 
increasingly counted on Bolshevik promises of independence – rst given 
849 Kettunen 1986, 86; Rinta-Tassi 1986, 41; Alapuro 1988, 152, 154.
850 Nyström 2013, 137–8.
851 Polvinen 1987, vol. 1, 43.
852 Evert Huttunen (Social Democrat), who was of Ingrian origin, quoted by Vares 
2006, 55.
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by Lenin in 1905853 – and followed his advice not to cooperate with the 
Provisional Government. 
A democratically elected parliament had organised itself and seemed 
ready to proceed towards the democratisation and parliamentarisation 
of government but on the conditions of the majority party: sovereignty 
would be vested unambiguously in the parliament and not in any Russian 
government or Finnish government independent of the parliament, and the 
duality of government of the German and Swedish type was to be abolished. 
is duality still appeared as desirable to the so-called bourgeois parties, 
who were concerned about the intentions of the socialist majority. In May, 
when relations with the Provisional Government were already deteriorating, 
the Social Democrats together with the republican and pro-parliamentary 
Agrarian League began to demand that all political power should be 
transferred to the Finnish parliament as the only legitimate representative of 
‘the power of the people’. In addition to legislative power, this would include 
considerable executive power as well. is uncompromising constitutional 
stand was supported by the Russian Congress of Soviets, representing leist 
parties in Russia, in a resolution on 3 July – its stand having been inuenced 
by transnationally linked Finnish Social Democrats (Evert Huttunen and 
K. H. Wiik), who assured the Congress that the Finnish socialists aimed 
at crushing the Finnish bourgeoisie and advancing the ‘politics of socialist 
democracy’.854 is demonstrates the tendency of the Russian revolutionaries 
to dene how democracy was to be understood in Finland: it was the 
democracy of the Russian socialist revolution.
e Finnish socialists drew overly optimistic conclusions about the 
intentions of the Congress and ignored the lack of support among other 
Russian socialists than the Bolsheviks (let alone the Russian bourgeoisie); 
indeed, ‘democratic associations in Russia’ were surprised by the plan of 
the Finnish parliament to declare itself sovereign.855 e Finnish socialists 
were not very familiar with the Russian socialist parties and regarded 
them as relevant only insofar as they took a stand on Finnish autonomy, 
an attitude that annoyed both the Russian revolutionaries and the Socialist 
International. e Finnish socialists turned to the Bolsheviks since these 
seemed ready to support Finnish independence; however, the Bolshevik aim 
was to weaken the Provisional Government rather than to advance the rise 
of an independent Finland. In the Finnish parliament, the Social Democrats 
were ready to make use of their parliamentary majority to force through an 
act of parliamentary sovereignty with the supposed support of the Congress 
of Soviets. ey contemplated the possibility of bypassing the parliamentary 
procedure for legislating constitutional issues, which included strict 
853 Polvinen 1967, vol. 1, 60; Haapala 2010b, 63. Prime Minister Oskari Tokoi’s 
speech on independence on 20 April 1917 was inspired by a speech given by 
Alexandra Kollontai and freely interpreted by Jonas Laherma in the Finnish 
National eatre on 9 April. Polvinen 1987, vol. 1, 60; Ketola 1987, 58, 73; 
Soikkanen 1990, 86.
854 Irakli Tsereneli, cited in Ketola 1987, 153.
855 Työmies, ‘Pietarin toimiston lewittämä tiedonanto’, 12 July 1917.
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minority provisions. In the end, the leading party members rejected this 
kind of manipulation,856 but even the contemplation of such measures made 
bourgeois MPs question the legitimacy of the procedure with regard to the 
consideration of minority views, especially as the Social Democrats had 
received fewer votes than the bourgeois parties in the previous election.857 
e so-called Power Act on the exercise of supreme power by the Finnish 
parliament was approved on 18 and 19 July – at a time when the Russian 
soldiers in Helsinki were supporting a Bolshevik policy and the Russian 
government was believed to have been taken over by the Bolsheviks. 
Furthermore, the German Social Democrats were known to be calling for 
peace and constitutional reforms, which also supported the impression of 
a transnational revolutionary moment, even if the news from Berlin was 
meagre in the Finnish papers.858 
e bill on parliamentary sovereignty had changed considerably in the 
course of the legislative process: in the original proposal of 11 June, the 
Provisional Government would convene the Finnish parliament, while 
in the approved act the parliament itself would decide on its sessions and 
new elections, initiate legislation and nominate the government. e Social 
Democrats were convinced that a strong status of the parliament of this kind 
would prevent the postponement of social reforms; that the realisation of 
a revolution via the parliament had become possible; and that the Finnish 
workers would now be liberated from the rule of both the Russian and the 
Finnish bourgeoisie. Since they did not wish to put the opportunities for 
majority rule at risk, the Social Democrats did not want to send the Act to 
Petrograd for promulgation.859 
Many bourgeois MPs disagreed, criticising the act as poorly prepared, 
judicially questionable, politically unrealistic and enabling political 
dominance by a socialist majority. A committee led by K. J. Ståhlberg, 
a leading constitutional lawyer and a Liberal politician, had recommended 
a republic based on the classical division of power, with a strong executive 
balancing parliamentary power. From the perspective of the Provisional 
Government, which consisted of Mensheviks and moderate socialists, both 
856 e Social Democrats disagreed on whether or not the constitutional procedure 
(supported by Edvard Hänninen-Walpas, Speaker Kullervo Manner, Evert 
Huttunen, K. H. Wiik and Chairman of the Constitutional Committee Yrjö 
Mäkelin) as opposed to a revolutionary simple majority (advocated by Otto Wille 
Kuusinen) should be used. e majority decided to follow the constitutional 
procedure but concluded that the party would quit the government and demand 
new elections and the convening of a national constituent assembly should the 
bill not pass. Lindman 1968, 82; Soikkanen 1975, 218–19; Ketola 1987, 175, 196–
8. According to Alapuro, the Power Act was adopted ‘in accordance with regular 
procedures’ and hence the elections of October and the decisions of the new 
bourgeois majority were regarded as illegal by the Social Democrats. Alapuro 
1988, 159–60. Concerns about the legality of the procedure, even if exaggerated, 
were decisive from the point of view of the legitimacy of parliamentary work. 
857 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Rätten att lämna lagförslag hvilande’, 13 June 1917.
858 Työmies, ‘Saksan waltiopäivät ja rauhankysymys’, 17 July 1917.
859 Polvinen 1987, vol. 1, 67–8; Kirby 1976, 101–3; Ketola 1987, 151–2, 189; Haapala 
2010b, 63–4; Haapala & Tikka 2013, 110.
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alternatives remained out of the question. ey saw the enactment of the 
Power Act simultaneously with a Bolshevik rebellion in Petrograd as an 
open challenge to the supreme authority of Russia in Finland. Hence the 
Provisional Government, encouraged by non-socialist Finns who wished to 
get rid of the Social Democrat parliamentary majority, dissolved the Finnish 
parliament on 31 July 1917 and ordered a new election. e legality of this 
measure was questioned by the Social Democrats, to whom it appeared as 
a violation of the will of the Finnish people as represented by the Social 
Democrat parliamentary majority. It was also a threat to the realisation 
of revolution through the parliament and seemed to end the prospect of 
reforms enacted through the representative system. e Menshevik stand, 
on the other hand, caused the Finnish Social Democrats to turn increasingly 
towards the Bolsheviks. ey summoned the dissolved parliament to 
further sessions until they were forced to concede that a new election would 
take place. e bourgeois parties accused the Social Democrats of using the 
Power Act to carry out a coup, while the Social Democrats presented the 
new election as a coup that called independence and parliamentary rule in 
question.860 As a result, the Finnish parliament was divided into two hostile 
sides questioning the legitimacy of each other’s policy and even of the 
legislative institution.
e bourgeois opposition to the Power Act was seen by the Social 
Democrats as challenging their position within the Finnish polity and 
seeking to expel them from power, which, according to Risto Alapuro, 
led to the rise of two rival polities861 and in the long run, in the absence 
of an organised police force, to a civil war. However, I argue that it is also 
necessary to take into account the radicalisation of Social Democratic 
parliamentary discourse, questions of the legitimacy of the parliamentary 
procedure and the transnational aspects and dynamics of the discursive 
confrontation to fully understand the development. When the Social 
Democrats were disappointed with their failure to bring about a revolution 
through the parliament, many, encouraged by the Bolsheviks in Petrograd 
and Helsinki and news on revolutionary developments elsewhere, began 
to move from constitutional and parliamentary to extra-parliamentary 
and downright revolutionary linguistic and physical action. According to 
Eino Ketola, too, the party moved from constitutionalism to ‘revolutionary 
democracy’, evidently accepting to a great extent a Bolshevik understanding 
of democracy, within one month aer the adoption of the Power Act.862 At 
this time, Lenin himself was hiding in Helsinki and in contact with Social 
Democrat leaders.
For many among the bourgeois parliamentary minority, which turned into 
a majority in the election of September, the Power Act appeared as an utterly 
radical socialist enterprise that had been introduced using constitutionally 
860 Kirby 1976, 102; Kettunen 1986, 87; Rinta-Tassi 1986, 22; Ketola 1987, 233; 
Sihvonen 1997, 2–3; Vares 1998, 50–1; Jussila, Hentilä & Nevakivi 1999, 94, 96–7; 
Vares 2006, 48; Jyränki 2006, 33; Haapala 2010b, 64–5; Kekkonen 2016, 51.
861 Alapuro 1988, 158–60, 189; Alapuro 1990, 21.
862 Ketola 1987, 262.
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questionable and downright treasonous language and procedural means; 
it appeared as a means to import revolution and excessive or perverted 
parliamentarism to Finland. e Finnish Power Act was the most radical 
of the attempts to create a parliamentary government in wartime Europe. 
It was clearly a partisan attempt, even though it won support from the 
centre parties, which made the Finnish right – falling back on Swedish and 
German traditions of political practice and theory – determined to maintain 
limitations to majority parliamentarism. But how exactly did conceptions 
of the war, revolution, democracy and parliamentarism evolve in these 
connected constitutional debates?
3.4.2  The international, imperial and national political  
 order changed by the war and revolution
e Finns had, despite economic hardships, escaped from the direct impacts 
of the war until spring 1917. However, owing to the constitutional, political, 
physical and – in the case of many persons – transnational links with 
Petrograd, they could not escape from the consequences of the Revolution 
there. Finnish constitutional debates were transnationally linked to those 
in other countries, too: to Sweden through the two countries’ common 
constitutional tradition and cultural anity and the contacts of Swedish-
speaking Finns; to Germany through cultural and ideological contacts and 
the possibility of an alliance in the ght for independence; and to Britain 
as an alternative model of parliamentary government and a leading power 
of the Entente, although this link was far less obvious. In this subsection, 
we shall analyse how, in debating the proposed parliamentary sovereignty, 
the Finns saw the implications of the war, the Russian Revolution, the 
revolutionary language of the class struggle and the dierent international 
models for the Finnish constitution.
Owing to the geographical distance of the battleelds, the First World 
War had touched Finland only indirectly, so that it was not so generally seen 
as such a decisive factor as in the countries of comparison. Yrjö Mäkelin, the 
Social Democrat Chairman of the Constitutional Committee, nevertheless 
addressed the matter from a Marxist perspective – in a situation when 
up to 50,000 Russian soldiers, Finnish workers and workers’ guards had 
demonstrated in Helsinki against the war and counter-revolution and the 
revolutionary initiative in Petrograd was generally believed to be shiing to 
the Bolsheviks.863 Mäkelin described how the Finnish people, too, had been 
forced to work without proper compensation to support the ‘imperialistic’ 
war, and the poorest had paid a high price both materially and physically. e 
time for the proletariat to pay imperialism back had arrived, thanks to the 
Russian Revolution.864 Such formulations resembled Russian revolutionary 
discourse especially in its Bolshevist form, which sought to turn the war 
into a civil war and an international class struggle rather than that of the 
863 Työmies, ‘Suuri mielenosoituskulkue eilen’ and ‘Mielenosoituspäiwä Pietarissa’, 
2 July 1917; Nyström 2013, 137, 139.
864 VP, Yrjö Mäkelin, 10 July 1917, 878.
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more patriotic Mensheviks865 or the cooperative views of the Labour Party 
in Britain and the Majority Social Democrats in Germany or Sweden. e 
Bolsheviks had made a strong impression in a recent party convention of the 
Social Democrats, and the joint demonstrations had reinforced discursive 
transfers. e physical reality of the eects of the wartime ination reinforced 
Mäkelin’s interpretation, and protests resulting from the shortages were 
emerging.866 e pattern of protest was not so dierent from the situation in 
Sweden, but there was no regular police force in Finland, and the majority 
party in the parliament was employing an openly Marxist discourse.
e right rejected Mäkelin’s revolutionary language in clear terms. 
According to Emil Schybergson (Swedish People’s Party) – a leading banker 
and Germanophile – the fate of the Finnish people would be determined 
by the result of the war and the following peace treaty and not by some 
revolution.867 Eirik Hornborg, who had undergone military training in 
Germany as one of the so-called ‘Jägers’, fought on the eastern front and 
served as the head of the press section of the Finnish oce in Berlin, 
rejected revolution and counted likewise on the goodwill that the Finns 
would encounter among the negotiators aer the war.868 Such comments 
reected a belief in a German victory that would open the way to Finnish 
(internal) independence. Many members in the conservative Finnish Party, 
too, wanted to wait and see. 
By contrast, Santeri Alkio, the leader of the Agrarian League, emphasised 
the unique possibility for Finns to determine their future and realise 
independence and hence urged the parliament to pass the act. Referring 
implicitly to Woodrow Wilson’s policy of self-determination, Alkio foresaw 
the rise of national ideologies among most small European nations aer the 
war; in his view, the Finns should express theirs early, while the war was still 
continuing.869 Alkio did not view the war as a ght over democracy: Finland 
already had universal surage, and it was unclear whether Germany or the 
Entente would best advance the cause of Finnish democracy. Only Social 
Democrat speakers took up the ideological aspect of the war, identifying 
with the understanding of radical Marxists, if not Bolsheviks, that the war 
should be turned into a revolution in which the proletariat would crush 
imperialism. Most Finnish MPs actually viewed the war as a chance for the 
Finns to liberate themselves – as a nation and perhaps socially as well.
e Finnish discussion focused on the ideologically charged concept 
of revolution rather than on the war and its political implications. e 
geographical vicinity of Petrograd and the presence of Russian troops 
brought a revolutionary atmosphere to Helsinki more immediately than to 
any capital outside the Russian Empire. Most non-socialist Finns still viewed 
865 Pipes 1992, 382; Zetterberg 2000, 331, 337; Rasmussen 2014, 394.
866 Haapala 2010a, 24–5.
867 VP, Emil Schybergson, 10 July 1917, 886. 
868 VP, Eirik Hornborg, 10 July 1917, 887; Such trust in the Western powers was 
questioned by Karl Harald Wiik in view of the fate of Belgium in the war. VP, 10 
July 1917, 894–5.
869 VP, Santeri Alkio, 10 July 1917, 890–1.
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the Revolution as a Russian rather than a Finnish event, but its inuence 
was nevertheless felt, and suspicions of an attempted revolution at home 
were increasing.870 Mäkelin’s language suggests that the notion of an ongoing 
international revolution had been adopted in socialist circles. However, the 
developments in Petrograd were dicult to interpret owing to the linguistic 
gap and the dual nature of the Russian revolutionary government, with both 
a committee of the Duma and a soviet of workers and soldiers claiming 
executive power. Tension between the two holders of power caused confusion, 
particularly as the dualism was extended to the local level,871 including the 
representatives of the Russian power in Helsinki.872 e Finnish Social 
Democrats tended to duplicate this duality. Lenin’s return to Petrograd 
in April 1917 increased the tension further: Lenin refused to support the 
Provisional Government and called for the introduction of a soviet republic 
as soon as the Bolsheviks won majorities in the soviets. A propaganda 
campaign emphasising the need for immediate reforms, class antagonism, 
the prospect of a civil war and the vision of the Russian Revolution as the 
forerunner of a pan-European revolution was launched. All the socialists 
in Russia accused ‘the bourgeoisie’ of counterrevolutionary intentions 
– no matter what the non-socialist parties were doing – and contrasted 
‘democracy’ with ‘the bourgeoisie’. Such revolutionary categorisations into 
true revolutionaries and the bourgeoisie had found their way into the 
Finnish parliament as well, reinforcing similar expressions of class hatred in 
Finnish Social Democratic agitation. e Bolsheviks may have held only a 
small minority in the Congress of Soviets,873 but they dominated the Russian 
contacts of the Finnish socialists and provided the clearest revolutionary 
message. is was reinforced by general Russian socialist discourse and the 
traditions of Finnish socialist parlance. 
By July 1917 some Finnish Social Democrats believed that a revolution 
could be expected soon in Britain, Germany and Sweden,874 and many 
thought that the Bolsheviks would take over power in Petrograd, when the 
demonstrations turned into an uprising. Communication between Petrograd 
and Helsinki was not without its problems, however, and misleading 
information, some of it purposely disseminated, was rife owing to the chaos. 
During the nal debate on parliamentary sovereignty, many Finnish socialists 
believed in a Bolshevik victory as their organ had just published ‘a piece 
of secure information’ that the Provisional Government had fallen, though 
details were still lacking.875 e Provisional Government nevertheless soon 
crushed the uprising, and Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders were forced to 
870 Alapuro 2003, 540.
871 Zetterberg 2000, 335, 337.
872 Upton 1980, 52–3.
873 Soikkanen 1961; Polvinen 1987, vol. 1, 8; Pipes 1992, 407; Wade 2000, 74–5, 80; 
Zetterberg 2000, 339–40.
874 Soikkanen 1975, 208.
875 Työmies, ‘Wenäjän wäliaikainen hallitus kukistunut’, 17 July 1917; on the 
following day, the news was that capitalist ministers had resigned in Russia. 
Työmies, ‘Taistelu hallituswallasta Wenäjällä’, 18 July 1917.
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go into hiding to Finland,876 which led to the intensication of transnational 
contacts with some Finnish socialists.877 Contacts between Finland and 
Russia were numerous, with activists travelling between the capitals, and 
they led to reinforced transfers of revolutionary language from Petrograd to 
Helsinki, even though these did not necessarily make for common interests 
or even a proper understanding of the state of aairs in the other country. 
Such transfers of revolutionary language have received fairly little attention 
in Finnish historical research, in which the Social Democrats have rather 
been presented as acting out of patriotic motives and any discussion of the 
multiple reasons for the Civil War has tended to be overshadowed by the 
treatment of its violence and victims. 
e German connection also mattered, despite the war. e concept 
of revolution as used in the programme of the Finnish Social Democratic 
Party had been borrowed from the manifestos of German Marxists. e 
Finnish socialists tended to adopt the interpretations of the more radical 
of these leist groups, who were ready to use the parliament mainly as 
a  forum for socialist agitation provided that the class struggle was also 
fought simultaneously on the streets. However, such a theory did not help 
to determine whether the time of a socialist revolution was at hand and the 
party should actively participate in it or just go on waiting. Yrjö Mäkelin 
– the Chairman of the Constitutional Committee – was in favour of active 
revolutionary action,878 which inuenced his parliamentary oratory when 
the future of the Finnish polity was being dened. 
By July, for the majority of the Finnish Social Democrats, the Provisional 
Government no longer represented a true revolution, and they believed 
that the initiative was moving to the Bolsheviks, who seemed prepared to 
allow the socialist parliament in Finland to extend its powers.879 According 
to Mäkelin, the Finns, unable to trust the leaders of the Russian Revolution, 
needed extensive independence to ensure that ‘the achievements of the 
revolution could at least partly be made permanent’. Independence and 
parliamentary sovereignty would enable an intensied class struggle and the 
establishment of reasonable conditions for the working class.880 Alexandra 
Kollontai and Jukka Rahja – the former a constant advocate of ‘civil war’ 
as the proper form of class struggle, an opponent of ministerial socialism 
and a critic of all cooperation with the bourgeoisie, the latter a Finn who 
876 Kirby 1976, 104–105; Ketola 1987, 233; Ketola 1990, 98; Pipes 1992, 421; 
Zetterberg 2000, 340–1; Wade 2000, 183. In August 1917, Lenin was back in 
Finland in hiding and working on his manuscript on State and Revolution, which 
recommended the destruction of ‘bourgeois’ and ‘bureaucratic’ institutions. 
Pipes 1992, 468–9.
877 See Ketola 1987, 286, on K. H. Wiik’s contacts with Lenin in late summer 1917, 
and 327 on party contacts with the Bolsheviks in Helsinki and Petrograd.
878 Upton 1980, 16–17; see Jörke & Llanque 2016, 266–8, on Karl Kautsky’s 
instrumental ideas on parliament, Eduard Bernstein on limitations to the 
majority principle and calls for a separation of powers and Rosa Luxemburg on 
the multi-sited class struggle and the rejection of bourgeois parliamentarism.
879 Ketola 1987, 147.
880 VP, Yrjö Mäkelin, 2 July 1917, 689.
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had been agitating to promote Bolshevism since 1903 – had made the 
same points in their meetings with Finnish socialists. ey had agitated for 
revolution in accordance with Lenin’s instructions, dazzling many Finnish 
Social Democrats and actively inuencing the decisions of the party. In 
a party convention in June, Kollontai had successfully pressurised the le 
of the party into joining the Zimmerwald International (which represented 
socialist internationalism as the Bolsheviks understood it) and thereby 
supporting the dissemination of the Bolshevik version of the Revolution 
in the hope of continued Bolshevik support for Finnish independence. 
Kollontai’s personality and knowledge of Finnish evidently had an eect 
here. e Social Democrats’ political discourse tended to be taken over by 
this revolutionary alternative, even though they continued to have diculties 
in understanding the dynamics of the Russian revolutionary debate and the 
limited extent of support for the Lenin and his circle in Petrograd.881 
In the same convention, the party also dened its stand on constitutional 
issues and ordered the majority in the Constitutional Committee to follow 
it.882 Lenin supported this development as he expected a Finnish revolution, 
when realised by the socialist parliament, to lead to a voluntary reunion with 
Russia. e Finnish Social Democratic Party, on the other hand, found itself 
emphasizing the class struggle to a degree unknown in its British, German 
and Swedish sister parties. Rejecting cooperation with the bourgeois groups, 
the party was ready to employ the entire arsenal of the Marxist discourse of 
the class struggle to give expression to popular discontent, as Anthony D. 
Upton has also concluded.883
On 3 July, the Congress of Soviets, ‘in accordance with the stand of 
the Finnish Social Democratic Party’, concluded that the Finnish question 
depended on ‘the victory of the Revolution’ in Russia. Alexandra Kollontai 
attended the meeting, describing an impending revolution in Finland and 
the strong ties between the Finnish and Russian proletariat.884 Here she 
was functioning as a political agent mediating discursive transfers in both 
directions. In the second reading of the act on parliamentary sovereignty, Yrjö 
Mäkelin accordingly described the current Finnish situation in revolutionary 
terms, presenting the Finnish dispute as a part of the Russian Revolution, 
which was about to turn into a global one. He saw counterrevolutionary 
tendencies emerging – from the Provisional Government885 and implicitly 
from the Finnish bourgeoisie – that might endanger the prospects that 
were being opened up by the Revolution. Hence the Finnish people should 
support ‘the Revolution and the liberty of Russia’ by allowing ‘the people 
themselves’ to decide as stipulated in the Power Act,886 which meant the 
Social Democratic majority of the parliament or the representatives of the 
881 Polvinen 1987, vol. 1, 71–2; Soikkanen 1975, 208–209; Rinta-Tassi 1986, 21, 49; 
Kirby 1986b, 114; Ketola 1987, 72–3, 80, 136–9, 146; Soikkanen 1990, 87.
882 Soikkanen 1975, 216. 
883 Upton 1980, 17; Wade 2000, 193.
884 Polvinen 1987, vol. 1, 79; Ketola 1987, 158–9, 162.
885 On Soviet attitudes to the Provisional Government in Petrograd, see Pipes 1992, 
324.
886 VP, Yrjö Mäkelin, 10 July 1917, 879.
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proletariat. e Chairman of the Constitutional Committee of the Finnish 
parliament thus presented parliamentary sovereignty in Finland as a means 
to support the transnational revolutionary cause; this stand diering from 
Labour goals in Britain and Social Democratic ones in Germany and 
Sweden, where direct associations between domestic constitutional reforms 
and the Russian Revolution were avoided, with some far-le exceptions. 
Concepts in line with Bolshevik policies were taking over in the discourse of 
the Finnish Social Democratic Party. 
In the meantime, a constitutional compromise with the bourgeoisie 
remained out of the question. Mäkelin used the revolutionary situation 
in Russia and its extension to Finland to put pressure on the bourgeois 
parties, implying that revolutionary times meant standing next to a barrel of 
gunpowder which might explode as a result of a seemingly harmless spark. 
e Social Democratic ‘youth’ of the country (excluded from voting by the 
24-year age limit) should prepare to defend the cause of the people together 
with the party in the spirit of popular socialism:887
Freedom! Let the long-lasting slavery come to an end. Let the chains so long 
carried by our people loose their hold. Let the era of free work and action, longed 
for from generation to generation, begin. Let there be a Finland free in her own 
aairs to emerge side by side with a Russia aiming at freedom. 
Mäkelin’s revolutionary declaration, which was primarily addressed to 
audiences outside the parliament,888 produced a parliamentary debate on 
a reformulated bill in the aermath of the decision of the Congress of Soviets 
to support the extension of Finnish autonomy. e Social Democrats were 
evidently aiming at ensuring the implementation of reforms by joining the 
Russian Revolution.
e Social Democrat prime minister Oskari Tokoi, too, viewed the 
Russian Revolution as the creator of ‘a new free Russia’ and as a factor 
that would transform Finland.889 ‘e great revolution’ was expanding 
and the Finns should participate in this ‘revolutionary age’. Some news 
already suggested that the Bolshevik uprising in Petrograd might fail, 
but Tokoi wanted to get the bill on parliamentary sovereignty through 
anyway,890 recognising the Petrograd Soviet as ‘the real representatives of 
the revolutionary Russian people’, dening the Power Act in revolutionary 
terms and declaring his all-party government, too, to be a revolutionary 
one, though one that acted within the Swedish-Finnish constitutionalist 
framework without manipulating parliamentary procedure as had been 
proposed by some Social Democrat leaders:891 
887 VP, Yrjö Mäkelin, 10 July 1917, 880. On similar ideas expressed in the party, see 
Ketola 1987, 197 and the discussion of Ehrnrooth 1992 in section 2.4.
888 A version of the speech was printed in Työmies, ‘Suomen korkeimman 
hallintowallan siirtäminen eduskunnalle’, 12 July 1917.
889 VP, Oskari Tokoi, 12 June 1917, 505. 
890 Cf. the determination of the Rump Parliament to elect a king despite the fall of 
Germany in October 1918, discussed in section 6.4.
891 VP, Oskari Tokoi, 17 July 1917, 1033. On Petrograd, see Ketola 1987, 194, 203, 
212, and Ketola 1990, 98; Wade 2000, 182–3.
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is decision, […], is a part of the revolution, one part of the great revolution 
which is now taking place, part of a revolution which, it has been proposed, should 
be carried out, so to speak, according to the constitution. I, as a representative of 
the revolutionary government, have no right to become an obstacle in the way 
of the revolution.
e Finnish constitutional debate of 1917 diered fundamentally from those 
in Britain, Germany and Sweden in that the Prime Minister was associating 
himself with the radicalising Russian Revolution though still asserting – in 
accordance with the decisions of the Social Democratic parliamentary 
group – that his government was carrying out the revolution constitutionally 
through the parliament. In the party organ, which printed Tokoi’s speech 
and only reviewed opposing views very selectively, a socialist MP called 
Eetu Salin declared that the vote involved the last ght between the capitalist 
class – the internal enemy – and the unprivileged proletariat and the transfer 
of legislative power to the people.892 Subsequently, the paper declared in 
its editorial that ‘the big bourgeoisie’ had lost the battle.893 While winning 
support from their radical supporters and the pro-parliamentary Agrarians, 
the Social Democratic policy alienated the legalistically constitutionalist 
right, who opposed the extension of the Revolution to Finland and preferred 
a cautious policy aimed at maintaining the established political order in the 
country.
More revolutionary discourse followed from the Swedish-speaking 
Social Democrat K. H. Wiik, who had attended a meeting of the Executive 
Committee of the Congress of Soviets in Petrograd and did not hesitate to 
announce this in the Finnish parliament.894 is importer of revolutionary 
discourse, with his contacts with Lenin and Kollontai and experience 
in negotiating with various Russian revolutionary groups,895 spoke for 
cooperation with the representatives of ‘Russian democracy’896 and ‘the 
revolutionary Russian people’ on the streets of Petrograd, i.e. the Bolsheviks 
rather than the Provisional Government.897 Wiik bypassed the fact that there 
were many on the Russian le, too, who did not support the sovereignty 
of the Finnish parliament in the proposed form.898 Instead, he criticised 
the parliament for its ineective resistance to Russian imperialism and 
reluctance to advance social reforms. 
In Social Democratic discourse, the Russians were carrying out ‘the 
most glorious revolution in the world’.899 Edvard Hänninen-Walpas – whom 
892 Työmies, ‘Mistä kysymys’, 18 July 1917.
893 Työmies, ‘Eduskunta julistautunut Suomen waltiowallan omistajaksi’, 20 July 
1917.
894 Ketola 1987, 192–3.
895 Polvinen 1987, vol. 1, 22; Upton 1980, 81; Ketola 1987, 79.
896 It is worth noting the association between the Bolsheviks and democracy, which 
Wiik had adopted in Petrograd.
897 VP, Karl Harald Wiik, 17 July 1917, 1021.
898 Ketola 1987, 183–4, 212.
899 VP, Konrad Lehtimäki, 17 July 1917, 1031.
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Alexandra Kollontai considered the leader of the Finnish leist socialists900 
– accused the Finnish ‘bourgeois classes’ and ‘exploiting classes’ of fearing 
that the Social Democratic majority was aiming at a socialist revolution 
through the extension of the powers of the parliament. His interpretation was 
that the bourgeoisie aimed at preventing the reform and the revolution by 
ignoring the parliament, which had been elected by the Finnish people.901 In 
other words, they would be acting as counter-revolutionaries. As the editor-
in-chief of Työmies, the organ of the Social Democratic Party, Hänninen-
Walpas had long been propagating an uncompromising doctrine of class 
struggle902 while nevertheless also recognising the parliamentary way as 
a strategy for the advancement of reform.903 Disappointment with the results 
of the seemingly radical parliamentary reform of 1906 and universal surage, 
the Social Democrat parliamentary majority of 1917, Bolshevik inuence, 
support for the Social Democratic policy received from the Bolsheviks and 
the ongoing Bolshevik uprising in Petrograd caused Hänninen-Walpas 
to adopt increasingly revolutionary rhetoric in which he contrasted the 
socialist revolution with the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.
e class struggle played a considerably stronger role in the discourse of 
the Finnish Social Democrats than it did in the countries of comparison; this 
was a result of a combination of a tradition of violent class struggle rhetoric 
and contacts with the Russian revolutionary discourse. e language of 
class was not the sole province of the Social Democrats, however: it was 
used by all parliamentary groups, which to some extent reects the fact that 
class dierences had been acerbated by the socio-economic circumstances. 
However, it was essentially manifested in a discourse of class confrontations 
that had been radicalised as a reaction on both sides of the ideological 
divide in Finland. Similar class dierences, reinforced by the everyday 
realities of the war, existed elsewhere, but they did not lead to such a erce 
discursive confrontation in the parliaments. e Finnish radical socialists 
were tempted to adopt Lenin’s ideas of the class war as a civil war and 
distance themselves from parliamentary cooperation in the expectation of 
a revolution.904 Finnish society was discursively divided into two opposite 
groups: the socialists presenting themselves as a party of the working class 
(the people proper), and the ‘bourgeois’ parties manifesting a developed 
class consciousness as property-owners. e use of the language of class by 
both sides deepened the realities of the social divisions at the local level, 
emphasised by Pertti Haapala,905 and certainly in the parliament, too.
e legitimacy of the political system was also wavering as a result of 
questions about the fairness of the observation of law and parliamentary 
rules. In the introduction of the bill, Prime Minister Tokoi had already 
argued that ‘the classes holding power have followed the forms and literal 
900 Ketola 1987, 142.
901 VP, Edvard Hänninen-Walpas, 17 July 1917, 1055.
902 Upton 1980, 17.
903 Ehrnrooth 1992, 185.
904 See Winkler 1999, 4; cf. Hentilä & Hentilä 2016, 100.
905 Haapala 2010a, 30.
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letter of the law’ and held to the established order in ways that had aggravated 
the workers.906 Such an attitude caused the right and the centre to conclude 
that Tokoi did not respect law and order and was unwilling to take measures 
to stop violence at the local level and the exertion of extra-parliamentary 
pressure on bourgeois MPs. As a consequence, any possibilities for consensus 
and compromise between the government parties were fast disappearing.907 
e rst minister’s parlance produced on one side a more radical class 
discourse and on the other legalistic defensive arguments as a reaction. e 
Social Democrat contemplations of bypassing the Parliament Act in order to 
get their will through clearly weakened trust in the system. 
e debate also exhibited a transnational discursive construction of 
opponents (a phenomenon familiar from Sweden). Yrjö Mäkelin, the 
Chairman of the Constitutional Committee, with his background as an 
agitator and journalist, pointed to representatives of ‘the international 
reactionary class’ among ‘the upper-class groups’ in the Finnish parliament.908 
In the opinion of the futurist writer Konrad Lehtimäki and also of a farmer 
called Antti Juutilainen, who was a representative of the Agrarians, the 
opposition to parliamentary sovereignty demonstrated that the Finnish 
upper class was ‘antiquated’, unable to learn from experience, having lost 
their previous intellectual leadership and failing to understand the interests 
of the lower classes and to thereby full their responsibilities to the people. 
e Finnish right was advocating ‘ultra-traditionalist reactionary views’ 
and ‘notions that will be removed from the stage’ since ‘new notions will 
denitely replace them’.909 All this reected a Russian revolutionary concept 
of the people proper as opposed to the educated classes. By July, the divisions 
in the Finnish parliament were interpreted as constituting a social (socialist) 
revolution, with the prospects for future equality and liberty being opposed 
by reactionary stagnation. e confrontation over parliamentary sovereignty 
was explained as being a result of ‘class dierences’,910 with the bourgeoisie 
appearing as the enemy of the workers.911 e speaker, Evert Huttunen, who 
was a journalist, had participated in Bolshevik meetings and led a delegation 
to the Congress of Soviets only a week earlier, thus acting concretely as an 
historical body importing discourse from Petrograd. Edvard Hänninen-
Walpas likewise repeated the accusations against ‘the reactionary leaders of 
the bourgeois classes’.912 
e ‘class interests’ of bureaucrats who were in danger of losing their 
power were also criticised by the anti-elitist and anti-capitalist but non-
socialist Agrarian League which aimed at the abolition of class boundaries.913 
906 VP, Oskari Tokoi, 12 June 1917, 508.
907 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Den nuvarande senaten och laglösheten’, 14 June 1917; 
Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Senaatin warapuheenjohtajan uusin lausunto’, 14 June 1917.
908 VP, Yrjö Mäkelin, 10 July 1917, 880.
909 VP, Antti Juutilainen, 10 July 1917, 907–9; Konrad Lehtimäki, 10 July 1917, 909.
910 VP, Evert Huttunen, 10 July 1917, 904; Rinta-Tassi 1986, 31.
911 is is what Evert Huttunen had said to the Congress of Soviets on 3 July. 
Huttunen’s newspaper Työ [Work] agitated Bolshevik ideas. Ketola 1987, 162.
912 VP, Edvard Hänninen-Walpas, 17 July 1917, 1055.
913 Maalaisliiton ohjelma, 1914.
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Santeri Alkio rejected both capitalist exploitation and socialist doctrines of 
a class struggle, being concerned about the rise of ‘class feeling’ and ‘class 
power’ among the socialist parliamentary majority.914 MPs from the right 
responded, likewise using the language of class antagonism, something 
that rarely happened in the other parliaments, though visible in the 
argumentation of the Swedish Right. Emil Schybergson (Swedish People’s 
Party) criticised the Social Democrats for denying the sacrices made by the 
upper classes on behalf of the Finnish nation.915 Georg Rosenqvist (Swedish 
People’s Party), a Professor of Dogmatics, complained about Finland being 
ruled at a decisive moment in history by ‘a senate of one class’.916 is 
reected the deteriorating legitimacy of parliamentary government among 
reform-minded bourgeois circles as well, Rosenqvist having previously 
sympathised with the reform demands of the workers. Such feelings added 
to a readiness to turn from parliamentary to extra-parliamentary methods 
on both sides. When Kaarle Rantakari (Finnish Party, a defector from the 
Social Democrats) lamented the fact that ‘class hatred’ had been eectively 
propagated in Finland for several years, the Social Democrats responded by 
accusing the propertied classes of precisely such agitation.917 Earlier Marxist 
discourse was reinforced by revolutionary discursive models imported 
from Petrograd, which removed any chances of compromise. e concrete 
context of these expressions of class hatred was the gradually worsening 
food crisis. Radical Social Democrats, who had previously warned about 
bourgeois conspiracies, had been propagating class hatred constantly. eir 
imaginary accusations of conspiracies had been countered in equally hard 
terms by ‘the bourgeoisie’.918 A revolutionary class division had become 
discursively established.
Bourgeois MPs still remained uncertain about the implications of the 
Russian Revolution for Finland. Santeri Alkio of the Agrarians saw it as 
having removed not only ‘the former bureaucratic government of Russia 
but also its henchmen in this country’.919 Constitutionally it had brought 
about a  revolution in Finland as well.920 However, Alkio later emphasised 
the fact that there was no revolution going on in Finland: the Finns were 
simply making use of the revolutionary situation in Russia to reform 
their constitution in a revolutionary direction.921 e right deprecated the 
Revolution: Minister of Justice Antti Tulenheimo (Finnish Party) accused 
the Social Democrats of adopting a concept of revolution according to which 
‘power and not law’ tended to become dominant in the parliament.922 Kaarle 
Rantakari (Finnish Party), having rejected the socialist internationalism of 
his youth, said that the socialists mistakenly believed that the course of world 
914 VP, Santeri Alkio, 12 June 1917, 511.
915 VP, Emil Schybergson, 10 July 1917, 909.
916 VP, Gustaf Rosenqvist, 12 June 1917, 514.
917 Vares 2000.
918 Upton 1980, 96, 98.
919 VP, Santeri Alkio, 12 June 1917, 511.
920 VP, Santeri Alkio, 2 July 1917, 696–7.
921 VP, Santeri Alkio, 17 July 1917, 1036–7.
922 VP, Antti Tulenheimo, 2 July 1917, 680; 17 July 1917, 1006.
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history had changed as a consequence of a single revolution and that there 
was a  revolution going on in Finland rising from local circumstances.923 
ey had been possessed by the spirit of revolution, interpreting acts of 
violence around the country as reections of their supposed revolution.924 
Onni Talas (Young Finns), a Professor of Administrative Law, pointed out 
that such a belittling of violence made it impossible for the bourgeois parties 
to accept Social Democratic policies.925 Eirik Hornborg (Swedish People’s 
Party) accused the Social Democrats of having combined the question of 
independence with their ideological goals of social and domestic political 
revolution, forcing the other political groups either to oppose or to support 
both. is linkage was unfair given that many Finnish members of the right 
held views that ‘in a European parliament’ (obviously the Prussian Landtag, 
which had recently questioned parliamentarisation) would have been 
regarded as leish.926 
In addition to Russia, political ferment in the established political 
models of other countries was also referred to, albeit selectively. References 
to contemporary Sweden, as opposed to the eighteenth-century Swedish 
constitutions, were rare in the Finnish constitutional debates. is reects 
the intellectual distance between the countries in the late 1910s,927 though 
there had been reports of a ‘revolutionary movement in Sweden’928 and the 
threat of a general strike929 during the hunger and reform demonstrations 
of the spring there. Nor did the other Scandinavian countries or the 
Anglo-American world appear as objects of comparison when a major 
step in parliamentarisation was debated in the Finnish parliament. e 
conventional view remained that parliamentarism was only suited to 
the specic circumstances of Britain.930 Wilsonian ideas of national self-
determination were not taken up either, though Santeri Alkio justied 
the Finns’ demands for liberty as ‘a civilised people’ (a highly Fennoman 
concept) by emphasising the Finnish struggle for freedom against both 
Swedish and Russian suppression.931 
e Finnish constitutional debaters rather looked to Germany, an old 
exemplar for the right, which seemed to be doing well in the war. e 
German model appealed to most educated MPs who, independently of 
their party aliation, viewed German culture as closely related to Finnish, 
whereas few regarded the Entente in a positive light.932 e success of the 
German war eort against Russia and the links of Finnish activists striving 
923 VP, Kaarle Rantakari, 10 July 1917, 897; 17 July 1917, 1022–3.
924 VP, Ernst Nevanlinna, 12 June 1917, 515.
925 VP, Onni Talas, 12 June 1917, 516.
926 VP, Eirik Hornborg, 10 July 1917, 887–8.
927 Ihalainen 2015.
928 Työmies, ‘Wallankumousliike Ruotsissa’, 28 April 1917.
929 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Socialdemokratiska demonstrationer i Stockholm’, 8 June 
1917.
930 Professor of Roman Law Rabbe Axel Wrede (Swedish People’s Party) in the 
Constitutional Committee. Lindman 1968, 91.
931 VP, Santeri Alkio, 12 June 1917, 510.
932 Upton 1980, 33.
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for independence with Germany supported the prevailing positive image of 
its being a well-ordered state. Finnish juridical discourse was traditionally 
closely connected with that of Germany,933 as was discourse in most academic 
elds. Kaarle Rantakari, the leading agitator of the Finnish Party, presented 
the German model as an ideal one: it had been created by ‘the most organised’ 
and ‘the bravest people in Europe and at present in all the world’ and was 
therefore admired even by the enemies of Germany.934 Prussian nineteenth-
century history provided a working model for building a new state, being 
based on discipline and order, austerity and the strong and centralised 
power of the state. Since German unication, the Reich and the German 
people had followed the Prussian model at all levels (the rising criticism of 
Prussianism in the Reichstag being ignored). e Finns, too, should adopt 
a similar constitution that would overcome party government, promote 
industry, austerity and the right kind of discipline and lead to success, as 
was being demonstrated by the Germans in the war.935 is German model 
was to be contrasted essentially with the Russian order, which had already 
been regrettably inuential in Finland.936 Rantakari’s comparison with 
Germany went further, turning into a defence of strong executive power and 
a criticism of parliamentarism based the experiences of das tolle Jahr of 1848 
and referring ironically to the ‘bustle’ and ‘elegant parliamentary speeches’ 
in the Paulskirche Parliament: when the parliament failed to unify Germany, 
the Prussian government had done so with methods that earned the respect 
of the German people.937 e German model was explicitly used to speak for 
the maintenance of the established Gustavian constitution in Finland with its 
emphasis on the government over the parliament. Such openly ideological 
interpretations of the German constitution were not made by the Swedish 
right, who were constantly accused by the le of defending the established 
order in alliance with Prussianism. e Finnish right, by contrast, did not 
hide its admiration of Prussianism. 
e Finnish le was provoked by such talk.938 Frans Rantanen presented 
the German militarism of the day as being equally as tragic as that 
witnessed in the irty Years’ War – the historical analogy referred to the 
alliance between Sweden and the German Protestants. In both situations, 
the Germans mistakenly believed that social and economic development 
could be determined through the use of violence.939 e news from Berlin, 
though even more fragmented than that from Petrograd, suggested that the 
Social Democrats and the centrist parties were challenging the war policies, 
calling for an electoral reform in Prussia and winning concessions from the 
Kaiser; even Prussian militarists were thus showing a willingness to allow 
democratisation. e Finnish right, by contrast, admired Frederick William 
933 Pulkkinen 2003, 243.
934 VP, Kaarle Rantakari,17 July 1917, 1022–3. 
935 VP, Kaarle Rantakari, 17 July 1917, 1023.
936 VP, Kaarle Rantakari, 17 July 1917, 1023.
937 VP, Kaarle Rantakari, 17 July 1917, 1024–5.
938 VP, Helenius-Seppälä, 17 July 1917, 1028. 
939 VP, Frans Rantanen, 17 July 1917, 1029.
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IV, a Prussian king who had rejected the imperial throne when it was 
oered to him by the revolutionary Frankfurt Parliament. But he, too, had 
in the end been forced to recognise constitutional monarchy. According to 
Rantanen, ‘in Germany, too, the social rule by the people’ (yhteiskunnallinen 
kansanvalta, die Soziale Demokratie, which can also be translated simply as 
‘social democracy’, implying the rule by the workers) would be realised in 
the near future.940 is reected a strong transnational awareness among the 
Finnish socialists of the German situation and can be characterised as an 
‘adapting translation’.941 e German Social Democratic example mattered, 
particularly as it supported the view that the world revolution was also 
making progress in more developed countries; that the Kautskyist moment 
had arrived; and that the Finnish socialists were bound to participate in 
this transnational revolution. Rantanen’s choice of words reinforced the 
assumption of the synonymity of ‘social democracy’ and ‘parliamentary 
democracy’, the ideological goals of the socialist party appearing as universal 
and exclusive of other forms of parliamentarism and democracy. No sister 
party in Britain, Germany or Sweden dened its ideology as identical 
with parliamentary democracy in the sense of the rule by the workers, 
which reected the inuence of the party’s unique majority position, the 
developments in confrontational rhetoric and the transnational transfers 
of Russian revolutionary discourse on Finnish Social Democracy. Both the 
concept of class and that of democracy had become dened along Russian 
revolutionary lines that sounded in non-socialist ears as Bolshevism.
Rantakari’s and Rantanen’s parallels between Germany and Finland 
are illustrative of the use of international comparisons in parliamentary 
constitutional debates in this and indeed any historical period: foreign 
examples are interpreted highly selectively in order to support particular 
goals in current domestic political struggles. ey by no means imply 
direct transfers between political cultures, but they do illustrate the relative 
importance of various foreign political cultures and oer ways to redene 
the prospective future of one’s own political community. e case of the 
Agrarian leader Santeri Alkio is illustrative of this context-bound nature of 
international comparisons. In summer 1917, Alkio joined the le in viewing 
the German model critically by speaking out for parliamentarisation and 
doubted the future of the Prussian system aer the war.942 In 1918, Alkio 
would, despite his republicanism, be sharing in the cultural admiration of 
Germany, while in 1919 he would look at the Western powers as models for 
organising a parliamentary democracy. 
3.4.3  International democracy or the vernacular ‘rule  
 by the people’?
‘Democracy’ had been discussed in Finland to some extent during the 
parliamentary reform of 1906,943 but the debate now became active when 
940 VP, Frans Rantanen, 17 July 1917, 1030.
941 Leonhard 2011, 256.
942 VP, Santeri Alkio, 17 July 1917, 1036.
943 Kurunmäki 2008, 364–5.
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the democratisation of government seemed a real possibility. When the 
parliament convened, Jaakko Mäki of the Social Democrats, a socialist 
agitator who had remigrated from the USA, called for ‘a new, more 
democratic form of government’ also for Finland.944 Here, as everywhere 
in the contemporary press, the vernacular term kansanvalta (the rule by 
the people) was used. When parliamentary sovereignty was rst discussed, 
Prime Minister Oskari Tokoi talked about ‘the new democratic Russia’ and 
its ‘democratic intentions’.945 e Finnish concept had slightly dierent 
connotations from those of the international concept of ‘democracy’, 
combining as it did notions of ethnicity, Finnishness and class. 
For the Social Democrats, the connotation of the rule by the common 
people or the workers as opposed to the upper classes was central; hence 
the above-mentioned attack by Yrjö Mäkelin, the Chairman of the 
Constitutional Committee on ‘a fear of the rule by the people’ among the 
bourgeoisie.946 For him, parliamentary sovereignty in the proposed form 
stood for the creation of a ‘Finland based on the rule by the people’, in 
which the working classes would rule in ways that would nd acceptance 
in revolutionary Russia. is explicitly dened democracy as the rule of 
the workers and more particularly the proletariat in the sense in which the 
term was used in Russian revolutionary and especially Bolshevik discourse. 
e uncompromising contrast between bourgeois rule as ‘exploitation’ 
and proletarian rule as ‘democracy’ was expressed in orthodox Marxist 
language:947
Where the bourgeoisie is in power, there are constant attempts to exercise 
exploitation and slavery as much as possible. But wherever the proletariat gains 
power, there not only one’s own freedom but the happiness and freedom of all 
peoples will be unceasingly advanced.
In the constantly mounting revolutionary fervour of July 1917, the cause 
of democracy was dened in Finnish Social Democratic discourse as 
being identical with that of the Social Democratic Party and its majority 
rule. is excluded the bourgeois parties (including the Agrarian League, 
which actually supported the Power Act) from cooperation in establishing 
democracy: only the socialist majority of the Finnish parliament were 
democrats. In a report in the Social Democratic organ, Työmies, Mäkelin 
was said to have emphasised the fact that ‘the Russian democracy’ and 
the Finnish Social Democrats were united in their goal to establish ‘global 
rule by the people’ (yleismaailmallinen kansanvalta), whereas on the other 
side they had a reactionary international948 – two internationalisms being 
typically set against each other.
944 VP, Jaakko Mäki, 10 April 1917, 12.
945 VP, Oskari Tokoi, 12 June 1917, 506.
946 VP, Yrjö Mäkelin, 2 July 1917, 687.
947 VP, Yrjö Mäkelin, 2 July 1917, 689.
948 Työmies, ‘Suomen korkeimman hallintowallan siirtäminen eduskunnalle’, 12 July 
1917.
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e resolution accepted by the Congress of Soviets in Petrograd, to which 
the Finnish Social Democrats referred, also addressed the question of ‘the 
Finnish democracy and especially Finnish Social Democracy’.949 Alexandra 
Kollontai, the most inuential intermediary between Bolshevist discourse 
and the Finnish socialists, had indeed urged ‘a distancing of the democracy 
of the workers from the domestic bourgeoisie both in Russia and Finland 
and the observance of the line of the class politics of the proletariat’.950 
is denition of democracy as the rule of the proletariat, borrowed from 
Russian revolutionary discourse, removed any possibilities of nding 
a  common or even compromise-seeking Finnish national discourse on 
democracy. e adoption of this discourse by the Finnish Social Democrats 
diers radically from the vague British concept of democracy, which Labour 
had not yet politicised, and from the Majority Social Democratic concepts 
of democracy in Germany and Sweden, which invited the Liberal Parties in 
these countries at least to participate in the construction of democracy. Even 
the Swedish far le was willing to join a common cross-party campaign 
for democracy, whereas the Finnish socialists now found themselves by 
international standards on the far le of revolutionary socialist discourse. 
Mäkelin’s notions of revolution and democracy might have been derived 
from Karl Kautsky, who has customarily been presented as the theorist who 
inspired the Finnish Social Democrats. In 1903 Mäkelin had employed 
Kautskyist thinking in emphasising the contrast between the rulers 
advancing their own interests and the lower orders who rejected institutions 
and laws.951 However, by 1917 Mäkelin’s views were more strongly inuenced 
by contemporary Russian revolutionary discourse than the works of remote 
German theorists, and in that discourse parliaments played a minor role. e 
Russian debate had long entertained a more radical concept of democracy 
than that of Social Democratic discourse in western and central Europe and 
had turned increasingly leist since the outbreak of the Revolution.952 
Ever since 1905 the Russian socialist parties had been struggling to 
control key concepts such as revolutsiia, demokratiia and proletarii, trying 
to monopolise their own understandings of them and ignoring alternative 
liberal and populist interpretations. e contrast between the workers and 
the peasants as the real ‘common people’ (narod), the ‘toilers’, the ‘mob’, the 
‘have-nots’ or ‘democracy’ with the ‘the bourgeoisie’ or the privileged classes 
had become evident well before 1917. All these words for the people were 
used interchangeably in Russian revolutionary discourse, and the exible 
concept of narod (comparable in some respects with the Finnish word kansa) 
was used to propagate a wide variety of visions for the future of society. By 
July 1917, even the boundaries of the working class had been more narrowly 
dened by the revolutionary Social Democrats in Petrograd, the rhetoric of 
a militant struggle between ‘us’ and ‘them’ was increasing, and the language of 
an irreconcilable class conict took over. Democracy no longer included all 
949 Polvinen 1987, vol. 1, 79.
950 Ketola 1987, 162.
951 Kettunen 2003, 189.
952 Gorham 2003, 7–9; Beuerle 2018.
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the people in a democratic republic but turned into an exclusive social term 
dividing the working population from the bourgeoisie. e implication was 
that democracy stood for the rule of the workers and essentially for the rule 
of the proletariat. Such a concept of democracy now dened the objectives of 
the revolution: Democracy stood for ‘democratic organisation’ as realised in 
soviets and for the ‘democratic forms’ of government provided by socialism. 
‘Revolutionary democracy’ in this sense meant the complete rejection of 
the ‘bourgeois’ state and all ‘bourgeois’ parties, which by denition could 
not be ‘democratic’. As a consequence, the alternative liberal understandings 
of democracy used within the Russian educated classes came to be totally 
excluded.953 e consequences of these exclusive denitions of the people 
and democracy for the revolutionary process not only in Russia but also in 
Finland were decisive, both before and during the Finnish Civil War.954 
As we have seen, this radically revolutionary and essentially Bolshevik 
understanding of democracy was transferred to Finnish discourse by trans-
nationally linked socialists, with Finnish MPs attending revolutionary as-
semblies in Petrograd and Bolshevik leaders visiting Helsinki. Furthermore, 
Finnish papers tended to translate Russian revolutionary speeches word 
for word. Mäkelin, too, excluded the bourgeois parties from cooperation 
in the construction of democracy: only the socialist majority represented 
true democrats. Long-lasting domestic agitation along the lines of orthodox 
Marxism,955 close transnational connections with Bolshevist discourse and 
a parliamentary majority made the Finnish Social Democrats’ concept of 
democracy exceptionally exclusive and divisive. rough uncompromising 
and universalist denitions and accusations that the Finnish bourgeoisie 
were counter-revolutionaries, the policy line of the Social Democrats be-
came associated by the Finnish bourgeois parties with that of the Bolshevik 
revolutionaries. 
Such discursive transfers from Petrograd to Helsinki and the historical 
contestability of concepts have received marginal attention in previous 
research on developments leading to the Finnish Civil War, in which 
structural explanations956 have been favoured and the inuence of Kautskyist 
953 Figes & Kolonickij 1999, 121–5, 188–9; Gorham 2003, 9, 25, 60. 
954 For terminology referring to the people and to soviets borrowed from Russia 
during the period of Soviet rule, see Rinta-Tassi 1986, 275–81; Borisova & Siro 
2014, 93. See also Haapala 1995, 235.
955 See, however, Kettunen 1986, 82, on the limits of the radicality of the Finnish 
labour movement.
956 Liikanen 1993. See Haapala 1995, 14, 223, 242, Haapala & Tikka 2013, 112–14 
and Haapala 2014 on structural explanations. According to Haapala, social 
confrontations contributed to the political crisis. e politicians themselves 
caused a political stalemate as a result of ‘political thought’ favouring party 
interests. Political attempts to solve questions of subsistence only led to the 
politicisation of these issues and to attempts to create a new order. In the 
parliament, the politicians quarrelled over interpretations of the constitution 
and accused each other of plans to stage a coup. Haapala 1992. Instead of merely 
blaming the parliament, it would be important to problematize the dynamics of 
political discourse by analysing language use empirically, particularly as Haapala 
suggests that it was political divisions rather than the economic situation that 
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theory on Finnish socialism emphasised. e sociologist Risto Alapuro 
– who prefers to compare Finland with the countries of Eastern Europe 
rather than with states that shared legal and representative traditions of the 
Swedish-Finnish kind – suggests that the impact of the Russian Revolution 
on the attempted class-based revolution in Finland happened through ‘the 
state’. According to Alapuro, the revolutionary situation followed from the 
crisis in Russia, which suddenly changed ‘the conditions of the contests 
for state power’ and, together with the character of the polity and the class 
structure, led the reluctant ‘non-revolutionary working-class movement 
into a revolution’.957 On the other hand, some within the movement had 
been expecting a Finnish revolution since 1905. e consideration of 
ideological discourses demonstrates the centrality, even if the ambiguity, of 
the concept of the revolution.958 Alapuro’s understanding of the reformist 
nature of the Finnish labour movement is not shared by Pauli Kettunen, 
though he, too, considers that the Finnish workers were not preparing 
a revolution.959 According to Alapuro, the Social Democratic Party saw itself 
as the leading advocate of the extension of democracy but its conception of 
revolution remained indenite and was not focussed on the class struggle 
in a revolutionary sense960 – a conclusion not supported by an analysis of 
parliamentary discourse in 1917. Alapuro concedes, nevertheless, that 
the proletarian nature of the Finnish Revolution may have followed from 
political events related to Russian history, allowing the Finnish socialists 
rst to enter the polity in 1907 and then allowing them to attempt a takeover 
without liberal support in 1917.961 
Seppo Zetterberg, on the other hand, has pointed to news from Russia 
suggesting that the political inuence of the Bolsheviks was rising and 
that they might soon seize power and continue to support the Finnish 
socialists.962 Pauli Kettunen and Osmo Rinta-Tassi have discussed the 
tendency of both Communists and Social Democrats to emphasise – aer 
the Civil War – the weakness of the links between the Finnish and Russian 
labour movements before the war, though actually the strengthening status 
of the Bolsheviks had played an important role, as had the tendency of some 
Social Democratic leaders to propagandistically instigate class hatred in 
explain the Civil War. Haapala & Tikka 2013, 121, also recognise the inuence 
of the ideological and political goals of the political leaders. Kekkonen 2016, 50, 
56, 332–4, recognises the debate on the extent of democracy and references to 
a possible civil war in 1917 but does not analyse them, emphasising structural 
explanations instead. On the neglect of the contemporary use of language and 
conceptualisations of democracy in political scientic structural analyses of 
political culture, see Kurunmäki 2012, 121–30.  
957 Alapuro 1988, 3–12, 16 (quote), 143 (quote); Alapuro 1990, 12, 20–1. 
958 Alapuro 2003, 537–41.
959 Kettunen 1986, 84, 89. 
960 Alapuro 1988, 150, 191; also Kettunen 1986, 80. On dierent approaches that 
have considered the eects of divisive class discourse on political action, see 
Soikkanen 1961.
961 Alapuro 1988, 196.
962 Zetterberg 1992, 29. 
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a Bolshevistic manner. is does not, of course, mean that Lenin’s ideas would 
have been understood and absorbed in full.963 An analysis of parliamentary 
discourse strongly supports the interpretation that Bolshevik-like parlance 
was already taking over the Finnish party in summer 1917.
Mäkelin continued using revolutionary denitions of democracy during 
the second reading of the Power Act bill on 10 July, calling the Representative 
Assembly of the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Soviets ‘the plenipotentiary 
representative’ of ‘Russian democracy’ and presenting the constitutional 
views of the Finnish Social Democrats as identical with its denitions. 
Mäkelin transnationalised the goals of both institutions by talking about 
‘endeavours to create a universal rule by the people’.964 Evert Huttunen – born 
in Ingria close to Petrograd, uent in Russian and hence a transnational link 
between Bolshevik revolutionary and Finnish political discourses965 – made 
the Social Democratic exclusive denition of democracy even more explicit 
by insisting that ‘the revolutionary democracy of Russia’ (or the Congress 
of Soviets) had always supported ‘the campaign for Finnish democracy (in 
this case Suomen demokratia, which underscored the identical nature of 
democracy and Social Democracy) against tsarism and the Russication 
policies of the Russian bourgeois imperialistic groups’.966 e soviets 
famously associated ‘revolutionary democracy’ with the lower classes 
preparing for a socialist revolution, which would become inevitable aer 
‘the bourgeoisie’ had betrayed the Revolution.967 According to Huttunen, 
the Congress had invited ‘the Finnish democracy and especially the Social 
Democracy to join forces with the Russian democracy to ensure the victory 
of the Russian Revolution’.968 Frans Rantanen insisted that a turn towards 
social democracy was to be expected in Germany as well.969 It is revealing 
of the expectations of a more radical revolution taking over in Russia 
that Matti Helenius-Seppälä (Christian Labour Party) and August Hyöki 
(Finnish Party) also saw ‘this same democracy’ as forming the core of the 
future constituent national assembly in Russia.970 e Petrograd soviets 
showed the way forward and were used by the Finnish Social Democratic 
parliamentary group to dene what democracy in Russia and in Finland 
was. e Bolsheviks of Petrograd had managed to take over the language of 
the Finnish Social Democratic parliamentary majority, describing it as ‘the 
963 Kettunen 1986, 80, note 40, 87, 90, 97; Rinta-Tassi 1986, 30–1, 33, 41.
964 VP, Yrjö Mäkelin, 10 July 1917, 878–9.
965 Polvinen 1987, vol 1, 62–3, 74; Rinta-Tassi 1986, 31; Ketola 1987, 79–80. anks 
to the fact that over 20,000 Finns were living in Petrograd, there were over 
600 Finnish members in the Bolshevik Party there. is group connected the 
Bolsheviks and the Finnish socialists, who might otherwise have been separated 
by cultural and linguistic dierences. Upton 1980, 85; Haapala 1995, 56.
966 VP, Evert Huttunen, 10 July 1917, 900; Polvinen 1987, vol. 1, 76.
967 Wade 2000, 66, 84.
968 VP, Evert Huttunen, 10 July 1917, 900. Notice a slight conceptual distinction 
here.
969 VP, Frans Rantanen, 17 July 1917, 1030.
970 VP, Matti Helenius-Seppälä, 10 July 1917, 905; August Hyöki, 10 July 1917, 907.
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legal representative of the workers of the Finnish people’ in a revolutionary 
sense.971 is implied that only they represented the people proper and that 
only they could constitute a democracy. 
is exclusive concept of democracy was used by the Finnish Social 
Democrats to draw conclusions about their political opponents. Kalle 
Suosalo questioned the intentions of the Finnish Party to advance the cause 
of the rule by the people and suggested that the Finnish right and centre 
did not recognise the Russian Revolution but had allied themselves with 
the counter-revolution.972 Only the Revolution (meaning the Bolshevik 
opponents of the Provisional Government in Russia) and that of the Social 
Democrats in Finland were true revolutions; their rivals were counter-
revolutionaries, ‘the Swedes of this parliament’, while the Finnish (oen 
Swedish-speaking) civil servants were presented as the most blatant 
defenders of class privileges and opponents of democracy.973 K. H. Wiik, 
responsible for the international relations of the Social Democrats, a friend 
Lenin and a publisher of his ideas, spoke about the common interests of ‘the 
Russian democracy’ (the Soviets) and ‘the Finnish democracy’, suggesting 
that ‘enemies of democracy’ were to be found in Finland as well:974 e 
Finnish bourgeoisie opposed the leadership of the people (as represented 
by the Social Democrats) instead of uniting with the people. As for ‘the 
international democracy’ that supported Finnish independence, it, too, was 
above all ‘the international Social Democracy’ that opposed imperialistic 
endeavours.975
is Social Democratic domination of the discourse on democracy le 
little space for alternative centrist or rightist denitions. As a result of its 
universalist and exclusive understanding of democracy, the policy of the 
Finnish Social Democratic Party became linked with that of the Bolshevik 
revolutionaries, which provoked opposition among the Finnish bourgeois 
parties, some of which had already been speaking in favour of the rule by the 
people for some time, though willing to retain the duality of government. 
e Social Democratic monopolisation of the concept also made them 
cautious about oering alternative bourgeois denitions of democracy. 
e language of democracy had been hijacked by the socialist majority of 
the Finnish parliament, in line with a common rhetorical practice among 
socialists,976 and this majority was giving it exclusive connotations inspired 
by the Bolshevik version of the Russian Revolution. is hijack had serious 
consequences as it prevented all compromise between the Social Democrats 
and the bourgeois parties until well aer the Civil War.
971 VP, Evert Huttunen, 10 July 1917, 901; cf. Ketola 1987, 81, for the situation in 
April.
972 VP, Kalle Suosalo, 2 July 1917, 700.
973 VP, Frans Rantanen, 17 July 1917, 1030; Edvard Hänninen-Walpas, 17 July 
1917, 1058. e same message was included in a declaration of the Reds at the 
beginning of the Civil War. Borisova & Siro 2014, 91, 94–5.
974 VP, Karl Harald Wiik, 10 July 1917, 894–5; Rinta-Tassi 1986, 31.
975 VP, Karl Harald Wiik, 10 July 1917, 895; 17 July 1917, 1021.
976 Previous examples are discussed in Pekonen 2014, 276–7 and 301–304.
204
3. The spring of democracy in 1917: The new constitutional scene
Among the leading non-socialist politicians, Santeri Alkio (Agrarians) 
had been the most consistent spokesman for democracy (in the vernacular 
form of ‘the rule by the people’) in the days of the parliamentary reform of 
1906. He still envisioned the future as one of democracy and considered that 
the right moment for constructing democracy was at hand: 977  
e future belongs to the rule by the people. But if that future is destroyed before 
the rule by the people has taken a stronger lead in this country than what we have 
at the moment, it is possible that the dreams of the realisation of the rule by the 
people in this country will not be fullled. 
What threatened the cause of democracy was not only opposition from the 
former ruling classes but also the class-based policies of the Social Democrats. 
Alkio opposed the Social Democrats’ amendments to the constitution as 
likely to lead to the nomination of (Socialist) ministers who were ready 
to ‘bow before the apparent rule by the people’; in his view, excessive 
subservience to a parliamentary majority might fail to serve the proper cause 
of the rule by the people.978 e interests of parliamentarism and democracy 
were not identical but needed to be reconciled so that an ideal balance 
might be attained. During the second reading, Alkio stated his belief that 
the soviets would take over in Petrograd, seeing them as representatives of 
‘Russian revolutionary democracy’ and as showing the way that the Finnish 
people should follow as opposed to other political forces in Russia.979 Alkio 
also referred to ‘international democracy (kansainvälinen demokratia), 
the inuence of which in the future settlement of European issues will be 
considerable’ and which would recognise Finnish independence,980 obviously 
having Wilsonian principles in mind. Even Russian Liberals such as Prince 
Lvov had recognised Russian democracy as the proper leader of ‘world 
democracy’,981 and the expected parliamentarisation in Germany could 
also be seen as part of the trend. Generally speaking, however, the concept 
of ‘world democracy’ received little attention in the Finnish parliament in 
comparison with the German and Swedish ones. Finnish politicians tended 
to view developments predominantly from a Finnish point of view.
e liberal Young Finns did not refer to the rule by the people in this 
context even though their platform had long presented democracy as its 
goal.982 Hufvudstadsbladet, the organ of the Swedish People’s Party, had 
recognised the representativeness of the parliament thanks to the realisation 
of democratic surage,983 but the party did not discuss democracy in these 
debates. Antti Tulenheimo of the Finnish Party, the minister responsible for 
juridical aairs, set out to dene proper democracy. Tulenheimo, well aware 
of German constitutional discourse, argued consistently for limiting the 
977 VP, Santeri Alkio, 12 June 1917, 511.
978 VP, Santeri Alkio, 2 July 1917, 698; also Hyvärinen 2003, 86.
979 VP, Santeri Alkio, 10 July 1917, 890.
980 VP, Santeri Alkio, 10 July 1917, 891.
981 Wade 2000, 60–1.
982 Liikanen 2003, 298.
983 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Ställningen och vårt folks plikt’, 18 March 1917.
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power of the parliament in relation to the ministry. It would be more in line 
with ‘the real rule by the people’ that the government should be able ‘to appeal 
to the people’ through new elections when it believed that the will of the 
majority of the parliament no longer corresponded with that of the people. 
In his view the Social Democrats were abusing the concept of democracy by 
describing any measures that were not to their liking as epäkansanvaltaista 
(opposed to the rule by the people or anti-democratic).984  e constitutional 
confrontations within the all-party government evidently concerned the 
very concept of democracy, with radical socialist and bourgeois conceptions 
countering each other and the Social Democrats trying to monopolise the 
discourse.
3.4.4  Defining the position of the people within  
 the Finnish polity 
e Social Democrats thus presented themselves as the sole advocates of 
the will of the Finnish people, while the bourgeois parties were sceptical of 
the (Social Democratic) parliamentary majority being capable of expressing 
the true will of the people: a re-elected parliament might communicate 
a popular will of another kind. is kind of debate on the popular will had 
long historical trajectories: early modern Sweden, then including Finland, 
had already seen the rise of a native tradition of appealing to the people 
by rival parties and even by monarchs.985 Appeals to the people had never 
been successfully monopolised by a single ideological grouping; rather they 
had been increasingly employed by numerous dierent political actors for 
a wide variety of purposes along with the rise of the notion of the sovereignty 
of the people, the emergence of the nation-state, the extension of popular 
representation and the popularity of constitutionalist political strategies.986 
e Finnish adult population had been given the vote in 1907, and 
the people had been activated by various parties to use that right, but the 
concrete involvement of the people in politics, especially in local government, 
had otherwise remained limited. e Social Democrats had nevertheless 
done their share to encourage their involvement. Oskari Tokoi, the prime 
minister, gave a highly positive and nationalistic characterisation of the 
political potential of the Finnish people, pointing out:987 
[T]he intention of the Finnish people and the Finnish parliament is the 
achievement of Finnish independence and freedom – an independence 
that corresponds with the esteem of the Finnish people among nations; that 
corresponds with the position which we as a civilised988 people must undoubtedly 
have in current society. 
984 VP, Antti Tulenheimo, 2 July 1917, 682; is argument may have arisen out of the 
fact that the Social Democrats had received their parliamentary majority with 
only 47.3 per cent of the votes. is had been recognized by the Social Democrats 
themselves, too. Lindman 1968, 11, 26.
985 Liikanen 2003, 266, 295; Ihalainen 2011; Ihalainen 2015.
986 Liikanen 203, 257–8, 302.
987 VP, Oskari Tokoi, 12 June 1917, 506.
988 Again in the Germanic sense of possessing Kultur.
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By the time of the nal debate on the Power Act, he had identied the will of 
the people with that expressed by the Social Democratic Speaker Kullervo 
Manner and by himself.989 e will of the people appeared as the highest 
authority, albeit one that was correctly interpreted by the socialist majority 
of the current parliament only. 
Popular, even nationalistic, rhetoric was heard also from Yrjö Mäkelin in 
a way that served the Social Democratic cause. Mäkelin admired a people 
who had – ‘despite long-standing oppression and persecution’ – been able to 
maintain ‘a clear understanding of the state’ and ‘built a state, developed it 
and created an original civilisation’.990 Within this people, however, ‘the lower 
classes constitute the core’,991 the Finnish people being dened as constituted 
essentially by the proletariat, not by all the inhabitants of the country, and 
as being represented by the Social Democrats. is corresponded with the 
Russian revolutionary concept of the people. Matti Airola spoke about 
‘a demand from among the deep ranks of the people forcefully supporting 
the Social Democratic group’, calling for the introduction of reforms without 
further postponement.992 Edvard Hänninen-Walpas greeted what he saw as 
the people having – despite bourgeois disinformation – obtained a proper 
understanding of their rights, which could now be realised through the 
parliament993 with its Social Democrat majority.
While the Social Democrats combined socialist and nationalist discours es, 
non-socialist MPs focused on the discourse of national self-determination and 
optimistically viewed the Finnish experience of democracy as a justication 
for independence. Ernst Nevanlinna of the Finnish Party appealed to ‘the 
maturity of the people with regard to liberty’ given that ‘our people have 
been one of the freest in the world in domestic issues’.994 e generally held 
but particularly rightist notion of a long native tradition of  (peasant) liberty 
was central: Nevanlinna called for the preservation of ‘the dearest national 
property that we possess, inherited from our fathers and preserved through 
the centuries’.995 His conclusion was that the Finnish people were mature 
in the aairs of the state and worthy of considerable self-determination’.996 
Gustaf Arokallio of the Young Finns echoed this view, concluding that ‘our 
naturally slow people has received sucient time to dene their opinions 
on the future activities of the state’.997 Several speakers from the Agrarian 
League, the party manifesto of which made extensive use of the concept 
‘citizen’ in order both to emphasise the activeness of the citizens and to build 
a political community,998 likewise agreed about the political maturity of the 
989 VP, Oskari Tokoi, 17 July 1917, 1033.
990 VP, Yrjö Mäkelin, 2 July 1917, 689.
991 VP, Yrjö Mäkelin, 2 July 1917, 699.
992 VP, Matti Airola, 12 June 1917, 516.
993 VP, Edvard Hänninen-Walpas, 17 July 1917, 1056.
994 VP, Ernst Nevanlinna, 17 July 1917, 1012.
995 VP, Ernst Nevanlinna, 17 July 1917, 1012; Ihalainen 2015.
996 VP, Ernst Nevanlinna, 17 July 1917, 1012.
997 VP, Gustaf Arokallio, 17 July 1917, 1013.
998 Stenius 2003, 351.
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Finnish nation. According to Juho Kokko, the Finns had been preparing 
for independence for centuries. anks to improved levels of education, the 
Finns were ‘a people that goes its own way, with an educated parliamentary 
institution’.999 
Condence in the people was high among both the Social Democrats 
and the Finnish-speaking bourgeoisie in the Finnish parliament in 
 summer 1917; the extension of the political independence of the country 
was a common goal, and the dispute concerned the means of achieving it. 
Disagreement about the role of the parliament in the expression of popular 
will was at the centre of this constitutional controversy. 
3.4.5  Prospects for a parliamentary Finland: opposing  
 Social Democratic and bourgeois views 
ere were also those who felt that they could not count on the maturity of 
the people and especially on the parliament as the way to determine the will 
of that people. e introduction of parliamentarism in the sense of the legally 
regulated political responsibility of the government to the parliament had 
already been demanded before and proposed by the Social Democrats in the 
inter-party discussions following the abdication of Nicholas II. e idea was 
then received with some caution among the bourgeois parties as no legislation 
guaranteeing such parliamentarism was, in their view, in force in any other 
country, but the majority of a committee on constitutional issues supported 
the introduction of parliamentary responsibility. In practical terms, the 
nomination of an all-party government implied that parliamentarism was 
recognised as the norm on the basis of which the relationship between of 
the parliament and the government should be regulated; at least the era of 
the bureaucratic governments of the tsarist regime was over. Oskari Tokoi 
emphasised the responsibility of his government to the parliament:1000 
[W]e do not have any other policy than the policy which the parliament has 
approved, and it is that policy that we will pursue. . . . And I put it very clearly 
that we do not have any other intentions than the fullment of the decisions and 
will of the parliament. . . . the government is . . . committed to be accountable 
and responsible to the parliament on all questions and actions. . . . And we are 
also always ready to resign our positions for the parliament to ll [i.e. appoint 
new ministers].
According to Tokoi, parliamentarism was already being practised. e 
majority of an extraordinary committee also agreed on the introduction 
of parliamentarism in the dra constitution in the sense of governmental 
responsibility, and the government agreed on the principle of parliamen-
tarism in May, a step that has been seen as being ahead of its time. Recent 
experiences of Russian-nominated ministers lacking the condence of the 
Finnish parliament facilitated the agreement on governmental responsibility 
despite the remaining existence of theoretical and party-political doubts. e 
999 VP, Juho Kokko, 17 July 1917, 1048.
1000 VP, Oskari Tokoi, 20 April 1919, 48–9; Lindman 1968, 20, 37–8, 63, 91.
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adopted formulation was close to that of the French ird Republic, which 
is a measure of the considerable extent of the planned parliamentarism.1001
ese agreements did not remove doubts about how the Social 
Democrats, reluctant to cooperate with the bourgeois parties, understood 
parliamentarism. Experiences from negotiations in the all-party government 
raised suspicions about their dedication to parliamentary government. 
eir view of the parliament as merely instrumental in the class struggle 
was reinforced in the party convention of June 1917: participation in the 
government of a capitalist country (which had previously been rejected for 
good) was presented as part of the current tactics, but the party reserved the 
right to either support or reject the government as best served the interests 
of the workers. e simultaneous commitment for the government and 
opposition to it, together with the violent acts committed by Social Democrat 
supporters at the local level, made it dicult for moderates to pursue 
cooperation across the ideological division.1002 Finnish parliamentarism had 
run into a deep crisis before it had even been properly established.
e Power Act was a one-sided attempt by the Social Democrats to 
legislate on parliamentary sovereignty on their terms. Although the Agrarian 
League decided to support the proposal, its leader Santeri Alkio was 
concerned about the rise of extra-parliamentary pressure groups among the 
Social Democrats trying to determine what the parliament should decide. 
He complained how a labour association in Helsinki (which had founded 
a workers’ assembly bearing the name of ‘parliament’) was ready to threaten 
the national parliament and to limit its freedom of action and force it to 
do what the crowds surrounding the parliament building were demanding 
with the support of the ries of Russian soldiers.1003 Instead of such extra-
parliamentary and potentially unpatriotic measures by the right and the 
le, Alkio urged the Finnish people and their parliament to cooperate and 
arrange the political order so that the Russian Revolution would not lead 
to the loss of national liberty.1004 When the Social Democrats accused the 
Agrarian League of denying the right of ‘the parliament of the people’ to 
nominate ministers,1005 Alkio did his best to explain what he viewed as its 
proper limits. Alkio, like most non-socialists in northern Europe, was highly 
critical of complete parliamentarism, rejecting Social Democrat attempts to 
make the government no more than ‘a slave or lackey of the parliament’ as 
detrimental to the people. A government could not be built simply on the 
basis of the will of a parliamentary majority so that the government ‘would 
only obediently take care of the oce duties given to it by the parliament’.1006 
Alkio did advocate the principle of the responsibility of the government to 
the parliament but did not want to see a government constituted by mere 
parliamentarians, as suggested by the Social Democrats:1007
1001 Lindman 1968, 90–2; Garrigues & Anceau 2016.
1002 Lindman 1968, 38–9.
1003 e rise of this parliament of the streets was described in subsection 3.4.1.
1004 VP, Santeri Alkio, 12 June 1917, 511.
1005 VP, Yrjö Mäkelin, 2 July 1917, 688.
1006 VP, Santeri Alkio, 2 July 1917, 698.
1007 VP, Santeri Alkio, 2 July 1917, 698.
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If an attempt is made to realise the rule by the people through a weak government, 
that will lead to the destruction of the state. It is entirely mistaken to assume that 
a government which would consist of persons enjoying the condence of the 
parliament, being constituted in accordance with purely parliamentary principles 
. . . it is wrong to assume that this would not be in line with the rule by the people. 
We have all been ready to pass a law according to which the Finnish government 
will be responsible to the parliament for all of its measures.
Alkio was here summarising much of the understanding that prevailed 
among the non-socialist parties. At the same time, some Social Democratic 
MPs also brought up the contempt for the parliament among their supporters. 
Evert Eloranta presented the anti-reform policies of the bourgeoisie as 
having created among the lower classes the unhappy conception that the use 
of legal and parliamentary means did not bring the necessary reforms.1008 
e inability of the reformed parliament to agree on reforms, and the vetoes 
of the Grand Duke on such reforms, had indeed demonstrated to many 
radical socialists that the parliamentary way of proceeding was ineective, 
which led to further radicalisation and calls for direct action.1009 
In the divisive Social Democratic discourse, all the blame for this was to 
be placed on the bourgeoisie. e Power Act was seen as a last chance to make 
the representative institution with its Socialist majority responsive to reform 
demands and to hence restore its legitimacy in the eyes of leist supporters. 
At the same time, however, the concept of the parliament was intentionally 
obscured: the Congress of Soviets was presented as a provisional parliament 
in Russia comparable to the Finnish parliament;1010 this was done by Evert 
Huttunen, who had attended an irregular meeting in Petrograd as a Finnish 
representative and interpreter and who was hence better informed about 
the nature of the soviets than any other Finnish MP.1011 Huttunen drew 
a misleading parallel between the two very dierent institutions, legitimating 
the Russian soviets and implying that the Finnish parliament, too, was 
revolutionary. As in the choice of the name of the workers’ parliament in 
Helsinki, the Social Democrats were redening ‘parliament’ to better serve 
their potentially revolutionary goals. 
Among liberals and conservatives, who tended to nd common ground 
in this debate (unlike in contemporary Sweden or Germany), the extension 
of parliamentary sovereignty along the lines of the Social Democrat 
majority caused rising concern. K. J. Ståhlberg (Young Finn) was the leader 
of the extraordinary committee which had prepared the original proposal 
and spoke for an update of the inherited eighteenth-century constitution 
with a degree of parliamentarism (which he basically supported) but with 
the maintenance of the duality of government. e submission of certain 
issues to the Russian government as well as regulations on the nomination 
and dismissal of government had in his view no precedents in other 
1008 VP, Evert Eloranta, 12 June 1917, 518.
1009 Tuomisto 1990, 41.
1010 VP, Evert Huttunen, 10 July 1917, 901, 903; Rinta-Tassi 1986, 31; Ketola 1987, 
168–9.
1011 Lindman 1968, 127; Upton 1980, 81, 155.
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countries.1012 Tekla Hultin, the rst female academic doctor in Finland and 
possessing a good knowledge of the ird Republic, expressed her trust in 
parliamentary procedures being integrated in the Finnish political system 
through practice. She wished nevertheless to reserve the right for the 
government to dissolve the parliament and to ask the opinion of the people 
in case severe disagreements between the government and the parliament 
emerged.1013 
In the meantime, the ‘Prussian’ right in Finland rejected what they saw 
as extreme parliamentarism in harsher terms, fearing that the division of 
power would be bypassed, the problems of the Age of Liberty reintroduced 
and in the end all power be given into the hands of the socialist majority.1014 
Gustaf Rosenqvist (Swedish People’s Party) complained about the removal 
of boundaries between the parliament and the government and about 
nearly all power being handed over to the representative assembly.1015 
According to Karl Söderholm (Swedish People’s Party), ‘an autocratic 
popular representation just like an autocratic monarch can abuse its 
power to the detriment of the country and the people’.1016 e suspicions 
of parliamentarism among the right were partly motivated by experiences 
from the eighteenth century, and parallels drawn between the Swedish Diet 
of the Age of Liberty and the proposed system of extended parliamentary 
sovereignty are particularly revealing. is analogy was also supported by the 
classical conception of the cycle of polities with republics and autocracies, 
oligarchies and ochlocracies following each other.1017 According to Kaarle 
Rantakari (Finnish Party), the proposal would reintroduce ‘the state in which 
our country was when it was joined to Sweden during the so-called Age 
of Liberty: the tyranny of the parliament’ (eduskunta-mielivalta).1018 In his 
conservative understanding, the Age of Liberty demonstrated how dicult 
it would be for the parliament to act satisfactorily in the absence of a true 
representative of executive power.1019 When the Social Democrats criticised 
the comparison as reecting a bourgeois ‘fear of the entry of democracy 
into force’ and rather saw the eighteenth-century crisis as a conict of class 
interests,1020 Rantakari nevertheless repeated warnings about ‘parliamentary 
absolutism’ (eduskuntayksinvaltius). Such warnings were also typical of 
German political discourse.1021 
According to Frans Rantanen of the Social Democrats, the suggested 
1012 VP, Kaarlo Juho Ståhlberg, 2 July 1917, 994.
1013 VP, Tekla Hultin, 2 July 1917, 695–6.
1014 Rabbe Axel Wrede, ‘Lagförslaget ang. styrelseledamöternas juridiska ansvarighet’, 
an editorial in Hufvudstadsbladet, 9 June 1917; Upton 1980, 170, written on the 
basis of a memorandum by Lauri Ingman.
1015 VP, Georg Rosenqvist, 10 July 1917, 883.
1016 VP, Karl Söderholm, 10 July 1917, 904.
1017 VP, Kaarle Rantakari, 10 July 1917, 896.
1018 VP, Kaarle Rantakari, 10 July 1917, 896.
1019 VP, Kaarle Rantakari, 10 July 1917, 896; more extensively in Ihalainen 2015.
1020 VP, Konrad Lehtimäki, 10 July 1917, 909; 17 July 1917, 1032; Frans Rantanen, 17 
July 1917, 1029.
1021 VP, Kaarle Rantakari, 17 July 1917, 1021; Biefang & Schulz 2016, 71.
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‘parliamentary democracy or the democracy of the Social Democratic 
workers’ (by implication one and the same thing) would create a completely 
dierent system.1022 is radicalised Finnish Social Democratic conception 
of Social Democratic democracy being synonymous with parliamentary 
democracy was exclusive and should be contrasted with Eduard Bernstein’s 
revisionist view of democracy standing not for the mere rule of the masses 
or for any type of class power but for self-government by the people.1023 
e Finnish Social Democrats advocated a party-political instrumental 
concept of parliamentarism, whereas the Finnish right, like the Swedish 
conservatives, took the national past as evidence for the rejection of 
unregulated parliamentarism.
e right typically turned to libustering through rhetorical redescrip-
tions. Ernst Nevanlinna (Finnish Party), with his reformist background, 
pointed to the far-reaching parliamentarisation of government that would 
de facto take place in Finland as a result of the original proposal and 
which removed any need for strict rules concerning the formation of the 
ministry. According to this professor of nance, the budgetary power of 
the parliament had already been extended, and it had become dicult to 
nominate a government that did not enjoy the condence of the parliament. 
e Social Democratic policy meant ‘the unlimited sovereignty of the current 
majority of each parliament’ and indeed implied, that ‘our people would in 
reality also gain the decisive power to nominate and dismiss the executive 
power, i.e. the government’.1024 His forecast was that the introduction of 
such a parliamentary sovereignty would lead to the ‘healthy majority of 
the people’ soon regretting their election of a parliament that had rejected, 
without proper deliberation, the ideally functioning eighteenth-century 
constitution in favour of parliamentary absolutism. Or, as Nevanlinna 
put it in a reference to a propagandistic phrase ‘law-bound liberty’ that 
Gustavus III used in 1772 when limiting the powers of the Diet, it would be 
to ‘exchange the law-bound civic liberty enjoyed by our people for centuries, 
the most beautiful and invaluable heritage of Swedish rule, for the tyranny 
of the parliamentary majority.’1025 
Finnish political history had throughout the Russian period concentrat-
ed on conserving this Gustavian monarchical constitution, which combined 
elements of constitutionalism with the Diet as a forum for royal representa-
tion. Now the pernicious order of the Age of Liberty with a ruling diet, from 
which the current constitution had saved the country, was in danger of 
being restored. Karl Söderholm (Swedish People’s Party) feared that such an 
excessive concentration of power in the parliament would lead to ‘political 
considerations’ becoming dominant in purely administrative matters. is 
could not be right as, according to the Finnish constitution, ‘the supreme 
1022 VP, Frans Rantanen, 17 July 1917, 1029.
1023 Müller 2014, 45.
1024 VP, Ernst Nevanlinna, 17 July 1917, 1011–12.
1025 VP, Ernst Nevanlinna, 17 July 1917, 1012; for eighteenth-century parlance, see 
Ihalainen 2010, and for further conservative history politics, see Ihalainen 2015.
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power in the country belongs to the monarch’.1026 e rightist discourse on 
parliamentarism was clearly built on eighteenth-century constitutionalist 
developments and German principles of constitutional monarchy.
e conceptual confrontation was escalated by dierent understandings 
of parliamentary procedure (discussed in section 2.4). Since the Social 
Democrats were known to have considered passing the Power Act with 
a simple majority should an attempt to use minority provisions to prevent 
this be made, Minister of Justice Antti Tulenheimo (Finnish Party) warned 
about the risks of disregarding parliamentary principles. Furthermore, 
parliamentarising all legislative and administrative power would mean 
the annulment of the older constitutional laws, and, under unlimited 
parliamentary power, the only way for the people to change the parliament 
would be through a revolution.1027 is statement implied that resistance 
and outright revolution on the part of the people against such a (potentially 
socialist) parliament appeared as an option for some bourgeois leaders as 
well. Edvard Hänninen-Walpas, the editor-in-chief of Työmies, the largest 
socialist organ in the world, implied that more concrete violence against 
their rightist opponents might occur, if not by fellow members of the party, 
at least by the people,1028 which shows how the notion of an unavoidable 
violent civil war against a stubborn bourgeoisie instead of parliamentary 
discussion was creeping into Social Democratic discourse. In the debate of 
the day, too, an interjection from the le would suggest that a civil war had 
become possible.1029 An instance of such violence replacing parliamentary 
procedure had been seen only three days previously when Russian troops 
had entered the parliament building to put pressure on the MPs.1030 More 
explicit talk about the possibility of a civil war replacing parliamentary 
procedures would be heard from November 1917 onwards. 
According to Ernst Estlander (Swedish People’s Party), a professor of the 
legal history who was dedicated to constitutionalism and extreme formal 
legalism and had campaigned for the rights of the Finnish parliament 
under Russian rule but opposed the inclusion of parliamentarism in the 
Finnish constitution,1031 the measures of the socialist majority demonstrated 
the questionability of ‘the frequently advertised parliamentarism of the 
le’.1032 Parliamentarism was turning into a mere hoax, and the Finnish 
parliament had ‘a lower political culture’ than this critic could ever have 
imagined.1033 In the deepening crisis of parliamentary legitimacy, the Social 
Democrats implicitly threatened to use violence should their radicalised 
concept of parliamentary sovereignty as the rule of a Social Democratic 
majority not be accepted. On the other hand, neither did the legalists of 
1026 VP, Karl Söderholm, 17 July 1917, 1018.
1027 VP, Antti Tulenheimo, 17 July 1917, 1007.
1028 VP, Edvard Hänninen-Walpas, 17 July 1917, 1056–7.
1029 Lindman 1968, 85.
1030 Polvinen 1987, vol. 1, 70.
1031 Lindman 1968, 92.
1032 VP, Ernst Estlander, 17 July 1917, 1054.
1033 VP, Ernst Estlander, 17 July 1917, 1054.
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the non-socialist side exclude the replacement of parliamentary means 
with outright violence if the established system were infringed. e crisis 
of the legitimacy of parliamentary government, provoked by exclusive 
Social Democratic denitions of the war, revolution, democracy, the people 
and parliamentarism, was being acerbated by the exceptional strength 
and inexibility of the legalistic and constitutionalist ideology of their 
opponents.1034 is way of thinking was particularly important for many 
members of the centre and the right, but it was abhorred by the le as 
obstructing reform.
1034 Brandt 2009, 172, also suggests that these traditions were stronger in Finland 
than in Sweden.
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4.  The autumn of 1917: A completed,  
 a suspended and a partial reform  
 – and a failed reform leading to a civil war
4.1  Britain: e rising politisation of democracy 
4.1.1  A final confrontation on extended suffrage 
 between the two chambers
Despite the consensual reform proposal made by the Speaker’s Conference 
and limited opposition to it during the rst readings in the Commons, 
further points of disagreement arose during deliberations on the technical 
details of the Representation of the People Bill. e members shared the 
view that the pressures of the war had changed the nature of the polity in 
such fundamental ways that constitutional modications were needed, but 
they continued to disagree on the timing and the extent of the revisions. No 
one denied the need to update the registers of voters or the principle that at 
least all men who had served in the army deserved the right to vote. While 
some Unionist opponents remained concerned about the consequences 
of extending surage, especially to women, the defenders of the bill held 
optimistic views on what a reformed Parliament with the strengthened 
support of the people would be able to accomplish once the time of post-
war reconstruction came. 
Procedural arguments for preventing the extension of surage or at least 
postponing the reform had been made during the spring. e Unionist 
opposition had questioned the mandate of an extra-parliamentary body 
to prepare such an unusual constitutional change and also the mandate of 
a parliament elected in 1910 to decide on one. ey would have preferred 
to see the pre-1911 rights of the Lords restored rather than extending 
surage. However, the reformists had managed to persuade the majority of 
the Conservatives to come over to their side. ey argued for an entirely 
new, stronger political community, in which the interests of the people 
and Parliament would be better united. In practice, the majority of the 
Conservatives were expecting extensive electoral support from both the 
ghting men and the women on the home front. e Unionist opposition 
now also concentrated on modifying rather than opposing the reform.
Foreign examples had been used selectively in the British debates, the 
focus being on the dominions; other great powers were referred to only to 
support particular points, not in search of any applicable models. While 
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some anti-reformists had suggested that the bill was a deliberate attempt to 
introduce a revolution to Britain, several reformists presented it rather as 
the means to prevent revolutionary developments of the Russian or some 
other type. A division in references to democracy had been visible, though 
by spring 1917 the concept had in no way been dominant in descriptions 
of the goals of the reform or the British political system more generally. 
is suggests that the idea of ghting for democracy was a construct of 
war propaganda rather than a universalist goal to change the world; it was, 
furthermore, introduced more distinctly by President Wilson aer the 
introductory debates of late March and hence its inuence on the British 
reform debates was a delayed one. Unionists opposing the reform had 
argued that Britain already possessed such a degree of democracy that 
the extent of the proposed changes was excessive, or they had called for 
the restoration of the good old system instead. While the opponents had 
deliberately sought to dene democracy in a way that supported their anti-
reformist arguments, few reformists used democracy as a dynamic concept 
to describe the desirable future. e Wilsonian and revisionist concepts of 
democracy as a universal goal, a norm for good government and a starting 
point for further reforms at home were only gradually creeping into British 
political discourse. 
By November 1917, the Commons had debated the details of the bill 
extensively in committee sessions of the entire House. e committee stage 
still produced only a few exchanges of opinion presenting the prospective 
future of the British parliamentary polity as a new type of democracy 
–  not to say any serious problematisation of the political signicance of 
the surage reform as ‘democratisation’. One explanation might be that the 
British system was viewed as democratic by denition. A more plausible 
explanation is, however, that democracy was still not considered the proper 
concept to dene the British polity – especially in wartime, when there were 
so many restrictions on ideal democracy and perhaps an awareness that 
demanding Prussia to democratise itself might backre at home. e War 
Cabinet had not expressly dened the bill as a democratic reform, which 
reects the reservations that some Liberals and Conservatives continued to 
have about this contested concept, which evidently meant dierent things to 
dierent ideological groups, including the representatives of Labour in the 
cabinet. For the ministry, the bill was therefore rst and foremost a technical 
measure needed to boost morale for the war eort (though it did serve party-
political purposes as well), and the opponents mainly seem to have accepted 
this interpretation. Democratisation or parliamentarisation did not concern 
Britain; they concerned Germany, just as Wilson had declared.
e MPs who attended the sessions, typically more hostile to the 
govern ment than those who were absent,1035 focused on controversial 
details such as proportional representation, the redistribution of seats and 
disqualication. With reference to the last-mentioned issue, the government 
was again accused of ‘Prussianism’, of being ‘infected by German doctrines’ 
1035 Turner 1992, 227.
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in the sense of seeing the state as superior to the individual conscience 
of conscientious objectors.1036 is was a rhetorical trick making use 
of propaganda discourses, and it shows why the cabinet was wise not to 
highlight democracy and similar concepts too much. Many reformist 
arguments were equally context-bound, building on war experiences and 
news of revolutionary movements abroad. Josiah Wedgwood (independent 
liberal, later Labour) repeated in the aermath of the Bolshevik Revolution 
the argument about the reform being necessary to save representative 
government: if ‘a man’s citizenship’ were taken away by denying him the right 
to vote, he might well feel like ‘a pariah so far as politics are concerned’ and 
become a ‘martyr’, who would then be ready to take ‘direct action’ under the 
instigation of trade and syndicalist unions,1037 or even Bolsheviks. Halford 
Mackinder (Scottish Unionist) was concerned about that the cooperating 
parties as ‘two schools of a ruling class’ might be replaced in Britain, too, with 
a confrontation between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and that such 
a class divide might lead rst to random parliamentary majorities and then 
to tyranny.1038 is was to be countered, as the Liberal reformist Aneurin 
Williams argued, by basing ‘government for the people and by the people’ on 
‘the common sense and honesty of the great mass of the people’ rather than 
on any prevailing ‘undemocratic’ voting practices.1039 Generally speaking, 
however, ‘democracy’ (like ‘parliamentarism’) remained strangely absent as 
a concept from discussions on the details of the reform in autumn 1917. e 
press, for its part, tended to characterise these debates as unconstructive,1040 
which tended to diminish the trust in Parliament in wartime. Its limited 
enthusiasm for the reform in spring was now tending to turn into cynicism.
e next plenary debates in the Commons took place between 4 and 
7 December 1917. As the principles of the constitutional change had already 
been discussed during previous readings, specic technical electoral issues 
or the treatment of special groups (such as conscientious objectors) now 
gured as objects of dispute. Most of this reading was taken over by arguments 
on Irish aairs in general and the Irish representation in the Westminster 
Parliament in particular. is was provoked by an attempted extension of 
the redistribution of seats to Ireland.1041 Irish MPs used the opportunity to 
voice a number of grievances specic to Ireland and to defend the relative 
overrepresentation of Ireland in the Imperial Parliament. e December 
debates again brought to light what Herbert Samuel called ‘anomalies’ in 
the ‘political situation in regard to the constitutional relations between 
Great Britain and Ireland’1042 unsolved by Home Rule and deepened by the 
experiences of the Easter Rising of 1916. For many non-Irish members, the 
1036 Interjection by an anonymous MP, Hansard, 20 November 1917, c. 1150; Edgar 
Jones (Liberal), 21 November 1917, c. 1253–5. 
1037 Hansard, Josiah Wedgwood, 21 November 1917, c. 1270. 
1038 Hansard, Halford Mackinder, 22 November 1917, c. 1444–5.
1039 Hansard, Aneurin Williams, 21 November 1917, c. 1311–12.
1040 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Amendments to the Franchise Bill’, 5 December 1917.
1041 e Manchester Guardisan, ‘Amendments to the Franchise Bill’, 5 December 
1917.
1042 Hansard, Herbert Samuel, 4 December 1917, c. 366.
217
4.1 Britain: The rising politisation of democracy
continuous debate on these anomalies appeared a waste of parliamentary 
time, reminding of earlier Irish obstructions, and hence the members of 
the cabinet hardly attended the debates.1043 Proportional representation, 
included in the original proposal of the government, did not pass the vote, 
and the notion of the alternative vote was also later omitted. All the same, 
the bill led to major changes in addition to the inclusion of women over 
30 in universal surage: constituencies would be radically redistributed, 
a deposit required to eliminate freak candidates, limits to expenditure set, 
and all voting ordered to take place on the same day.1044 
Extensive debates in the Lords followed, providing an opportunity to go 
back to the principles of the reform. e bill was introduced on 11 December 
1917, and the debates took place between 17 and 19 December 1917, again 
on 8 –10 January 1918 and further on until 6 February 1918. ere was not so 
much principled opposition any longer, with the Unionist peers also ready 
to compromise in the extraordinary circumstances of wartime, counting 
on electoral support for the Conservatives and seeing a chance to appease 
repeated reform demands without the threat of having a radical leist 
parliament, especially in the aermath of the Bolshevik Revolution. e 
bill passed the second reading, but some further dispute followed in early 
1918. Illustrative of the marginality of the Lords aer the Parliament Act 
(particularly from the point of view of the Liberals) is how selectively and 
without commentary e Manchester Guardian reported their proceedings: 
only the Lords’ views on women’s surage and their submission to the will 
of the Commons on proportional representation were considered worth 
commenting on. In the latter case, the paper focused on the point of view of 
the Commons and had nothing to say with regard to ‘democracy’ about the 
signicance of the Lords’ submissions for the constitution or the surage 
reform.1045 Not even the British Liberals regarded the reform as a transition 
to democracy. is diers sharply from German, Swedish and Finnish 
Liberal ways of viewing the constitutional changes of the period.
e relatively early timing and the seemingly indigenous origin of the 
British reform meant that it was viewed by contemporaries as much less 
dependent on the state of international aairs and transnational inuences 
than was the case with the other constitutional reforms of the time. e British 
parliament remained a self-esteeming, even self-satised, representative 
institution with no need to relate its decision-making to past, current or 
future constitutional developments abroad. Transnational contacts were 
weaker than those of Continental MPs, particularly among the rather 
more imperially oriented Conservatives. By December 1917, nevertheless, 
the American involvement in the war, which had intensied discourse on 
democracy among all the Allied Powers and particularly trans-Atlantic 
1043 Hansard, William Hayes Fisher, 5 December 1917, c. 492.
1044 Machin 2001, 144–5.
1045 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Electoral Reform Bill’, 18–19 December 1917, 10 
January 1918; ‘Peers and Votes for Women’, 11 January 1918; ‘Reform Bill Passed’, 
7 February 1918.
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Anglophone discourse,1046 and the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution in 
early November, did inuence the views of the British parliamentary elite 
somewhat. ere was a growing tendency to view the Bolshevik regime as 
expansionist and a feeling that its spread could be limited best with a well-
managed parliamentary reform at home.1047 However, Russian inuences or 
the fear of Bolshevism were in no way dominant in Britain in late 1917. 
Owing to the peripheral geographical position of Russia from a British 
point of view, its internal turmoil had mainly been considered from the 
perspective of the war – at least until the Bolsheviks took over and declared 
a world revolution. Even the October Revolution caused no immediate 
concern among the Western Allies.1048 
e impact of the war had been felt in Britain much more concretely as 
a result of the intensied submarine war depleting the food markets. While 
this did not lead to any widespread questioning of the political and military 
leadership or to the rise of a widespread peace movement in Britain, the 
atmosphere suered, with creeping doubts about the likelihood of winning 
the war. London was bombed by the Germans in late 1917, which created 
entirely new fears among the civil population.1049 An obvious consequence 
was a weakened interest in the debate on political rights in Parliament, the 
thoughts of the population being rather occupied by every-day problems. 
As in the other studied countries, the public at large was not really involved 
in the reform debates; the democratic process was in this sense restricted.
e Revolutions in Russia most clearly aected the ideological stand of the 
Labour Party even though its MPs had been very careful not to side with the 
March Revolution during the debates of the spring. A positive interpretation 
of the revolution had been, especially among the more patriotic MPs, that 
Russia was about to turn into a democracy ghting against autocracy. In 
March, Russia had been cited a few times as an encouraging example, but by 
May such assumptions had evaporated and more was heard about the chaotic 
state of the revolutionary regime. e Bolshevik Revolution, by contrast, 
oered a warning vision of a global revolution that might encourage the 
workers to revolt, remove bourgeois parliamentary democracy and install 
the soviets as holders of power or some feared direct action of the masses. 
is became a matter of concern not only for the ‘bourgeois’ parties but also 
for the moderate Labour leaders, particularly as there had been considerable 
industrial action in Britain, too, although reactions among the population 
at large remained overwhelmingly anti-Bolshevik. Most Labour leaders 
concluded soon aer the October Revolution that Bolshevism represented 
an undesirable kind of undemocratic socialism. eir goals remained fairly 
1046 See e Times, ‘e End and the Means’, 6 December 1917, thanking Wilson for 
contributing to the understanding of the war by combining an ideal with concrete 
means of achieving it: the democracies should destroy Prussian militarism. is 
was supported by ‘Mr. Wilson’s Triumph’, which reported ‘the democracies of the 
world’ welcoming Wilson’s recent address.
1047 Rose 1995, 68.
1048 Pipes 1992, 607.
1049 Leonhard 2014, 729–30.
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moderate, albeit undergoing a slight radicalisation from summer 1918 on, 
which immediately gave rise to accusations of Bolshevism from the centre 
and the right. For some British socialists, direct action also remained 
a possibility,1050 which provoked debate for and against representative 
parliamentary government among the public. In Parliament such radicalism 
was reduced by the modest number of Labour MPs and their ideological 
moderation. Revolution was debated, but one of the Russian type was 
regarded as impossible.
4.1.2  ‘This Bill is a revolution’: The reform in relation 
 to British constitutional history and  
 foreign examples
Given the long history of debates on representation, going back to at least 
the seventeenth century,1051 Stanley Buckmaster, a Liberal peer and former 
Lord Chancellor, wanted to move on from ‘the old tiresome arguments 
as to what is the system of government’ and to modify ‘Parliamentary 
institutions’ to meet the challenges of the future.1052 No doubt remained as 
to the importance of the bill in British constitutional history. Towards the 
end of the committee stage and soon aer the Bolshevik Revolution, the 
Attorney General, Frederick Smith (Conservative), pointed out that no one 
really knew what politics aer the conclusion of peace would be like, the 
Revolution having further strengthened the sense of the inception of an 
entirely new era. Smith foresaw the economic losses of the war as potentially 
leading in Britain, too, to ‘revolutionary demands’ that should be obviated 
with a Commons that represented ‘the nation and community as a whole’.1053 
is again reects the Conservative adaptation to universal surage in the 
circumstances of the late 1910s. Andrew Anderson (Liberal) was likewise 
concerned about ‘ood or spate politics’ (a current international metaphor) 
arising from revolutionary fervour or opposite reactionary stands aer the 
war. e only way to prevent this in Britain was to make the Commons ‘a real 
reex of the people outside’ in accordance with ‘democratic’ or ‘representative 
government’.1054 Edward Hemmerde (Liberal, later Labour) echoed the view 
that only a proper reform providing for adult surage and a free electoral 
system would prevent ‘labour trouble’ and even ‘revolution’ aer the war.1055 
e reform was a preparation for the post-war situation, justied by each 
party from its own particular perspectives, though a  distinctly Social 
Democratic perspective of the kind that existed in Germany, Sweden and 
Finland was still lacking.
Voices critical of the reform were also heard. James Bryce (Liberal), 1st 
Viscount Bryce, who had made a distinguished career both as an academic 
in law and history (he had written a book on US institutions and was 
1050 Pugh 2002, 172; Leonhard 2014, 730–1.
1051 Seaward & Ihalainen 2016.
1052 Lords, Stanley Buckmaster, 19 December 1917, c. 267–8.
1053 Hansard, Frederick Smith, 22 November 1917, c. 1427.
1054 Hansard, Andrew Anderson, 22 November 1917, c. 1465–6.
1055 Hansard, Arthur Hemmerde, 22 November 1917, c. 1488.
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President of the British Academy) and as a top civil servant (among other 
things holding the post of Ambassador to the United States) saw the bill as 
one which ‘revolutionises the Constitution of this country more than any 
measure since the great Reform Act of 1832’. In Bryce’s view, its adoption in 
wartime, when ‘the people’ could not give it the attention it deserved, was 
a mistake.1056 Bryce would elaborate his criticism of the reform in Modern 
Democracy (1921), joining an international group of leading academics who 
had diculties in accepting what they saw as mass democracy. He was one 
of the Western authorities to whom Germans would refer in countering 
Western calls for democratisation.
Nor was women’s surage yet unanimously accepted among the British 
political elite. In Sir Charles Bathurst’s (Conservative) sexist reasoning, the 
combination of ‘the more level-headed male opinion on political matters’ and 
‘the more emotional opinion of the other sex’ could well lead to ‘a revolution’ 
should no buer (such as proportional representation) be adopted.1057 Many 
peers also believed that proportional representation would keep radicalism 
under control in future elections, whether women were allowed to vote or 
not. 
As in spring, ‘revolution’ was used on both sides and with a variety 
of connotations: the Home Secretary, Sir George Cave (Conservative), 
wondered whether ‘everybody in the House thoroughly realises the tremen-
dous revolution which we are asked to make in our electoral system’.1058 
Britain was here viewed as introducing a revolution (in both a good and 
a bad sense) through parliament. Among the reformist aristocracy, Victor 
Bulwer-Lytton (Conservative), the 2nd Earl of Lytton, who had supported 
the Parliament Act and was a long-standing advocate of female surage, saw 
the bill as unique in that it was no longer a ‘Representation of Some People 
Bill’ like previous parliamentary reforms. It was a bill made necessary by 
the war and hence a piece of ‘strictly war legislation’,1059 rather than being 
a revolution as suggested. Harry Levy-Lawson (Liberal Unionist), 2nd 
Lord Burnham, the owner of e Daily Telegraph, by contrast, was positive 
that ‘this Bill is a revolution’, but he was optimistic that this parliamentary 
revolution would be ‘a pacic and, as we all hope, a peaceful revolution’.1060 
e notion of ‘revolution’ via parliamentary reform thus received at times 
a highly positive connotation. e British political elite was actively 
redening the feared concept of ‘revolution’ here, giving it a parliamentary 
reformist sense that was opposed that attached to the Bolshevik Revolution 
in Russia: the argument that Parliament was able to revolutionise itself was 
even stronger than in spring. And many (for good reasons) were condent 
about the continuity of the political order thanks to the wartime patriotic 
atmosphere once Bolshevism had been prevented from entering the country 
by means of this reform.
1056 Lords, Viscount Bryce, 17 December 1917, c. 176; also Richard Chaloner, 1st 
Baron Gisborough, 10 January 1918, c. 488–90. 
1057 Hansard, Sir Charles Bathurst, 30 January 1918, c. 1631.
1058 Hansard, Sir George Cave, 30 January 1918, c. 1694.
1059 Lords, e Earl of Lytton, 19 December 1917, c. 277–8.
1060 Lords, Lord Burnham, Lords, 17 December 1917, c. 201. 
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No such understanding of ‘revolution’ was shared by George Clarke, 
Baron Sydenham of Combe, an expert on defence and imperial aairs, who 
had become highly critical of universal surage aer his experiences as 
Governor of Victoria in Australia. He wanted to retain a strong hereditary 
upper house. is constant denouncer of socialist and Jewish conspiracy plots 
responded pessimistically to Burnham, viewing the bill as ‘a revolutionary 
change of the most controversial character’ as it contained ‘the germs 
of a  disease which may bring about the destruction of our Empire’.1061 
Sydenham, who had argued for a written constitution and feared the 
destruction of the established order, saw the entire procedure as ‘a agrant 
breach of constitutional practice’, ‘revolutionary’, as lacking ‘any sanction 
from the people of this country’ and as creating a dangerous precedent for 
the future.1062 is was legalistic conservative anti-reformism at its strongest, 
resembling that of the right in Germany, Sweden and Finland. Such an 
attitude was also reinforced by concern about the future of the Empire.
Frank Russell, 2nd Earl Russell, who was the rst peer to join the Labour 
Party, responded by conceding that the bill was indeed revolutionary, but 
he provoked Sydenham further by declaring: ‘[Y]our Lordships, if you are 
afraid of revolution, have some reason to fear it.’1063 us leading advocates 
of the reform recognised its revolutionary character. However, in their 
view, revolution in any Russian sense was not to be feared as the British 
government and Parliament had taken the initiative to introduce their 
own restricted revolution. George Curzon, Earl Curzon of Kedleston, even 
viewed the year 1917 as marking a transition to a permanent revolutionary 
era, into which the new act would safely transfer the British parliamentary 
system:1064
If we are at the end of one epoch we are also at the beginning of another, and if the 
epoch which we are closing has been darkened by all the horrors and tragedies of 
warfare, the epoch that is coming will be disturbed by convulsions and agitations, 
not less remarkable and very likely destined to shake even more profoundly the 
whole machinery of State.
According to this widely travelled former Viceroy of India, the Leader of the 
House of Lords and a member of the War Cabinet, the bill prepared the British 
parliament to play the role which the British state would have ‘in the future 
regulation of the life of its citizens’. It also gave ‘the great masses of the people 
in this country’ the share of political power they had been striving for.1065 
From his distinguished position, Curzon argued strongly for the bill and 
abstained from voting against it despite his continued opposition to female 
surage as the former president of the National League for Opposing Woman 
1061 Lords, Lord Sydenham, 17 December 1917, c. 210–11.
1062 Lords, Lord Sydenham, 17 December 1917, c. 214; also Philip Stanhope, 1st 
Baron Weardale (Liberal), president of an anti-surage organisation, 8 January 
1918, c. 354–6.
1063 Lords, Earl Russell, 17 December 1917, c. 220.
1064 Lords, Earl Curzon, 19 December 1917, c. 300.
1065 Lords, Earl Curzon, 19 December 1917, c. 300, 303.
222
4. The autumn of 1917: A completed,  a suspended and a partial reform
Surage.1066 His speech act reects the Conservatives’ wartime adaptation to 
an interventionist state, constitutional evolution and universal surage.
e Lords nally approved the surage bill with an amendment which 
reintroduced the principle of proportional representation in it, motivated 
by the above-mentioned belief that it would hinder radicalisation.1067 is 
constitutional intervention by the upper house provoked bitter comments in 
the Commons. According to Austen Chamberlain, a Liberal Unionist whose 
opinion in favour of the reform had been inuential within the party, the bill 
had been skilfully formulated by the Commons and should not have been 
amended by the Lords, an act which now tested the principle established by 
the Parliament Act:1068
is Bill, as it le our House, . . . was going to produce a revolution in our 
electoral system, a peaceful revolution, a revolution on the lines on which we 
have proceeded hitherto, and therefore the best kind of revolution, but still 
a revolution. 
By the end of January 1918, the idea of a parliamentary revolution had been 
fully accepted by Chamberlain. His argument that the bill was revolutionary 
enough was intended to express support for the retention of the old majority 
election system and to thereby prevent the revolution from going too far. 
He wanted to maintain traditions that were ‘the really broad and solid 
foundations on which our political system rests’. Proportional representation 
would not produce ‘an eective representation of the national will’ and 
thus should be opposed as a mistaken kind of revolution. Exaggerating the 
degree of potential change, Chamberlain called for a further reform of the 
Lords, since that house, which should have been a defender of traditions 
that checked ‘revolutionary change’, was now proposing a wrong kind of 
revolution itself.1069 By emphasising the already revolutionary nature of the 
bill, Chamberlain played down any suggestions for a more extensive reform 
of the Commons and addressed the incomplete reform of the upper house 
instead – all issues that were connected with party politics. 
us the concept of revolution touched Britain metaphorically, but the 
British reform was still, despite the constitutional ferment in other countries 
in 1917, viewed as so exceptional that examples from elsewhere did not 
apply. European countries were not seen to be going through comparable 
processes – despite the fact that constitutional debates about surage had 
started in Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Finland, at least by spring 
1917, and the new Swedish parliamentary government was also expected to 
make a proposal for reform soon. In comparison with spring 1917, the sense 
of transnational interaction would even seem to have diminished now that 
Britain was being defended against anything resembling Bolshevism.
1066 McCrillis 1998, 13; Gullace 2002, 168; e Manchester Guardian, ‘Peers and Votes 
for Women’, 11 January 1918.
1067 Evans 2000, 88.
1068 Hansard, Austen Chamberlain, 30 January 1918, c. 1610; see also William 
Burdett-Coutts, 30 January 1918, c. 1605; Grigg 2003, 106.
1069 Hansard, Austen Chamberlain, 30 January 1918, c. 1617.
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e peers used examples from abroad somewhat more readily, but still 
very selectively, than the MPs, which is reective of their more cosmopolitan 
attitudes. Anti-reformists were always eager to point out warning instances. 
James Bryce emphasised the experiences observed in countries that already 
had women’s surage when arguing against it.1070 For him, anarchical 
Bolshevik Russia constituted a particularly deterring example of claims 
about ‘the abstract natural rights’ of anyone to actively participate in 
government. In countries with female surage, women tended to vote as 
their male relatives or the party organisations advised. Great nations such as 
France had not experimented with female surage, and there was hence no 
reason for Britain to do so either. e Finnish and Norwegian cases did not 
count as their experience of the practice was so short (in Finland 11 years 
and in Norway four). In Australia and New Zealand and some states of the 
United States, a tiny group of women appealing to democratic principles 
had managed to gain the vote, but women did not even seem desirous to 
use that right. A further anti-suragist argument was that it was unfounded 
to expect that female surage would improve political life in any way: in 
New Zealand, women’s votes had ‘confused and perplexed politicians’, while 
in Australia women voters had prevented general conscription and thereby 
damaged the interests of the British Empire. ere had not even been any 
increase in female interest in politics; it was rather in Britain, where no female 
surage existed, that more women ‘study politics, think about politics, talk 
about politics and take part in political work’;1071 consequently, the vote and 
political activity did not go together. George Curzon had similar opinions 
about the irrelevance of minor states as examples, pointing to the French 
and Italian exclusion of women from surage, bypassing Germany and 
condemning universal surage in the form in which it had been introduced 
in Russia. He was convinced that, wherever women had been allowed to 
vote, the result had been victories for socialism,1072 though he did not refer 
explicitly to Finland, where the crisis resulting from socialist challenges to 
parliamentary government was acute and would soon turn into a civil war. 
Transnationally connected spokesmen for reform found some 
encouraging examples from abroad. Charles Cripps (Conservative, from 
1923 Labour), 1st Baron Parmoor, an internationalist lawyer who opposed 
the war and campaigned for the creation of the League of Nations, contrasted 
the less fortunate examples of majority elections in the British dominions 
with ones based on proportional representation in Sweden. Most MPs had 
heard about the Swedish elections of September 1917, which had led to 
the introduction of parliamentary government with a Liberal and Social 
Democrat majority and to the preparation of universal surage in that 
country, and this evidently inspired British leist reformists as a potential 
future vision. It was of particular interest to Parmoor, who had transnational 
1070 Lord Sydenham later praised Viscount Bryce for being such ‘an old and earnest 
student of practical politics in all lands’. Lords, 17 December 1917, c. 187–90.
1071 Lords, Viscount Bryce, 17 December 1917, c. 189; Lord Sydenham, 17 December 
1917, c. 212–13.
1072 Lords, Earl Curzon, 10 January 1918, c. 510, 514, 521–2. 
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connections with Sweden via the administration of the Church of England: 
he was an acquaintance of the pacist Archbishop of Uppsala, Nathan 
Söderblom, who had several times visited his estate and evidently informed 
him about the ongoing political changes there.1073 According to Parmoor, the 
Swedish system, which was based on proportional representation, allowed 
both Hjalmar Branting, the leader of the Social Democrats, and Arvid 
Lindmann, a leading Conservative, to be elected by the Stockholm electorate 
to the national parliament. Archbishop Söderblom had recommended such 
a system as it enhanced cooperation between dierent parties. Leading 
Swedish politicians, too, claimed that the system was fair and decreased 
personal attacks during election campaigns.1074 e description of the 
Swedish representative system and its consensual orientation oered by 
Söderblom and Parmoor was rather idealised in the light of the unsolved 
confrontation on surage reform there. 
Parmoor added examples from Belgium and other countries where 
cooperation rather than confrontation between interest groups and classes 
was said to predominate.1075 In the Lords, such an argument might count 
among those Conservatives who were seeking a consensual polity. Lord 
Burnham (Liberal Unionist), a lawyer with academic connections with the 
dominions and Belgium, likewise spoke for a comparative examination 
of contemporary politics.1076 Roundell Palmer (Conservative), Viscount 
Wolmer, referred to half a dozen ‘democratic countries’ which had been 
happy with proportional representation,1077 while Edward Hemmerde 
(Liberal) questioned the relevance of a system that ‘has happened to have 
worked fairly well in Belgium and possibly better elsewhere’ as the British 
voters were simply not asking for the abolition of the majority voting 
system.1078 e divergent deliberative approaches of the two Houses made 
a dierence: the Commons debates tended to be patriotic, even xenophobic, 
whereas the peers could aord to contemplate matters from more general, 
comparative, cosmopolitan and even universalist perspectives. However, in 
the Commons, too, Andrew Bonar Law (Conservative), the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, favoured the use of international comparisons to promote 
proportional representation, claiming that it was an insult to the British 
electors to suggest that a system that worked well ‘in countries less well-
educated than ours’ would not be applicable in Britain.1079 International 
comparisons and transnational links thus had a role in the British 
parliament even though they remained a minor phenomenon and were 
considerably fewer than in the countries of comparison. Britain was making 
this revolution on its own terms.
1073 Anon. 1970. Nathan Söderblom, a speaker of English, had been the Archbishop 
of Uppsala since 1914 and campaigned internationally for peace.
1074 Lords, Lord Parmoor, 17 December 1917, c. 195.
1075 Lords, Lord Parmoor, 17 December 1917, c. 195. 
1076 Lords, Lord Burnham, 17 December 1917, c. 206. 
1077 Hansard, Roundell Palmer, 30 January 1918, c. 1663.
1078 Hansard, Arthur Hemmerde, 30 January 1918, c. 1629.
1079 Hansard, Andrew Bonar Law, 30 January 1918, c. 1672.
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4.1.3  The increasingly contested definition  
 of ‘democracy’ 
While democracy had not really been a dening concept in debates on the 
Representation of the People Bill in spring 1917, it was used slightly more 
frequently and in a greater range of senses in the autumn, which reected 
a tendency especially in opposition circles to politicise the surage reform 
by interpreting it as an act that concerned democracy. e committee phase 
had given the politicians time to reect on the political implications of the 
reform; Wilson’s discursive intervention declaring democracy as a war goal 
had gained support; and the calls for democratisation in other European 
countries (especially Germany) had been recognised by some MPs. e 
denition of the Western Allies as ‘democratic States’ was becoming 
commonplace,1080 but ‘democracy’ as a normative designation of the British 
political system or ‘democrat’ as a self-denition by an MP were still rare. 
John David Rees’s (Unionist, formerly Liberal), a former imperial civil 
servant, nevertheless dened the imperial Parliament as ‘democracy’ since it 
consisted of great democrats and was based on majority rule,1081 and thereby 
fullled the Conservative criteria of democracy.
In spring, some Unionist anti-reformists had redescribed democracy 
for oppositional purposes. ese men were now underrepresented in the 
debates, and, uninterested in pursuing an issue that the majority considered 
already resolved, had since June focused on amendments rather than open 
opposition. Unionist critics were either absent or followed the proceedings 
in silence. e rightist opposition recognised that they had lost and did not 
regard it worth continuing with their expressions of dissent; they adopted 
a pragmatic approach, attempting to mould the act to their liking so that it 
would serve their party interests.1082 is diers from the more inexible 
strategy of the Swedish right in late 1918 and that of the Swedish People’s 
Party in Finland in 1919, not to mention the stance of the German right. 
It was rather the Irish Nationalists who adopted democracy as a concept 
that embodied a variety of positive senses, thereby enabling them to engage 
in politicking. Joseph Devlin, for instance, criticised the Northern Ireland 
Unionists for turning to ‘anti-parliamentary’ measures in supporting the 
redistribution of seats in Ireland at a time when electoral reforms were 
supposed to turn Parliament into ‘a constitutional and progressive machine’. 
According to Devlin’s ironical remark, self-nominated Conservative 
‘democrats’ were ready for ‘revolution’,1083 and consequently any Conservative 
arguments based on ‘democracy’ were to be regarded with suspicion. e 
redistribution of Irish seats did not pass the Commons,1084 but it contributed 
to the attempted politicisation of democracy in the House. 
1080 Hansard, Ronald McNeill, 4 December 1917, c. 288.
1081 Hansard, Sir John David Rees, 4 December 1917, c. 295.
1082 McCrillis 1998, 16.
1083 Hansard, Joseph Devlin, 4 December 1917, c. 347; John Dillon added that the 
British government was contributing to the rise of ‘the revolutionary party’ in 
Ireland with its policies and leading the Irish to turn to ‘revolutionary methods’. 
4 December 1917, c. 381; 5 December 1917, c. 458–9, 462; see also F. Meehan, 
5 December 1917, c. 484.
1084 McCrillis 1998, 14, 17; Evans 2000, 88.
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e Irish Parliamentary Party together with some Labour and Liberal 
MPs also identied themselves with democracy more openly than in 
the spring. Charles O’Neill called John Dillon, an old Irish Nationalist 
reformer, ‘a democrat of the deepest dye’.1085 e Wilsonian emphasis on 
democracy and the sovereignty of small nations suited the Irish Nationalists 
and was reinforced by trans-Atlantic connections between Ireland and 
American political discourse. Devlin’s suggestion was that Britain, unlike 
its democratic allies, was not acting like a democracy in Ireland.1086 William 
Field presented himself as ‘a democrat’ and challenged the Conservative 
redescriptions of the concept: ‘It is very dicult to know who is a democrat 
these days, because in this House we have Gentlemen of red-hot Tory 
principles declaring themselves democrats.’ e motivation for this was that 
‘democracy is fashionable now, and of course it has a large following’.1087 
Among the Labour MPs, William Tyson Wilson, a trade union activist and 
party whip, promised the support of ‘organised labour and democrats’ for the 
bill.1088 is was an expression of a Marxist association between democracy 
and the working classes even though no attempts to monopolise the 
concept of democracy were made. A similar Marxist association is evident 
in the emphatic assertion of Philip Snowden (Labour), a radical utopian 
socialist and a critic of capitalism, that he represented ‘certain democratic 
principles’.1089 In the far le press, a discourse using terms like ‘the new 
democracy’, ‘the future democracy’ and ‘the coming of true democracy’ had 
been activated, as had calls for new elections aer which the people would 
govern themselves.1090 On the other hand, the Labour leaders continued to 
avoid openly programmatic declarations of democracy. Democrats appeared 
in all parties, but it was patently clear that the word had a wide variety of 
meanings.
In comparison with the spring, ‘democracy’ had become a positively 
charged but still relatively sparsely used concept: it could be used to 
characterise the fairness of parliamentary procedures, to evaluate the 
domestic policies of the government and to dene one’s identity or that 
of some party fellow. Having one’s support for democracy questioned by 
a political opponent was taken as an insult, and argumentative confrontations 
followed about who was more clearly on the side of democracy. When Sir 
John Lonsdale (Irish Unionist), a whip of his group, attacked the Irish 
Nationalist Party for opposing ‘a thoroughly democratic proposal’ on the 
redistribution of seats in Ireland and thereby challenging the principles of 
justice and fair play,1091 Devlin responded by emphasising what his party 
had done to support the representation of the working classes and hence 
1085 Hansard, Healy, 4 December 1917, c. 329; Charles O’Neill, 5 December 1917, 
c. 470.
1086 Hansard, Joseph Devlin, 5 December 1917, c. 548.
1087 Hansard, William Field, 5 December 1917, c. 531.
1088 Hansard, William Tyson Wilson, 6 December 1917, c. 792.
1089 Hansard, Philip Snowden, 30 January 1918, c. 1687.
1090 e Herald, ‘A Plea for the Use of Brains’ and ‘Labour’s Supreme Duty’, 8 December 
1917; ‘Quo vadis?’, 15 December 1917.
1091 Hansard, Sir John Lonsdale, 4 December 1917, c. 319–20.
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‘the story of continued progress along every line of Radical and democratic 
advance’.1092 
e Irish Nationalist Party, in particular, set out to ask whether the War 
Cabinet represented ‘the democracy of this country’,1093 the denite article 
suggesting that this was now a class issue. William Redmond received 
cheers from both sides of the House1094 when he questioned the democratic 
character of current constitutional policies by characterising the reform 
proposal as ‘Prussianism’ – making use of the strongest counter-concept 
to democracy thinkable in the circumstances of 1917. Woodrow Wilson’s 
speeches and the consequent rise of ‘democracy’ into a war goal and 
‘Prussianism’ into a phenomenon against which the war was being fought 
now inspired a domestic constitutional dispute about what democracy was. 
Rather than concerning the political system in general, this debate was 
about imperial policies in Ireland and hence about the degree of democracy 
within the British Empire from a class perspective. e Irish Nationalists 
also made use of the authority that soldiers (including Irish volunteers like 
Captain Redmond himself and his brother, who had been killed in June 
1917) enjoyed in contemporary debates everywhere:1095
I have come from a portion of the world where we are ghting what we call 
Prussianism. I have come from a place where I have been in company with 
Englishmen, Irishmen, Scotsmen, men from all quarters of the British Empire, 
who are all combined in a common object, action, as well as desire, in combating 
the system known now in the stereotyped phrase as Prussianism. I have fought 
Prussianism face to face, but it is very hard indeed when one comes back to 
one’s own country to nd oneself stabbed with Prussianism in the back. Was 
there ever a more agrant instance of patent Prussianism perpetrated by any 
combination of men calling themselves up-to-date and democratic rulers of 
a  great democratic Empire than the spectacle of this coalition Government in 
its treatment of Ireland to-day?
Redmond was constructing a ‘stab-in-the-back’ theory (cf. the German 
Dolchstoβ myth) of his own, insinuating that the current rulers of Britain 
were destroying what had been achieved in the war with the attempted 
redistribution of seats in Ireland. e War Cabinet had not presented 
themselves as champions of ‘democracy’, although they had made it clear 
that the intention was to take the will of the people better into account, 
and in radical public discourse ‘democracy’ was increasingly referred to 
as having implications not only for Germany but also for Britain. Being 
accused of anti-democratic measures at home despite contrary claims was 
grave particularly as the accusations came from an army ocer. According 
to this Irish Nationalist, ‘e present British Government have acted the 
part of Germany in regard to Ireland and torn up once more treaties with 
Ireland just as Germany tore up treaties of Belgium.’ ere was ‘a system 
1092 Hansard, Joseph Devlin, 4 December 1917, c. 349.
1093 Hansard, omas Scanlan, 4 December 1917, c. 354.
1094 e Times, ‘Electoral Reform’, 6 December 1917.
1095 Hansard, William Redmond, 5 December 1917, c. 559.
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of pure Prussianism practised by the Government which is supposed to be 
doing all it can to destroy Prussianism elsewhere’.1096 is may well have 
been excessively virulent parliamentary rhetoric (which it undoubtedly was 
given the dierences in the electoral systems of Britain and Prussia) but it 
nevertheless challenged the government to state its stand on democracy. 
e ministry, however, chose to ignore the Irish provocation as irrelevant 
opposition polemics and to avoid a more awkward debate on the issue. 
ere would be no such extensive attempts to politicise the issue in 
the Lords’ debates, which lacked Irish Nationalist and Labour members 
and were attended only by Conservatives and several recently nominated 
Liberal peers. Not unlike the Herrenhaus in Prussia and the First Chamber 
in Sweden, the Lords could have turned into a bastion of conservatism, 
its members not needing to worry about the electoral consequences of 
expressing traditionalist views. However, British Conservative peers talked 
rather positively about democracy in the wartime situation, redescribing 
it creatively into a democracy to their liking. James Gascoyne-Cecil, the 
Marquess of Salisbury, an opponent of the Parliament Act, wondered:1097 
Why should the Government . . . wish to avoid controversy except through the 
weakness of the esh? Aer all this is a democratic country which prides itself 
on the fact that it governs itself, and to smuggle a Bill through when people are 
thinking of something else does not seem to me the right way to be loyal to the 
democratic institutions of our country.
Lord Sydenham, a defender of a stronger hereditary House of Lords and 
an opponent of democracy, likewise used the pre-war Conservative 
understanding of democracy to justify the anti-reformist line. In insisting 
that ‘no revolutionary change’ should be carried out before ‘the will of 
the people’ had been consulted through a new election, Sydenham urged 
the Lords to ‘vindicate the principles of the Constitution and incidentally 
the theory of democracy’.1098 Henry Petty-Fitzmaurice, 5th Marquess 
of Lansdowne, who had made a career as an imperial administrator and 
key minister, shared these aristocratic views and declared: ‘We live in 
a democracy. We are fulsome in our professions of faith in the democratic 
system. Surely the essence of a democratic system is that the ascertained 
will of the people should prevail.’1099 Opposition to the bill was rhetorically 
redened by Lansdowne as the defence of constitutional ‘democracy’ 
against ‘revolution’. In leist public discourse, Lansdowne’s sincerity in 
calling for democracy had been questioned on both sides of the Atlantic 
as an attempt to save the aristocracy.1100 Denitions of ‘Tory democracy’ 
familiar from pre-war opposition to Liberal reforms continued to be used 
1096 Hansard, William Redmond, 5 December 1917, c. 560, 562.
1097 Lords, e Marquess of Salisbury, 17 December 1917, c. 164.
1098 Lords, Lord Sydenham, 17 December 1917, c. 210; also Alexander Bruce, 6th 
Lord Balfour of Burleigh (Unionist), 9 January 1918, c. 214.
1099 Lords, Marquess of Lansdowne, 9 January 1918, c. 442.
1100 e Times, ‘More Criticism of the Lansdowne Letter’, 4 December 1917; e 
Herald, ‘A Republican’s Fears’, 15 December 1917.
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by the Conservative opposition: Britain was already a democratic country 
based on parliamentary government. e War Coalition was abusing the 
democratic institution by introducing a radical reform in wartime when 
neither Parliament nor the public could concentrate on such changes. 
Whether such rhetoric would convince many outside the Lords in late 1917 
was another matter. On the far le, e Herald, for instance, declared that 
the rulers of Britain had shamefully ‘not fought democracy in the open, but 
have used its own sacred name to destroy itself ’,1101 an indication that the 
awareness of political language games was high.
At the same time, Lord Haldane, a leading Liberal, ironically pointed to 
how the Conservative Party was becoming more democratic, being ‘infected 
with the spirit, and [claiming] to represent democracy’. For Haldane himself, 
democracy stood for ‘government by the whole of the people of the nation 
with the exception and exclusion of those who are unt’ (but not excluding 
women). Democracy was as impossible to resist as the tide of the Atlantic 
(a very Wilsonian metaphor referring to trans-Atlantic discourses), and the 
extension of the representation of the nation was a way to keep potentially 
revolutionary movements in check.1102 Some British Liberals evidently used 
democracy as a normative concept for setting criteria for the constitution.
e debate on democracy was participated in from quite a dierent 
perspective by Baron Parmoor, a pacist peer who sympathised with Labour 
and was inclined to international leism. Parmoor recognised that the 
proposed reform was a way to allow the expression of ‘the democracy of 
the time’,1103 with democracy appearing as an irresistible transnational trend. 
Parmoor dened the concept in arguing for proportional representation as 
the way to proper democracy:1104
I have no fear of democracy. I welcome it, but with this proviso – that the 
democracy must be, a true and not a false one. It must be a democracy that is 
really representative. . . . We want the co-operation of all classes of this country. . 
. . We want to get rid as far as possible of friction and antagonism.
Parmoor held a leist understanding of democracy, in which the proposed 
parliamentary reform would increase political and social cohesion by 
removing party and class confrontations and lead to further later reforms. 
e Lords should use their constitutional rights to advance ‘a democratic 
cooperation between classes’ rather than ‘a democracy which may lead 
to friction and trouble’.1105 Parmoor’s reasoning was supported by his 
transnational acquaintance with Swedish Liberal and revisionist Social 
Democratic ideals on democracy, not by the concept of class struggle.
Baron Burnham (Liberal Unionist), also held an optimistic conception 
of democracy as a means to unite a class society, but his conclusion diered 
1101 e Herald, ‘A Clean Sweep, a Clean Peace’, 15 December 1917.
1102 Lords, Lord Haldane, 9 January 1918, c. 428. 
1103 Lords, Lord Parmoor, 17 December 1917, c. 194. 
1104 Lords, Lord Parmoor, 17 December 1917, c. 194. 
1105 Lords, Lord Parmoor, 17 December 1917, c. 195, 200. 
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from that of Parmoor. For Burnham, British democracy had already brought 
the classes closer to each other so that ‘to talk of the governing classes 
now is almost a contradiction in terms’ when ‘all the classes are governing 
classes’.1106 is was an overstatement used to counter leist discourse, but it 
also reects a belief in democracy as a way to build national unity. Burnham, 
like Parmoor, was arguing for proportional representation as a check on 
majority rule:
Democracy, . . . is oen unjust and oen cruel, but its worst vice is its tendency 
on all occasions, if it can, to suppress minority opinion; and you cannot guard 
against the danger by any system of representation I know . . . unless you follow 
the sure rule which gives minorities their proper weight in the aairs of the State, 
and carries out Burke’s maxim that—‘the virtue, the spirit, the essence of the 
House of Commons consists in its being the express image of the nation.’
It would be through proportional representation that the best possible 
democracy would be achieved. Any ‘tyranny of the mob’ would be avoided 
by ‘giving democracy a fair chance’ through proportional representation.1107 
Burnham’s optimism is also reected by his questioning of previous 
predictions of the levelling consequences of the introduction of democracy. 
Instead, he oered a positive forecast of the evolutionary potential of 
a democratic constitution reformulated by the people:1108
I do not believe that the form of Government makes the character of the people. 
On the contrary, I believe that the character of the people moulds and forms 
the Government. If our character is sound, so I believe, under all the conditions 
of the wide and popular franchise we are now creating, the institutions will be 
sound and stable too.
Britain, as the pioneer of parliamentary government, had provided 
precedents for the entire civilised world and continued to have a particular 
mission in the advancement of democracy of this kind.1109
Some other Liberals in the meantime rejected democracy as a normative 
concept: even the 85-year-old Leonard Courtney, 1st Baron Courtney 
of Penwith, a former professor of political economy and a peer with 
progressive views on parliamentary reform, expressed doubts concerning 
‘the enthronement of a democracy’ and was worried about the socialist 
revolutionaries taking over the concept, and mutilating democracy into 
the rule of one class. Some other term might hence be more appropriate to 
describe the goals of the new British legislature:1110
at word ‘democracy’ is one that I am not very fond of using. It seems to me 
that we are in great danger of employing it, as I think it I oen see it employed, 
1106 Lords, Lord Burnham, 17 December 1917, c. 203.
1107 Lords, Lord Burnham, 17 December 1917, c. 209. 
1108 Lords, Lord Burnham, 17 December 1917, c. 209.
1109 Lords, Lord Burnham, 17 December 1917, c. 209.
1110 Lords, Lord Courtney, 18 December 1917, c. 248. 
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as a mere word of cant, not covering what is properly understood by democracy, 
but what in a confused way is limited to one class, oen the most numerous 
class of the community. ere is a spirit abroad which suggests that democracy 
and proletariat are identical, the same thing. I venture to suggest that history, 
experience, and clear thought demand that there shall be no confusion between 
these terms.
is conceptual problematisation of democracy arose from the increasingly 
ideologically contested nature of democracy in the aermath of the 
Bolshevik Revolution. Courtney wanted to reform the British parliament 
but not to have it associated with a concept that could be interpreted as 
referring to the power of the proletariat. Courtney’s Parliament would 
express ‘the whole mind of the nation’ and constitute ‘the People’s House’; it 
would be inclusive of all classes. He was, furthermore, still unsure whether 
the current bill would create a Parliament that would reect ‘the exact image 
of the outer nation which it professes to represent’ – as had been proposed 
by Edmund Burke. Proportional representation, by contrast, would ‘make 
the Parliament of the future a true representative of the whole mind of the 
nation and the exhaustive collection of the opinions of the kingdom’.1111 
Several Liberal lords had visions of a democracy based on a new kind 
of (proportional) representation and contemplated the alternatives more 
freely than the party politicians of the Commons. However, their views 
counted little in the legislative process. Even less signicant was the ultra-
conservative opinion: William Hugh Cliord, 10th Baron of Cliord of 
Chudleigh, could well suggest that it was impossible to govern by the will 
of the people as ‘the people is a herd’, that the rise of democracy inevitably 
led to civil wars and that a civil war was to be expected in Britain unless the 
aristocracy was allowed to lead ‘the mass of society . . . to success’.1112 No 
other speaker echoed such traditionalist views, although in the Lords there 
was no restriction on their free expression.
e Lords made a controversial decision in adopting an amendment 
in favour of proportional representation, which had already been rejected 
by the Commons no matter what its ‘democratic’ justication might be. 
Such an independent use of constitutional power by the upper house 
provoked claims that the Lords was being revolutionary in a way that 
endangered democracy. William Burdett-Coutts (Conservative) expressed 
his unhappiness about the amendment, although he considered that the 
former inuence of the Lords had provided a counterweight to radical 
political changes such as the French Revolution. anks to the Lords, ‘the 
freest and most democratic Constitution in the world’ had been secured in 
the past, but now, Burdett-Coutts claimed, the peers had adopted a purely 
academic notion of proportional representation.1113 He presented the British 
constitution as the most democratic one existing. British democracy had 
grown in an evolutionary manner and lacked the revolutionary fervour of 
the Continental kind. What the Lords were doing was, in Burdett-Coutts’ 
1111 Lords, Lord Courtney, 18 December 1917, c. 249–51. 
1112 Lords, Baron Cliord, 8 January 1918, c. 369.
1113 Hansard, William Burdett-Couts, 30 January 1918, c. 1605.
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partisan rhetoric, participating in a ‘great revolution’ that would destroy the 
delicate balance of that excellent constitution. e Commons should thus 
throw out the amendment and retain the bill in a form which would ensure 
‘the future welfare of democratic government in this country’.1114 Even more 
than in other parliaments, the dynamics of British parliamentary discourse 
led to argumentative and rhetorical uses of ‘democracy’ determined by the 
political interests of the moment and building creatively on the linguistic 
resources of the time.
e Commons rejected the amendment, which gave rise to some 
disappointed protests in the upper house about its traditional constitutional 
status being ignored.1115 Most peers conceded, however, that the reform 
would take place anyway. e supporters just wanted to see that ‘this great 
change in democratic government’ would be a decent one,1116 and they argued 
for ‘giving a fair chance to this tremendous experiment in democracy’.1117 By 
1918, the majority of the British peers had recognised the inevitability of 
the transformation, and many were already dening the political system as 
essentially democratic. At the other end of the ideological spectrum, e 
Herald, in which the reality of British democracy and parliamentarism had 
been questioned in comparison with ‘that very process of democratisation 
… in Germany’, was now also ready to declare that ‘the hour of democracy 
comes’.1118 is was an instance of an interpretation according to which 
Britain was about to become a democracy that was spreading in a variety of 
political circles in spring 1918. 
4.1.4  ‘Women in Parliament, in Governments’:  
 The widening involvement of the people in politics
e feeling that the political character of the British people and hence the 
relationship between the people and politicians was changing also found 
expression in both Houses. Appeals to the people were generally regarded as 
authoritative arguments in endeavours to legitimate policies and Parliament 
as an institution. Yet the legitimacy of the procedure of constitutional 
reform was questioned by Hardinge Giard (Conservative), the 1st Earl 
of Halsbury, a former Lord Chancellor, complier of an encyclopaedia on 
e Laws of England and old opponent of the Parliament Act, who argued 
that it constituted a needless reinvigoration of unsolved conicts, created 
disturbances in a war-faring polity and was vitiated by the impossibility of 
critical debate in wartime.1119 is was an example of even an arch-aristocrat 
rhetorically turning to the people as the source of legitimacy. According to 
Lord Curzon, the Leader of the House, the bill was by no means based on 
any plot that bypassed the constitution but was instead ‘a Parliament Bill, 
1114 Hansard, William Burdett-Couts, 30 January 1918, c. 1609. 
1115 Lords, Earl Curzon, 6 February 1918, c. 403–404.
1116 Lords, Burnham, 6 February 1918, c. 412.
1117 Lords, William Palmer (Liberal), e Earl of Selborne, 6 February 1918, c. 412.
1118 e Herald, ‘e Prussian Reform Bill’, 15 December 1917; ‘Appeal to the 
Congress’, 29 December 1917; cf. ‘For Peace or Revolution?’ and ‘At Home & 
Abroad’ by e Herald, 9 February 1918.
1119 Lords, e Earl of Halsbury, 18 December 1917, c. 227.
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a People’s Bill, a Nation’s Bill, in which the Government have given such 
assistance as they can to enable Parliament and the people at large to carry 
into eect the views which at any rate a very large number of them are believed 
to hold’.1120 e Conservative elite did not hesitate to use a combination of 
parliamentary and popular rhetoric to get this bill through – especially in 
this case as it was Curzon’s parliamentary duty to ensure its smooth passage.
e relationship between parliamentary and public discourse was 
a recurrent theme in the British reform process, which is reective of the 
fact that the sophisticated relationship between Parliament and the press 
was felt to be out of balance. While Conservative opponents of the bill 
suggested that the lack of a proper public debate made it questionable to 
decide on such a major constitutional amendment in wartime, John Dillon, 
an Irish extreme reformist, put forward an opposite argument, suggesting 
that the press had obtained disproportionate inuence over the government 
in the question of the surage of conscientious objectors, for instance.1121 
Lord Weardale, a leading anti-suragist, likewise lamented the replacement 
of ‘a Parliamentary régime’ with ‘a Press régime, where the Press practically 
governs the country, and not always the best part of the Press, to the detriment 
of popular and constitutional government’. Governments had been changed 
as a consequence of press campaigns, which had replaced ‘Parliamentary 
action’.1122 An alternative way of thinking was presented by Colin Coyote 
(Liberal), who assumed that ‘the deliberations of this House, and of the 
nation’ had taken place side by side despite the war.1123 ere was also the 
traditionalist virtual representation kind of argument that extending voting 
rights was unnecessary as ‘public opinion’ took care of the advancement of 
women’s rights.1124 Lord Burnham, the owner of e Daily Telegraph, who 
supported proportional representation, depicted the potential inuence of 
the newspaper press in relation to the parliamentary system: if the reform 
was not realised, only the press would be available for minorities to express 
their views.1125 
More serious from the point of view of the parliamentary elite was 
a  suggestion of Roundell Palmer (Conservative) that strong anti-party 
and anti-politician feelings existed throughout the country and that 
these decreased condence in Parliament as well.1126 Politics appeared to 
the common man and woman as a sinister game played by the parties in 
Parliament. ere was a shared understanding among the parliamentary 
elite that measures had to be taken to restore the legitimacy of Parliament 
by allowing a larger segment of the population to vote. It was particularly 
important to activate the soldiers: they were ‘our own people at large’ and ‘the 
most loyal and the most public-spirited of our people’, as Conservative lords 
1120 Lords, Earl Curzon, 19 December 1917, c. 288–9.
1121 Hansard, John Dillon, 4 December 1917, c. 299, 303.
1122 Lords, 8 January 1918, c. 346–7.
1123 Hansard, Colin Coyote, 4 December 1917, c. 360; cf. Seaward & Ihalainen 2016.
1124 Lords, Viscount Bryce, 17 December 1917, c. 181–2, 186; cf. Ihalainen 2010.
1125 Lords, Lord Burnham, 17 December 1917, c. 205–207. 
1126 Hansard, Roundell Palmer, 30 January 1918, c. 1655–6; cf. the reports on the 
mood in Germany discussed in subsection 3.2.1.
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put it,1127 recycling the stereotype of an armed male citizen. Robert Crewe-
Milnes (Liberal), 1st Marquess of Crewe and former Secretary of State for 
the Colonies, leader of the House and Lord President of the Council, spoke 
about a ‘great citizen army’.1128 In the Marquess of Salisbury, a Conservative 
Privy Councillor, this widening of the concept of the people as a consequence 
of the war led to the important conclusion that it was necessary to extend 
surage to cover all men and women. Aer the joint national experiences 
of the Great War, democratic surage could be justied on race- rather 
than gender-bound grounds as the political virtues of the entire population 
independently of their social rank had been demonstrated:1129
I have great condence in my countrymen. I believe that they all share the public 
spirit, the political instinct, the administrative capacity, which are characteristic 
of the race to which they belong. ey do not dier diametrically from the classes 
above them. . . . ey have the same instinct and the same high quality. I am 
willing to trust them. . . . I ventured to urge . . . that it was necessary and in the 
highest interest of the State that we should trust the working classes, and that the 
old attitude of suspicion and want of condence should be swept away. . . . We 
are not afraid of them; we are prepared to trust them; . . . . ere is no reason 
why we should not trust the women. ey belong to the same race and have no 
doubt the same instincts. 
Among some Conservatives, such justications of the extension of surage 
were connected to concerns about the consequences for both the old elites 
and the political community at large.1130 Hence, despite his principally 
positive argumentation, Salisbury spoke against immediate women’s 
surage.1131 He categorised citizens, furthermore, into ‘the most loyal 
citizens the soldiers’ and ‘the less loyal citizens of the Empire’, who could 
be found particularly in Ireland.1132 He was opposed to ‘introducing politics 
amongst the troops’ by holding elections before the end of the war.1133 us 
an opponent of immediate reform was – reective of the pressures of the 
wartime – speaking reformist language.
Some peers still maintained that women were not ready to receive the 
political right to vote. According to James Bryce (Liberal), the majority 
of women lacked the knowledge and interest in public aairs that would 
advance the cause of the nation: 
ey do not meet and talk about politics; they do not attend meetings; they do 
not read political news, as we all know, in the way in which men do . . .  [H]ow 
many women whom we know . . . read the political news or know anything of 
what is passing in the political sphere?1134 
1127 Lords, Marquess of Salisbury, 17 December 1917, c. 165–6, 175.
1128 Lords, e Marquess of Crewe, 18 December 1917, c. 256.
1129 Lords, e Marquess of Salisbury, 17 December 1917, c. 167–8.
1130 Lords, e Marquess of Salisbury, 11 December 1917, c. 169–70.
1131 Lords, e Marquess of Salisbury, 11 December 1917, c. 168–9.
1132 Lords, e Marquess of Salisbury, 11 December 1917, c. 173.
1133 Lords, e Marquess of Salisbury, 11 December 1917, c. 174.
1134 Lords, Viscount Bryce, 17 December 1917, c. 183.
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eir assumed lack of interest thus excluded women from the privilege of 
being involved in politics.1135 For Bryce, politics remained a gendered sphere 
of activity in which men sitting in Parliament were the qualied agents 
although at times of election this sphere could be extended to include other 
males as well. Women had other roles in politics and public life and would do 
better wait until they were properly qualied to receive surage. Bryce could 
not see any ‘brighter and better era’ following the entrance of women into 
Parliament either: it was doubtful whether ‘we shall have politically a new 
heaven and a new earth’ or whether ‘women will bring a purer and nobler 
spirit into politics’.1136 Lord Sydenham – a developer of conspiracy theories 
who was afraid of ‘a triumph of feminism’ of the type witnessed in Australia 
– did not hesitate to accuse British suragists of encouraging Germany to 
wage war against a weakened British polity in which even women could 
disturb the established order. Women should not be allowed to govern the 
British Empire as they might support socialism and thereby ruin the entire 
state.1137 Henry Chaplin (Conservative) was utterly opposed to the idea of 
having ‘women in Parliament, in Governments’.1138 e gendered character 
of politics was strongly defended by a handful of peers, some of them of 
considerable academic standing, even though the party as a whole had 
decided to embrace female surage.
e claim about women’s lack of interest in politics and their failure 
to attend political meetings or read newspapers was disputed by several 
other peers.1139 Earl Russell (inclined towards Labour) argued that women 
should be given a vote as human beings, not in the expectation of better 
politics. It was unjustied to deny women surage by claiming that male 
voters understood ‘all the political considerations’ linked to voting: indeed, 
many a male who had ‘never bothered his head about politics’ would now 
be allowed to vote. Women may have lacked ‘political education’, but they 
had demonstrated their capability of political action and should hence be 
allowed to vote.1140 e Church of England had also become convinced 
of the necessity of the extension: Arthur Winnington-Ingram, the Bishop 
of London, pointed out that women would be needed in the post-war 
reconstruction of the country and should hence be represented.1141 Randall 
Davidson, Archbishop of Canterbury, interpreted the division of the 
Commons to indicate that the time for women’s surage had come and 
that any other decision by the Lords would just split the nation.1142 e war 
experience had evidently united much of the nation behind the decision. 
e justication for the reform came from outside Parliament.
1135 Lords, Viscount Bryce, 17 December 1917, c. 183–5.
1136 Lords, Viscount Bryce, 17 December 1917, c. 185.
1137 Lords, Lord Sydenham, 17 December 1917, c. 212–13.
1138 Lords, Viscount Chaplin, 18 December 1917, c. 235–6.
1139 Lords, Lord Burnham, 17 December 1917, c. 201–202; e Marquess of Crewe, 
18 December 1917, c. 258; Lord Buckmaster, 19 December 1917, c. 269–74.
1140 Lords, Earl Russell, 17 December 1917, c. 216–18.
1141 Lords, Arthur Winnington-Ingram, 9 January 1918, c. 458.
1142 Lords, Randall Davidson, 10 January 1918, c. 481–3.
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Some peers might doubt the political qualications of women, but few 
questioned the political potential of the people during the nal stages of 
the bill, as for instance some members of the upper house in Sweden did. 
Speakers from all political groups referred to ‘the people’ or ‘the nation’, 
whose representation in Parliament should be extended. Lord Haldane 
(Liberal) insisted that ‘Parliament is entitled to take cognisance of the changes 
which are going on outside its own walls’ – to interpret public opinion.1143 
Reective of the patriotic and nationalistic wartime spirit is Baron Parmore’s 
description of Parliament as ‘a reex of national life’ and ‘representative 
of all the forces and ideas which in the aggregate we connote by the term 
“nationality”’.1144 e concepts of the people and nation had traditionally 
been nearly synonymous in British parliamentary discourse, but Parmoor’s 
persuasive rhetoric reects an emphasis on the national community as 
being strengthened by the war rather than on popular sovereignty only. 
His message was addressed especially to Conservative peers. e people 
as a nation were entering British politics as a consequence of the war, 
a nationalist interpretation that overshadowed some of the potentially more 
radical implications of democracy. 
4.1.5  The future of a democratic parliamentary polity 
 after the war
Just as the British parliamentary elite generally agreed about the experience 
of the war uniting the nation and the need to engage the people in politics, 
most of them shared a feeling that the parliamentary system was about to 
change as a consequence of the entry of the masses into politics in ways 
from which there was no going back. e constitution and the functioning 
of the political system simply needed to be updated. As Roundell Palmer 
who had warned about popular discontent with Parliament, put it: ‘You have 
to face a new England, a new party situation, and a new set of problems, and 
those cannot be dealt with by the old methods.’1145 Parliament, too, had to 
adapt itself to new the political circumstances created by the war.
Many described Parliament as being easily adaptable. Herbert  Samuel 
(Liberal) set out to dene the lengthy process of debating on the constitu-
tional reform as one that would save Britain from revolutionary fervour in 
the future:1146
[W]e shall undoubtedly have to pass through times of stress and of diculty, and 
there may be a revolutionary feeling in the air; but the great safeguard against 
revolution always has been, and is now, wise constitutional reform, and it is only 
when the masses of our people see that our political institutions are broad-based 
and a real expression of the popular will, and that there is full and free access 
to Parliament for all sections and classes of the community, that the spirit of 
revolution can be exorcised.
1143 Lords, Lord Haldane, 9 January 1918, c. 422. 
1144 Lords, Lord Parmoor, 17 December 1917, c. 193.
1145 Hansard, Roundell Palmer, 30 January 1918, c. 1162.
1146 Hansard, Herbert Samuel, 7 December 1917, c. 824.
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is description of the political process demonstrates an understanding of 
the constitution as an evolutionary instrument for dening the functioning 
of a political community. e goal of the reform had been to demonstrate to 
an extended British people the genuinely popular base of Parliament and to 
thereby restore the legitimacy of the institution, which was under pressure 
as a result of the war. e reform showed how the British state was able to 
‘perfect our constitutional and electoral system’ even in time of war.1147 
William Peel, Viscount Peel, introduced the bill to the Lords using 
related though dierently formulated ideas about ‘enormous changes’ 
being vital in order to prepare the country for solving a variety of post-
war problems that were likely to give rise to ‘clamorous voices outside the 
gates of Parliament’.1148 Potential revolutionary tendencies aer the war, the 
threat of which had become acute aer the Bolshevik Revolution, would 
be dampened with a wartime parliamentary reform. A similar argument 
on the electoral reform passed by Parliament being an ecient antidote to 
revolution was made by Earl Russell, a peer close to Labour:1149
[W]e grant the vote for . . . the protection of the State, in order that through the 
ballot-box the State may learn, from the organised opinion of those who have 
grievances and who desire their remedy, what those grievances are. I suggest 
that the vote is granted nowadays . . . as a substitute for riot, revolution, and the 
rie. We grant the surage in order that we may learn in an orderly and civilised 
manner what the people who are governed want.
e strengthening of the connection between popular opinion and 
Parliament would make the British polity stronger by removing the 
causes for direct action, which seemed to be on the rise internationally 
and which had been experienced in British history so many times before. 
William Adamson (Labour) concluded in line with Samuel and Peel that 
constitutional reform ‘as a safety valve is one of the greatest assets that any 
country could possess’.1150 e momentum for transition was considered 
unique by the majority of the Conservatives as well. As the Chancellor 
Bonar Law put it, the degree of party confrontation around the proposal had 
been considerably reduced by the war from what it had previously been.1151 
Some peers saw the global future and world order beyond the British 
Empire as matters for deliberation. Courtney (Liberal) referred to Wilsonian 
ideas about the founding of an international organisation that would use 
diplomacy to prevent further wars and coordinate economic cooperation 
between the member countries. e name of an organisation based on 
a fundamental rethinking of the world order had not yet been established 
– it might be ‘the Family of Nations’, ‘the Society of Nations’ or ‘the League 
1147 Hansard, Herbert Samuel, 7 December 1917, c. 824.
1148 Lords, Viscount Peel, 11 December 1917, c. 102. Such voices were not heard in 
Westminster – unlike Stockholm and Helsinki – owing to the continuation of the 
wartime party truce and the distance of the assembly halls from the streets.
1149 Lords, Earl Russell, 17 December 1917, c. 216–17.
1150 Hansard, William Adamson, 7 December 1917, c. 826.
1151 Hansard, Andrew Bonar Law, 7 December 1917, c. 825–6.
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of Nations’1152 and reminded ‘the Parliament of Man’ which had sometimes 
been envisioned by nineteenth-century British internationalists. Given the 
internationally discussed plans and the serious domestic problems awaiting 
a solution aer the war, the British people should design their representative 
institution already during the war since the extent of the challenges justied 
‘abnormal’ legislative measures. Britain needed a ‘Legislature of the future 
competent for the discussions of the future’.1153 
A particularly vivid description of the renewal of parliamentary 
surage initiated by the joint war eort was put forward by Lord Lytton, 
a Conservative reformist, who suggested that a parliamentary polity based 
on a broad popular legitimacy would be better prepared to meet the future 
challenges. Lytton’s thinking combined Conservative pessimism with trust 
in the potential of popular government:1154 
e future is certainly dark, impenetrably dark and uncertain, and the only light 
by which we can be guided is that which we carry in our own hands, . . . the light 
which comes from faith in our cause and condence in our people. . . . the Bill is 
a trumpet call blown in the midst of the battle to the democracy of this country. 
It is at the same moment an expression of condence and an appeal for help.
By ‘democracy’ Lytton was referring within the traditional framework of 
a mixed government to the people at large, whose support legitimated the 
work of Parliament, an institution separate from the people. His thinking 
was patriarchal, even patronising: the bill demonstrated to the people: ‘We 
trust you with the destinies of this country; and as for the future, though we 
cannot see, we need not fear what it may bring, because we shall face it as one 
people with united eorts and with a single purpose.’1155 e people, in turn, 
would have a stronger trust in parliamentary government once Parliament 
had demonstrated its readiness for compromise, as Charles Stuart-Wortley 
(Conservative), 1st Baron Stuart of Wortley, pointed out. is experienced 
Conservative politician viewed the reform as a demonstration of the 
continuing status of the British polity as a model:1156
[I]t has provided for the whole civilised world the most splendid evidence of 
our national strength; evidence, too, that this country is still devoted to those 
political ideals which have placed it in the lead of all free peoples in the world, 
and is determined that even in the great discussions that are before us there shall 
1152 Andrew Bonar Law also referred to the future League of Nations, which might 
already have been created by the Inter-Parliamentary Union had there been time 
for it before the war. Hansard, 30 January 1918, c. 1676. An interesting point is 
the unrealised possibility of constructing the organisation on the basis of inter- 
and transnational parliamentarism. e League of Nations, too, would have 
a parliamentary assembly. On this change in international relations produced by 
the war, see Götz 2005, 267.
1153 Lords, Lord Courtney, 18 December 1917, c. 247–8. 
1154 Lords, Earl of Lytton, 19 December 1917, c. 281.
1155 Lords, Earl of Lytton, 19 December 1917, c. 281.
1156 Lords, Lord Stuart of Wortley, 19 December 1917, c. 286.
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be the fewest possible number of unenfranchised citizens taking part in those 
discussions . . . 
Britain was thus demonstrating to the observing world that it was a true 
democracy – or, at least, the leader of the ‘free peoples’.
When the bill was returned to the Commons aer amendments by the 
Lords, the arguments defending it in its original form were mostly repeated 
in a spirit of lower-house parliamentarism, though some supporters of 
the amendments also emerged. Robert Cecil (Conservative), from the 
perspective of a former parliamentary civil servant, wanted to prepare 
Parliament for further constitutional challenges and develop it as part of the 
democratic system:1157
 
It seems to me to be wilfully shutting our eyes to suppose that the House of 
Commons occupies the same position of inuence and authority as it used 
to occupy or that it is in a position to stand the very serious test which I am 
convinced the next few years will impose upon all our constitutional machinery. 
I believe we must go back to the rst principles of democracy. I am not saying that 
a good deal might not be said for and against democracy as a general principle. 
I am quite certain that a democratic form of government is the only possible form 
of government for this country, and that it ought to be made the very best form 
of democracy that we can make it. I am perfectly convinced of that.
By January 1918, the Representation of the People Bill could thus be 
interpreted, at least by an MP who contributed actively to the planning of 
the League of Nations, as touching on the very principles of representative 
democracy as the future political system. Democracy, despite its obvious 
shortcomings, provided the best available basis for political order, building 
as it did on the tradition of ‘representative institutions’.1158 Once such pro-
democracy statements began to appear among the Conservatives in the 
British parliament, the British act, too, could be seen as a major step towards 
building a democratic political system. Proportional representation, for 
instance, would help to realise ‘the true principle of democracy’, the accurate 
representation of the electorate.1159 It was the Bolshevik Revolution that 
persuaded Cecil to declare the strengthening of representative democracy 
by strengthening parliamentary institutions as the only way forward:1160
[I]n the course of the next few years we in this country, and, I believe, the people 
of every country in Europe, are going to have great tests applied to the solidity 
and the reasonableness of our institutions and to many of our most cherished 
1157 Hansard, Robert Cecil, 30 January 1918, c. 1647–8.
1158 Hansard, Robert Cecil, 30 January 1918, c. 1649–50.
1159 Hansard, Robert Cecil, 30 January 1918, c. 1649.
1160 Hansard, Robert Cecil, 30 January 1918, c. 1650; see Ihalainen 2010. e Times 
had published a letter by Kerensky in which he questioned the democratic 
character of Bolshevik rule. ‘e Voice of M. Kerensky’, 7 December 1917. 
Trotsky was reported to have said that it was the right of a ‘democracy’ to crush 
another class. ‘Trotsky Against the Cadets’, 18 December 1917.
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beliefs. I wish to see our Constitution made as strong, as vigorous, and as well-
founded as possible, in order to resist the shock of the times that are coming 
upon us.
Cecil, who was a visionary in seeing the future pan-European challenges 
to democracy and parliamentarism, regarded parliamentarism as an 
antidote to radicalism. In Britain, the constitutional reform for which 
he spoke would be successful, winning the support of a great majority 
of the old elite, maintaining the essence of the old constitution while 
democratising it to a degree sucient to absorb the pressures of the time. 
With its reform Britain would avoid ‘the paralysis of Parliaments’ and related 
revolutionary developments.1161 e story of the transition to democracy 
and parliamentarism would not be quite such a fortunate one in the leading 
enemy country. It would also be more confrontational in Sweden and 
Finland.
4.2  Germany: Democratisation and parliamentarisation come  
 to a halt
Constitutional debates had been intensied in Germany during spring 1917 
by diculties encountered in the war and on the home front, the tendency 
of the Entente war propaganda to present a change in the German political 
system as a war goal, the Russian Revolution and the US declaration of war. 
In practice, pressures for constitutional changes which had been expressed 
forcefully by several leists and a few centrists in March were buried 
in the committees of the Reichstag and did not lead – despite a further 
parliamentary attempt in July 1917 – to any governmental initiative on 
reform. e German ‘inter-party conference’, if one is permitted to draw 
an imperfect parallel with the British extraordinary body, was limited to 
the activities of the parliamentary committees and failed in the end both in 
forcing through a constitutional reform and in restoring peace. 
On 27 June 1917 – simultaneously with the Finnish debate on parlia-
mentary sovereignty – the parliamentary representatives of the Social 
Democrats were again calling for an electoral reform in Prussia, which had 
been vaguely promised by the Chancellor and the Kaiser in spring. e 
committees were still discussing constitutional questions in early July 1917, 
when the Social Democrats, the liberals and the Catholic Centre formed a new 
Inter-Party Committee.1162 is led to a confrontation between the General 
Sta and the Reichstag majority, which reached a climax in connection with 
debates on further war loans when the Majority Social Democrats, breaking 
the wartime party truce, promised to approve further funding only if a peace 
resolution were accepted at the same time.1163 ese expectations for reform, 
which intensied in July, also had a transnational signicance: promises by 
1161 Taken up in e Herald, ‘For Peace or Revolution?’ 9 February 1918.
1162 Leonhard 2014, 738.
1163 Gusy 1997, 5.
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the Chancellor and the Kaiser in April to amend the Prussian surage system 
aected discourses on democratisation and parliamentarisation in Sweden 
and Finland. e timing and content of the German debates of late March 
and July 1917 mattered for Finnish parliamentarians, for instance, since 
they gave the impression of a transnational revolution. If both Russia and 
Germany, the geographically proximate great powers became democracies, 
then why not Sweden and Finland?
As we saw in section 3.2, the adoption of the defence of ‘democracy’ 
against ‘Prussianism’ as a major ideological war goal of the Entente provoked 
a new kind of debate on the signicance and implications of democracy 
in Germany. e frequent use of the term ‘democracy’ in calls for the 
reconsideration of the German constitution increased polarisation between 
the Social Democrats and the right. Scholars have dated this polarisation to 
the summer of 1917, but we found it already in the reform debates of late 
autumn 1916 and early spring 1917. A new cycle of discourse followed in 
July. Hugo Haase – the leader of the far-le Independent Social Democrats 
and a friend of the Marxist theoretician Karl Kautsky – demanded the 
full democratisation of the German constitution and the administration 
of the Reich and the federal states.1164 e current leader of the Social 
Democrats, Friedrich Ebert, repeating the Social Democratic arguments 
of late March, likewise stated on 3 July 1917 that the democratic reform 
of the German political order was essential for both the internal and the 
external strength of the country.1165 ese interventions provided support 
for the simultaneous calls for full parliamentary sovereignty by the Social 
Democratic parliamentary majority in Finland, although the inspiration for 
the rhetoric of the Finns came from the Bolsheviks in Petrograd.
When suggestions for reform by the majority of the Constitutional 
Committee were introduced on 6 July 1917, it was emphasised by Dr. Ernst 
Müller (Progressivists) that the extensions of surage had been agreed 
on in principle by the large parties before the war and that only the war 
had led to their postponement. In his view, the moderate proposal of the 
Constitutional Committee consisted mainly of an increase in the number 
of constituencies and the introduction of proportional representation and 
could hence be passed.1166 Matthias Erzberger of the Catholic Centre took 
a major risk when speaking in the Main Committee about the need to solve 
the constitutional crisis of the Reich, thus deviating from the stances of 
several leading members of his party, although the centrist leaders generally 
were condent about the potential of the Reichstag to achieve reforms.1167
For the Social Democrats, the compromise proposal was insucient. 
According to Georg Gradnauer, a journalist with Vorwärts, the proposal 
constituted no real political reorganisation and watered down the surage 
reform. Vorwärts had been critical of the ‘oligarchical’ or ‘dictatorial’ 
features of existing parliamentary systems, too, which in its view made 
1164 Bollmeyer 2007, 136.
1165 Llanque 2000, 200.
1166 Verhandlungen, Ernst Müller-Meinigen, 6 July 1917, 3507.
1167 Grosser 1970, 122, 134.
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them far from ideal for the self-government of the people. e Social 
Democrats would begin to rethink their attitudes to parliamentarism more 
generally aer the July crisis, beginning to see parliamentary elections as 
a way to engage the people in the aairs of the state and also accepting the 
idea of participating in a parliamentary government. Even so, theoretical 
criticism of parliamentarism as a plutocratic system of representation and 
warnings about its degenerating eects on the workers’ parties continued 
to appear in German Social Democratic circles, which still prioritised 
the democratisation of surage over parliamentarisation.1168 us the 
parliamentary model provided by the German Social Democrats for the 
Swedes and Finns was certainly not an uncritical one, although it could also 
be used to support the idea of the Social Democratic takeover of parliaments 
through universal surage. 
During the July crisis, the German Social Democrats thus focused on 
the extension of surage. A proposal for women’s surage was missing 
from the compromise proposal. According to Gradnauer, in this respect 
Germany lagged behind countries such as Australia, Britain, the United 
States, Norway and Denmark. Gradnauer pointed out that in Finland, which 
he probably knew little about but which provided him with a peripheral 
example to underscore the backwardness of the German Reich, ‘An entire 
row of highly capable women sit in Parliament.’ In Revolutionary Russia, 
too, women’s surage was being planned. Particularly bitter was the fact 
that Britain was preparing to introduce women’s surage in elections for the 
House of Commons, whereas Germany did not intend to do anything about 
the matter.1169 Here Britain appeared again as the standard, which annoyed 
the right. us it was possible for a Social Democrat to make constitutional 
comparisons not only between Germany and the Allied powers, which were 
presenting themselves as defenders of democracy, and those Scandinavian 
countries that had introduced female surage but also, in the revolutionary 
atmosphere of 1917, even with Russia, where the direction that political 
development would take remained highly uncertain.
e Social Democrats, both the Majority and the Independents of the 
far le, viewed democracy as their future goal. At the same time, criticism 
of both democratisation and parliamentarisation remained commonplace 
among non-socialists. Even the le-liberals were uncertain and disunited as 
to what the suggested reforms might mean in practice. Friedrich von Payer, 
a lawyer from Wurttemberg and a former speaker of the regional parliament 
who defended parliamentary powers, complained about the multiple 
meanings assigned to the concept of parliamentarism, while liberal papers 
1168 Grosser 1970, 137, 153–5. is more positive interpretation of parliamentarism 
and cooperation with bourgeois parties would seem to have arisen in Germany 
aer the Finnish Social Democrats had attempted a more radical introduction 
of parliament-dominated democracy in the sense of Social Democratic majority 
rule. In autumn 1917, they would be unwilling to look to their German comrades, 
who had failed in their reform, since more radical and obviously more successful 
models could be found in the east.
1169 Verhandlungen, Georg Gradnauer, 6 July 1917, 3508–10; Leonhard 2014, 782.
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sometimes also published arguments claiming that parliamentarism was the 
way to respond to the needs of the masses.1170 Marcus Llanque explains such 
ambivalence among the liberals by their lack of experience in parliamentary 
government. e German parties had diculties in dening what they 
expected from the proposed reform, particularly when it was demanded in 
wartime, a situation that set evident limits to radicalism:1171 no party wished 
to be seen as unpatriotic. Subsequently, the German liberals have also been 
presented as being to blame for the failure of German democracy – as not 
being consistently supportive of it, like members of Liberal Parties in most 
countries.
When the Inter-Party Committee, formed from the Social Democrats, 
the Catholic Centre and le-liberals and for some time also the National 
Liberals but with no members from the right, started to meet on 6 July, 
parliamentary reform was very much on its agenda. Some, though not 
all, the leaders of the centrist parties had been rethinking their stands 
on parliamentarisation, and Gustav Stresemann of the National Liberals 
welcomed it as well.1172 e work of this committee was based on 
collaboration between the reformist parties on constitutional matters; it was 
not considered representative of all major political groups and was hence 
ignored by the conservative Neue Preußische Zeitung, for instance. Vorwärts, 
the source which foreign papers most actively followed and whose news 
sometimes created wrong impressions outside Germany, wrote boldly about 
the chances for a government supported by the masses of the people that 
would realise democratisation, at the same time criticising the Chancellor 
for attempting to reconcile nationalism and internationalism, conservatism 
and social democracy, uncompromising ghters and peace-seekers, 
opponents and supporters of democracy and reform, in other words, of 
trying to please everyone. e expectations of cooperation from the parties 
of the centre tended to turn into criticism of their vacillation. At the same 
time, reports from the debates of the Constitutional Committee conrmed 
to Social Democrat readers the fact that the Conservatives were not willing 
to agree to equal surage in Prussia or to other reforms during the war.1173
e Constitutional Committee nevertheless challenged the wartime 
government and the General Sta to a degree that some scholars have 
interpreted as having contributed signicantly to the transformation 
towards a parliamentary system in Germany. is interpretation probably 
goes too far given the wartime circumstances of the government, the 
unrepresentative nature of the committee, the wavering stands of the parties 
and the reservations about parliamentarisation that still persisted in 1918 
and 1919. Even so, several changes in the political system were demanded 
by this committee in line with suggestions made in the debates of the 
spring, including the appointment of secretaries of state by the Reichstag 
and the formation of advisory boards to supervise the executive. Chancellor 
1170 Julius Lissner, Berliner Tageblatt, 6 July 1917.
1171 Llanque 2000, 203, 206.
1172 Grosser 1970, 121, 132.
1173 Vorwärts, 7 July 1917.
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Bethmann Hollweg reacted by repeating promises for a surage reform in 
Prussia on 11 July 1917 and invited leading parliamentarians to advise the 
government, but by this time his authority in the leadership of the Reich 
had become contested not only by reformist parliamentarians but above all 
by the army chiefs of sta, who were unhappy with the course of the reform 
debates. Bethmann Hollweg consequently lost his position on 13 July with 
the adoption of a peace resolution by the Reichstag.1174 
On 19 July, the Reichstag nevertheless accepted, despite many dissenting 
voices, a proposal to be presented to the Entente on the restoration of peace 
without changes of borders or indemnities and formed one more committee 
to prepare a constitutional revision.1175 Vorwärts described this as the rst 
‘act of will of the German representation of the people’ intervening in 
foreign policy: the Social Democratic organ claimed that even if opposed by 
inuential power-holders, this would force the government to act according 
to the will of the Reichstag majority.1176 e paper continued to publish overly 
optimistic descriptions of the successes of the party, as a result of which, it 
even claimed, ‘Germany is democratising itself!’1177 e le-liberal Berliner 
Tageblatt also declared that it had consistently prioritised the introduction 
of ‘the parliamentary system’, referring to the restructuring of the Reich 
and a new division of power and responsibility (which was again a rather 
ambiguous demand). e paper saw such a reform as inevitable in the 
current era of mistrust of Germany abroad. Conrad Haußmann described 
the formation of the parliamentary majority and the consequent rise of 
parliamentary powers overoptimistically as a turning point in the history 
of the Reich and of Europe.1178 An interesting detail from a transnational 
perspective (though of minor signicance) is that the Berliner Tageblatt on 21 
July reported about a decision of the Finnish parliament on ‘independence’; 
this, it claimed, reected a parallel decisiveness in a parliamentary body and 
‘a virile people’, to whom the paper wished all the best.1179
e German situation was constitutionally confusing, both for Germans 
and outsiders, and consequently for later historians as well. Marcus 
Llanque has concluded that the constitution was not even the key issue 
for the parliamentary parties in July 1917: instead of concentrating on the 
democratisation and parliamentarisation of the constitution, they prioritised 
a joint peace proposal (somewhat in line with the aims of the Stockholm 
peace conference in June). e initiative was immediately turned down by 
the Western powers,1180 which regarded the proposal as mere propaganda 
– even if the majority of the German political leaders were aware of the 
dicult strategic position of Germany and evidently ready for peace at this 
1174 Grosser 1970, 127; Pohl 2002, 7–8; Seils 2011, 342, 351; Leonhard 2014, 739.
1175 Leonhard 2014, 738, 740.
1176 Vorwärts, 20 July 1917. 
1177 Vorwärts, 21 July 1917.
1178 Berliner Tageblatt, 19 July 1917, 20 July 1917.
1179 Berliner Tageblatt, 21 July 1917.
1180 Llanque 2000, 203; Wade 2000, 172.
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stage and on these terms.1181 is reaction further diminished the credibility 
of the reformists in Germany: democratisation and parliamentarisation 
were associated with giving up ghting the war, while even the West did not 
take the proposals seriously. According to Dieter Grosser, no German party 
attempted to introduce a parliamentary system at this stage, at least as far 
as the choice of the chancellor was concerned. e le-liberals and Social 
Democrats, also criticised Western models rather than dened what the right 
type of democracy should be. is added to the confusion in constitutional 
thinking and to a delay in the transition to parliamentary government.1182 
All this speaks against a silent parliamentarisation thesis and explains the 
mixed interpretations that socialists outside Germany could make about 
what was expected to happen in Germany. e Prussian conservative press 
made eective use of this confusion by publishing declarations that rejected 
‘Reichstag democracy’, ‘parliamentary dominance’ and mere political talk as 
ways to bring about peace.1183 As far as the conservatives were concerned, the 
war must be won with ‘blood and iron’, quoting Bismarck’s famous speech.
Whether the cooperation of the parties of the le and the centre in July 
1917, which aimed both at the restoration of peace and a rather indenite 
constitutional reform in Germany, should be characterised as an early or 
gradual parliamentarisation of the German monarchy is a question that has 
divided German historians for nearly sixty years. In both older and more 
recent research, a link has been drawn between the attempts of summer 
1917 and the actual reforms of autumn 1918.1184 e fact that there was 
a parliamentary intervention in foreign policy and calls for a surage reform 
continued is beyond question, but it is an overstatement to characterise 
the majority of the German political elite (or even of the future Weimar 
Coalition) as ready for the full parliamentarisation of the constitution of 
the Reich in summer 1917. As Llanque argues, peace was considered more 
urgent than an immediate constitutional transition. And as an analysis of 
debates of summer 1917, autumn 1918 and spring 1919 suggests, there were 
evident limits to how far the German parties envisioned democratisation 
1181 Soutou 2014, 513.
1182 Grosser 1970, 129, 139.
1183 Neue Preußische Zeitung, 18 July 1917.
1184 For early theses on creeping parliamentarisation, see Epstein 1960, 562–84, 
Rauh 1977, 379, and Gusy 1994, 753. e later debate has been summarised 
in Schönberger 2001, 624–5, 665, Kühne 2005, 293, 316, and Bollmeyer 2007, 
35–9, who all consider speculation about a gradual structural transition to 
parliamentarism to have been wishful thinking. See also Retallack 1996, 38, and 
Retallack 2006, 12, who challenges interpretations that claim that early twentieth-
century Germany was in a state of transition to democracy. Seils 2011, 395, who 
has studied the wartime history of the Reichstag in detail, cannot see any reason 
to talk about parliamentarisation before the autumn of 1918. Jörn Leonhard, 
building on Udo Bermbach’s argument of 1967 and emphasising the emergence 
of networks, repeats the interpretation that claims that the constitutional debates 
of summer 1917 were a reection of an early parliamentarisation of Germany 
anticipating the rise of the Weimar Republic. Leonhard 2002, 33, and Leonhard 
2014, 739, 763. is thesis is also repeated by Müller 2014, 45, so that the debate 
goes on.
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and parliamentarisation proceeding, the lines of the Social Democratic 
and liberal parties being far less clear than those of their sister parties in 
Sweden and Finland, for instance. e preparation of the peace resolution 
itself certainly increased the political determination of the Reichstag parties, 
allowing the parliamentarians to think that they possessed unprecedented 
inuence over the aairs of the Reich. is interpretation was especially 
strong in the Social Democratic and liberal press.1185 However, such beliefs 
in the parliamentarisation of foreign policy would soon turn out to be 
completely premature, and the same is true of the constitutional reform. 
Expectations were nevertheless high among the Social Democrats not only in 
Germany but also in countries such as Sweden and Finland, where German 
developments were observed with great interest and overt optimism. 
In Germany, constitutional questions remained intertwined with the 
war – even more concretely than in Britain, Sweden or Finland – in that 
the Social Democrats had presented the continuation of their support 
for the war eort as dependent on the advancement of domestic reforms. 
ey had also received a degree of support from the le-liberals and the 
Catholic Centre for these demands,1186 which made all the reformist 
parties appear to be an unpatriotic home front in the eyes of the right. 
Expectations for the further parliamentarisation of German politics or even 
for the promised democratisation of surage in Prussia were nevertheless 
overoptimistic. e decision of the reformist parties to put forward foreign 
political initiatives before their previous calls for constitutional reforms had 
led to any concrete concessions from the executive le the constitutional 
reform, too, at a  complete standstill when the foreign policy initiatives 
failed. e intervention in foreign policy issues, which were traditionally 
regarded as the prerogative of the executive, diminished the credibility of 
the parliamentary groups in question with regard to the preparation of the 
proposed constitutional reforms as well.
A breakthrough in the reform issue had been expected by German and 
Northern European reformists in July 1917, but all came to nothing with 
the nomination of a new chancellor. Both the peace resolution and calls for 
parliamentarisation had little worth in the eyes of those who would now 
lead the German war eort. Chancellor Georg Michaelis, nominated by the 
Kaiser without consulting the Reichstag, had not committed himself to the 
proposed changes in the established political system. As an ally of Paul von 
Hindenburg and Erich Ludendor of the General Sta, Michaelis rejected 
the peace resolution and opposed all calls for further parliamentarisation 
and democratisation of the government.1187 In his speech to the Reichstag on 
19 July 1917, the new chancellor turned down all proposals for constitutional 
reform. While recognising the need of the government and the parliamentary 
parties to communicate more intensively, Michaelis insisted that all such 
cooperation should take place ‘without harming the constitutional and 
federal foundations of the realm’. In principle, the government of the Reich 
1185 Bollmeyer 2007, 173.
1186 Gusy 1997, 5.
1187 Llanque 2000, 205; Becker 2014, 28; Leonhard 2014, 741.
247
4.2 Germany: Democratisation and parliamentarisation come to a halt
would aim at strengthening ‘the relation of trust between the parliament and 
the government’ so that ministers could count on enjoying the backing of 
the large parties ‘in the great representation of the people’. is formulation 
might seemingly recognise a degree of the kind of parliamentarism favoured 
by the le (who cheered in the chamber), but it by no means stood for the 
concrete parliamentarisation of the government, only for the involvement 
of the parties in policy planning. To the delight of the rightist parties in 
the chamber, Michaelis asserted: ‘e constitutional rights of the head of 
the realm in the leadership of politics may not be diminished.’1188 at was 
to say that the Reichstag could only be engaged in projects that served the 
interests of the imperial government. Its old limited role within the duality 
of government would be maintained. Even some members of the centre 
shared these views: the Catholic Centre remained far from enthusiastic 
about the parliamentarisation of the government and continued to defend 
the established system.1189
Neue Preußische Zeitung concluded decidedly on 20 July that there would 
be no ‘parliamentary joint government’ for which the leist bloc, with its 
criticisms of the Prussian system, had been campaigning.1190 In the debates, 
Social Democrat spokesmen still tended to insist that full democratisation 
and parliamentarisation had become the goals of the German people – the 
term did not matter so much for them as long as ‘democratic development’ 
was secured.1191 At the same time, their leader Friedrich Ebert, too, advised 
the party not to be obsessed in the quest for parliamentary government in 
the prevailing circumstances.1192 Hugo Haase of the far le optimistically 
insisted that the democratisation of the German constitution would lead to 
an early peace – partly because the Western powers would be more willing to 
conclude a peace with a democratic Germany.1193 Among the Progressivists, 
too, Friedrich von Payer, on the basis of the discussions of the preceding 
weeks, was optimistic about the democratisation and parliamentarisation 
of the constitution in the sense of the government and parliament being 
brought into closer cooperation with each other. He maintained: ‘Democratic 
thinking has proceeded apace in Germany during the last few weeks’1194 
– a statement that has been used to support those interpretations that regard 
parliamentarisation as having progressed in Germany in summer 1917. e 
le-liberal Bernhard Dernburg, a Prussian businessman and civil servant 
in the colonial administration who had served in the United States as well, 
also argued in these days for the necessity of democratising Germany by 
strengthening the political role of the Reichstag.1195 
However, such reformers remained a minority; the executive power would 
stay in the hands of the supporters of the established Prussian political order. 
1188 Verhandlungen, Georg Michaelis, 19 July 1917, 3570–3.
1189 Verhandlungen, Constantin Fehrenbach, 19 July 1917, 3574–5.
1190 Neue Preußische Zeitung, 20 July 1917.
1191 Verhandlungen, Philipp Scheidemann, 19 July 1917, 3576–8.
1192 Grosser 1970, 131.
1193 Verhandlungen, Hugo Haase, 19 July 1917, 3587.
1194 Verhandlungen, Friedrich von Payer, 19 July 1917, 3581–2.
1195 Llanque 2000, 196.
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e government continued to be responsible to the Kaiser alone. e centrist 
press soon concluded with disappointment that the parliamentarians lacked 
the will to enforce a truly parliamentary system. e plausibility of the entire 
idea of parliamentarisation by the current parties consequently tended to be 
questioned: le-liberals and centrist commentators regarded the Reichstag 
itself as responsible for its own weak position.1196 Businessmen, for their 
part, warned the politicians against democratising and parliamentarising 
the country.1197 e far right soon formed the German Fatherland Party 
(Deutsche Vaterlandspartei), bringing together nationalist forces in defence 
of the established Prussian order and the much advertised ‘German freedom’. 
In its founding manifesto, this rapidly growing party dened itself as an 
alternative to Western democracies, which it represented as hypocritical 
and materialistic advocates of ‘false democracy’, whose only aim was crush 
Germany militarily. e rst versions of the ‘stab-in-the-back’ (Dolchstoß) 
myth also began to circulate in autumn 1917, suggesting that the soldiers 
were being betrayed by internal enemies who had been persuaded by 
Western propaganda about democracy.1198 Conservative forces in Germany 
– and potentially also in Lutheran countries such as Finland and Sweden 
– made eective use of the fourth centenary of the Lutheran Reformation 
in October 1917 to emphasise German national virtues and the historical 
tradition of ghting against surrounding ideological enemies to the very 
end.1199 
Doubts about the parliamentary parties and their motives were strength-
ened by the episodes of summer 1917 and contributed to the diminution 
of the credibility of parliamentary government even before the system had 
been established in Germany. ese attitudes did not disappear when the 
Weimar National Assembly was established in spring 1919; they were indeed 
reinforced by the even more serious ‘Dolchstoß’ of autumn 1918, when the 
political system collapsed although there was no visible evidence to the 
general public of the war having been lost. is matter will be analysed in 
section 6.2. 
We can hence argue with Jörn Leonhard that the problematic role of 
parliaments not only in Germany but also in Russia and Austria had been 
demonstrated during 1917: in none of these great powers could a consensus 
be reached and domestic politics be stabilised on a constitutional and 
parliamentary basis. On the contrary, the parliaments turned into forums 
of deepening ideological polarisation within which the forces both of the 
right and the le were radicalised.1200 In none of these national cases were 
the parliaments truly powerful, and hence, in the lack of any necessity to 
arrive at a consensus and to seek the compromises that would have been 
necessary in parliamentary governments based on coalitions of parties, they 
easily turned into forums of political polemic. A comparison with Finland 
1196 Llanque 2000, 194–6, 198, 208.
1197 Stibbe 2001, 173.
1198 Grosser 1970, 179; Stibbe 2001, 184; Leonhard 2014, 741–3.
1199 Ihalainen 2009; Leonhard 2014, 745.
1200 Leonhard 2014, 763–4.
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in 1917 is helpful here: there, too, expectations of the nal democratisation 
and parliamentarisation of government were high aer a 10-year experiment 
with universal surage and the development of parliament into a leading 
forum of societal debate, but the political parties failed to agree on the reform 
in the aermath of the Russian Revolution, which led to the diminution of 
mutual societal trust and to a deepening crisis of parliamentary government 
not only among its traditional critics on the right but also among the 
liberals and socialists. Since the political power of the parliament had 
remained limited, it had developed into a site of polemic in which inexibly 
ideological views could be expressed without any consequent need for 
compromises in a joint ministry. In Finland, the parliament failed even 
more seriously to reach a consensus on a constitutional political order. In 
Sweden, by contrast, the parliamentarisation of the government progressed 
early enough, during the second half of 1917, and there were also promises 
of further democratisation, which prevented a similar acerbation of the 
crisis. Otherwise the Swedish parliament might well have remained a forum 
of ideological polarisation for a longer time. In Britain, the majority of the 
parties possessed shared views on the principles of parliamentarism and had 
recognised the necessity of surage reform as a consequence of common 
war experiences. e early wartime reform supported belief in the capability 
of parliamentary government to implement revisions and prevented the 
potential for polarisation; thus the parliamentary process was able to handle 
ideological eruptions without turning into a cycle of mutual provocation.
Alternative ways to introduce reforms were proposed in Germany, 
too, including the idea that the political system could be democratised in 
a ‘wise’ and controlled way without parliamentarisation. Centrist writers, 
in particular, were sceptical about the sense of further parliamentarisation 
of the system.1201 Distinctions between democracy and parliamentarism 
were typical of the German debates, though they could sometimes also 
be combined into an ambiguous reformist package. In the other three 
national debates, the two concepts were more commonly associated with 
one another; distinctions between them were drawn mainly by the far right 
and the far le. In the German Social Democratic press, too, the defenders 
of parliamentary democracy tended to increasingly suggest that democracy 
could be realised only through parliamentarism.1202  
Aer the crisis of July 1917, which had further decreased the legitimacy 
of the Reichstag as capable of initiating a reform, German debates on the 
constitution came to a standstill that would last for over a year  – until 
September 1918. Some further optimistic speculations on a possible new 
start for parliamentarisation in the sense of bringing the will of the people 
and that of the government closer together occurred in the aermath of 
the nomination at the beginning of November 1917 of the new government 
of Count Georg von Hertling (Catholic Centre). Such speculations had no 
noteworthy consequences, however: the Chancellor was not in favour of 
the parliamentarisation of the government despite his dependence on the 
1201 Llanque 2000, 208–9
1202 Llanque 2000, 284.
250
4. The autumn of 1917: A completed,  a suspended and a partial reform
reformist parties and his willingness to negotiate about peace. e plans for 
surage reform in Prussia were in practice given up. e Chancellor was old 
and unable to inuence war policies, which were dictatorially determined 
by the army commanders. In the meantime, the Reichstag proved incapable 
of asserting any inuence on the policy of the government and unable to 
play the role of an active agent in promoting either democratisation or 
parliamentarisation.1203
At the same time, the debates on constitutional reform were proceeding 
in the countries of comparison, although the progress partly depended on 
German developments: the British House of Commons would complete the 
surage reform by February 1918. e Swedish Riksdag debated a similar 
reform proposed by its rst parliamentary government in spring 1918, but 
its upper chamber, dominated by the German-oriented right, voted it out. 
e majority of the Finnish Eduskunta rst set out to formulate a republican 
constitution in late 1917, and then in the course of 1918 it would make 
several attempts to force through a monarchical polity designed according 
to the German model. In Germany, the population tended to lose their 
condence in the ability of the government (or the parliament in late 1917 
and much of 1918) to introduce major reforms as long as the war continued. 
Nevertheless, the transnational signicance of the German development 
is evident. e rise of democratisation as a goal for constitutional reforms in 
the language of the German Social Democrats during the rst half of 1917 
had eects in Sweden and Finland, and so did the anti-reformist attitudes of 
the Prussian right, whether they were aristocrats, military men or academics. 
e German model encouraged the Swedish Social Democrats and Liberals 
to accept joint responsibility for forming the rst parliamentary government 
and setting electoral reform as its major goal aer their election victory in 
September 1917. is change of government simultaneously implied a turn 
in Swedish foreign policy, which had until autumn 1917 been directed by 
the King and the right, both of whom shared pro-German views, but which 
now aimed at building good relations with the Western Allies. is turn in 
Swedish foreign policy was noticed in the German Reichstag as well: Dr 
Ferdinand Werner, a member of the radically anti-Semitic German Ethnic 
Party (Deutschvölkische Partei), commented on the Swedish election result, 
the rise of the Social Democrats and Liberals to power and the expected 
change in foreign policy, implying that the peace resolution of the Reichstag 
had inuenced the election result in Sweden in a negative way, weakening 
trust in the Prussian system. Werner had been informed by his rightist 
allies that while Sweden, as ‘altogether a thoroughly Germanic country’, had 
initially been ‘almost completely pro-German’ in 1914, the mood there had 
changed as a result of ‘the agitation of Branting and the Entente’ and by 
October 1917 Swedish opinion had become far less sympathetic towards the 
German war aims.1204 is German rightist comment on Germano-Swedish 
relations can be seen as a further indication of a notable turn in Sweden 
towards the Anglo-American political model even if the shi continued 
1203 Llanque 2000, 206–208; Becker 2014, 28; Bessel 2014, 130.
1204 Ferdinand Werner, 6 October 1917, 3749.
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to be ercely opposed by the Swedish right until the fall of the German 
monarchy – and indeed would be completed only aer the Second World 
War. 
e Finnish Social Democrats, who had won the rst ever socialist 
parliamentary majority in 1916 and retained it until the elections of October 
1917, were likewise encouraged by the German Social Democratic example 
to stay rm in their demands for full parliamentary sovereignty in the 
summer of 1917, particularly as they had been ideologically inuenced 
by the German Marxists. e transition of supreme power to parliament 
was supported by the Social Democrats and most centrists. For the Finnish 
right, and especially for independence activists, including those who were 
receiving military education in Germany or serving on the Baltic front, 
Germany remained the model polity. is was also denitely true of 
those academics who were active in the Finnish- and Swedish-speaking 
conservative parties. e Anglo-American model, by contrast, appeared as 
politically relevant only in the eyes of a few Anglophile Finns.
4.3  Sweden: e introduction of parliamentary government  
 as a safeguard against domestic upheaval
Despite some socialist hints and rightist fears, Sweden saw no revolution 
in spring 1917. Compared to the war-faring Central Powers and Finland, 
the danger of one breaking out may have been small but such a threat was 
unique in Swedish history. Without a doubt, there were tensions: demands 
for electoral reform remained unanswered and decisively aected the results 
of the parliamentary elections of autumn 1917. e voters were eectively 
informed by all parties that they were voting on a possible change in the 
parliamentary power balance and hence on a constitutional change1205 
– a lot like the Finns at about the same time. 
Expectations of the extension of surage in other countries encouraged 
the parties of the le to speak out for female surage and equal voting 
rights. e Social Democratic election manifesto from July 1917 took up the 
Danish, Dutch, Finnish, British and Russian wartime transitions to ‘clearly 
democratic forms of government’ and presented ‘the stormy democratic 
wave’ as having reached Prussia, ‘the old model country of anti-democracy’, 
which was now on the way to democracy and parliamentarism (which 
was not true, as we just saw). ese developments made ‘the democratic 
breakthrough’ and ‘the democratisation of the constitution’ unavoidable 
in Sweden as well, the goal of international Social Democracy being ‘the 
power of the people’ (folkmakt).1206 e Liberals spoke for parliamentary 
government and ‘the full self-government of the Swedish people’ as 
a precondition for ‘democratic progress’ towards ‘a democratic society’.1207 
e Right, by contrast, continued to defend the policies of the preceding 
1205 Gerdner 1946, 9.
1206 Till Sverges arbetande folk!, 1917.
1207 Frisinnade Landsföreningens valprogram, 1917.
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caretaker governments and regarded the existing electoral legislation as 
perfect for the country’s national circumstances: the constitution guaranteed 
the continuity of lawbound liberty while previous reforms allowed 
‘continuous development to a democratic direction’; revolutionary agitation 
was thus unfounded.1208 
External attempts to inuence the Swedish elections were also evident: 
while the Germans backed the monarchy and e Right, Britain and the 
United States favoured the le, expecting them to distance the country 
from Germany at least in trade; increasing idealisations of Western models 
of parliamentarism prevalent among members of the le were also seen 
favourably by the Entente. Hjalmar Branting was generally known to have 
become sympathetic to the Western powers as the German war eort 
stagnated, and he expressed his sympathies during visits to the Allied Powers. 
He was consequently accused in rightist papers in Sweden of ‘Entente 
activism’ and being ready to renounce the policy of neutrality, which had 
been the ocial line of the country, although the policies pursued by Sweden 
during the war were actually pro-German. As could already be seen in the 
metaphors of democratisation in spring 1917, the Social Democrats tended 
increasingly to view the war – in line with Woodrow Wilson – as a struggle 
between democracy and autocracy, and in this division they felt that Sweden 
should take its place in the Western democratic camp and oppose the 
Prussian power of the Junkers. A diplomatic scandal revealing the German 
connections of the rightist minority government added to the increasingly 
suspect nature of links with Germany: the German Foreign Ministry had 
used Swedish channels to communicate information concerning submarine 
warfare – the controversial aspect of the war that nally brought the 
United States into it. e revelations undermined the Western powers’ 
trust in Swedish neutrality, threatened vital trade connections for food and 
industry and made the open advocacy of Germanophile attitudes by the 
right increasingly dicult. Among other things, this explains the lack of 
comparisons with the German constitution in parliamentary debates aer 
1918. e le responded by calling for the democratic control of foreign 
policy to prevent such scandals in the future.1209 
With the example of the pernicious consequences of the Prussian 
connections cherished by the monarchy and the landowning and academic 
elites, the le did well in the elections. e number of the seats received by 
e Right in the Second Chamber consequently sank to 57, the Liberals 
gained ve more seats and had 62 representatives, the Social Democrats won 
14 seats, becoming the largest group with 86 seats, and the two Agrarian 
parties (ideologically opposed to constitutional reforms and supportive of 
e Right1210) gained 12 seats. is would give the prospective Liberal-Social 
Democratic coalition an overwhelming majority but also called for close 
cooperation between these parties of the le. e leist Social Democrats, 
1208 Allmänna Valmansförbundets valupprop, 1917.
1209 Gerdner 1946, 10; von Sydow 1997, 116; Olsson 2000, 89–90; Hadenius 2008, 
41–4, 48–9.
1210 Bondeförbundets valprogram, 1917.
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by contrast, failed to win much support for their programme that associated 
socialism, democracy and revolution a lot like their Finnish comrades,1211 
being le with just 11 seats. In the election for the First Chamber, e Right 
continued to benet from the inequitable surage system and received 88 
seats against 45 for the Liberals and just 17 for the Social Democrats.1212 
is majority would be able to stop any constitutional reform endangering 
the inuence of e Right, a situation that was oen compared with that of 
the Prussian Herrenhaus. Although the diplomatic scandal did contribute to 
the victory of the le, the result was nevertheless mostly determined by the 
existing unsolved constitutional and acute economic issues.1213 
e formation of the government aer the elections has been regarded 
as a turning point, even a regime change, in Swedish political history:1214 
a  ministry based on a parliamentary majority was formed for the rst 
time within the apparent continuity of the Instrument of Government of 
1809. is Liberal-Social Democratic coalition was expected to soon bring 
a proposal for a surage reform before the parliament – particularly as the 
British parliament, which had been increasingly viewed by the parties of the 
le as a model that surpassed the German type of constitutional monarchy, 
was about to implement a major extension of surage. Similar reforms had 
already been seen in Finland, Norway, Denmark and the Netherlands and 
were expected to take place in other countries too, although the German 
reform was unlikely to make progress under the new chancellor. e decision 
of the Finnish parliament on extensive parliamentary sovereignty in July, 
which had only deepened the constitutional crisis in the country, did not 
provide a model that the Swedish leists wished to follow; rather it provided 
a warning example that called for caution in reformism. e radicalising 
Russian Revolution aected the Swedish debate as well, suggesting that it 
might be good to have a timeout before a reform proposal was brought 
before the parliament. is would happen in April 1918, aer the Finnish 
Civil War was over. is section hence contains no detailed analysis of 
Swedish constitutional debates during autumn 1917.
Parliamentarism in the sense of governmental responsibility to 
a  parliamentary majority – representing the Western European model of 
parliamentarism – was brought into the Swedish system in autumn 1917 
without changing the letter of the constitution or debating extensively. 
However, this transition only took place aer a constitutional confrontation 
between King Gustav V and e Right on the one hand and the Liberals 
and Social Democrats on the other concerning the implications of the 
election result. e monarch, and his wife Queen Victoria von Baden, who 
was a cousin of Kaiser Wilhelm, feared that the Entente was hatching a plot 
to incite a revolution in Sweden and intending to replace the monarchy 
with a republic.1215 e royal couple and their rightist supporters were 
1211 Till Sverges valmän!, 1917.
1212 Gerdner 1946, 10–11; von Sydow 1997, 116; Eskola 2011, 16. 
1213 Carlsson 1985, 85–6.
1214 Olsson 2000, 88.
1215 Stibbe 2001, 176–7. 
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also concerned about traditional Swedish sympathies for Germany being 
replaced by open warfare against the country’s natural cultural ally. ey 
could not trust the le and preferred a more moderate coalition; even the 
Liberals were suspect as they had been supporting the cause of democracy 
and parliamentarism and rejecting ‘Prussianism’ (and by implication 
a  constitutional monarchy of the German type). An alternative coalition 
was unrealistic, however: no parliamentary majority could be found as long 
as e Right remained unwilling to make any concessions over the surage 
question, and minority government continued to lose credibility. e royal 
attempts to nominate a coalition government that went against the election 
results consequently failed in a humiliating manner, and the King was forced 
to accept a Liberal-Social Democrat ministry. e Bolshevik Revolution in 
Russia made him increasingly concerned about the future of the monarchy 
and about the risks of parliamentary government, even leading him to 
consider abdication. is possibility of the fall of the monarchy together 
with the election losses forced e Right, too, to give in – even though their 
views on parliamentarism had by no means changed. e concession could 
also be understood as tactical and temporary in that e Right yielded 
the responsibility for running the country in hard times to the le, while 
retaining the ability to prevent radical reforms with their majority in the 
upper house. Anyway, the general assumption among e Right was that 
parliamentarism was on the retreat globally. e court retained its inuence 
over foreign policy, and the conservative civil service, which prepared and 
implemented every law and decision, would not let through any radical 
break with the past. Bureaucracy was another feature that was common to 
Prussia, Sweden and Finland and an object of constant complaint by the le 
in all of these countries. All in all, this pragmatic Swedish-style introduction 
of parliamentary government without any change in the constitution was 
facilitated by the exibility of the Instrument of Government of 1809: no 
changes in it were needed even though the actual functioning of the political 
system changed so dramatically.1216 is exibility enabled a peaceful 
transition to a parliamentary government that oered an alternative to the 
German and Finnish confrontations. 
Decisive for the Swedish transition to parliamentarism was also the fact 
that the parties of the le had become ready to cooperate and govern the 
country together; the Social Democrats accepting the so-called ‘minister 
socialism’ and cooperation with the bourgeoisie, to a greater extent than their 
German comrades and a lot like the British Labour Party. e parliamentary 
discourse used by the government parties on questions of democracy 
and parliamentarisation had already become mutually supportive, as the 
analysis in section 3.3 has demonstrated. A coalition government of the 
Social Democrats and Liberals, led by Nils Edén, was nominated on 19 
October 1917. e Social Democrat leader Hjalmar Branting and three of 
his party fellows were appointed as ministers, though Branting resigned 
1216 Gerdner 1946, ix, 12–15; Nyman 1965, 159–62; von Sydow 1997, 116–17; Molin 
1992, xxi–ii; Olsson 2000, 88, 99–100, 110, 114; Nilsson 2004, 145.
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as Minister of Finance in January 1918. e rise of the Social Democrats 
to participate in a functioning majority government for the rst time in 
Sweden (though not in the world, given the Russian and Finnish precedents 
in spring 1917 and the fact that the Labour Party had been represented in 
the British War Coalition) was a major political shi, and it led the party 
to view its chances of changing society by parliamentary means very 
optimistically and distanced the Swedish Social Democratic Labour Party 
further from the kind of direct action advocated by the far le.1217 is was 
clearly a revisionist party cooperating with relatively a radical Liberal party, 
something that its German sister party had failed to do as eectively, and 
which its Finnish sister party did not even consider aer failing to introduce 
a form of parliamentary rule that was to its liking.
Parliamentarisation, aer a lengthy argument on parliamentary respon-
sibility that had brought the coalition partners closer to each other, together 
with a clear election result, had a more promising start in Sweden than 
in Finland, where the coalition partners in the all-party government had 
not been fully committed to cooperation: the Social Democrats demurred 
for ideological reasons and strife within the government became overt in 
connection with the Power Act, with the result that the Social Democrats 
le the ministry in early September and began to adopt extra-parliamentary 
tactics. Parliamentarisation proceeded in Sweden also because most ministers 
were members of parliament and could defend the government’s proposals 
in the debates. Further democratisation was promised: disregarding the 
expected opposition in the upper house, the ministry pledged itself to 
introduce a proposal granting equal surage to all tax-payers in local 
elections and hence universal surage in national elections as well. e 
King agreed to rely on his ministers and not use any extra-parliamentary 
measures to prevent the planned reform.1218 
Despite these high expectations, the debates would continue to be heated 
in spring 1918, at a time when a German victory in the war still seemed 
possible and there were hence no guarantees for the expected dawn of an era 
of democracy and parliamentarism, which could be stigmatised as a mere 
leist fantasies. A decisive turn in the course of the First World War would 
be needed before the reform would be realised in Sweden; even then the 
Swedish right would remain patently reluctant and need considerable time 
to rethink its suspicious attitudes to the democracy and parliamentarism 
that was being championed by the le.
At the same time, the Swedish debates on constitutional issues would 
seem to have become more internally oriented than had been the case in 
spring, when hopes for a global revolution had taken over. e German 
promises for a peaceful revolution through the parliamentarisation of 
government and the democratisation of the Prussian surage system, which 
had been discussed briey in the rightist and extensively in the Social 
Democratic press, withered away aer July, Social-Demokraten concluding 
1217 Nyman 1965, 154–6, 164–7.
1218 von Sydow 1997, 116–17; Andræ 1998, 243; Olsson 2000, 88.
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that ‘bureaucracy’ had prevailed in Germany.1219 ere was not much news 
about the British reform, either. e Bolshevik Revolution in early November 
1917 tended to be overshadowed by the domestic upheaval caused by the 
nomination of a leist government. Only the far le was openly enthusiastic 
about the Revolution, while the Majority Social Democrats distanced 
themselves further from developments in Russia. Most Swedes presumed 
that what had happened in Petrograd was no more than a temporary coup 
and rejected all revolutionary action of the Bolshevik kind. However, 
the rightist press became increasingly alarmed about the situation in 
Finland,1220 where constitutional and ideological confrontations between 
the Social Democrats and the bourgeoisie were getting out of hand aer 
parliament had ‘proclaimed the independence of the country’ in July and 
now a revolution imported from Russia appeared as a real possibility due 
to a socialist parliamentary majority that was seeking Bolshevik support.1221 
e common constitutional tradition of the two countries seemed to be 
under serious threat in Finland, and there was no full certainty that a similar 
deterioration of the established order might not spread into Sweden as well. 
4.4  Finland: Discursive struggles over democracy and  
 parliamentarism turn into an attempted revolution
4.4.1  The Bolshevik Revolution and the questioned 
 legitimacy of Finland’s disputatious new parliament 
e approval of a law on parliamentary sovereignty by the votes of the Social 
Democrats and the centre parties in the Finnish parliament on 18 July 1917 
openly challenged the Russian Provisional Government. In response, the 
Provisional Government ordered new elections, something to which the 
Finnish bourgeois parties also contributed. 
e crisis that followed has been summarised by Esko Ketola and Hannu 
Soikkanen: e Social Democrats consequently resigned from the all-party 
government in September, leaving a bourgeois minority government to 
run Finland in the midst of a deepening crisis of subsistence, order, trust 
and legitimacy. ey started to openly oppose the Provisional Government 
and the Finnish bourgeois government and the application of the current 
Parliament Act at all levels. Kullervo Manner, the Speaker of the dissolved 
parliament (in which there had been a Social Democratic majority), 
convened this assembly a few times in early autumn. At rst only a few and 
later no bourgeois MPs attended, and extra-parliamentary demonstrations 
reinforced this opposition, but the Social Democratic parliamentary group 
nevertheless decided on 28 September that this old ‘parliament’ would enact 
1219 Aonbladet, 7 July 1917, 11 July 1917, 12 July 1917 and ‘Krisen i Tyskland 
avveklas i samförstånds tecken’, 13 July 1917; Social-Demokraten, 12 July 1917, 
13 July 1917.
1220 Andræ 1998, 13; Olsson 2000, 110.
1221 Aonbladet, 20 July 1917.
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the Power Act and the reform laws demanded by the Social Democratic Party. 
is was done in a meeting that was declared to be legal on the argument 
that the dissolution of the old parliament had, according to the Social 
Democratic interpretation, been illegal. Such procedural practices denied 
the authority of any other parliament than one with a Social Democratic 
majority. e party took a Social Democratic majority among the people as 
self-evident and expected a victory in the new election, declaring it to be ‘the 
election of revolutionary democracy’. It showed no readiness to surrender 
its parliamentary majority to the non-socialists by boycotting the election; 
nor was it willing to fully reject parliament as a political forum and let the 
parliament of the streets take over the political process. Parliamentarism 
was rather depreciated through the above-mentioned practices and the 
compilation of a list of candidates with anti-parliamentary views.1222 
In the meantime, Vladimir Lenin was hiding in Helsinki in the home of 
MP Evert Huttunen, who was later accused by the right of being a Bolshevik 
emissary,1223 and there he met Otto Wille Kuusinen, Kullervo Manner and 
K. H. Wiik, among others – all opponents of bourgeois democracy and 
Western parliamentarism. Lenin himself was by this time about to abandon 
cooperation with the moderate socialists and to opt for a Bolshevik take-
over. He viewed revolutions in Russia and Finland as inseparable and pointed 
this out to the Finnish socialists. e Finns knew that a Bolshevik coup was 
coming and were encouraged by Lenin and other revolutionary visitors from 
Petrograd to prepare for a takeover by a revolutionary democracy. Kuusinen 
became the most prominent of the revolutionaries dedicated to Lenin’s goals, 
though he and his comrades remained hesitant about proceeding –  until 
the Social Democrats lost their parliamentary majority in the election of 
1–2 October. e message of the non-socialist parties, whose campaign had 
emphasised the risks of the Social Democrats usurping supreme power, had 
got through to the majority of the voters. A bourgeois government based on 
the new parliamentary majority was appointed, an action that accelerated the 
fall of parliamentary legitimacy in the eyes of the Social Democrats. While 
the party had previously considered parliamentary elections and work in 
the parliament to be a temporary means to advance the class struggle and 
revolution, its leaders now declared the elections and the new parliament 
illegal. e new parliament met on 1 November nevertheless, and the 
MPs, who disagreed on the legitimacy of the institution, set out to solve 
the deepening constitutional and socio-economic crisis1224. An emerging 
solution to the relationship between Finland and Russia was rejected by the 
1222 Soikkanen 1975, 236; Ketola 1987, 333–4, 340.
1223 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Från kammare och kuloar’, 10 November 1917.
1224 e economic situation was rapidly deteriorating with increasing unemployment 
arising from the lack of Russian orders and construction work as well as a currency 
crisis and rising ination. In this state of shortages and unemployment, the 
streets of Helsinki tended to become even more politicised than they had been in 
spring. e situation was particularly acerbated by cases of hoarding foodstus. 
Nyström 2013, 153, 164–6, 181.
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Finnish Social Democrats, and the agreement was not ratied in Petrograd 
by the Bolsheviks, who assumed power on 7 November.1225 
e Bolshevik Revolution upset the constitutional situation in Finland 
completely, making the supporters of various parties change their views on 
independence. While the Social Democrats had been willing to proceed 
to the full sovereignty of the Finnish parliament under the Provisional 
Government, aer the Bolshevik takeover in Petrograd it was now the 
bourgeois parties that sought immediate full independence. e latter 
found a formal justication in paragraph 38 of the Gustavian Instrument of 
Government of 1772, according to which the Riksdag was legally authorised 
to elect a new holder of supreme power in case the royal family should 
cease to exist. e Social Democrats – unable to accept the election result as 
reective of public opinion – insisted on recalling the previous parliament 
in which they had held a majority. ey also called for the election of 
a national constituent assembly (an idea that emphasised the Russian-like 
revolutionary nature of the situation) and aimed at independence on the 
basis of a declaration issued by the Bolshevik government. e bourgeois 
parties rejected such contacts with Lenin and looked rather to Germany 
to provide possible support for a unilateral declaration of independence, 
an independent Finland being a desirable option for Germany with regard 
to the ongoing war in the east. On 15 November, the bourgeois majority 
of the Finnish parliament declared itself the holder of supreme power, and 
on 27 November a bourgeois senate aiming at international recognition of 
the country’s independence was nominated. On 4 December, a proposal for 
a republican constitution was put before the parliament simultaneously with 
the publication of a declaration of independence. In a vote on 6 December 
(which was later chosen as Independence Day), on the declaration, the 
parliament was divided between the bourgeois parties, who were ready 
for a unilateral declaration, and the Social Democrats, who proposed 
the establishment of a Fenno-Russian committee to negotiate about 
independence. Before Sweden or Germany or any of the Entente powers 
recognised Finnish independence, however, recognition from the Bolshevik 
government was needed. is was received on 31 December 1917 from 
Lenin, who assumed that the Finnish workers, who had insisted on their 
desire for independence and their dedication to the class struggle, would 
make a revolution, provide the Swedish socialists with a model and nally 
reunite with Bolshevik Russia. French, Swedish and German recognitions 
were consequently received, but Britain and the United States refrained from 
recognising Finland owing to its pro-German line and their expectations 
of the rise of a new non-Bolshevist Russian government, whose stand on 
Finnish independence might be negative.1226
1225 Lindman 1935, 14; Soikkanen 1975, 235; Kirby 1976, 105–6; Rinta-Tassi 1986, 
31; Polvinen 1987, vol. 1, 106; Ketola 1987, 335–8, 340, 344; Haapala 1995, 240; 
Sihvonen 1997, 3; Jussila, Hentilä & Nevakivi 1999, 98; Wade 2000, 222, 225; 
Vares 2006, 71, 74; Nyström 2013, 140.
1226 Polvinen 1987, vol. 1, 192–5; Ketola 1987, 351, 368; Sihvonen 1997, 4–6; Jussila, 
Hentilä & Nevakivi 1999, 101–106.
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Researchers have generally agreed on this course of events but have had 
diculties to explain why the widely shared goal of Finnish independence 
ended up with the deterioration of mutual trust and an internal confrontation 
by November 1917. ere is no simple explanation. Turning to the dynamics 
of parliamentary debate and related discourses in the press we see the 
impact of the complex international situation on denitions of democracy, 
the political role of the people and parliamentarism in late autumn of 1917. 
With several alternative models and allies available the debate tended to 
become transnational to an exceptional degree. e MPs understood that 
the Finns were not deciding about their future constitution in a vacuum 
but in a context in which the choices that were made would have concrete 
implications for the immediate future of the country, including its foreign 
policy. 
4.4.2 Reforms to be implemented by a national 
parliament or by an international revolution?
e preparations for independence were characterised on both sides by 
accusations of transnational connections of the worst kind. In Social 
Democratic discourse, the word ‘revolution’ appeared with increasing 
frequency and tended to be associated with the potential use of force for 
taking over power. is was especially true of the Red Guards, who were 
motivated by the example of, and contacts with, the Bolsheviks and by 
Lenin’s exhortation to launch a revolution. e leaders of the party, however, 
worried about the consequences of such an attempt. Risto Alapuro has 
argued that the party leadership did not aim at a popular rising but called for 
a revolution only to intimidate the bourgeoisie into agreeing to the Power 
Act and invalidating the election of the autumn.1227 However, its violent 
rhetoric inside and outside the parliament also opened possibilities for the 
use of violence in the deepening political confrontation. 
Suggestions of an alliance between counterrevolutionary forces in Finland 
and Russia or in Finland and Germany (Prussia) against democracy became 
commonplace in Social Democratic parliamentary speeches.1228 ey found 
background support, for instance, from the fact that some professors of 
law in Berlin took a stand in favour of Finnish independence,1229 and by 
5 December it was known that Germany had decided to send troops to 
Finland.1230 K. H. Wiik, who had visited Germany and met Finnish activists 
there, protested against this development by talking about Germany as ‘an 
object of the admiration of our bourgeois class’ and as a country in which ‘the 
1227 Rinta-Tassi 1986, 52–3; Alapuro 2003, 540–1.
1228 See VP, Jaakko Mäki, 8 November 1917, 15; Edvard Hänninen-Walpas, 10 
November 1917, 64, 82; Jussi Kujala, 15 November 1917, 139; Eetu Salin, 24 
November 1917, 187–9; Oskari Tokoi, 26 November 1917, 199; Jussi Vuoristo, 26 
November 1917, 219; Jussi Kujala, 26 November 1917, 257; Yrjö Sirola, 9 January 
1918, 824.
1229 e Times, ‘Berlin Professors on Finland’s Status’, 6 December 1917.
1230 Ketola 1987, 395. is had been discussed by Finnish activists on 26 November. 
Hentilä & Hentilä 2016, 23.
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state power and militarism have enchained civil liberty and free thinking’.1231 
In response, bourgeois MPs pointed at cooperation between the Finnish 
socialists and the Bolsheviks.1232  Such accusations on both sides of the 
ideological divide added to the deteriorating legitimacy of parliamentary 
government: parliamentary deliberation at the national level appeared to 
have been replaced by transnational plotting with external forces. What 
made things worse was that competing transnational connections were 
indeed being actively maintained on both sides, and their inuence in the 
constitutional debates was obvious.
In the immediate aermath of the October Revolution, the Finnish Social 
Democratic Party published a parliamentary declaration uniting the party 
with ‘the Social Democratic parties of various countries that were engaged 
in the class struggle and supported the international brotherhood of the 
workers’. e emphasis on the class struggle in the declaration alienated the 
party from the Western revisionists and their alternative internationalism. 
It implied joining a global revolution as ‘the brotherhood’ stood for ‘the 
unwavering class struggle of comrades in Russia who are heroically advancing 
the cause of the Russian Revolution and thereby of all oppressed people and 
the cause of liberating the workers of all countries’.1233 A telegram was sent 
to Petrograd stating that ‘the Finnish democracy’ was ready to ght with ‘the 
Russian democracy’ against ‘the bourgeoisie’.1234 When the line of the party 
was being discussed, K. H. Wiik, for one, had worried about the Bolsheviks 
forcing the Finnish Social Democrats into a  revolution against their will, 
regardless of their own success in Russia.1235 However, despite such dissent, 
the party decided on 8 November (one day aer the Bolshevik takeover and 
on the day of the following debate in the Finnish parliament) to opt for 
a  revolution. e hesitation and reluctance of some members is reected 
by a double strategy of working both inside and outside the parliament.1236 
On 8 November, Työmies declared that ‘the bells of the Revolution are 
ringing’, summoning the workers to ght against repression, reaction and 
bourgeois plans for a coup;1237 on the following day it accused the bourgeois 
parties of conspiring against the Power Act and the Finnish people and 
called for the removal of bourgeois politicians from power.1238 Oskari Tokoi, 
1231 VP, Karl Harald Wiik, 7 December 1917, 419. Such suggestions had already 
appeared in summer 1917. Ketola 1987, 164; Rudolf Nadolny of the German 
Foreign Ministry and Ernst von Hülsen of the German General Sta had 
negotiated with three Finns on possible German support for Finnish 
independence on 18 November 1917. Biewer 1994.
1232 VP, Oswald Kairamo (Finnish), 24 November 1917, 185; Annie Furuhjelm 
(Swedish), 24 November 1917, 192.
1233 VP, Jaakko Mäki, 8 November 1917, 17.
1234 Hufvudstadbladet, ‘Finska socialdemokratin och den nya ryska revolutionen’, 10 
November 1917.
1235 Lindman 1968, 177; Upton 1980, 269–73; Rinta-Tassi 1986, 50; Kettunen 1986, 
96; Haapala 1995, 240.
1236 Rinta-Tassi 1986, 53.
1237 Työmies, ‘Suomen työwäelle! Walweille! Woimat kokoon!’, 8 November 1917.
1238 Työmies, ‘Riippumattomuus Suomen kansalle waiko riippumattomuus Suomen 
kansasta’, 9 November 1917.
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the former prime minister, described the state of the Russian Revolution 
in the plenary session, reporting that the Provisional Government had 
resigned ‘as a response to the will of the revolutionary Russian people’ and 
that the revolution was continuing and aecting Finland more concretely 
than before. Tokoi went on to claim that the Social Democrats alone 
represented the will of the people and to question the legitimacy and future 
of the bourgeois institutions:1239 
We are in the middle of a vortex of revolution and, therefore, in a revolutionary 
age, one needs to listen more closely than at other times to the voice of the 
people, more carefully than at another time take into account those opinions, 
the demands which the people impose on the parliament and more particularly 
on the government, as the future of the ruling institutions is nowadays very 
uncertain.
e Social Democrats were trying to force the bourgeois parliamentary 
majority into concessions with threats of extra-parliamentary action: in 
the new situation, the bourgeoisie could no longer count on the continued 
existence of their representative institution. e Social Democrats had 
already partly joined the Bolsheviks discursively during the previous 
Bolshevik attempted coup in July 1917; now they adopted revolutionary 
discourse with increasing condence in the inevitability of the ongoing 
revolution. Tokoi’s speech was generally interpreted as revolutionary and 
inspired by the events in Petrograd.1240 It contained seemingly moderate calls 
for governmental and parliamentary observation of the will of the people. 
However, he also demanded the promulgation of the Power Act, which 
had been passed under his government and was emphasised in the Social 
Democratic election campaign,1241 and he threatened revolution and civil 
war in case the current parliament should fail to do this. Within the party, 
he had already broached the possibility of extra-parliamentary measures 
in October.1242 Now he asked whether ‘we want it [the Russian Revolution] 
to roll in here, covering and possibly drowning us?’ and answered ‘No!’, 
suggesting that a parliamentary majority would still be able to save the 
country from a revolution by adopting the reforms demanded by the Social 
Democrats.1243 
Yrjö Sirola, who had taken part in the general strike of 1905, translated 
the writings of Karl Kautsky (but now had evidently renounced Western 
social democracy1244), been active in the radical labour movement of 
American Finns, admired the Bolshevik revolutionaries, belonged to the 
radical majority of the party committee, and had been elected secretary of 
the revolutionary committee on the same day, was even more explicit about 
1239 VP, Oskari Tokoi, 8 November 1917, 19–20.
1240 Hufvudstadbladet, ‘Från kammare och kuloar’, 9 November 1917.
1241 Soikkanen 1975, 239; Alapuro 1988, 161.
1242 Rinta-Tassi 1986, 22; Ketola 1987, 343.
1243 VP, 8 November 1917, 20.
1244 Hufvudstadbladet, ‘Från kammare och kuloar’, 9 November 1917.
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the consequences of this ‘third revolution’ aecting the Finns. According 
to Sirola, the revolutionary situation must have been ‘a very unpleasant 
surprise’ to the bourgeois majority in ‘this meeting’1245 – an expression that 
questioned the legitimacy of the Finnish parliament, especially when it 
came from a member of the committee that had prepared the parliamentary 
reform of 1906. e representatives of the bourgeois parties, by contrast, did 
not share the claim that the revolution had now reached Finland.1246
On 10 November 1917, three days aer the Bolshevik Revolution and 
a week before the rst decision on an active revolution was made by the 
Social Democratic Party, Finnish socialists celebrated the progress of an 
international revolution. Yrjö Mäkelin (a former chair of the Constitutional 
Committee) outspokenly put revolution above parliamentarism. Yrjö Sirola 
encouraged the Parliament of the Workers (another alternative parliament) 
to call for a revolution.1247 Oskari Tokoi brought this radicalisation up in 
a plenary session, warning the parliament once again that the bourgeois 
parliament would be bypassed should it not immediately join the cause of 
the revolution. e bourgeoisie should1248 
listen to the bells of revolution which are currently ringing in large parts of 
Europe, those bells of revolution which ring in Russia and which will without 
a doubt be echoing throughout the known world and whose tolling will awaken 
the Finnish workers. And it is possible that it will not take a long time, if the 
parliament treats the opinions that inspire the Finnish people in this way before 
the people themselves take the lead and determine their own fate independently 
of what the parliament decides.
e Finnish Social Democratic Party continued to regard itself as the 
sole representative of the people (like in one-sided Russian revolutionary 
conceptualisations) and overtly adopted the revolutionary cause, demanding 
that the reluctant non-socialist parties do the same. Otherwise extra-
parliamentary action challenging the representative institution would follow 
and would inevitably lead to a civil war. Such language in the circumstances 
of the day was denounced in the bourgeois papers.1249
According to David Kirby, Otto Wille Kuusinen who, like Yrjö Sirola, 
was familiar with Lenin’s writings (and there were not many such men 
among the Finnish Social Democrats), had adopted a revolutionary 
attitude and accused the rest of the party of revisionism.1250 Now he told the 
parliament that ‘a European proletarian revolution’ was likely to follow but 
depended on the progress ‘in Russia, Germany, France, England’; without an 
international proletarian revolution of this kind no such revolution would 
1245 VP, Yrjö Sirola, 8 November 1917, 24; Rinta-Tassi 1986, 56.
1246 Professors Rabbe Axel and Ernst Estlander of the Swedish Party, VP, 8 November 
1917, 29, 33.
1247 Soikkanen 1975, 243, 246.
1248 VP, Oskari Tokoi, 9 November 1917, 54.
1249 Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Hallituskysymyksen ratkaisu’, 10 November 1917.
1250 Kirby 1976, 109.
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follow in Finland either.1251 is reected a certain (calculated) hesitation 
on his part. Lenin, who had le Finland two weeks previously and whom 
Sirola would meet again in two days’ time, believed that Germany was now 
ripe for revolution.1252 Kuusinen said he hoped that ‘the red ame’ ignited by 
the Bolshevik Revolution would be extended to Germany and consequently 
become ‘a general European re’, but he was not so certain about the British 
or French post-war revolutions turning proletarian. Nevertheless, the 
Finnish bourgeoisie should prepare for anarchy and the burning of estates 
as a reaction to their ‘rule of terror’ and not from any socialist agitation.1253 
is was, in the circumstances of November 1917, no less than a threat of 
civil war of the Bolshevist type presented in a parliamentary debate about 
supreme power – days before the Social Democrats’ decision to start 
a revolution and two and half months before the actual Red uprising. For 
the Social Democrats, a revolution had become inevitable, but its timing 
remained linked to the progress of a pan-European, even global revolution. 
At the same time, a bourgeois reaction might be that similar threat-lled 
language had been heard so many times before that this was really nothing 
new.1254 Uncompromising views on both sides deepened the confrontation.
An MP called Erkki Härmä made a Marxist point in universalist terms: 
e bourgeoisie had learned from previous revolutions how all victories by 
the working class could be overturned by introducing oligarchic forms of 
government; they had done so during the French Revolution and again aer 
the victories of the Russian and Finnish workers in 1905. is tactic had 
also been used in 1917: the reforms in favour of the workers introduced 
by the majority of the Finnish parliament had been nullied by the 
Finnish bourgeoisie in cooperation with reactionary forces from Russia.1255 
is implied that the Finnish bourgeoisie was ‘counterrevolutionary’ in 
a universal sense, which caused Härmä to use references going all the way 
back to the French Revolution: they were trying to introduce ‘a Directory’ 
and making a coup just like the counterrevolutionaries in 1795 when 
nominating regents.1256 e Marxist conclusion was that only a proletarian 
revolution would bring an end to these repeated bourgeois plots – that history 
demanded a revolution to stop the Finnish bourgeoisie. Such suggestions 
1251 10 November 1917, 56; e Revolutionary Council in Helsinki, founded on 8–9 
November 1917, though not aiming at an immediate revolution, had decided 
in favour of taking over power earlier on the same day under pressure from the 
Russian revolutionaries. Lindman 1968, 176–7; Ketola 1987, 356; cf. Kirby 1976, 
110, and Rinta-Tassi 1986, 55, on Otto Wille Kuusinen’s doubts in late October 
and throughout November; Upton 1980, 275; Ehrnrooth 1992, 185, 268. e 
council’s readiness was encouraged by the ease with which the Bolshevik coup 
had been carried out in Petrograd three days earlier. Wade 2000, 233.
1252 Ketola 1987, 361; Wade 2000, 223.
1253 VP, Otto Wille Kuusinen, 10 November 1917, 56.
1254 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Från kammare och kuloar’, 20 November 1917 (dated 11 
November).
1255 VP, Erkki Härmä, 10 November 1917, 73.
1256 VP, Erkki Härmä, 10 November 1917, 73; Herman Hurmevaara explicitly 
declared the government’s proposal to be a ‘counterrevolutionary attempt’. VP, 
10 November 1917, 85.
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of an unavoidable revolution at the beginning of the new parliament also 
corroded trust in parliamentary solutions among members of the centre and 
the right, and they began to prepare for the use of extra-parliamentary force 
themselves through the Civil Guards (White Guards).
More threats followed: according to Edvard Hänninen-Walpas, ever 
since 1905 the Finnish workers had hoped for a new revolution in Russia as 
a way to create a truly democratic parliament in Finland. is expectation 
had prevented them from themselves engaging in ‘bloody revolutions, 
which have been seen in times of transition in almost all countries’.1257 e 
implication was that if no democratic parliament in a Social Democratic 
sense were established, a domestic revolution was to be expected. is 
denied the democratic stature of the current parliament. Hänninen-Walpas 
interpreted the election of regents as proposed by the bourgeois government 
as a further demonstration by the bourgeoisie that1258 
it is possible to introduce reforms that are benecial to deep layers [of the 
people] only through extra-parliamentary action, that they need to be realised 
through outright revolutionary action. In my view, the current proposal is such 
a declaration of war on the Finnish workers and the Finnish people; it is an 
oligarchic declaration of war against democracy.
In Social Democratic parliamentary discourse, in which revisionist 
supporters of parliamentary methods played no role (if indeed any had 
been elected since such candidates had been excluded from the lists), extra-
parliamentary and revolutionary action on behalf of ‘democracy’ appeared 
not only as possible but as inevitable, and the full blame for a  possible 
revolution was laid at the feet of the bourgeoisie: they themselves had 
already declared a revolution and a civil war through their actions. e 
radicalisation – indeed what appeared as the Leninisation1259 – of Finnish 
Social Democratic discourse and its insistence on the impossibility of 
compromises le few options open other than turning from violent rhetoric 
to the actual use of violence. ese discursive transfers have not been 
suciently considered in previous analyses of Finnish Social Democracy 
and the progress to a civil war in 1917.
e bourgeois parliamentary groups rejected Social Democratic claims 
that the war and the Russian Revolution should determine the course 
of Finnish politics. Some of the Agrarians recognised that the Russian 
Revolution aected Finland but warned the socialists against involving 
themselves in it. Santeri Alkio, who tried to resolve the dispute over 
the adoption of the Power Act but failed to receive Social Democratic 
support,1260 emphasised the fact that the current Finnish parliament was 
the representative of the Finnish people, the mirror of its divisions and 
1257 VP, Edvard Hänninen-Walpas, 10 November 1917, 62. 
1258 VP, Edvard Hänninen-Walpas, 10 November 1917, 82–3.
1259 Winkler 1999, 4; Cf. especially Alapuro’s claim that the Bolsheviks had little 
inuence on the Finnish Social Democrats. Alapuro 1988, 167. 
1260 Rinta-Tassi 1986, 51.
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responsible for solving the problems of the country through reforms carried 
out in cooperation. e Social Democrats should therefore not proceed 
‘selshly out of revolutionary principles’ as that would not lead to a ‘class 
victory’ but to a ‘national disaster’.1261 Socialist demands for convening 
a constituent assembly, in particular, constituted an illegal and revolutionary 
challenge to the legitimate parliament.1262 Mikko Luopajärvi urged the le 
and the right to cooperate in adopting reforms that would pacify class 
struggles and prevent ‘revolutionary tempests’; otherwise the one-sided 
extra-parliamentary agitation of hatred between groups of people on the one 
hand and the obstruction of reforms on the other would result in anarchy 
and suering for the whole nation.1263 Artur Wuorimaa defended the current 
parliament against the Social Democrats’ claims by arguing that it had been 
elected by the Finnish people ‘in an atmosphere of revolution’ to decide on 
a new constitution for the country.1264 According to Antti Juutilainen, on the 
other hand, the looming threat of a revolution justied the establishment of 
the Civil Guards.1265
By mid-November, most bourgeois members shared Gustaf Arokallio’s 
(Young Finns) conclusion that independence was the only way ‘out of the 
chaos into which the world war in the form of Russian anarchy is about to cast 
us’.1266 Santeri Alkio characterised the situation of Finland as revolutionary 
but in a way that facilitated a declaration of national independence:1267
We are now in a new revolutionary situation. In connection with this revolution 
there has appeared a chance for Finland, too, to implement such a revolutionary 
measure as will enable it to take into its own hands that power which is currently 
free and available for us to take. . . . [T]his does not constitute any revolution 
against a legal government.
While giving supreme power to the Finnish parliament did not constitute 
any political or social revolution, the use of power by the new government 
would be ‘revolutionary’ in the sense that it would need to create something 
completely new in the history of the Finnish state.1268 Alkio was redescribing 
revolution in order to legitimate non-socialist constitutional policies 
towards independence.
On the following day, 16 November, the party committee of the Social 
Democrats decided to initiate a revolution, only to immediately revoke that 
decision. However, a revolution increasingly appeared as the only option 
for Social Democrat MPs. As Kuusinen’s speech indicated, there had been 
a lot of obscurity in the use of the concept ‘revolution’ in Social Democratic 
discourse: on the one hand, it had suggested that a ‘revolutionary road’ might 
1261 VP, Santeri Alkio, 8 November 1917, 23.
1262 VP, 15 November 1917, 124–5.
1263 VP, Mikko Luopajärvi, 10 November 1917, 78.
1264 VP, Artur Wuorimaa, 10 November 1917, 60.
1265 VP, Antti Juutilainen, 8 November 1917, 36.
1266 VP, Gustaf Arokallio, 15 November 1917, 130.
1267 VP, Santeri Alkio, 15 November 1917, 135.
1268 VP, Santeri Alkio, 15 November 1917, 136.
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be opened by a general strike declared by the Revolutionary Central Council 
of the Workers; on the other, it had claimed that a revolution in Finland 
alone was not possible and that the proposed general strike constituted no 
more than an ordered action of the masses.1269 Some radicals supported 
joining the Russian Revolution when the moment seemed right in order 
that a dictatorship of the proletariat might be created.1270 
One day aer the start of the general strike, which led to a revolutionary 
situation with Workers’ Guards taking control of several towns and trying 
to force the parliament to pass laws on an eight-hour day and universal 
communal surage, the bourgeois majority put forward a proposal that 
aimed at transferring sovereignty to the parliament.1271 is caused the 
Social Democrats to adopt an increasingly radical revolutionary discourse. 
Jussi Kujala declared: ‘Only the victory of the working class, which is an 
historical necessity and which will one day become a reality, will secure real 
liberty and happiness for Finland, too.’1272 For this agitator, a revolution was 
coming no matter what the bourgeois parliamentary majority did. Aer the 
strike, Eetu Salin – another radical speaker, who had become a socialist in 
Germany and Sweden but had turned to militancy during the Revolution 
of 1905 and emigrated to the United States – interpreted the constitutional 
dispute in deterministic Marxist terms of the class struggle as being about 
to turn to a civil war: when ‘the last social class comes to power and when 
there are now arms in the hands of this class, I will not wonder if it, too, 
uses them to achieve its goals – to achieve its constitutional goals – as all 
other historical classes have done and still do.’1273 e Finnish bourgeoisie 
was to blame for the mounting support for a revolution, and the Social 
Democrats were unable to contain those forces.1274 In Salin’s thinking, which 
was expressed in nearly biblical terms, the world war had led capitalism to 
the day of nal reckoning, and the Finnish battle had become an aspect of 
a struggle between awesome global forces – ‘the last ght’ between classes 
described in the words of e International. Since this class struggle had 
been taken to the extreme, it was no longer possible for Finns to agree 
in their parliament on how to reconstruct their polity, particularly as the 
representatives of the people on the two sides were, according to Salin, no 
longer allowed even to greet each other.1275 e replacement of unproductive 
parliamentary methods with an openly revolutionary class struggle appeared 
as inevitable in this agitator’s language, which was in no way modied 
1269 Upton 1980, 276–7; Alapuro 2003, 541.
1270 Kirby 1986b, 200; Rinta-Tassi 1986, 50. Sirola, Kuusinen, Manner and Salin 
supported the revolution, while Mäkelin, Vuoristo and Airola preferred to 
continue the class struggle by putting pressure on the parliament.
1271 Kirby 1986, 150; Alapuro has argued that the Bolshevik Revolution had no big 
inuence on the Finnish Social Democrats, whose leaders in mid-November 1917 
wished to prevent the general strike from turning into a socialist revolution by 
emphasising political and social reforms. Alapuro 1988, 167–9; Alapuro 2003, 541. 
1272 VP, Jussi Kujala, 15 November 1917, 140.
1273 VP, Eetu Salin, 24 November 1917, 188.
1274 VP, Eetu Salin, 24 November 1917, 189.
1275 VP, Eetu Salin, 24 November 1917, 190.
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for the parliamentary audience; it was addressed to the audience outside. 
Radical Marxist discourse in the parliament and press had also begun to be 
implemented in extra-parliamentary action. is was the impression shared 
(and readily overinterpreted) by the bourgeois members of parliament.
From the point of view of rightist MPs, it was evident that the Social 
Democrats were under the inuence of ‘revolutionary intoxication’ and 
ready to give up the ballot and parliament for methods that ignored the 
conventions of the Finnish polity. According to Oswald Kairamo (Finnish 
Party), the socialists wished to make Finnish politics dependent on ‘the 
erratic upheavals of the political life of St Petersburg’.1276 ey had allied 
themselves with the Bolsheviks, opting for unbounded claims of class 
interest and the rejection of legal and parliamentary means of advancing 
their cause,1277 the implication being that the bourgeoisie might be forced 
to do the same. Annie Furuhjelm (Swedish People’s Party) could not 
understand how revolution could be propounded in a country that already 
had universal surage, freedom of association and liberty of the press and 
which provided full possibilities to achieve one’s goals by parliamentary 
means. Why was the Finnish Social Democratic Party looking for support 
from the Bolsheviks, whom even the leist socialists in Russia did not 
recognise? Social Democrat women at least should, according to this activist 
for women’s rights, oppose violent methods and support the restoration of 
a constitutional and parliamentary line in the party.1278 But this ght clearly 
was not a gender issue, and women MPs were not able to save the country 
from a civil war, as David Norman in Sweden would later ironically point 
out.
e centre was equally concerned about Social Democratic discourse 
and acts of violence initiated by ‘the so-called revolutionary committee’, in 
which Social Democrat parliamentarians were involved.1279 e boundary 
between parliamentary debate and engagement in the initiation of extra-
parliamentary violence had been crossed, which proved to many that the 
Social Democrats had abandoned democracy and parliamentarism in favour 
of violence. Antti Mikkola (Young Finns), a lawyer who was the founder of 
the Turku newspaper Turun Sanomat and Chairman of the Legal Aairs 
Committee, doubted whether the French revolutionary principles of liberty, 
equality and fraternity had any hope of being realised as a result of the 
violent acts of the Social Democratic Red Guards and proposed the creation 
of an organised military force as a response.1280 While Agrarians such as 
Kalle Lohi saw the socialist agitation of class hatred as stemming from the 
real grievances of the people,1281 Santeri Alkio concluded that the Finnish 
1276 VP, Oswald Kairamo, 24 November 1917, 185.
1277 VP, Oswald Kairamo, 24 November 1917, 185. is was an old suggestion that 
had already appeared in the election platform of the Finnish Party in 1907.
1278 VP, Annie Furuhjelm, 24 November 1917, 192.
1279 VP, Antti Juutilainen, 24 November 1917, 192–3. 
1280 VP, Antti Mikkola, 26 November 1917, 237. On bourgeois press debates about 
the deterioration of public order, see Nyström 2013, 173. Mikkola himself would 
be shot by the Reds Guards in Helsinki on 1 February 1918.
1281 VP, Kalle Lohi, 26 November 1917, 238.
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socialists were imitating the worst aspects of Bolshevism.1282 MPs from the 
bourgeois parties, including the most fervent defenders of democracy and 
parliamentarism, were already giving up any hope of solving the crisis by 
parliamentary means. As Hannu Soikkanen has pointed out, each of the two 
blocs believed in its one-sided and ideologically coloured interpretations of 
the situation. ese interpretations, which were constantly reinforced in the 
parliament and in press discussions, supported the escalation of the crisis 
as new incidents occurred.1283 However, the origin of the crisis can be found 
in the challenge to parliamentarism in the one-sided discourse that the 
parliamentary Finnish Social Democratic Party was fostering, sometimes 
openly, sometimes disguised under the rhetoric of democracy, and that 
sounded like Bolshevism, and not so much in its legalistic defences.
Despite the tendency of the Social Democratic parliamentary group to 
borrow the parlance of the radicalised Russian Revolution, views among 
them about the chances for an actual revolution continued to vary. In the 
party convention of 25–27 November 1917, the majority still voted in favour 
of parliamentary means,1284 even though the example of the Petrograd Pre-
Parliament suggested the futility of parliamentary debate as opposed to an 
armed take-over.1285 According to David Kirby and Juha Siltala and others, 
this indecisive compromise, which was intended to keep the radicals within 
the party (and to avoid a division seen in Sweden and Germany), actually led 
to a situation in which the more Kautskyist moderates, who were sceptical 
of violent revolution, increasingly associated themselves with the views of 
the radicals. At the same time, the dri towards violence continued at the 
local level, with the Red Guards supplementing and even replacing what 
they regarded as unproductive parliamentary methods. is had led the 
rightist press1286 to conclude that the party planned to use mass violence 
against the parliament. e moderates did not actively oppose plans for 
a violent coup in the name of defending the workers against a bourgeois 
‘counter-revolution’, and this in practice opened the way for a decision to 
launch a revolution in January 1918 in the face of fears that rightist armed 
activists would make a coup. Many Social Democrats would be driven into 
a civil war in the belief that it was just another means of putting pressure on 
the bourgeoisie. e majority of the workers thus joined the revolution, and 
once the revolutionary process had started, it tended to become increasingly 
radical, turning into a proletarian revolution, as moderates either resigned 
or associated themselves with the increasingly violent measures.1287 
1282 VP, Santeri Alkio, 9 January 1918, 827.
1283 Soikkanen (ed.) 1967.
1284 Upton 1980, 284, 330.
1285 Wade 2000, 234.
1286 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Från kammare och kuloar’, 11 November 1917.
1287 Kirby 1986, 151; cf. Kirby’s previous interpretation of external pressures such as 
the economic crisis and political confrontations leading to a rising by reluctant 
socialist leaders. is interpretation bypasses the role of discourse in the political 
process. Kirby 1976, 100, 106–107; Rinta-Tassi 1986, 499, 501; Polvinen 1987, 
vol. 1, 129, 203; Siltala 2009, 525–7; Nyström 2013, 220.
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e views of the supposedly moderate majority within the Social 
Democratic Party were not heard in the parliamentary plenaries. e 
extremist language used by the speakers of the party, even if intended only 
to intimidate the bourgeoisie, inevitably contributed to the development 
towards a civil war. e description of Oskari Tokoi, the former prime 
minister, of the state of aairs on 26 November provides an illustrative 
example. According to Tokoi, the dierent classes of the Finnish people 
had been agitated into a violent struggle against each other by bourgeois 
opposition to reforms. is radicalisation could no longer be stopped by 
Social Democratic attempts to placate the workers and persuade them to 
keep on waiting. A pan-European revolution was, aer all, removing old 
institutions; in this situation, the Social Democrats were responsible to 
present the popular will, which was opposed to the bourgeois government.1288 
Tokoi here linked the pan-European war, the Russian Revolution and 
the Finnish constitutional confrontation in internationalist terms that 
were likely to further provoke the nationalist supporters of the bourgeois 
parties. In the words of Jussi Kujala, too, the Finnish Social Democrats 
‘were cooperating with international social democracy in order to raise 
and nally liberate the proletariat’, and opposing ‘the international class of 
employers, which internationally is using all means against both us and the 
proletariat of all countries’.1289 Internationalism was being again used here in 
a Bolshevist fashion to argue for the inevitability of an armed conict with 
the bourgeoisie. According to Erkki Härmä and Yrjö Sirola, too, membership 
in the Zimmerwald International obliged the Finnish Social Democrats to 
ght against the imperialistic propertied classes.1290 
Aer the acts of violence committed during the general strike, the 
right and the centre concluded that a revolutionary coup was being 
attempted and that the established political order was in danger.1291 Paavo 
Virkkunen (Finnish Party) said that the Social Democrats had rejected 
parliamentarism in favour of a violent revolution supported by foreign 
troops: they were serving the cause of a foreign revolution by importing 
it to Finland and introducing ‘socialist tyranny aimed directly against this 
parliament’. is ‘revolution’ had in Virkkunen’s view not been initiated by 
any oppressed majority of the people against an oppressing minority; in this 
‘revolution’ a minority was rebelling against the majority, who had voted 
against continued revolution and socialist government. Virkkunen foresaw 
the revolutionary road of the socialists leading an open confrontation.1292 
Santeri Alkio (Agrarians) gave voice to the fears of the non-socialist political 
nation: the general strike with its incidents had entailed the arrival of the 
world war in Finland in the form of ‘a civil war’ (kansalaissota). is civil war 
1288 VP, Oskari Tokoi, 26 November 1917, 197–201.
1289 VP, Jussi Kujala, 26 November 1917, 257. Cf. the obvious uncertainty about 
international developments. Upton 1980, 310.
1290 VP, Erkki Härmä, 7 December 1917, 409; 7 December 1917, 411; Rinta-Tassi 
1986, 20–1.
1291 Haapala 1992, 126.
1292 VP, Paavo Virkkunen, 26 November 1917, 206, 208–209.
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(used here two months before its actual outbreak) had certainly escalated 
as a result of famine, but it had also been escalated especially by agitation 
for a ‘class struggle’ by the uncompromising and unparliamentary le.1293 
Alkio lamented the way in which Finland was being dragged into this war at 
a time when ‘the rst spring birds of peace have started to sing’ in Europe, 
this vernal metaphor being highly ironical. e current policies of the Social 
Democrats threatened the achievement of ‘the earthly, social paradise which 
they currently are trying to create in midst of a global tempest’.1294 According 
to Alkio, the Socialists were to blame for the crisis which threatened to 
destroy the nation.
Such expressions of concern from the right and the centre had little 
eect; the Social Democrats, encouraged by their current party convention, 
which Stalin himself attended, carried on with their revolutionary discourse. 
Matti Airola, a solicitor, who was an activist in the Red Guards, presented 
the use of violence as justied as long as capitalist society existed, since such 
a society inevitably led to the deepening of class confrontations and to the 
desperation of the oppressed. Besides, both sides had already turned to 
violence at all levels of Finnish society.1295 Jussi Vuoristo presented the societal 
power structures of bourgeois society as a further reason for the readiness 
to turn to violence: the bourgeois press gloried battles and atrocities, and 
school history was ‘entirely constructed in a spirit of admiration for human 
slaughter and wars, and [it continues] to educate people in that spirit’.1296 
e ongoing revolution was a consequence of the Finnish bourgeoisie 
having used Russian power to dissolve the preceding parliament, in which 
‘the workers’ had held a majority, and having chosen revolution by taking 
over supreme power in the current parliament; this had made the Finnish 
workers themselves launch a revolution, ‘the rst class war in Finland’.1297 
e perverted structures of bourgeois society, the selsh party tactics of 
the bourgeois parties and conspiracy theories (a claim typical of Russian 
revolutionary discourse1298) thus explained the outbreak of a justied class 
war of the type recommended by the Bolsheviks. is deterministic Social 
Democratic interpretation oered no alternative but violence, revolution 
and civil war. 
Yrjö Sirola, a supporter of a Bolshevist-type of revolutionary movement, 
presented revolution in Finland as part of an international popular 
movement and a general pattern of revolutions as seen in the French 
Revolution; this interpretation included the conclusion that the legitimate 
cruelty of the revolutionaries arose from the unjust acts of their masters. e 
internationalist Sirola willingly reported to the Finnish parliament about his 
1293 VP, Santeri Alkio, 26 November 1917, 223–4. Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Från kammare 
och kuloar’, had already mentioned the possibility of a ‘feud between brethren’ 
(brödrafejd) and a ‘civil war’ on 20 November 1917 (dated 11 November 1917).
1294 VP, Santeri Alkio, 26 November 1917, 226.
1295 VP, Matti Airola, 26 November 1917, 214.
1296 VP, Jussi Vuoristo, 26 November 1917, 217.
1297 VP, Jussi Vuoristo, 26 November 1917, 219.
1298 Wade 2000, 192.
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recent visit to Petrograd.1299 During the visit, Lenin had advised the Finnish 
socialists to initiate a political general strike – a suggestion that the party 
followed.1300 He had condemned the suspension of the general strike, which, 
according to Sirola, was no more than a temporary ‘armistice in a class 
war’ since a revolution might still break out against the armed propertied 
classes.1301 Again, following what sounded like Lenin’s logic, Sirola’s rhetoric 
presented civil war as inescapable. According to Santeri Mäkelä, too, 
a ‘national war’ (kansallissota) had already come about as a  result of the 
wartime economy and the militarism of the bourgeoisie; it was part of the 
current universal revolution, in which monarchies, parliaments (!) and the 
press – all institutions of the old world – were being crushed, and individuals 
just had to adapt themselves to the forces of history:1302
e revolution does not care about what is thought in throne rooms, in 
parliaments or editorial desks. When history creates itself, when the labour 
pains of the new world shake the body politic, the learned may freely argue about 
whether the people are the law and whether the events that take place before their 
eyes are a revolution, hooliganism or hunger riots. e revolution does not care 
about this. It sings a song of its own. It breaks and creates, it destroys and builds 
with speed. It does not understand us. We need to understand it. If we cannot, it 
will remove us from the stage.
is was openly revolutionary, deterministic and militant thinking that 
rejected all traditional political order – including parliamentary institutions 
defended by Kautsky1303 – in favour of a newly created society. It had evolved 
in the mind of an immigrant miner, editor and orator during his stay in the 
United States and been developed by a popular author and socialist agitator. 
Mäkelä would carry out his mission as an administrator of the Red Guards 
during the Finnish Civil War and later as a teacher of military history and 
a politruk in the Soviet Union – until his death in a Stalinist prison camp. 
Hilja Pärssinen, the editorial secretary of the socialist women’s paper 
Työläisnainen, asserted that a proper revolution should have been a mental 
phenomenon, but that the revolution had now been turned into a concrete 
one by the wrong policies of the bourgeoisie:1304
We have always preached that the revolution needs to take place in the mind, that 
it needs to originate from the mind. We have carried out enlightenment work, 
enlightenment work that prepares for the revolution, prepares for a new system, 
a humane system. We have always rejected anarchy.
1299 VP, Yrjö Sirola, 26 November 1917, 221.
1300 Rinta-Tassi 1986, 31, 54; Polvinen 1987, vol. 1, 124–5; Haapala 1995, 221.
1301 VP, Yrjö Sirola, 26 November 1917, 223; Rinta-Tassi 1986, 54; Polvinen 1987, vol. 
1, 126–7.
1302 VP, Santeri Mäkelä, 26 November 1917, 232–4; cf. Winkler 1999, 4.
1303 Kautsky 1919, chapter 8.
1304 VP, Hilja Pärssinen, 26 November 1917, 245.
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us this leading female labour activist, too, accepted the prevalent 
conspiracy theory, claiming that the propagators of anarchy within the 
labour movement had been sent by the bourgeoisie, who wished to tarnish 
the reputation of the movement, and that the revolution had actually been 
provoked by the bourgeoisie. e Finnish Social Democrats could not help 
it if Marxist ideology turned to violence as the workers were merely1305
resorting to the struggle of class against class; they have believed in it and today 
still believe that the ght of the working class against another class will one day 
bring class oppression to an end. rough a ght against the system we can one 
day create a new humane system.
Uncompromising fundamentalist Marxism had progressed so far within the 
Finnish Social Democratic Party that a class war appeared as the only available 
solution. In this version of Marxist ideology, which recalls Bolshevist goals 
rather than anything found among revisionist Social Democrats or even 
among the parliamentary far le in Germany or Sweden, parliamentary 
discourse was no longer one of the means by which political change would 
be achieved: the old system simply needed to be destroyed. Or, as Nestori 
Aronen put it, bourgeois violence had caused revolution to ‘rise out of the 
stomachs of the workers’, and this had led to ‘the regrettable but necessary 
consequences of the giant waves of revolution’.1306 e time of complying 
with laws passed by bourgeois parliamentary majorities was over; the laws 
passed ‘by your parliament of the estates’ had been observed by the working 
people, and though ‘we Social Democrat speakers . . . have always tried to 
explain to our numbers that laws must be respected until they have been 
changed by legal means’,1307 this no longer suced: revolutionary means had 
replaced parliamentary ones for changing society, and the Social Democrats 
were not to blame for this change, he claimed. 
e Social Democrats were selective in their use of international constitu-
tional comparisons. While Russia did not yet provide authoritative examples, 
Switzerland did. However, instead of expressing any genuine interest in the 
Swiss model, these socialist hardliners used it, indeed misrepresented it, in 
making their claims for parliamentary sovereignty (in the form of the Power 
Act of July 1917). e Marxists knew about the Swiss socialist demands for 
direct popular rule as opposed to parliamentary social democracy, and Karl 
Kautsky had discussed the Swiss constitution,1308 which according to him 
removed the boundaries of executive, legislative and judicial power and had 
in the course of the late nineteenth century incorporated the referendum 
and the citizens’ initiative. Western European models of parliamentary 
representative government could be challenged with this established 
alternative. Otto Wille Kuusinen referred to the Swiss case when arguing 
1305 VP, Hilja Pärssinen, 26 November 1917, 246.
1306 VP, Nestori Aronen, 26 November 1917, 247.
1307 VP, Nestori Aronen, 26 November 1917, 247.
1308 Kautsky 1907, 5, 58–9; Lindman 1968, 352–3.
273
4.4 Finland: Discursive struggles over democracy and parliamentarism
for democratic reforms and against the division of power.1309 He attacked 
‘so-called parliamentary governments’ in France, Britain and Italy for their 
weakness and constant ‘parliamentary cockghting’ and opposed the French 
and US presidencies to democracy, contrasting them with Switzerland.1310 
e Swiss model, as perfected in the Finnish Power Act, entailed the direct 
election of the government by the parliament and the rotating post of head 
of state. Unlike governmental responsibility to parliament, the system was 
based on a government consisting of persons who enjoyed the condence 
of the parliament.1311 On 6 December 1917, K. J. Ståhlberg of the Young 
Finns rejected Kuusinen’s ‘Swiss’ model of ‘parliamentary democracy’ as 
being based on a tendentious interpretation and illustrated by the actions 
of the Red Guards during the recent general strike.1312 e bourgeois 
MPs felt that the Social Democrats were questioning democracy, popular 
rule and parliamentarism in the senses in which they understood those 
concepts. e conceptual strife on the revolution in the Finnish parliament 
was approaching an impasse, and the transition to violence – as explicitly 
pointed out by many Social Democrats – had become only a matter of time. 
4.4.3 The Finnish ‘rule by the people’ in the shadow  
 of Bolshevism
Democracy or ‘rule by the people’ was at the centre of this conceptual 
strife in the Finnish parliament in the immediate aermath of the October 
Revolution. As already in the summer, the discourse on democracy tended 
to be one-sidedly dominated by the Social Democrat parliamentary 
group, even though the bourgeois parties also defended their alternative 
interpretation of democracy with growing intensity. Introducing the 
demands of the party to the parliament on the day following the Bolshevik 
Revolution, the chairman of the Social Democrat parliamentary group 
Jaakko Mäki (described in the rightist press as an uneducated demagogue 
from America1313) accused the bourgeoisie of being ‘hungry for violence and 
illegality in their fear of the rule by the people’ and of having thus prevented 
from coming to force ‘a constitution passed to protect the democratic liberty 
of Finland’, i.e. the Power Act of July 1917.1314 Työmies, the organ of the party, 
dened it as ‘the constitution of the rule by the people’, which ‘the Finnish 
democracy’ would never abandon.1315 Mäki’s speech, according to Osmo 
Rinta-Tassi authored by Otto Wille Kuusinen before the new revolution 
1309 VP, Otto Wille Kuusinen, 10 November 1917, 55; Kuusinen had already cited 
the Swiss example in the debates of June 1917. It was favoured by other Social 
Democrats as well. Lindman 1968, 92, 349.
1310 VP, Otto Wille Kuusinen, 5 December 1917, 350–1.
1311 VP, Otto Wille Kuusinen, 5 December 1917, 351–2.
1312 VP, Kaarlo Juho Ståhlberg, 6 December 1917, 370.
1313 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Från kammare och kuloar’, 20 November 1917.
1314 VP, Jaakko Mäki, 8 November 1917, 15.
1315 Työmies, ‘Porwariston wallankaappaushanke’, 8 November 1917; ‘Riippu mat to-
muus Suomen kansalle waiko riippumattomuus Suomen kansasta’, 9 November 
1917.
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in Russia, was employed to put pressure on the parliament, its ambiguous 
formulations leaving space for the interpretation of both parliamentary and 
revolutionary means. e declaration was designed to placate the radicals in 
the party; some of these demands were naturally impossible to full without 
the parliament resigning in favour of its predecessor. In the ears of the non-
socialists, Mäki’s speech sounded like a declaration of revolution.1316 
Marxist denitions of democracy followed, reinforced by Työmies, 
which claimed that ‘our modest rule by the people’ was being destroyed 
by the bourgeoisie at a moment when revolution was about to enter the 
country.1317 Yrjö Sirola, who admired the organisation of the Russian 
Bolsheviks, and Otto Wille Kuusinen, another Marxist theorist, pointed 
out that Finland lacked democracy at the local level (which was true) and 
demanded that ‘democracy, the rule by the people’ (demokratia, kansanvalta) 
should be rapidly created with ‘a thorough democratisation of society’ 
(kansanvaltaistuttaminen) and of the administration at all levels. Such 
a demand might still have been accepted by the Agrarians, whose manifesto 
contained an occasional reference to kansanvaltainen (democratic),1318 
and the parliament would actually pass a law on universal surage in local 
elections on 15 November. Sirola (who on 21 November would propose to 
the parliamentary group that a revolution be instigated) nevertheless went 
on to describe the Bolshevik power in Russia as ‘genuine democracy’,1319 
which alienated any bourgeois members who might have supported it. Given 
the central role that Sirola played in the ideological training of the party, this 
denition of the Bolshevik system, which was still an unknown quantity, 
as the standard illustrates how far Finnish Social Democratic ideology had 
moved towards that kind of radicalism. 
Kullervo Manner (the former Speaker of the parliament) and Edvard 
Hänninen-Walpas (the current editor of Työmies), next proposed that the 
Social Democrats were advocating democracy against the oligarchic goals of 
the bourgeoisie, the simple choice being between ‘the rule by the people’ and 
‘the rule by the masters’,1320 which reproduced the simplistic dichotomies 
of Russian socialist discourse (and would appear in the dra constitution 
1316 See Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Landtdagens maktfråga och socialdemokraterna’, 11 
November 1917; Rinta-Tassi 1986, 47–52. Not every Social Democrat member 
had approved the declaration but the group decided to adopt it and demonstrate 
its radical aims to the masses.
1317 Työmies, ‘Eduskunta eilen’, 9 November 1917.
1318 Maalaisliiton ohjelma, 1914.
1319 VP, Yrjö Sirola, 8 November 1917, 25–6; Otto Wille Kuusinen, 10 November 
1917, 55; Yrjö Sirola, 26 November 1917, 221–3; 7 December 1917, 411; Rinta-
Tassi 1986, 56. In Petrograd Lenin asserted in the meantime that the Bolsheviks 
would observe ‘genuine democracy’ during the future Constituent Assembly 
as formulated by him before the Revolution. Pipes 1992, 545; Müller 2011, 35. 
To the Finnish workers he promised support against the Finnish bourgeoisie. 
Kirby 1976, 108. Sirola himself argued for a union with this ‘true’ revolutionary 
democracy in an article published on 17 November. Kirby 1974, 81.
1320 VP, Kullervo Manner, 8 November 1917, 38; Edvard Hänninen-Walpas, 
8 November 1917, 45; Kullervo Manner, 10 November 1917, 71.
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of Red Finland as well). Indeed, according to Hänninen-Walpas, the 
Finnish workers had hoped for this revolution in Russia as it would allow 
‘the democratic parliament’ of Finland (the dissolved rst parliament 
of 1917 with its socialist majority) to gain ‘democratic power’. e new 
revolution in Russia meant democracy for Finland, whereas the Finnish 
bourgeoisie lacked ‘a democratic conscience’ and had been ready to use 
the Russian counter-revolutionaries (the Provisional Government) ‘against 
the democratic parliament of Finland, against Finnish democracy’,1321 
a  Social Democratic majority being again identied with democracy as 
opposed to the bourgeoisie as abusers of procedure. With their proposal 
to elect three regents, the Finnish bourgeoisie would now create another 
body aimed at destroying the decisions of ‘a democratic parliament’ and 
‘Finnish democracy’.1322 ey were, according to Hänninen-Walpas, thereby 
associating themselves with German militarism, which hated democracy, 
and their ultimate intention was to prevent all ‘democratic reforms’ planned 
by ‘the democratic parliament’.1323 Oskari Tokoi, the former prime minister, 
likewise argued that the Finnish bourgeoisie was opposing the ‘democratic 
winds’ that were blowing across the world.1324 Socialism was democracy by 
denition, while the bourgeoisie represented counterforces to revolution 
and democracy in alliance with imperial Germany. 
When the transfer of the supreme power to the parliament and the 
general strike took place in mid-November, Jussi Kujala considered the 
Finnish right to be ghting ‘a political and economic class struggle against 
the democracy of the proletariat’, here reasserting the identication of the 
proletariat with democracy and the notion of democracy being about the class 
struggle. Furthermore, he accused the right of stigmatising the proletarian 
form of democracy as pernicious and irrational while they themselves had 
throughout history abused the idea of democracy with fallacious appeals 
to the rule by the people in order to advance their class interests.1325 When 
the agenda of the new bourgeois government was introduced, Eetu Salin, 
a socialist agitator who had connections with Lenin, declared that the 
class war which the bourgeoisie was ghting would never be able to ‘bury 
democratic activities and communal surage’.1326 During these days, Sirola, 
Manner, Kuusinen, Wiik and Hänninen-Walpas received a letter from Lenin 
calling for a socialist revolution in Finland.1327 In the parliament Sirola 
pointed out again that Finland had never been a genuine democracy. While 
suggesting that far-reaching democratisation might still help to solve the 
1321 VP, Edvard Hänninen-Walpas, 10 November 1917, 62–3.
1322 VP, Edvard Hänninen-Walpas, 10 November 1917, 63, 65. e speech was 
greeted with applause from the le and the galleries; see also Vilho Lehokas, 
10 November 1917, 86.
1323 VP, Edvard Hänninen-Walpas, 10 November 1917, 82–3.
1324 VP, Oskari Tokoi, 10 November 1917, 54.
1325 VP, Jussi Kujala, 15 November 1917, 138–9. 
1326 VP, Eetu Salin, 24 November 1917, 188–9; Rinta-Tassi 1986, 31; Polvinen 1987, 
vol. 1, 128.
1327 Polvinen 1987, vol. 1, 130; Ketola 1987, 378. e letter was dated 24 November 
1917.
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problems, he concluded that ‘our numbers are very afraid that there will be 
compromise’.1328 e deliberation between further parliamentary attempts 
and outright revolution continued, but the chances for compromise were 
consistently diminished in discourse.
Among the non-socialists, democracy (or the rule by the people) raised 
mixed feelings. ere were statements by members of the right describing 
the Finnish polity as democratic, aimed at defending the established 
order. Eirik Hornborg (Swedish People’s Party) recalled that the Finnish 
parliament was, on the basis of universal surage, already ‘one of the most 
democratic assemblies of representatives in the world’.1329 Emil Schybergson 
insisted that the parliament had already received ‘as democratic a proposal 
for a constitution as such a proposal can be, and which can of course be 
made even more democratic’;1330 this illustrates the desire of some Swedish-
speaking conservatives, too, to hold on to a positively charged concept of 
democracy despite their doubts about excessive parliamentarisation and 
to even negotiate about it. At the same time, Hufvudstadbladet, the organ 
of the Swedish People’s Party, presented the Social Democrats as the least 
democratic of all parties because of their opposition to the parliamentary 
majority1331 and wrote ironically about Bolshevik ‘democrats’. It welcomed 
help from monarchical Sweden to save Western civilisation in Finland from 
the Russian Revolution.1332 At this stage it also defended the republican 
constitutional proposal as the most ‘democratic’ possible.1333 Lauri Ingman, 
a professor of theology and the leader of the Finnish Party, likewise talked 
about ‘a far-reaching proposal for a new democratic constitution’,1334 which 
illustrates a rightist defence of democracy, albeit a form of democracy 
dened by a bourgeois republican compromise which would retain the 
duality of government. 
e new bourgeois coalition, led by P. E. Svinhufvud, explicitly aimed 
at a constitution based on the principles of democracy,1335 which shows 
that the centre and the right were unwilling to leave the denition of the 
concept to the radicalised Social Democrats. In that respect, the Finnish 
bourgeois coalition, although it wished to set limits to both democracy 
and parliamentarism, stood more clearly for representative democracy and 
parliamentary government than the right in Germany or Sweden. Rather 
than dening what bourgeois democracy stood for, the coalition was united 
by a common enemy: they dened themselves as democrats in opposition 
to Social Democratic policies. eir extreme conclusion was that the Social 
Democrats, in demanding a socialist government, had in reality rejected 
the principles of both democracy and parliamentarism in favour of the 
1328 VP, Yrjö Sirola, 26 November 1917, 220.
1329 VP, Eirik Hornborg, 8 November 1917, 28.
1330 VP, Emil Schybergson, 10 November 1917, 54.
1331 Hufvudstadbladet, ‘Landtdagen och dess rätt’, 10 November 1917.
1332 Hufvudstadbladet, ‘Den ryska demokratin och Finland’, 1 December 1917.
1333 Hufvudstadbladet, ‘Grunderna för regeringsformen’, 6 December 1917.
1334 VP, Lauri Ingman, 15 November 1917, 121.
1335 VP, 24 November 1917, 182.
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rule of terror.1336 Pekka Ahmavaara (Young Finns) lamented the fact that 
democracy had not made a breakthrough in Finland as a result of so many 
socialists being ready to ‘trample all democracy and proceed to terrorism 
and fratricide’.1337 Awareness of the discursive process having got out of hand 
was widespread.
While centrist members consistently emphasised the democratic 
endeavours of the reformists in the parliament, Social Democrats such as 
Yrjö Sirola questioned the willingness of the Finnish farmers to understand 
genuine democracy,1338 thereby excluding the peasantry from political 
cooperation in the building of democracy. is confrontation alienated the 
Agrarians further, provoking them to call explicitly for the rule by the people. 
Mikko Luopajärvi asserted that the Agrarians wanted to do everything 
possible to get democratic reforms passed, while the Social Democrats 
were playing opportunistic procedural games that were inconsistent with 
their calls for ‘extreme democracy’.1339 Artur Vuorimaa also pointed out 
ideological divergences between the centre and the right: according to him, 
there was also a battle between present-day ideas about the rule by the people 
and past notions of monarchy and bureaucracy that was being fought.1340 
Minister of Agriculture Kyösti Kallio declared the Eduskunta to be ‘the most 
democratic parliament in the world’ and thereby a powerful tool for leist 
endeavours to realise their goals despite reactionary opposition from the 
right.1341 Kalle Lohi pointed out that there were also ‘democratic, radical 
elements’ among the bourgeois parties outside the Agrarian League and that 
the bourgeois coalition was ready to take the democratic measures required 
by the times.1342 e Finnish centre parties declared themselves on a broad 
front to be democrats who opposed both extremes and to be ready to accept 
democratic reforms – indeed to an even greater extent than centrists in 
Britain or Germany, in this respect resembling the Swedish Liberals.
Bourgeois democracy found defenders among the Finnish liberals, 
many of whom were radical by international standards. Among the clerical 
representatives of the Young Finns, Gustaf Arokallio still welcomed the 
principle of the rule by the people on which the Power Act of July 1917 had 
been based, pointing to its ongoing breakthrough in a number of countries.1343 
Antti Rentola was critical of the Social Democrats for not respecting the 
principles of parliamentary democracy and for rejecting the possibility of 
socialists and bourgeois radicals ghting together for democracy,1344 as had 
happened in many other countries. ere was an explicit willingness among 
1336 VP, Paavo Virkkunen (Finnish), 26 November 1917, 206, 244.
1337 VP, Ahmavaara, 26 November 1917, 210.
1338 VP, Yrjö Sirola, 10 November 1917, 74.
1339 VP, Mikko Luopajärvi, 10 November 1917, 76.
1340 VP, Artur Vuorimaa, 15 November 1917, 133. 
1341 VP, Kyösti Kallio, 26 November 1917, 201.
1342 VP, Kalle Lohi, 26 November 1917, 238–9.
1343 VP, Gustaf Arokallio, 15 November 1917, 129–30. Ernst Estlander immediately 
questioned the truly democratic nature of the Power Act. 15 November 1917, 
130. 
1344 VP, Antti Rentola, 24 November 1917, 190–1.
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both parties of the centre to cooperate with the Social Democrats in a way 
that had recently been carried out in Sweden and had been attempted in 
Germany. However, positive responses from the Social Democratic side 
were lacking, and cooperation with even reformist bourgeoisie continued 
to be excluded. 
By the time of the declaration of independence, both the Social Democrats 
and the bourgeois coalition claimed to be striving for democracy: the former 
agitated for an understanding of democracy that sounded in the ears of 
contemporary non-socialists practically inseparable from the ways in which 
the Bolsheviks used the concept. e non-socialists, on the other hand, were 
united more by reactions to one-sided Social Democratic denitions than 
by any shared concept of the rule by the people. All political groups had 
nevertheless adopted a discourse based on the concept of democracy, and 
most claimed that they stood for democracy. e Finnish parliamentary 
debate on democracy was, owing to this ideological confrontation, and 
to the positive and widely held ethnic and/or social connotations of the 
coinage ‘rule by the people’ (kansanvalta), more extensive in 1917 than 
corresponding debates in Britain, Germany or Sweden. e confrontation 
was about the kind of democracy that a nation aiming at independence 
would build. Democracy became dened by the socialists on the one hand 
and the bourgeois parties on the other in ways that made it practically 
impossible to nd a common discourse that would enable compromises on 
the constitution, since the Social Democratic understanding of proletarian 
democracy was so categorical. On the bourgeois side, there existed some 
readiness for concessions but, on the other hand, the legalistic stand of the 
lawyers and other academics of the right, who remained devoted to the 
eighteenth-century Swedish constitutional tradition1345 in ways that recalled 
the Prussian and Swedish right, tended to limit the concept of democracy to 
the representation of the people in legislative measures and not to extend it 
to include the responsibility of the government to the parliament. By the end 
of November, the right saw the formation of armed guards as the only way 
to maintain law and order against those whom Hufvudstadsbladet called ‘the 
hooligans of the le’.1346
When the new republican constitutional proposal was debated on 
5 December 1917, Otto Wille Kuusinen, encouraged by a letter from Lenin,1347 
rejected it for its ‘undemocratic character’ (epäkansanvaltaisuus). As Yrjö 
Sirola put it, it would not make Finland ‘a democratic republic’ in the sense 
that the Social Democrats wanted. What Kuusinen oered instead sounded 
in principle acceptable to many: it was a system of ‘sovereign parliamentary 
democracy’ (suvereeninen eduskunnallinen kansanvalta), albeit one dened 
in the Social Democratic Power Act.1348 However, it had become clear that 
the Social Democratic parliamentary democracy was far removed from 
1345 See Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Landtdagens maktfråga och socialdemokraterna’, 
11 November 1917
1346 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Det politiska perspektivet’, 25 November 1917.
1347 Polvinen 1987, vol. 1, 130.
1348 VP, Otto Wille Kuusinen, 5 December 1917, 348–9, 352; Yrjö Sirola, 6 December 
1917, 371.
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what the bourgeois coalition was aiming at. Kuusinen now denounced the 
coalition’s ‘democracy’ as mere ‘bourgeois democracy’, which, although 
based on a ruling government enjoying the condence of parliament, did 
not represent genuine democracy at all.1349 Kuusinen was making a point 
recalling not only the conventional Marxist historical narrative but also the 
one made by Lenin on his arrival in Petrograd1350: bourgeois democracy was 
incompatible with the democracy of the Bolshevik Revolution. Kuusinen 
repeated the denition of the Social Democrats as the only true Finnish 
democrats, accusing the Agrarians of letting their democratic voters 
down by helping the right to transform ‘the present democratic system 
into a more undemocratic one’.1351 Kullervo Manner provocatively echoed 
the insinuation that the centre could not choose between democracy and 
reactionary politics.1352 e conclusion of the Social Democratic leaders was 
that this parliament was unlikely to adopt ‘a progressive democratic’ line 
that would demonstrate to the workers that parliamentary means would 
relieve their suering.1353 According to Alma Jokinen, both the right and 
the centre had rejected the Power Act as ‘too democratic’ since they feared 
democracy and the reforms that a socialist parliamentary majority would 
introduce.1354 e abnegation of non-socialist democracy was unwavering.
e Social Democrats also challenged the government about a proposal 
to create a parliamentary committee for foreign aairs.1355 Sirola called for 
‘a  democratic foreign policy’ based on cooperation with ‘the democracy 
of the peoples of the world’, which his audience probably understood as 
Bolshevik internationalism rather than Wilsonianism. Sirola and the Social 
Democrats, consistently identifying true revolutionary democracy with 
Bolshevism, argued that democracy would prevail in Russia only with the 
victory of the Bolsheviks. Joseph Stalin, the People’s Commissar responsible 
for national questions, had during the Social Democratic party convention 
in Helsinki on 25–27 November promised a way to ‘the democratic self-
determination of Finland’.1356 Evidently, Stalin and Alexandra Kollontai, 
1349 VP, Otto Wille Kuusinen, 5 December 1917, 350.
1350 Pipes 1992, 393.
1351 VP, Otto Wille Kuusinen, 5 December 1917, 354; cf. Otto Wille Kuusinen, 
5 December 1917, 361.
1352 VP, Kullervo Manner, 5 December 1917, 360.
1353 VP, Otto Wille Kuusinen, 5 December 1917, 355.
1354 VP, Alma Jokinen, 5 December 1917, 363–4.
1355 Ketola 1987, 396.
1356 VP, Yrjö Sirola, 7 December 1917, 412, 416. Stalin had recognised the right of 
the Finns to independence on 7 May 1917 (Polvinen 1987, vol. 1, 64) and on 
27 November 1917 but expected there to be a union between the Finns and the 
Russians. His views caused concern to Evert Huttunen in December, and they 
were also reported with suspicion in the rightist press. Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Den 
ryska demokratin och Finland’, 1 December 1917. On 4 January 1918 Stalin 
rejected Lenin’s recognition of the Finnish bourgeois government but expected 
the Finnish socialists to now nally make a revolution. Kirby 1974, 81, 83; Kirby 
1976, 108; Rinta-Tassi 1986, 59; Polvinen 1987, vol. 1, 188. As for the Marxist 
monopolisation of the concept of democracy, it should be noted that e Herald 
also wrote about ‘the democracy’ and ‘the democracies of the world’ on 22 
December 1917 and preferred ‘democratic diplomacy’.
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presenting themselves as ‘democrats’, had used the meeting to propagate the 
Bolshevik conception of an international socialist revolution as opposed to the 
use of parliamentary tactics. Even if the policy of continuing parliamentary 
work had still won out in the convention, the ambiguously worded resolution 
had le the possibility of a revolution open.1357 Finnish independence was in 
any case presented as dependent on cooperation with the Bolsheviks and the 
world revolution. In early January 1918, aer the Bolshevik government had 
recognised Finnish independence, the Social Democrats accused the Finnish 
bourgeoisie of ghting against democracy in Finland and being unwilling to 
maintain relations with ‘the purely democratic elements in Russia’.1358 e 
Bolsheviks as representing the Russian democracy were to be thanked for 
recognising Finnish independence.1359 Quite clearly, cooperation with the 
Bolsheviks seemed to be the form of democracy that the parliamentary 
speakers of the Finnish Social Democrats endorsed, which made the 
reformist bourgeoisie defend their democracy by all possible means. 
Space and time for constructive non-socialist denitions of democracy 
were running out, however. e Agrarians insisted that the parliament had 
the full liberty to adopt a suciently democratic constitution.1360 Onni 
Talas (Young Finns), the minister responsible for introducing the proposed 
constitutional reform, also took it as self-evident that the future Finnish 
constitution should be based on ‘the most democratic principles’ because 
‘the Finnish people are in their entire essence democratic’ and hence ‘only a 
completely democratic constitution can be adopted by the Finnish people’.1361 
is spokesman of the bourgeois coalition argued for democracy, dening 
all aspects of the constitutional proposal (rhetorically) as democratic, 
concluding that the proposal was entirely based on ‘democratic principles’ 
and hoping that this ‘step towards full democracy’ would prevent further 
power struggles. e new Finland would be a democracy in name, but in line 
with most liberals and conservatives in Northern Europe, Talas defended 
limitations to the power of the parliament, maintaining that unlimited 
parliamentary power would produce an oligarchy.1362 K. J. Ståhlberg, the 
chairman of the preparatory committee, also insisted on the highly democratic 
nature of the proposal despite its emphasis on maintaining the power of the 
executive side by side with that of the parliament.1363 e leading lawyers 
of the centre parties, too, distinguished between representative democracy 
and far-reaching parliamentarism, echoing transnational liberal thinking of 
the time. For them, the maintenance of the dualism of government within 
representative government constituted a desirable type of democracy. is 
bourgeois compromise on democracy remained irreconcilable with the 
1357 Soikkanen 1975, 248; Rinta-Tassi 1986, 56–7; Polvinen 1987, vol. 1, 130–1; Ketola 
1987, 379–80; Tuomisto 1990, 44.
1358 VP, Karl Harald Wiik, 9 January 1918, 819. Wiik had met Lenin on 27 December 
1917.
1359 VP, Yrjö Sirola, 9 January 1918, 827.
1360 VP, Artur Wuorimaa, 5 December 1917, 362.
1361 VP, Onni Talas, 6 December 1917, 368.
1362 VP, Onni Talas, 6 December 1917, 369–70.
1363 VP, Kaarlo Juho Ståhlberg, 6 December 1917, 370–1.
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revolutionary concept which the Finnish Social Democratic Party was 
agitating for, and an open conict on the nature of democracy followed.
4.4.4  A people divided by class and parliamentary 
 discourse
e clash of the socialist and bourgeois concepts of democracy was based 
on and reinforced by equally confrontational ideological understandings 
of ‘the people’. e Social Democrats aimed at monopolising the concept 
in line with the polarised Russian denition, which was countered in 
parliamentary debate by alternative centrist and rightist discourses. Oskari 
Tokoi maintained at the opening of the new parliament that, it had lost any 
connection with the will of the people within the period of a single month 
and that the people were ready to take revolutionary measures to bypass it, 
should it not assent to the Social Democrats’ reform demands. e centrists 
found it impossible to agree with this claim: in their view, the current 
parliament was the best possible representative of the Finnish people: its 
democratic nature and legitimacy was strengthened by the fact that the 
people had voted more actively in October than in previous elections.1364
e contemporaries were highly aware of these ideological and conceptual 
confrontations and their potential risks. ey made Wäinö Valkama of the 
Finnish Party pessimistic over the political outlook for the Finns as a people: 
if they really were as divided and inclined to quarrel at a decisive moment 
as the parliamentary debates suggested, it was questionable whether they 
were ready for independence. Parliamentary discourse had been turned by 
the socialists into mere agitation of the class war while the real duty of the 
representatives should have been to advance the cause of the nation.1365 e 
le was undermining the relationship of trust between the people and the 
parliament, or rather the relationship between the people and themselves, 
with the constant agitation that was being reiterated in the workers’ press.1366 
In the Social Democratic press, speeches by the party’s own MPs were indeed 
published in detail, whereas those of the other parliamentarians were only 
selectively summarised. Valkama’s conservative statement, for its part, still 
reects a high degree of trust in the observance of the law by the majority of 
the people and in parliamentary government: the Finnish people followed 
the parliament through the press, respected it and could distinguish between 
proper and improper parliamentary discourse. Pekka Ahmavaara (Young 
Finns) also counted on the workers not to follow the Social Democratic 
policy once they had seen it put into practice during the violent general 
strike.1367 Many representatives of the Finnish-speaking right (Fennomans) 
and liberals were clearly on the side of democracy as far as counting on the 
1364 VP, Eero Pehkonen and Mikko Luopajärvi (Agrarians) and Gustaf Arokallio 
(Young Finns), 10 November 1917, 69, 76; 15 November 1917, 129; also Huf-
vudstadsbladet, ‘Landtdagens maktfråga och socialdemokraterna’, 11 November 
1917.
1365 VP, Wäinö Valkama, 8 November 1917, 39; also Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Landtdagens 
maktfråga och socialdemokraterna’, 11 November 1917.
1366 VP, Wäinö Valkama, 8 November 1917, 39.
1367 VP, 26 November 1917, 210.
282
4. The autumn of 1917: A completed,  a suspended and a partial reform
people as a political force was concerned. e Civil War would certainly 
disabuse some of them of such optimism, albeit only temporarily.1368 
e revolutionary concept of ‘the people’ agitated by the Social 
Democrats supported opposite conclusions. According to Tokoi, the 
ongoing revolutionary and democratising international trends called for 
the concentration of political power in the hands of the people,1369 i.e. the 
workers. Otto Wille Kuusinen contrasted the bourgeois proposal to nominate 
three regents for the realm with the socialist demands that political power 
belonged to ‘the parliament of the Finnish people’ (the dissolved parliament) 
as dened by the unpromulgated Power Act.1370 Vilho Lehokas declared 
that the Finnish people were tired of hollow reform promises1371 and hence 
tired of the parliament as an institution. According to Nestori Aronen, the 
bourgeoisie stubbornly opposed the Power Act because of their fear of 
a takeover of political power by the Finnish people and of the (preceding) 
parliament.1372 Claims about the will of the people and the proper realisation 
of the power of the people remained confrontational and irreconcilable, and 
the parliamentary discourse referring to the people reinforced ideological 
divisions – and indeed the concrete division between Finns at the local level. 
All this contributed to the diminution of trust in parliament.
4.4.5  Diminishing trust in parliamentary government  
 escalates the crisis
A repeated claim of the Social Democrats was that the will of the 
parliamentary majority of November 1917 did not correspond with the 
will of the people. Ever since September, their leaders had lost what was 
le of their faith in parliamentary cooperation with the bourgeois parties as 
a way to achieve reforms. In the new parliament the critical attitude towards 
the ecacy of parliamentary work turned into the ocial party line, as 
the parliamentary group put it with reference to social reforms: ‘We do 
not have great hopes that even these . . . can be happily solved through the 
recently elected parliament.’1373 One claim was that the parliament lacked 
legitimacy since the electoral law did not allow the youth to vote (the age 
limit being 24) and made it impossible to achieve ‘the massive democratic 
majority’ needed for reforms, instead allowing a bourgeois minority to 
obstruct them.1374 Disappointed with the rules of the parliamentary system 
and the bourgeois majority that the October election had produced, the 
Social Democratic group, inspired by the Russian example, demanded the 
election of a national constituent assembly that would legislate on a new 
constitution. Such an assembly would possess unlimited supreme power 
and would make decisions on the basis of simple majorities;1375 the principle 
1368 See Virtanen 2015.
1369 VP, Oskari Tokoi, 10 November 1917, 54. 
1370 VP, Otto Wille Kuusinen, 10 November 1917, 55.
1371 VP, Vilho Lehokas, 10 November 1917, 86.
1372 VP, Nestori Aronen, 26 November 1917, 253.
1373 VP, Jaakko Mäki, 8 November 1917, 16.
1374 VP, Jaakko Mäki, 8 November 1917, 17.
1375 VP, Jaakko Mäki, 8 November 1917, 17.
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of the unpromulgated Power Act would apply and the majority quotas of 
the Parliamentary Act of 1906 would be annulled. Instead of seeing this 
simply as an anti-parliamentary declaration, it can also be interpreted as an 
attempt to give one more chance to parliamentary government – admittedly 
along the lines set by the Social Democrats. However, the proposed solution 
violated the Swedish-Finnish constitutional and parliamentary tradition 
that was so prized by the bourgeois parties and was also counter to the 
results of the recent elections. 
Yrjö Sirola already set a revolution and the parliament as alternatives to 
each other, suggesting that a failure to comply with the Social Democrats’ 
demands would unavoidably lead to a Russian-style revolution by direct 
action: ‘the parliament of the streets will speak its language with thousands 
of voices’ – or ‘is starting to speak’, as an interjection from another Social 
Democratic member had it.1376 e Finnish parliament had in fact had to 
make decisions under the threat of crowd violence on several occasions.1377 
Street demonstrations had been heard in the chamber in July, when 
a  Bolshevik coup in Petrograd was under way. Now that this revolution 
had taken place, the masses having entered the Duma and forced it to 
take action,1378 the Social Democratic suggestion that extra-parliamentary 
revolutionary fervour might take over and circumvent the parliament in 
Helsinki, too, sounded all the more threatening. For Sirola, moreover, the 
current parliament was no more than a mere ‘meeting, not a legitimate 
parliament.1379 e problems of the country should be solved by new political 
institutions formulated by a constituent national assembly.1380 For Sirola, the 
time for bourgeois parliamentarism had come to an end. Kautsky believed 
in the ability of parliaments to reect political and social power relations.1381 
Lenin, who considered parliaments to be seemingly democratic institutions 
that the bourgeoisie merely abused to bolster their class rule, saw no value in 
them other than for propagating the challenge to the bourgeois polity from 
within.1382 is seemed to have become the dominant attitude in Finnish 
Social Democratic parliamentary discourse as well.
Bolshevik-like discourse could also be heard in a revolutionary 
challenge to parliamentary government by Kullervo Manner, the Speaker 
of the previous parliament, which was interpreted by the rightist press as 
reecting ‘anti-parliamentary views’.1383 According to Manner, ‘this society’ 
1376 VP, Yrjö Sirola, 8 November 1917, 26.
1377 Nyström 2013, 154.
1378 Wade 2000, 43.
1379 VP, Yrjö Sirola, 8 November 1917, 24; Matti Airola, 9 November 1917, 44. 
Jaakko Mäki, the chair of the parliamentary group, talked about ‘this meeting 
or parliament, whatever this is’, which reects the existence of doubt among the 
Social Democrats, too, as whether to recognise the current parliament or not. 
8 November 1917, 34.
1380 VP, Yrjö Sirola, 8 November 1917, 26.
1381 Kautsky 1918b; Kettunen 1986, 93; Häupel 1993, 166.
1382 Gronow 1986, 233; Kettunen 1986, 90–3; Müller 2011, 36.
1383 Hufvudstadbladet, ‘Från kammare och kuloar’, 9 November 1917; ‘Landtdagen 
och dess rätt’, 10 November 1917.
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or ‘meeting is not the legal Finnish parliament’, and no decisions that 
might bring comfort to the working people could be expected from it. It 
followed that the Social Democrats had no reason to respect and support 
such a parliament. Instead, the previous parliament, nicknamed ‘Manner’s 
parliament’, could in his view still be reconvened.1384 He did not hesitate to 
present himself as the Speaker of the legal parliament and to suggest that he 
remained entitled to decide when that parliament would meet.1385 His fellow 
MPs even implied a readiness to use personal violence against the actual 
Speaker (the Oldest Member) in protest against his procedural decisions in 
this context. is represented an extraordinary denial of the legitimacy of 
a democratically elected parliament by the Speaker of its predecessor, and it 
is an example of how the crisis of parliamentarism was further aggravated 
by the contemptuous way in which the Social Democrat leaders spoke about 
the representative institution. Parliamentary government had little chance 
to ourish under a former Speaker and an opposition leader who had no 
respect for parliamentary government in any other sense than as a forum for 
agitation and a takeover by a socialist majority.
e representatives of the right and the centre disagreed strongly over the 
claims concerning the illegality of the current parliament. Eirik Hornborg 
(Swedish People’s Party) considered it, thanks to the extensive surage, more 
legitimate as a ‘national assembly’ than any other representative institution 
on earth.1386 Juhani Arajärvi (Finnish Party) required the Social Democrats 
to say whether they really wanted to invalidate the current parliament, 
from which the people outside expected decisions. For the majority of the 
members of parliament, there was no questioning the legality of the present 
institution, Arajärvi emphasised.1387 Mikko Luopajärvi and Artur Wuorimaa 
(Agrarians) likewise condemned the unwillingness of the party that had lost 
the election to recognise the present parliament.1388
e Social Democrats did make an eort to explain why they thought 
parliamentary government had failed. According to Edvard Hänninen-
Walpas, the reform had only gone half-way following the Russian Revolution 
of 1905: the parliament was based on universal surage but lacked any real 
political power. When the opportunity to democratise the parliament had 
come, only seeming and temporary ‘so-called parliamentarism’ had followed. 
In his opinion the bourgeoisie admired British parliamentarism only 
because oppression of the workers was easiest in that system and had allied 
themselves with the Russian administration whenever their class interests 
had been in jeopardy. Consequently, only a revolution in Russia was capable 
of creating a ‘serious democratic parliament’ in Finland.1389 Hänninen-
Walpas already opted for extra-parliamentary means, a revolution, to force 
the reforms through.1390 
1384 VP, Kullervo Manner, 8 November 1917, 37–8.
1385 VP, 10 November 1917, 70.
1386 VP, Eirik Hornborg, 8 November 1917, 28.
1387 VP, Juhani, Arajärvi, 8 November 1917, 30, 41. 
1388 VP, Mikko Luopajärvi, 8 November 1917, 32; 10 November 1917, 60.
1389 VP, Edvard Hänninen-Walpas, 10 November 1917, 61–2, 82. 
1390 Kirby 1986, 163. 
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According to Jussi Vuoristo1391, too, the workers no longer trusted 
parliamentary activity. e Social Democrats had used all possible 
means to try to prevent the workers from turning to extra-parliamentary 
measures, but it was doubtful whether they would still be able to do so and, 
indeed, ‘it is hardly our duty to prevent it’, which statement can be related 
to various explanations for the Civil War presented in previous Finnish 
research.1392 is was, aer all, yet another way of suggesting that the time 
of parliamentary reform eorts was over and that the supporters of the 
Social Democrats, who were calling for participation in local government, 
demanding guarantees of employment and food supplies and were outraged 
by alleged bourgeois plots,1393 were likely to turn to extra-parliamentary 
measures. e claim that the masses were disappointed with parliamentary 
activities had been reiterated by Otto Wille Kuusinen, Kullervo Manner and 
other party leaders for some time.1394 Quite clearly the workers’ leaders had 
– in the aermath of the lost election, with local struggles for power and in 
expectation of a Bolshevik Revolution – been reconsidering the need to use 
force. On 22 October, the local association in Helsinki had already called for 
1391 He was himself an opponent of revolution. Rinta-Tassi 1986, 48.
1392 VP, Jussi Vuoristo, 10 November 1917, 84. Risto Alapuro has emphasised the 
fact that the party was no longer able to prevent the ongoing revolutionary 
radicalisation in the Red Guards at the local level, which arose mainly from 
discontent over the distribution of food by local government authorities (there 
had been no reform of local government) and over the organisation of the White 
Guards. e authority of the party over the masses was declining, but it was able 
to postpone the outbreak of the revolution. Pauli Kettunen, too, argues that the 
‘Kautskyist’ party leadership tried to prevent this radicalisation. Kettunen 1986, 
87–8; Rinta-Tassi 1986, 39, 41; Alapuro 1988, 162–70, 190–4; Alapuro 1990, 20. 
e shortages were not always real, as Alapuro states, and it was rather feelings 
of injustice concerning the political system that accelerated radicalisation, as 
Haapala & Tikka 2013, 109, point out. e harvest of 1917 was not exceptionally 
bad (Nyström 2013, 187, 218), and social and economic diculties by no means 
automatically led to a violent confrontation (Haapala 1992, 126; Haapala 1995, 
218). Since much worse shortages did not lead to a revolution in many other 
countries, the impact of discursive trends and weaknesses in parliamentary work 
arising from violations of its rules should also be considered as additional factors 
in the progress towards a civil war. Even if the Social Democratic discourse of 
class antagonism hardly created the confrontations alone, it contributed to their 
exacerbation by repeating the chimera of the greedy bourgeoisie and promises 
of a proletarian takeover. Siltala 2009, 524; cf. Kirby 1986, 162–3; e role of 
parliamentary procedure has previously been recognised by Rinta-Tassi 1986, 
57, 65, who concludes that the inconsistent ‘Kautskyist’ strategies adopted by the 
SDP led to the weakening of its legitimacy in the eyes of the bourgeois parties, 
its own parliamentary group, the Russian Bolsheviks, the Red Guards and the 
trade unions, and hence the party became unable to control the situation. An 
alternative interpretation is oered by Borisova and Siro 2014, 88, who argue 
– in a rather simplistic manner – that ‘the Finnish Revolution’ followed from the 
disintegration of the Russian Empire and a declaration of independence that led 
to a power vacuum. 
1393 Kirby 1986, 153.
1394 Rinta-Tassi 1986, 49.
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a revolution, distancing itself from Kautskyist notions and ready to move 
from radical words to radical acts. Typical of the time were insinuations 
about the evil-intentioned plans of the rival side at every level of society: all 
the problems were presented as being produced by their political opponents. 
Local labour associations might warn the workers against participating 
in activities organised by the bourgeoisie. e Social Democratic organ 
Työmies tried to keep the masses under the direction of the party by openly 
accusing the employers and the bourgeoisie of intentionally crushing the 
workers and failing to help the economically distressed.1395 
e Social Democrats declared a general strike, while in parliament they 
continued to challenge the bourgeois side, which, according to Jussi Kujala, 
was afraid of ‘those powers which are now active elsewhere, outside the 
parliament, those powers whose members demand more’.1396 e ‘powers 
outside the parliament’ stood for the proletariat, ‘the lower layers of the 
people, its deep lines excited to the highest degree’ as a result of the failed 
food supply policies of the government.1397 Kujala emphasised the progress of 
extra-parliamentary and revolutionary action as an alternative to the current 
parliament. Nor did Edvard Hänninen-Walpas believe in parliamentary 
government as long as the bourgeois parties held the majority. Even if 
‘revolutionary workers strangled this parliament and forced it to make 
a decision favourable to them’ (again a reference to the use of violence), the 
bourgeois government would still annul the parliament’s decisions. With its 
tactics of obstruction and the help of ‘the butcher guards of the bourgeoisie’ 
the government could rule alone and in the end extinguish all parliamentary 
activity from the country,1398 the current government being represented as 
a violent destroyer of parliamentarism. e uncompromising demand of 
the Social Democrats for the reintroduction of the Power Act and for the 
necessary majority power of the workers (as their Marxist ideology had 
it) led to the conclusion that no concessions whatsoever from the centre 
and right could save the parliamentary system. e bourgeois parties were 
dened in a radical Marxist, Russian revolutionary and Bolshevik manner as 
a class enemy that lacked any honest intentions of advancing democracy or 
parliamentarism and aimed instead at violent suppression of the demands 
of the working class. e militant revolutionary rhetoric of Finnish Social 
Democracy was leading Finnish parliamentary government into an impasse 
in which either an armed rising against the current parliament or its armed 
defence appeared as the only alternatives. e Civil War was already being 
fought discursively.
e bourgeois majority was shocked by the openness of the Social 
Democratic revolutionary challenges to parliamentary government. e 
1395 Kirby 1986, 147; Tuomisto 1990, 42; Haapala 1992, 126; Nyström 2013, 175, 178, 
185.
1396 VP, Jussi Kujala, 15 November 1917, 140.
1397 VP, Jussi Kujala, 15 November 1917, 140.
1398 VP, Edvard Hänninen-Walpas, 15 November 1917, 144. On similar discussions 
in the Social Democratic press concerning the Civil Guards, see Nyström 2013, 
175.
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general strike was explained by the workers’ leaders as an attempt to 
prevent the escalation of direct action, but it undoubtedly exacerbated 
the revolutionary atmosphere. As the national parliament was due to 
take over sovereignty on 15 November, members of the Parliament of the 
Workers’ Associations of Helsinki called for a coup by the workers, and 
the Revolutionary Workers’ Central Soviet decided to start a revolution.1399 
In the national parliament, Lauri Ingman, the leader of the Finnish Party, 
forcefully denounced this soviet, in which many leading Social Democratic 
parliamentarians were participating, and its insistence that ‘Manner’s 
parliament’ remained the only legitimate representative institution. Ingman 
rejected calls for the adoption of the Power Act, describing it as utterly 
pernicious since such a constitution would make ‘party strife’ a permanent 
feature of Finnish politics.1400 e right was determined to maintain 
the duality of government despite the transfer of the supreme power to 
parliament: there had to be limits to parliamentarism. It did not question 
the need to strengthen the parliament provided that the government 
retained a certain independence of it, and an increase in the powers of the 
parliament was hence mentioned in the programme of the new bourgeois 
government.1401
e Agrarians called more clearly than the other bourgeois parties for the 
introduction of full parliamentarism; this would include the parliamentary 
nomination of the government and the responsibility of the ministers to the 
parliament, which was to be seen as representative of the power invested 
in the Finnish people.1402 Santeri Alkio questioned the rightist criticism 
of the increase of the power of parliament on the one hand while on the 
other making it clear that the Agrarians would never recognise ‘Manner’s 
parliament’; the current parliament should just assume supreme power. 
ere was, according to Alkio, a threat that the country would fall into 
total anarchy should parliamentarians themselves or the people outside not 
submit to parliamentary decisions.1403 is was indeed happening.
e government’s promises of extended parliamentarism had no eect 
on the Social Democrats’ views on parliamentarism. Eetu Salin continued 
to emphasise the diminution of trust in parliamentarism among the Finnish 
working class, threatening that if the bourgeoisie did not ‘assent to the 
justied demands of the proletariat, the Finnish workers may abandon 
parliamentary means of struggle and move on to the ways of anarchy’.1404 
Salin, although he was generally regarded as an advocate of parliamentary 
means, said that the bourgeoisie were to blame for the rising number 
of people who considered voting useless and opted for ‘extraordinary 
measures, unparliamentary measures’: bourgeois opposition to reforms had 
1399 Nyström 2013, 205–206.
1400 VP, Lauri Ingman, 15 November 1917, 122; see also Paavo Virkkunen, 26 
November 1917, 244.
1401 VP, Lauri Ingman, 24 November 1917, 182.
1402 VP, Kalle Lohi, 15 November 1917, 137; see also Mikko Luopajärvi, 15 November 
1917, 141.
1403 VP, Santeri Alkio, 15 November 1917, 123–5.
1404 VP, Eetu Salin, 24 November 1917, 188.
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made the masses ‘unparliamentary’ and ready to participate in ‘anarchical 
phenomena’; it had ‘goaded these unparliamentary masses into this ght 
against parliament itself ’.1405 At the level of parliamentary discourse, 
a  revolutionary and increasingly anti-parliamentary struggle had begun, 
and it found physical counterparts in violent incidents at the local level. 
Anti-parliamentary discourse among the Social Democrats had reached 
such a degree that hardly anything but the total surrender of power to the 
Social Democrat minority could have prevented a civil war. Disappointment 
with the results of the parliamentary system, which had not corresponded 
with the high expectations created by the parliamentary reform of 1906, and 
above all the Social Democratic agitation of uncompromisingly Marxist views 
about parliament were leading to the collapse of parliamentary government 
before one had even been properly implemented. Matti Paasivuori was the 
only Social Democrat MP to reject demands for a government dominated 
by his party as unparliamentary – only to be countered with an interjection 
from fellow party members inveighing against the ‘parliamentarism of the 
masters’ (herrojen parlamentarismia).1406 e Social Democrat parliamentary 
group denounced parliamentarism as a failed strategy that served only the 
interests of their class enemies. 
Some bourgeois MPs continued their defence of parliamentarism. 
Chaplain Antti Rentola of the Agrarians declared that in a ‘democratic 
parliamentary government’ the minority in the parliament, as the Social 
Democrats were, could not form the government and determine its 
policies.1407 Paavo Virkkunen (Finnish Party), too, explicitly defended parlia-
mentarism, which illustrates the devotion of some Finnish conservatives to 
parliamentarism in ways that resemble the attitudes of British Conservatives 
rather than those of the German and Swedish right. e Finnish right 
was ready to cooperate with the centre to stop Social Democratic anti-
parliamentarism and to make concessions to that end, the feared alternative 
of a Bolshevik-minded socialist government in the aermath of the October 
Revolution forcing them to opt for majority parliamentarism. According 
to Virkkunen, who would turn to questionable rhetorical redescriptions of 
democracy aer the Civil War, parliamentarism was realised in Finland for 
the rst time as the members of parliament were1408 
representatives of the people raising their voices in support of parliamentary 
demands for the appointment of the government of the country, in support of 
an appointed government that really enjoyed the condence of the majority of 
parliament and concomitantly the condence of the majority of the people.
is was a positive description of the current policy of the bourgeois 
majority being based on ‘healthy parliamentarism’. But it was more than 
mere rhetoric: some in the Finnish Party felt that parliamentary principles 
1405 VP, Eetu Salin, 24 November 1917, 189.
1406 VP, Matti Paasivuori and interjections, 26 November 1917, 231. 
1407 VP, Antti Rentola, 24 November 1917, 190.
1408 VP, Paavo Virkkunen, 26 November 1917, 205.
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were being threatened by the violent revolutionary actions of the Social 
Democrats, who did not ‘care about parliamentarism’ in calling for a socialist 
minority government. e preceding prime minister had, indeed, ‘cast the 
principles of parliamentarism and democracy far behind his back.’1409 
To be sure, there were inuential bourgeois MPs who already felt that 
parliamentary work had proved to be useless. Professor of Finnish E. N. 
Setälä (Young Finns), the acting prime minister, called for actions instead 
of parliamentary debate in its radicalised form,1410 which is a noteworthy 
statement coming as it did from a linguist who had participated in formulating 
the dra constitution and now served as the head of the executive. Oswald 
Kairamo (Finnish Party), the owner of a country estate, was shocked by 
violations of his parliamentary immunity outside parliament, which arose 
from his previous statements on the relationship between estate owners and 
tenants, but which he considered concerned all MPs as such illegalities had 
hindered the work of parliamentary committees. Parliamentary activity 
was impossible when ‘men with bayonets disturb its work and when no 
one protects it against the violence and arbitrary power of the public in the 
streets’.1411 
Most bourgeois speakers however, agreed on the value of parlia-
mentarism. Pekka Ahmavaara of the constitutionalist Young Finns said 
that the Finns had taken power into their own hands once the parliament 
had unanimously declared itself the possessor of supreme power.1412 Santeri 
Alkio (Agrarians) emphasised the parliamentary way of thinking among 
the bourgeoisie, who had allowed the nomination of a government with a 
socialist majority in the previous spring. e Social Democrats, by contrast, 
had chosen an unparliamentary line in demanding a majority in government 
despite their minority in parliament. Such demands made parliament 
anarchical and unable to carry out its responsibilities to the people.1413 
e strengthening view of the right and the centre about the need to 
defend the cause of parliamentarism and democracy against a Bolshevik 
revolutionary minority brought together what came to be the White side 
in the Finnish Civil War – despite their remaining disagreements on 
how democratic, parliamentary and republican the future polity should 
be. Rhetorically at least, the Finnish-speaking right was from the end of 
November 1917 on united on the side of parliamentarism, whereas the 
Swedish People’s Party remained doubtful about majority parliamentarism: 
its organ wrote about ‘ultra-democratic parliamentary circumstances’ and 
about ‘horse-trading’ in a unicameral parliament. It described the ranting of 
the socialists and the applause from the ‘mob’ in the galleries, it compared 
the crisis to a degenerating illness and it concluded that the only solution 
was to replace the ‘completely impossible’ unicameral system with a proper 
1409 VP, Paavo Virkkunen, 26 November 1917, 205–206, 244. 
1410 VP, Emil Nestor Setälä, 26 November 1917, 256.
1411 VP, Oswald Kairamo, 26 November 1917, 256; Nyström 2013, 206–207.
1412 VP, Pekka Ahmavaara, 26 November 1917, 213.
1413 VP, Santeri Alkio, 26 November 1917, 224–6.
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bicameral one.1414 Nevertheless, the threat of the Bolshevik Revolution 
spreading to Finland forced many of the Finnish right to move to the side 
of democracy and parliamentarism, although this support might still be 
wavering, as was demonstrated by the constitutional debates of 1918. 
All political groups were disappointed in the aermath of the general 
strike, being either horried at the violence or frustrated about a further 
delay in the revolution. e Parliament of the Workers’ Associations 
of Helsinki – the name of which continued to cause confusion about 
what ‘parliament’ stood for, especially as it was established to decide on 
revolutionary measures1415 and openly challenged ‘the dominant bourgeois 
class’1416 – considered launching a revolution but chose instead to challenge 
the city council.1417 e contrast between the non-socialists’ and the Social 
Democrats’ views on parliament expressed in November and December 
1917 is striking, as is illustrated by a nal example from the Social 
Democratic side. In the words of Otto Wille Kuusinen on 5 December 1917, 
the Social Democrats refused to recognise any ‘parliamentary democracy’ 
in the constitutional proposal for a presidential republic by the bourgeois 
government as it would only mean a ‘bourgeois parliamentarism’ based on 
the power of the parties and the kind of ‘parliamentary cock-ghts’ that 
were familiar in Western Europe. Democracy and parliamentarism stood 
for two dierent things and were dened by the Marxists in ways that 
made all bourgeois proposals unacceptable. At the same time, Kuusinen 
accused the constitutional proposal of constituting a coup against the power 
of parliament.1418 e major question in Kuusinen’s view was whether the 
Finnish system would award supreme power to the parliament without 
retaining an executive body capable of opposing the will of parliament, or 
whether the dual system would be retained with some power being placed 
in the parliament and some in the government so that the latter would 
regulate the parliament. In other words, ‘whether the people are to be 
allowed to rule themselves via the parliament or whether the people shall 
remain under oligarchic power?’1419 Kuusinen’s suggested ‘parliamentary 
democracy’1420 of the Social Democratic kind would include an imperative 
mandate: ‘When the supreme power is invested in the parliament, then the 
people must also have a democratic right to control the dealings and failures 
of every representative in the parliament. . . . e parliament can full its 
duties properly only under the healthy control of democracy.’1421 Kuusinen’s 
speech le the impression that the Social Democrats were, despite their anti-
parliamentary rhetoric, aiming at a truer parliamentary democracy than the 
1414 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Från kammare och kuloar’, 20 November 1917.
1415 Työmies, ‘Tiedonanto työwäelle’, 9 November 1917.
1416 Työmies, ‘Porwariston likaista syytöstulvaa wastaan’, 24 November 1917.
1417 Nyström 2013, 208, 220.
1418 VP, Otto Wille Kuusinen, 5 December 1917, 348, 350–1, 355; see also Matti 
Airola, 5 December 1917, 358.
1419 VP, Otto Wille Kuusinen, 5 December 1917, 349; also Alma Jokinen, 5 December 
1917, 364.
1420 VP, Otto Wille Kuusinen, 5 December 1917, 355.
1421 VP, Otto Wille Kuusinen, 5 December 1917, 353.
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bourgeois parties. ere is no doubt, however, that many Social Democratic 
MPs were inspired by Lenin’s idea of destroying the structures of the class 
state such as parliaments rather than aiming to take them over.1422 e 
Parliament of the Workers’ Associations soon called for the renunciation 
of parliamentary activity, but the struggle within the party would continue 
until late January.1423 
ere were now fewer bourgeois responses to Kuusinen; an increasing 
number of representatives were giving up arguing with the Social Democrats 
as unproductive. Onni Talas (Young Finns), responding on behalf of the 
government, argued that even under the most democratic surage system 
the parliament did not always express the true will of the people, as ‘the 
parliament is by no means the same thing as the people’;1424 this would have 
represented an average liberal view in Germany or Sweden as well. Talas also 
presented British parliamentarism as exemplary, which was exceptional in 
the Finnish debates of 1917 or 1918. However, he stated that the discrepancy 
between the broad surage and the limited power of parliament should be 
resolved. Instead of making parliament an omnipotent user of potentially 
‘oligarchic’ power, however, Talas preferred – in the name of democracy 
– that the people be allowed in certain cases, aer a presidential intervention, 
decide whether the parliament had interpreted their wishes correctly.1425 
Parliamentarism and presidential power would thus be combined in ways 
that resembled the later formulation in the Weimar Constitution. Here, 
his proposal was inuenced by the transnational theoretical debate on the 
deciencies of parliamentarism. e Finnish debate would, however, be 
interrupted by a civil war, and aer it the constitutional debate would take 
on a very dierent tone.
1422 Pipes 1992, 396.
1423 Soikkanen 1975, 258.
1424 VP, Onni Talas, 6 December 1917, 368.
1425 VP, Onni Talas, 6 December 1917, 368–9.
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5.  The spring of 1918: Western and 
 Prussian versions of ‘parliamentarism’ 
 clash in the Swedish and Finnish 
 parliaments
5.1  Britain aer of the Representation of the People Act
e year 1918 opened with an international debate following Woodrow 
Wilson’s Fourteen Points, presented to the U.S. Congress on 8 January and 
calling for the reorganization of the international order aer the war. e 
general principles concerning the future world order put forward by Wilson 
shaped the course of transnational discourse during the year once again. 
During the spring, Wilson added explicit demands for the democratization 
of Germany as a precondition for peace as he interpreted the terms of the 
Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as an expression of German imperialism that needed 
to be countered with heavier demands. He spoke in particular about the 
rejection of European traditions of secret diplomacy and about making the 
world safe with the universal adoption of liberal democracy (in its American 
form) everywhere. David Lloyd George, the British prime minister, also 
took a stand on the war aims in January, albeit a still rather speculative one; 
he did not call for a regime change in Germany since, in the aermath of the 
Bolshevik Revolution, his concerns were focused on the rise of the working 
class both at home and abroad. When the German spring oensive of 1918 
started, however, he joined Wilson’s denition of the war as an act of self-
defence of the democracies of the world. In his foreign policy, Lloyd George 
used references to democracy more to divide the Germans than to really 
campaign for democratisation there; even less did he aim at any radical 
democratisation at home. Generally, the discursive turn of spring 1917 
was reinforced in spring 1918, and the war between the imperialist great 
powers was even more clearly transformed into a war for the defence of 
Western democracy worldwide. is Wilsonian discourse included notions 
of a free economy and the right of self-determination (relevant for smaller 
nations like the Finns), and it proposed that the administration of future 
international relations should be given to an intergovernmental organisation 
of democratic nations that would solve conicts peacefully while respecting 
the territories of the member states.1426 
1426 Soutou 2014, 522–3; Leonhard 2014, 807–808, 810; Müller 2014, 32; cf. Newton 
1997, 416, Cunningham 2001, 238, and Fry 2011, 144–5, on Lloyd George’s 
changing tactics being motivated by domestic political interests. 
293
5.1 Britain after of the Representation of the People Act
In the meantime, Britain had concluded a surage reform but kept 
public discussion on the country’s future form of government to the 
minimum. In the nal debates on the Representation of the People Bill 
in the Lords, criticisms of female surage and technical aspects of the 
reform were still heard, but the opposition peers mainly abstained from 
voting against the reform in order to avoid a further confrontation with 
the Commons. Universal surage was recognised by the great majority of 
the Conservatives – even including many of the opposing minority – as 
unavoidable. Proportional representation was advocated by the Lords but 
was voted down by the Commons. A plan for further reform, too, was 
rejected in May.1427 Some matters concerning related practicalities such as 
the costs of the Act, were taken up in several parliamentary questions in the 
following session, but there were no extensive debates on them. e surage 
reform seemed to have been completed, and constitutional discussion now 
turned to other matters. 
Owing to the continuing war and the reservations of the government 
in referring to democracy, the British act was not really celebrated as 
a  measure of democratisation. In practice, however, it would – when it 
was implemented aer the ceasere – change the political system in the 
direction of a representative parliamentary democracy based on nearly 
universal surage in a more radical way than any of the numerous previous 
reforms.1428 Britain was about to become a representative democracy, at least 
to the extent to which William Hurrell Mallock had dened the concept in 
November 1917, and one with nearly universal surage to boot:1429 
Democracy is a word which may be conveniently and correctly employed to 
designate the constitution of any complex State, if by all parties concerned it is 
understood to mean simply a state in which the democratic principle is powerful 
within certain limits; in which it is provided with legal means of expressing itself; 
and which is thus contrasted with States in which no such means exist. 
e democratic principle within certain limits did not mean for the anti-
socialist Mallock or the conservatives in general that ‘in political government 
. . . merely popular power . . . can be supreme in any great State whatever’. 
Oligarchy would still be needed side by side with democracy.1430 
Universal male surage had been introduced in many European states 
(including France and Germany) before that, and women’s surage in some 
(including Finland and Norway). Britain was nevertheless a pioneer in the 
transnational wave of democratising and parliamentarising constitutions 
in 1918 and 1919, and the British reform added to the pressures for 
reform in other countries, Germany and Sweden included. e British 
constitutional reform was not to the same extent a result of outside pressures 
as in Germany, Sweden and Finland, although the exceptional wartime 
1427 Machin 2001, 144–6; Curtice 2003, 505.
1428 Machin 2001, 146.
1429 Mallock 1918, 389.
1430 Mallock 1918, 390–2.
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circumstances made it possible with the joint war experience changing the 
attitudes of the Conservatives and to a lesser extent those of the Liberals. e 
suragette violence had also ceased during the war, and there was a general 
determination to avoid its re-emergence during or aer the war. Both of 
these factors supported a wartime revision of the political system.1431 
For many of the British political elite, the Representation of the People 
Bill had not really been about democracy; it was about motivating the 
nation to support the war eort and to prepare for post-war reconstruction. 
Democratic ideals continued to be emphasised during the rst half of 1918 
mostly in the international context with reference to Wilson’s Fourteen 
Points.1432 Nor did the War Cabinet hesitate to suggest that the war was being 
fought for ‘democratic government’ and that, as a consequence of the war, 
‘the whole community has received an education in the problems of practical 
democracy’.1433 e continuing rarity of comments in both Conservative and 
Liberal papers on the constitutional change as a further democratisation or 
parliamentarisation of the British government is noteworthy. e Manchester 
Guardian consistently used these terms for the Prussian reform only, 
reporting on 27 February how the Prussian government, with its proposal to 
‘the Prussian Diet’ (not recognised as a parliament), was attempting to turn 
the Herrenhaus into an even stronger bulwark against the democratisation 
of Germany. e conclusion was that any Prussian franchise reform (much 
expected during the rst half of 1917), should it be realised, ‘will be as far as 
ever from what Western Europe calls democracy’.1434 If someone suggested 
the democratisation of the German government in the Reichstag, or if ‘the 
Junker press’ wrote against such democratisation, this was readily reported 
in e Manchester Guardian.1435 Such news only deepened the divide 
between the (still vague) Western conception of democracy and Prussianism 
as dened in Allied war propaganda.
Within the British Labour Party, the rhetoric of democracy in an 
international Wilsonian or socialist sense was favoured in referring to 
a  democratic peace, for instance, and the domestic political implications 
of the concept also appeared in phrases like ‘the democratic control of 
society’.1436 In the eyes of radical reformists, by contrast, the constitutional 
reform remained deplorably incomplete aer the Representation of the 
People Act,1437 as the wartime realities of the concentration of power 
had not changed. e Herald complained with irony how ‘[w]e are all 
kept slaves toiling and suering and groping in the dark of this “war for 
democracy”’ and saw as the only solution the Commons replacing ‘the 
1431 Machin 2001, 154.
1432 e Times, ‘“Hard, Practical Necessity”’, 12 January 1918, for instance.
1433 e Times, ‘e War Cabinet Report’, 19 March 1918.
1434 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Franchise Reform in Prussia’, 27 February 1918.
1435 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Economic Policy’, 14 May 1918; ‘As the Germans See 
It’, 14 June 1918.
1436 e Times, ‘President Wilson’s Message’, 10 January 1918, ‘Labour’s Election 
Plans’, 6 March 1918, ‘New Social Order’, 9 May 1918, ‘Labour Policy’, 24 June 
1918.
1437 Close 1977, 907.
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present self-constituted and bungling bureaucracy’ – an accusation familiar 
in Germany, Sweden and Finland as well – with ‘a Government that the 
people can trust’. e new government of the people should adopt ‘a new 
policy of publicity, democracy, and peace by negotiation’, ending a war 
that was ‘the very negation of democracy’. e Herald, while recognising 
the merits of Woodrow Wilson, questioned the sincerity of his calls for 
democracy given the concentration of power in his own hands.1438 As for 
Britain, the Commons had ‘abrogated all authority as well as all decency, 
and become a laughing-stock even to itself ’. Parliamentarism did not work, 
and the will of the people did not count despite the calls for democracy 
in war propaganda. e organ of the pacist far le opposition was also 
unhappy with the unwillingness of the War Cabinet to get Britain out of the 
war, suggesting that secret diplomacy and military rule did not allow even 
the prime minister to govern, the implication being that Britain was not any 
better than Prussia, despite claims to the contrary:1439
e nation acquiesces, it is true, in a sense. But if this sort of depressed and 
embittered acquiescence is democracy, then militarist Prussia is a democracy, 
and Tsarist Russia was a democracy. Have our brothers died to make the world 
‘safe’ for this sort of democracy?
e Herald insisted that it was neither the army nor the press but the people 
who should rule in a genuine democracy.1440 H. N. Brailsford, in particular, 
questioned whether Britain was ‘a civilian democracy’ and implied that 
the country was ruled by Lord Northclie’s press, not Parliament – just as 
Germany was ruled by Ludendor and not the Reichstag;1441 this analogy 
with Prussia was extremely provocative. Evidence of ‘Prussian’ measures 
were also found in the eld of foreign policy: the British government 
was accused of planning to recognise the ‘anti-Socialist, anti-democratic, 
oligarchical and militarist’ Finnish White government in summer 1918 aer 
the civil war in that country while refraining from recognising the Bolshevik 
government.1442 e far le was marginal in Britain, to be sure, but it kept 
the debate on democracy going.
Nor were the Conservatives all that satised with the reformed polity, 
despite the optimistic expectations of the majority. Many of those who 
had opposed the reform still considered a reform of the upper house 
essential to counterbalance the extensions of surage: according to them, 
the constitutional circumstances preceding the Parliament Act of 1911 
should be restored. If such a reform were introduced, perhaps full universal 
surage could also be awarded as the Lords would again be able to hold up 
the measures of a potential Labour government until a general election or 
1438 e Herald, ‘en go, Lloyd George!’, 14 February 1918.
1439 e Herald, ‘Who rules Britain now?’, 18 March 1918.
1440 e Herald, ‘Who rules Britain now?’, 18 March 1918.
1441 e Herald, H. N. Brailsford, ‘Nationality, Party, and Class’, 29 June 1918, and 
‘e Fall of von Kühlmann’, 20 July 1918.
1442 e Herald, ‘Bourgeois and Bolshevik’, 1 June 1918.
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a referendum.1443 is reasoning of the opposition Conservatives resembles 
that of the Swedish right in their opposition to universal surage as long 
as the continued existence of an upper house as a counterweight was not 
guaranteed – and the desire of the Swedish People’s Party to establish 
a second chamber in Finland.
e Speaker’s Conference had also taken up the possibility of reforming 
the Lords and restoring some of its inuence, but the proposals were not 
taken any further.1444 Another commission – nominated in 1917 and chaired 
by Viscount Bryce (Liberal), a sceptic of modern democracy –  reached 
a  compromise on the future tasks of the upper chamber but not on its 
membership. e Lords would not regain power over nancial matters, 
and disagreements would be solved by a joint committee. But even this 
proposal was not brought before the Commons by the government.1445 e 
War Cabinet rejected the reform, and the House of Lords remained very 
much what it had been since 1911.1446 As we have seen, Britain had become 
a parliamentary democracy in a twentieth-century sense as far as the lower 
chamber was concerned, but it retained the House of Lords as an advisory 
deliberative body.
Jörn Leonhard has shown how the degree of parliamentary government 
in Britain faced a major test in spring 1918 simultaneously with some of the 
worst battles on the Western Front. In Britain, too, the relations between 
military and political leaders tended to become confrontational under the 
pressures of the war. A serious parliamentary crisis seemed to be at hand 
when the War Cabinet wished to cut recruitment numbers to save the work 
force for coal and food production, as a result of which a top military ocer 
publicly accused the government of failing to supply sucient troops and 
of hiding this failure from Parliament, and some of the Liberal opposition 
joined the criticism. Prime Minister Lloyd George, by attacking ocers for 
leaking military secrets, managed to turn the debate in Parliament and win 
support for the political control of the military. A vote of no-condence 
on the war policies of the cabinet followed, and the government emerged 
from the division a clear winner. is was a demonstration of the residual 
strength of parliamentary government, for even though Parliament had been 
marginalised from signicant decision making in the wartime, the principles 
of parliamentary government had survived. is diers distinctly from the 
German case, where the military had practically taken over political power 
both from the representative institution and from the monarchy, which was 
supposed to supervise all executive power. e Prussian model, as applied 
during the First World War, forced the politicians to blindly count on their 
military leaders – to the extent that the legitimacy of the monarchy became 
dependent on the achievements of the military.1447 
1443 Close 1977, 909–10.
1444 Pugh 2002, 157.
1445 Walters 2003, 229.
1446 Rush 2001, 74; Lyon 2003, 390. 
1447 Leonhard 2014, 866, 932–3.
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5.2  Germany: All quiet on the reform front
Spring 1917 had seen rising demands and expectations for a surage reform 
in Prussia and for the parliamentarisation of government in Germany. 
During the summer of 1917, the overly optimistic prospects of the reformists 
had been eectively quashed by the new chancellor and the stubborn 
General Sta, and a conservative reaction against reform followed in the 
autumn. By spring 1918, it had become evident that any future political 
reform depended on when and how the war would end. e Reich would 
not be parliamentarised nor the Prussian surage democratised before the 
restoration of peace. Indeed, it had become increasingly unclear whether 
these would change even aer the war, especially as the Central Powers 
were still expected to win it. e German army launched a new operation in 
the west in spring 1918 with the aim of ending the war. e parliamentary 
majority might be complaining about its lack of inuence in deciding about 
peace terms and military strategy, but that changed little in the actual policy 
that was pursued.1448 
In the prevailing circumstances, reforms had little chance of making 
any progress. Indeed, setbacks followed: we have already mentioned the 
news in British papers about the Herrenhaus opposing reform. In the 
Preußisches Abgeordnetenhaus (the Prussian House of Representatives), 
the leading conservative parties, half of the National Liberals and some 
of the Catholic Centre used their majority and threw out a government 
proposal on a Prussian surage reform on 2 May 1918. As the spring 
oensive seemed to make good progress, political stability was prioritised 
to equal political rights. e Kaiser, for his part, continued to vituperate 
Western plutocracy in his speeches. For him, political reform in Germany 
meant vindicating German freedom,1449 that is, retaining as much of the 
established order as possible. is Prussian stubbornness and proclivity 
for conservative rhetorical redecriptions also strengthened the inexible 
line of the Swedish right in its opposition to a parallel reform, and it was 
even more decisive for the determination of the Finnish right to replace the 
republican constitutional proposal of December 1917 with a monarchical 
one in summer 1918. e stagnant state of constitutional aairs in Germany 
thus made the future of political reform uncertain in other countries, too. 
In the eyes of the Swedish and Finnish right, the Treaty of Brest-Litowsk 
in the east and the new German oensive in the west appeared as further 
demonstrations of the unbending strength of the Prussian political system 
which spoke against extended democratisation or the extension of the 
powers of their own national parliaments. Spring 1918 consequently saw 
the reinforcement of Prussianism as a political model in both countries.
Such optimistic and downright opportunistic interpretations inside and 
outside Germany overlooked the evident weaknesses of the German polity. 
e earlier political truce between the parties, for instance, no longer existed. 
In January 1918, there were hunger demonstrations and extensive strikes in 
1448 Grosser 1970, 152; Dahlmann 2014, 49.
1449 Stibbe 2001, 190–1; Müller 2002, 308.
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several German towns accompanied by calls for for peace and a surage 
reform in Prussia and expressing sympathy with the Russian workers. When 
the spring oensive failed to bring the war to the expected victorious end, 
German public opinion turned increasingly sceptical about its outcome,1450 
and the legitimacy of the prevailing political order began to wither away. 
In Sweden and Finland, it took longer for public opinion, and especially 
rightist views, to rethink and to re-orientate themselves. In both countries, 
developments not only in Germany but also in their neighbouring countries 
tended to reinforce the conservative reactions that dominated their political 
scenes in the spring and summer of 1918.
5.3  Sweden: A parliamentarised ministry introduces its  
 rst reform proposal 
5.3.1  Anti-reformism bolstered by a civil war next door
By autumn 1917, it had become obvious that revolutionaries of the Russian 
type would nd only marginal support in Sweden: the far le did very badly 
in the elections, and the Social Democrats had prioritised parliamentary 
work and cooperation with the reformist bourgeoisie over direct action. ey 
only even hinted very selectively at the possibility of a popular uprising. Soon 
aer the October Revolution, the Swedish Social Democratic Labour Party 
ocially denounced the revolutionary methods used by the Bolsheviks as 
hostile to democracy and set out to help Lenin’s political rivals instead. e 
party consequently also condemned the revolutionary attempt to overthrow 
a parliamentary majority and parliamentary government by the radicalised 
Finnish Social Democrats in late January 1918. Social Democratic papers 
waged a ercely anti-Bolshevist campaign, and the revisionist party leaders 
spoke for reforms that aimed at strengthening parliamentary democracy 
in Sweden. is had become their rst priority; the longer-term goals of 
building socialism would need to wait. At the same time, only the marginal 
leist press in Sweden sympathised with the Bolsheviks in Russia and the 
Reds in Finland.1451 ey were the only group to express understanding for 
the Finnish revolution in the Riksdag as well.
Swedish politics, and especially the constitutional reform, were in this 
period intimately entangled with developments in Finland, as well as with 
those in Germany and Russia, even though that has not been generally 
recognised in Swedish research. Even if the Civil War in Finland of January–
April 1918 did not concern the Swedish constitution as such, its inuence 
on Swedish reform discussions was inevitable: a class-based ideological 
and highly emotional debate for and against an intervention in the Finnish 
war and on the possible exportation of weapons to the army of the Finnish 
government ensued. Even if a revolution in Sweden seemed increasingly 
unlikely, the Red rebels rising in arms against a legal non-socialist govern-
ment in a sister country caused concern among the Swedish right as well. 
1450 Dahlmann 2014, 49; Bessel 2014, 131; Leonhard 2014, 873.
1451 Kan 1999a, 146; Olsson 2000, 122.
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Indeed, a Finnish revolution was much more alarming for them than the 
tumults in the culturally and geographically much more remote Russia; the 
cause of Finland was at this critical moment easily interpreted as the cause 
of Sweden. Some rightist activists had been considering an intervention 
in Finland earlier during the First World War, but by January 1918 all 
Swedish parliamentary parties had already rejected an open intervention. 
Much of the press and bourgeois public opinion together with many Liberal 
ministers nevertheless wished to support the Finnish White government, 
justifying this (in rather racial if not downright racist terms) by the cultural 
connections between Swedish-speaking Finns and Sweden. e labour 
movement, by contrast, opposed and organised an extensive counter-
campaign to condemn alleged bourgeois plans to intervene or sell weapons 
to the Whites in Finland.1452 
Since the Liberals did not wish to endanger their new-born coalition 
with the Social Democrats, in view of the agreed plans for extensive reforms, 
they refrained from suggesting open support for the Finnish Whites. e 
Majority Social Democrats, on the other hand, also prioritised reformist 
cooperation at home and hence made a concession to the Liberals by in 
practice allowing the smuggling of weapons to Finland.1453 is was not 
even against their principles in the sense that they had denounced the 
Finnish rising. At the same time, revolution in Sweden had become an 
all the more unrealistic option once the Social Democrats saw what was 
happening east of the Gulf of Bothnia. Cooperation with the Liberals at 
home to advance reforms was for them a much better option than support 
for the ideologically dubious revolutionary struggle of the Finnish working 
class; associations with that isolated and over-radicalised – even Bolshevik 
– movement were rather to be avoided. e domestic political situation thus 
led to the Liberal-Social Democratic ministry not taking any ocial stand 
on the Finnish conict while allowing private Swedish activists to support 
the White government there.1454 e Finnish cause was important for the 
Swedish parties but secondary to domestic and foreign policy concerns.
All the same, the divisions caused in Swedish society by the Finnish 
Civil War were deep. Many rightists saw the White Finns as ghting a war 
of independence that ocial Sweden should support. e historian Olof 
Palme (a Swedish-speaking Finn in origin) asserted that the struggle of 
the Finns was ‘to save that social order and culture which the Swedes have 
founded in past times and which have ever since been maintained and 
cherished’.1455 It was ‘the struggle of the Swedes themselves that is going on 
in Finland’, condescendingly implying that the Swedes should also take care 
of the semi-barbarous Finns.1456 Stopping the Reds in Finland was viewed 
1452 Aonbladet, ‘Dödsfaran för svensk kultur i Finland’, 20 February 1918; Social-
Demokraten, ‘Mot Finlandsaktivismen’, 20 February 1918; Andræ 1998, 13–14, 
158, 165–6, 170, 174.
1453 Andræ 1998, 174.
1454 Olsson 2000, 122–3.
1455 Quoted in Nilsson 2002a, 22.
1456 Nilsson 2002a, 26.
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as a way to discourage revolutionary socialists in Sweden, but not even 
the rightist leaders called for an intervention. Moderate Social Democrats 
were critical of the Red rebellion but repudiated support for the White 
government, whereas more radical Social Democrats and leists viewed 
the Finnish war in Marxist lines as a concrete class struggle between the 
workers and the upper classes; what made the struggle even worse for them 
was the fact that the Finnish bourgeoisie had turned to the Prussians for 
help: the Finnish Civil War was a truly fundamental ideological conict 
that reected the ideological and international confrontations of the time. 
e Social Democratic press was doubtful about sending volunteers, and 
leists denounced all such one-sided involvement in the class struggle. e 
Liberal-Social Democratic ministry looked for a middle way, determined to 
avoid engagement in the war on the German side, rejecting intervention and 
refraining from giving direct help. In the meantime, rightist volunteers were 
able to leave for Finland, Swedish companies sold arms to the Whites and 
German troops were allowed to travel through Swedish maritime waters to 
Finland, the last a concession that might compromise Swedish neutrality in 
the eyes of the Entente. ere was one interventionary measure on which 
the Swedes did agree, however: Swedish troops were sent to the Åland 
Islands to support a local separatist movement that aimed at a union with 
Sweden and to take over an important strategic area. is was a measure that 
violated the interests of White Finland1457 and caused tension between the 
two countries for years to come. Together with the perceived unwillingness 
of the Swedish government to openly support the legal Finnish government, 
this intervention led to contemporary Sweden being marginalised to an 
exceptional degree in Finnish constitutional debates, which diered from 
the usual Finnish cultural practice of comparing Finland with Sweden.
ere was rightist sympathy for Finland, and particularly for Swedish-
speaking Finns, whereas transnational contacts between Swedish and Finnish 
socialists remained few. e Swedish Social Democratic Party – unlike the 
Finnish one – had been divided before the Russian Revolution, and its 
majority focused on obtaining governmental power through elections; in 
this the Finnish example was uncomfortable rather than encouraging. Some 
contacts had been created with K. H. Wiik and Yrjö Sirola from the Finnish 
sister party during spring 1917, but the Swedish Social Democrats still 
continued to read reports of events in Finland from bourgeois newspapers, 
in particular the ultra-conservative Hufvudstadsbladet. e party wanted to 
avoid all association with Bolshevism, and this included the radical Marxism 
that had taken over the Finnish party in 1917. Once the Finnish party sought 
to launch an armed struggle, the Swedish Social Democrats denounced the 
uprising as ‘a denial of the founding principle of democracy, a declaration 
of violence of a minority over the majority of the people’. e leists, in the 
meantime, retained direct contacts with their Finnish comrades, reported 
on their campaign positively, attacked the bourgeois and Social Democratic 
papers for disparaging the Finnish working class, criticised rightist activism 
1457 Nyman 1965, 19–20; Carlsson 1985, 91; Hadenius, Nilsson & Åselius 1996, 374; 
Nilsson 2002a, 24–8.
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and shared many of the ideological premises cherished by the Finnish Reds. 
For instance, both were ready to engage in extra-parliamentary violence 
if parliamentary methods failed to produce the necessary reforms. Such 
conicting attitudes to the Finnish Civil War deepened confrontations 
between the two socialist parties in Sweden, especially when, in the leists’ 
view, the governing Social Democrats consistently prioritised the coalition 
with the Liberals and seemed to have capitulated to ‘bourgeois’ democracy 
and ‘Western’ parliamentarism for power-political reasons. e Majority 
Social Democrats condemned the attack against ‘a democratic constitution’ 
by the Finnish Social Democrats and presented themselves as ghting ‘for 
a more democratic constitution’ in Sweden.1458 e reactions to the Finnish 
situation helped to clarify the ideology of the party further: revolutionary 
means were rejected and democracy obtained through parliamentary 
means was rmly set as the goal. e Right might view their calls for 
parliamentarisation and further democratisation with concern, but fears 
about demonstrations and uprisings never materialised as the majority of 
Swedish workers believed that the Liberal-Social Democratic ministry was 
capable of bringing in a constitutional reform. e Swedish workers were 
discouraged by news about the failed strikes in Germany and the internecine 
revolt in Finland, so the Social Democratic leaders had no problem in 
keeping their supporters placated. e far leists in Sweden hence never 
managed to form councils that would have radicalised the workers in the 
way they did in Finland and Germany.1459 
e much expected proposal on surage reform was introduced to the 
Swedish parliament once it had become clear that the Finnish Civil War 
would end with the defeat of the Red rebels. It was introduced despite 
the enduring belief in a German victory in the war and knowledge of the 
postponement of reforms in Germany. Both international factors were likely 
to strengthen the rightist opposition, which, having retained a majority in 
the First Chamber, could vote the proposal down in any case.1460 At the same 
time, the state of international aairs was also changing in some respects: 
Britain was demonstrating increasing diplomatic interest in Scandinavia in 
order to prevent the expansion of the Bolshevik Revolution and perhaps 
engage Sweden in pacifying the situation in the Baltic states (if not in the war 
against Germany). Sweden was increasingly dependent on British supplies 
as opposed to those from Germany, which was in deepening economic 
trouble. e Swedish media paid increasing attention to the Entente, no 
longer prioritising the German point of view, and willingly published news 
on Bolshevik acts of terror in Russia and Finland.1461 A turn from a pro-
German to a pro-British foreign policy had begun, although it would be 
completed only aer the defeat of Germany was beyond doubt. 
1458 Andræ 1998, 175–82.
1459 Andræ 1998, 13–14, 186, 191–2, 194, 196.
1460 Andræ 1998, 244, 269.
1461 Andræ 1998, 214–15.
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5.3.2  Surrounding wars and revolutions as transnational 
 agents of political change
e Finnish Civil War was intensively debated in the Swedish parliament 
and the press in February 1918: members of the upper chamber crowded the 
galleries of the lower house, where representatives shouted interjections in 
a way rarely heard in the Swedish representative institution.1462 e debate 
was initiated by a far le interpellation that urged the government not to 
intervene in the Finnish conict. e Liberal prime minister Nils Edén, 
who had just met a delegation of Finnish bourgeois parliamentarians asking 
for help,1463 talked about a ‘brother country’ whose internal strife touched 
all Swedes, presented the acts of the Reds as ‘anarchical delusions’ and was 
determined to prevent possible ‘contagions’ in Sweden.1464 Hjalmar Branting 
emphasised the condemnatory stand of the Social Democrats with regard 
to the Red rebellion and questioned the necessity of ‘the revolutionary 
measures’ which the far le at home appeared to be supporting. According 
to Branting, a revolution should be made peacefully through parliament; it 
was a mistake by the Bolsheviks (and by implication the Finnish Reds and 
the Swedish far le) to view universal surage as an outdated institution.1465 
Arvid Lindman, the leader of e Right could side with the ministry on this 
issue, condemning the leaders of the Reds (in Finland and by implication 
in Sweden as well) as ‘commissars of the people’.1466 Anti-Bolshevism united 
the great majority in the lower chamber.
Even Ivar Vennerström of the leist Social Democrats recognised that 
‘from the point of view of Western European democracy the attempt of the 
Finnish revolutionaries appears rather dubious’.1467 However, whether this 
Western bourgeois democracy constituted an ideal to follow was another 
matter. e desperate situation of the Finnish comrades actually legitimised 
their actions: in parallel circumstances, Vennerström suggested, the Swedish 
workers would also have found themselves ‘on the side of the revolutionaries 
now that the revolution must come and could no longer be stopped’;1468 
this was an expression of transnational far leist beliefs that the time for 
an unavoidable revolution had arrived. e Swedish leists shared the Red 
interpretation of the causes of the Finnish Civil War: the Finnish bourgeoisie 
had malevolently allied itself with the Russian bourgeoisie and German 
militarism, made an illegal coup against the Social Democratic majority 
of the Finnish parliament and acted as counter-revolutionaries against the 
constitution in advocating a monarchical republic of the American type as 
opposed to a democratic republic of the Swiss type (as suggested by Otto 
Wille Kuusinen in December 1917). A further factor behind ‘the Finnish 
1462 Aonbladet, ‘Regeringen och Finland’, 20 February 1918; Dagens Nyheter, 
‘Regeringens ställning till Finland’, 21 February 1918.
1463 Aonbladet, ‘Den nländska deputationens första framträdande’, 19 February 
1918.
1464 AK, Nils Edén, 20 February 1918, 16:6.
1465 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 20 February 1918, 16:39.
1466 AK, Arvid Lindman, 20 February 1918, 16:29.
1467 AK, Ivar Vennerström, 20 February 1918, 16:11. 
1468 AK, Ivar Vennerström, 20 February 1918, 16:11.
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revolution’ was the existence of famine there,1469 a matter that concerned 
Sweden as well. If ‘Swedish revolutionaries’ did emerge, however, they would 
not opt for the violence used by the Finns. Internationalism among the 
socialists existed, to be sure, but the Swedish rightists belonged to a dierent 
international network, one that was guilty of instigating both the world 
war and, as a consequence, the rise of revolutions.1470 According to this 
transnational Marxist conspiracy theory, they must now be prevented from 
joining their cronies in ghting ‘a so-called anti-revolutionary preventive 
war’ on Finnish soil.1471 e constructions of two rival internationalisms, 
familiar from the Finnish context, were present in the Swedish parliamentary 
discourse as well.
Further international comparisons and interpretations of the position of 
Sweden in a war-faring and revolutionary Europe were heard in debates on 
the proposal for surage reform in April. e Liberals now set out to dene 
Sweden as a Western democracy, thereby challenging both the right and the 
far le: Minister of Justice Eliel Löfgren, Prime Minister Edén and Vice-
Speaker Raoul Hamilton justied equal surage for men and women by 
comparisons with Norway, Denmark,1472 Finland, Britain, the Netherlands, 
the United States and Australia; the experiences of these countries, as well 
as the conduct of Swedish women, showed that neither riots nor revolutions 
would follow from women’s surage. e case for female surage had 
made considerable progress internationally aer the war had removed 
the plausibility of counterarguments, constituting, in the words of the 
feminist activist and socialist intellectual Ellen Key, a decisive ‘moment in 
world history’.1473 is moment made it necessary to reject older political 
conceptions, to communicate an activating message to the people at large 
and to thereby demonstrate willingness by the political elite to take ‘a major 
step towards a new age’.1474 e Swedish Liberals had no explicit reservations 
at all about the reform being necessitated by the war, which diers from the 
stance of many liberals in Britain and Germany.
e Social Democrats linked the war experiences and the essential need 
for a global reform in similar terms.1475 According to Harald Hallén, the front 
lines of the war had now reached Sweden, where the battle was being fought 
between democratic and anti-democratic ideals,1476 the suggestion being 
that Sweden should clearly change sides from Prussianism to democracy 
and introduce a constitutional reform. e continuous insinuations about 
1469 AK, 20 February 1918, 16:12–13, 16.
1470 AK, 20 February 1918, 16:17, 21.
1471 AK, 20 February 1918, 16:23.
1472 Erik Röing, a businessman from Gothenburg, pointed to the elections in 
Denmark a few days earlier with women participating peacefully in the voting. 
AK, 27 April 1918, 44:51.
1473 AK, Eliel Löfgren, 27 April 1918, 44:15, 20; FK, Nils Edén, 27 April 1918, 
27:26, 30–1, 89; AK, Raoul Hamilton, 27 April 1918, 44:60; Dagens Nyheter, 
‘Kvinnornas rösträtt fallen ännu en gång’, 28 April 1918. 
1474 FK, Nils Edén, 27 April 1918, 27:77, 79.
1475 FK, Olof Olsson, 27 April 1918, 27:48.
1476 AK, 27 April 1918, 44:37.
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ideological links between the Swedish and German right were plausible 
as the transnational contacts between them had indeed been intimate and 
news expressing admiration of Germany constantly appeared in rightist 
papers.1477 Various transnational arguments were used to persuade e 
Right to rethink such links. Arthur Engberg (who had himself studied in 
Germany) suggested that the rightists had overlooked Friedrich Meinecke’s 
recommendation to award political rights to the people at large aer ‘the 
globally historic teachings of the world war’.1478 Engberg contrasted – in 
a counterfactual manner given the prevailing conservative reaction in 
Germany since summer 19171479 and Meinecke’s rejections of the popular 
state and parliamentarism in favour of a militaristic monarchy1480 – ‘the 
Prussian right with its modern trends of thought’ with the outdated notions 
of the Swedish right.1481 Hjalmar Branting emphasised the unavoidable 
impact of ‘external’ political trends on Swedish politics, presenting the 
uncompromising rightist opposition to female surage as belying news of 
developments in Germany and the rest of the world.1482 
e Right had a dierent conception. Claims about a progressing 
transnational wave of democracy in the sense of extended voting rights 
were hardly supported by events in contemporary Germany (apart, at least, 
from the Social Democratic Vorwärts). On the contrary, a transnational 
anti-democratic counter-reaction was visible: e victory of the reactionary 
forces in Germany had made the Swedish right unwilling to make any 
further concessions, particularly as the already awarded parliamentarisation 
needed to be kept in check and there was no evidence of Germany losing 
the war. e Finnish case, for its part, demonstrated that a hard line by 
the bourgeoisie worked best: the Civil War had ended two days previously 
with the victory of the Whites over the socialist revolutionaries. In these 
circumstances, Swedish Social Democrats avoided all analogies between 
Sweden and Finland as counterproductive to their reformist cause. Axel 
Sterne rather emphasised that there was no evidence of female surage 
having contributed to the Finnish Civil War, as some rightists had insinuated, 
whereas the current world war had been started by male leaders.1483 For 
Swedish MPs, the Finnish crisis remained a disaster the potential relevance 
of which was known but played down by the reformists to counter rightist 
use of Finland as a demonstration of what democratisation might entail.
1477 Erik Palmstierna reported in his diary that the leaders of e Right were visiting 
Berlin every year. Palmstierna 1953, 23 March 1918, 154; Aonbladet. ‘De 
politiska nybildningarna vid Östersjön’, 27 April 1918.
1478 AK, Arthur Engberg, 27 April 1918, 44:58.
1479 However, there had also been news about the continuation of reform plans 
in Prussia. Aonbladet, 19 February 1918. Social-Demokraten wrote on the 
preceding day about a turning point in the democratisation of Germany. ‘Inför 
en vändpunkt?’, 26 April 1918.
1480 Stibbe 2001, 169; Bruendel 2003, 187–8; Leonhard 2006, 218; Meinecke would 
only give in to ‘wahre und gute Demokratie’ [true and good democracy] in late 
October 1918. Bruendel 2003, 240, 249.
1481 AK, Arthur Engberg, 27 April 1918, 44:59.
1482 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 27 April 1918, 44:74–5.
1483 AK, Axel Sterne, 27 April 1918, 44:67.
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Reforms abroad warranted no reform in Sweden as far as the rightist 
academics was concerned.1484 Harald Hjärne, a professor of history and the 
grand old man of e Right, pointed out that authoritative gures (both 
political and academic) in Britain and Germany continued to warn against 
extensions of surage,1485 Viscount Bryce being a British case in point. Ernst 
Trygger took the higher age limit for women as a demonstration of well-
founded British doubts.1486 Women remained ‘politically all too immature’ 
to vote, and ‘cultured countries’ such as France – ‘particularly advanced 
in questions of social understanding and social development’ – had no 
intention of extending the franchise to women.1487 No advances in social 
policy, increased justice or peace would follow anyway,1488 as could be seen in 
Norway and Finland: women voters may not have caused the Finnish Civil 
War, but they had not been able to prevent it either.1489 While some rightists 
played down all need for reform, others turned to a crisis discourse that 
viewed reform as impossible in the current circumstances, and all accused 
the le of abusing the manipulative power of the press to create a sense of 
urgency in the need for reform.1490 In Sweden, there was, in fact, too much 
public debate, they claimed.
A further confrontation was seen when the government’s proposal was 
put before a plenary session again in June 1918. e consequences of the 
victory of the Finnish Whites had become clear. A monarchical, reactionary 
constitutional proposal was expected to be introduced to the Finnish Rump 
Parliament. e eastern neighbour now provided warning examples for 
both sides of the Swedish dispute, though the Social Democrats denied any 
comparability, looking to the West or back in history rather than appealing 
to any openly Marxist principles. Axel Sterne, building on an assumed 
historical comparability of the British and Swedish polities,1491 went back 
to what he interpreted as the declaration of the sovereignty of the people 
through the abolition of the House of Lords by the English Commons in 
the aermath of the Civil War in the 1640s, the implication being that 
the Swedes were deplorably late in abolishing the dominance of the First 
Chamber.1492 Gustav Möller, the party secretary, conceded that reactionary 
views on reform dominated the international scene but nevertheless believed 
in the rapid recovery of the democratic cause.1493 Harald Hallén redescribed 
the situation by quoting the German chancellor Count Georg von Hertling, 
who had conceded in the Prussian House of Representatives (which had 
recently rejected a reform) that universal surage was the only way to avoid 
ferment among the people. e German right seemed to understand the 
1484 AK, Arvid Lindman, 27 April 1918, 44:40.
1485 FK, Harald Hjärne, 27 April 1918, 27:44–5.
1486 FK, Ernst Trygger, 27 April 1918, 27:90.
1487 AK, Axel Sundberg, 27 April 1918, 44:69–71.
1488 FK, Samuel Clason, 27 April 1918, 27:57.
1489 FK, Carl Boberg, 27 April 1918, 27:42.
1490 FK, Knut von Geijer, 27 April 1918, 27:67.
1491 See Ihalainen 2010 and Ihalainen 2015 on this.
1492 AK, Axel Sterne, 8 June 1918, 72:4.
1493 AK, Gustav Möller, 8 June 1918, 72:24.
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necessity of a reform while the Swedish did not.1494 e transnational quotes 
here reinforced the image of the Swedish right as uncritical sympathisers of 
Prussia by over-interpreting the news from Berlin, where all reform eorts, 
as we have seen, remained at a standstill. 
The Right was not persuaded by accusations that Sweden was a retarded 
Prussia. Sweden was doing much better than Finland, which had universal 
surage; clearly, such practices did not protect states against illegal outbreaks 
of violence challenging the established order.1495 Karl Hildebrand referred 
to a supposed turn in philosophy, suggesting that ‘the syndicalists and 
members of the Red Guard in Finland’ were ‘the leading individualists of 
our time’ who stood close to ‘pure anarchy’.1496 Universal surage would 
cause similar forces to rise up in Sweden. Hallén, who had attended the party 
convention of the Finnish Social Democrats in June 1917,1497 questioned such 
comparisons between Sweden and Finland as unfair because of the dierent 
‘cultural conditions’ in the two countries. e Finns followed ‘zigzag-politics 
in an extreme form’ anyway, and were now proceeding in an undemocratic 
direction. e Swedes should rather look to Germany, Denmark and 
Norway to perceive that the time was ripe for democratisation.1498 Hjalmar 
Branting ignored Finland and saw the history of constitutional reform in 
nineteenth-century Sweden as being inspired by the Norwegian model of 
a unicameral parliament.1499 As Wilhelm Gullberg of the Liberals put it, 
once the Swedes had seen the terrifying scenes of civil strife in Finland, they 
would never opt for revolutionary methods.1500 Even the far le now referred 
to revolutionary examples from ancient Rome and modern France rather 
than to contemporary Marxist examples, especially the Finnish Reds.1501 
e discredited Finns had been removed for the time being from the list of 
model polities by all the Swedish parties. eir failed revolution had made 
a revolution in Sweden a practical impossibility and encouraged a search for 
other ways to achieve democracy. 
5.3.3 An attempted democratic breakthrough 
In hindsight, the timing of the government reform proposal of April 1918 was 
unfortunate: given the circumstances, with reform obstructed in Germany 
and Finland and the progress of Bolshevism in Russia, there was little 
incentive for e Right to reconsider. e Finnish crisis had nevertheless 
helped the various parties to clarify their stands on democracy. All parties 
had spoken positively about Finnish democracy as such during the Civil 
War, albeit using this ‘democracy’ in senses that supported their goals in the 
incomplete reform process in Sweden. 
1494 AK, 8 June 1918, 71: 50; 8 June 1918, 72:25–6.
1495 AK, David Norman, 8 June 1918, 72:9.
1496 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 8 June 1918, 72:17.
1497 Ketola 1987, 140; Eskola 2011, 14–15.
1498 AK, 8 June 1918, 72:26–7, 29.
1499 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 8 June 1918, 72:35.
1500 FK, Wilhelm Gullberg, 8 June 1918, 48:23.
1501 FK, Fredrik Ström, 8 June 1918, 48:15.
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Only the leists had a degree of understanding for the Finnish radical 
Marxist concept of democracy, which, they admitted, diered from that of 
‘Swedish and Western European democracy’. e Finnish socialists were 
not to be condemned for having scorned ‘the most democratic society in 
Europe’ or accused of ‘dragging the ideal of democracy into the dirt’, as Ellen 
Key and the entire Swedish Social Democratic Labour Party had claimed. 
e Finnish constitution remained ‘the most democratic in the world or 
at least in Europe’ provided that it was observed1502 – which may have been 
true of the Finnish Parliament Act or the Power Act but certainly not of 
the Gustavian constitution, which was still in force. Understanding of the 
Finnish system was limited and selective. Sympathy with the Finnish Reds 
was expressed by the leists but direct associations with them avoided: the 
Swedish far le did not advocate the sort of extreme ‘democracy’ that the 
Finnish Red government aimed at imposing.
Interestingly, the Swedish right also expressed esteem for democracy 
in Finland during the Civil War, dening the existing political system 
there (and implicitly in Sweden) as suciently democratic, in the Finnish 
case ‘the most democratic that exists in Europe’.1503 e Swedish Social 
Democrats were thanked for their condemnation of ‘an armed uprising 
against a parliament elected by the broadest popular vote’, which had been 
against ‘the basic principle of democracy’;1504 is brought the Swedish 
opposition and government onto the same side in support of democracy, at 
least discursively with regard to a foreign policy issue. Democracy was not, 
however, the main motivation for e Right to help the White government: 
the shared constitutional tradition and political values of the two countries 
counted for more. David Norman, certainly not a democrat himself, 
made intertextual references to Social Democratic views on the Finnish 
constitution as ‘the most democratic in the entire world’, emphasising this 
recognition of the democratic nature of the Finnish (and implicitly Swedish) 
societal order as being based on majority parliamentarism and the rejection 
of rebellion. Norman wondered rhetorically about the Swedish government’s 
reluctance to support the Finnish government on ‘the broadest democratic 
basis’ and quoted Harald Hallén’s controversial speech of 14 April 1917, in 
which he had predicted international support for ‘Swedish democracy’ in its 
attempts to ensure a democratic development.1505 Norman turned Hallén’s 
challenge to the Swedish established order rhetorically into an argument for 
support for the established order in Finland. e Right was making use of 
the opportunity to put pressure on the Social Democrats, who had presented 
themselves as transnational advocates of democracy but were now unwilling 
to give international support for a system they recognised as democratic. 
While the Finnish Civil War forced the Social Democrats to distance 
themselves from notions of direct democracy, the Swedish right propagated 
an interpretation of the established Swedish-Finnish order as inherently 
1502 AK, Ivar Vennerström, 20 February 1918, 16:10–11.
1503 AK, Arvid Lindman, 20 February 1918, 16:29.
1504 AK, 20 February 1918, 16:32.
1505 AK, David Norman, 20 February 1918, 16:51–3.
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‘democratic’; this was a conservative argument, but paradoxically it brought 
e Right over to the side of democracy, at least as they envisioned it. 
e Social Democrats indeed saw no justied reason for the Finnish 
Socialists to make a revolution ‘against an entirely democratic social 
order, against a democratic order which was not endangered’ and ‘against 
a democratic parliament elected on the basis of universal surage’.1506 
Hjalmar Branting thus dened the political order represented by the 
Finnish bourgeois government as democratic. He declared further that 
‘every democracy universally requires that certain basic principles must be 
observed so that it can be called a democracy’, the most important being 
the power of the majority as opposed to that of a minority. Such a notion of 
democracy made it impossible to defend any violent seizure of power away 
from a parliamentary majority.1507 Democracy and majority parliamentarism 
became identied with each other, and Bolshevik methods, including those 
of the Finnish Reds and Swedish leists, were denounced. According to Per 
Albin Hansson, the editor-in-chief of Social-Demokraten, the Finnish Social 
Democrats had held such a strong parliamentary position that they could 
have stuck to parliamentary means to safeguard democracy. By using violence 
against a parliament elected with universal surage they had jeopardised 
both democracy and the interests of the working class.1508 A major problem 
with the Finnish Civil War was that any result might endanger democracy: 
a victory for the Reds would lead to ‘Bolshevist anti-democracy’, while 
a victory for the Whites would produce an extreme reaction; it was best to 
bring this war to a quick end and to rebuild the democratic foundation of 
Finland. Hansson, himself regarded as a radical, also pointed ironically to 
the surprising interest of the Swedish right in democracy outside Sweden;1509 
this illustrates the contemporary awareness of the contingent nature of the 
rhetoric of democracy opening up possibilities for reconceptualisations.
As soon as the Finnish Civil War was over, the Swedish government 
set out to increase democracy by extending surage. Whereas progress 
in constitutional reform had stagnated in Germany and Finland, the 
British parliament had approved a reform in February, the majority of 
the Conservatives in both houses conceding the necessity of universal 
surage. e Liberals and Social Democrats perhaps hoped that the 
Swedish right, wishing to avoid the fate of Finland and understanding that 
the German polity was also bound to be reformed aer the war, would be 
ready for similar concessions. However, scepticism about the possibilities 
of getting the proposal through existed even in the government ranks 
despite supportive popular meetings in which Social Democratic leaders 
reiterated the arguments put forward in parliament. Hjalmar Branting gave 
an extra-parliamentary speech in which he viewed democracy as the very 
heart of political life and the means by which society could be changed: 
‘To work for and to believe in democracy means the recognition of belief 
1506 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 20 February 1918, 16:37, 39.
1507 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 20 February 1918, 16:39–40.
1508 AK, Per Albin Hansson, 20 February 1918, 16:58.
1509 AK, Per Albin Hansson, 20 February 1918, 16:63.
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in humankind.’1510 At the same time, the party organ Social-Demokraten 
anticipated that this would be only the beginning in the battle for democracy 
both inside and outside parliament. e paper conceived of a common front 
by talking about the le (including the Liberals) as ‘democracy’, which was 
opposed to e Right.1511
In parliament, the coalition contrasted its ‘democratic demands’ with 
the policies of e Right.1512 e le was moving towards a process-like 
concept of democracy. Minister of Justice Eliel Löfgren (Liberal) dened the 
goal of democracy as ‘ensuring the undisturbed development of society by 
giving the privilege of responsibility and a share in it to the many, not only 
to the few.’1513 Axel von Sneidern (Liberal) suggested that e Right were 
relying on the uncertainty that the democratic countries would win the war 
and the possibility of autocracies being restored and were hence unwilling 
to promise any reform in Sweden.1514 Harald Hallén (Social Democratic 
Party) openly accused e Right of having sided with the ‘anti-democratic 
ideals’ of the old regime, which had caused the world war, and of standing 
against ‘the democratic ranks of the people’. is still remained the rightist 
attitude despite the ever more widely accepted fact that ‘only the politically 
liberated, informed democratic will of the people’ was capable of restoring 
world peace. e Right did not regard democracy and popular sovereignty 
as capable of rational development, and this increased the pressures for 
democratisation among ‘the masses of the democracy’.1515 According to Axel 
Sterne, Sweden was nevertheless involved in a global ‘process of democratic 
development’ and ‘a battle of the democracy for political equality’ so that 
e Right would need to adapt themselves to ‘the democratic demands 
of the people, the inevitable demands of the people’.1516 Hjalmar Branting, 
too, viewed democratisation as an ongoing process: Sweden should build 
on ‘democratic ideals’ despite transnational signs of a weakening of ‘the 
forces of democracy’ in ‘the great global battle between democracy and its 
antithesis’.1517 Delays and setbacks in Germany and Finland, the battles on 
the Western Front and uncertainty about the outcome of the war would not 
prevent reform in Sweden. 
e Right did not share this view that ‘a democratic era’ had begun. 
Samuel Clason disliked the way in which Social-Demokraten had envisioned 
democratisation as leading to the takeover of the upper chamber by the le1518 
and to the consequent removal of a ‘counterbalance’ to Social Democratic 
1510 Social-Demokraten, ‘Nej:et’, 29 April 1917; ‘Opinionsmötet för en demokratisk 
författning’, 8 June 1918; 10 June 1918; Aonbladet reported that ‘the people’ were 
weakly represented in the meeting. 9 June 1918.
1511 Social-Demokraten, ‘Ett välde på vacklande grund’, 8 June 1918; 10 June 1918. 
Dagens Nyheter, ‘Den 40-gradiga skalan’, 7 June 1918.
1512 FK, Nils Edén, 27 April 1918, 27:74; also Axel Sterne, 27 April 1918, 44:67.
1513 AK, Eliel Löfgren, 27 April 1918, 44:21–2; FK, 27 April 1918, 27:32.
1514 AK, Axel von Sneidern, 27 April 1918, 44:31.
1515 AK, 27 April 1918, 44:37; also Arthur Engberg, 27 April 1918, 44:56–7.
1516 AK, Axel Sterne, 27 April 1918, 44:64–5, 68.
1517 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 27 April 1918, 44:72–5.
1518 FK, Samuel Clason, 19 April 1918, 25:6.
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class interests. e Right had reason to doubt any pan-European victory 
of democracy: the Russian and German attempts of 1917 had failed; the 
Finnish Civil War had let loose the worst traits of democracy. e British 
Act, as all things British, was exceptional and peculiar to that system, and 
was not a relevant model for Sweden. In these circumstances, rightist 
politicians were reluctant to engage in a debate for and against democracy. 
Arvid Lindman just complained about the politicisation of the concept: the 
Liberals uncritically regarded ‘the mere word “democracy” as satisfactory’, 
assuming that every reform they declared to be ‘democratic’ was positive 
and in no need of further consideration.1519 Samuel Clason insisted that 
pure democracy had never produced a happy society.1520 Unlike in spring 
1917 and implicitly during the Finnish Civil War, the rightists did not insist 
that Sweden was already a democracy, which reects the inexibility of 
their stance in the atmosphere of spring 1918. No real debate on democracy 
emerged, nor was there any explicit rethinking of the concept. 
e Liberal and Social Democratic speakers were right in claiming that 
the obstinate attitude of the Swedish right was inspired by the slow progress 
of the German reform: e Right counted on Germany winning the war, the 
reform being postponed and the need for it being removed. Caution was 
recommended by the result of the Finnish Civil War as well: democratisation 
there had ended up with a civil conict, which the bourgeois parties had won, 
and the winning side was reformulating a reactionary constitution based 
on the Swedish constitutional tradition and theory with concrete support 
from Germany.1521 Democracy seemed to be retreating transnationally. As 
its position in the upper house remained untouched, the Swedish right 
considered it best to just wait and see. e conservative paper Aonbladet 
could not help rejoicing over Bolshevism turning into a asco, which had 
nullied Branting’s advocacy of democracy in the name of the Entente and 
against Germany.1522 e Finnish Civil War had not launched a series of 
risings as the Bolsheviks had planned.1523 Both Bolshevism and democracy 
seemed to be on the retreat, so why not counter both by postponing the 
constitutional reform? A leist counter-argument was that the Swedish 
people wanted this reform. e Right, on the other hand, claimed that this 
was not the case and asked who represented the people anyway. 
5.3.4  Bypassing the political rights of the Swedish 
 people
Few Swedish MPs sympathised with what seemed like the Bolshevik concept 
of ‘the people’ adopted by the Finnish Red government, which had attempted 
to replace parliamentary democracy with violence or the dictatorship of 
the proletariat. e Swedish Social Democrats could not accept ‘putting 
1519 AK, Arvid Lindman, 27 April 1918, 44:42–3.
1520 FK, Samuel Clason, 8 June 1918, 47:56.
1521 See Aonbladet, ‘När tyskarna erövrade Hälsingfors’, 26 April 1918, and 
‘Preussiska valrättsreformen’, 28 April 1918.
1522 Aonbladet, 9 June 1918.
1523 Aonbladet, 9 June 1918.
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violence in place of the majority of the people’.1524 Rightist speakers intimated 
that Swedish socialists would do better to give up any plans to challenge 
a parliamentary majority elected by the people1525 – the people for them 
being constituted by the unreformed electorate and parliament being elected 
according to the existing law. 
When the Liberal-Social Democratic coalition attempted to extend 
surage to women, Harald Hjärne regarded such an idea in wartime as 
a demonstration of a lack of political maturity since all the forces of the 
people should be united in striving to bring the country out of the crisis.1526 
Samuel Clason insisted that surage was not a universal human right; it was 
a political duty reserved for those who were qualied to full it, women 
having other natural duties.1527 According to Ernst Trygger, women lacked 
political maturity and their inuence in political parties would consequently 
endanger the common good and the interests of the state.1528 Arvid Lindman 
recognised that the people were entitled to criticise the political views and 
actions of MPs but saw the activation of women as detrimental both to the 
state and to women themselves.1529 e rightist concept of the people clearly 
remained traditional, male and property-dominated.
Various strategies of persuasion were applied to counter the conservative 
concept. Perhaps a reference to Otto von Bismarck himself, who had 
recognised the value of surage motivating the people, might help? Gerhard 
Halfred von Koch (Liberal), an expert in social policy, tried one, emphasising 
that the war had extended politics to aect all areas of human life1530 and that 
popular involvement hence needed to be broadened. Prime Minister Edén 
pointed out that the Swedes were like other European peoples, unable to 
depend solely on male power in seeking a better future; women, too, needed 
to be involved.1531 
e Social Democrats were positive that political power should be 
awarded to all people as only ‘the informed democratic will of the people’ 
could advance peace, reason and justice in the world.1532 Arthur Engberg 
challenged the way in which e Right used the traditionalist concept of 
‘reason of state’ (statsnyttan) to claim that some objective denition of the 
interests of the state existed, ignoring the tendency of every class to associate 
its own interests with that pretext. From a Social Democratic point of view, 
the polity should be strengthened by connecting the mass of the people and 
the state1533 through ‘the political citizenship of women’.1534 Gender equality 
1524 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 20 February 1918, 16:39–40.
1525 AK, David Norman, 20 February 1918, 16:52.
1526 FK, Harald Hjärne, 27 April 1918, 27:45.
1527 FK, Samuel Clason, 27 April 1918, 27:57.
1528 FK, Ernst Trygger, 27 April 1918, 27:83, 86.
1529 AK, Arvid Lindman, 27 April 1918, 44:39.
1530 FK, Gerhard Halfred von Koch, 27 April 1918, 27:70.
1531 FK, Nils Edén, 27 April 1918, 27:79.
1532 AK, Harald Hallén, 27 April 1918, 44:37.
1533 AK, Arthur Engberg, 27 April 1918, 44:57, 59; also Axel Sterne, 27 April 1918, 
44:67 and Hjalmar Branting, 27 April 1918, 44:76.
1534 AK, Axel Sterne, 27 April 1918, 44:64.
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and democracy were thereby implicitly linked, though such a connection 
was not explicitly drawn even by woman activists.1535 Women’s surage was 
in the contemporary understanding more about citizenship than about 
democracy. 
e entire le spoke for the sovereignty of the people in spring 1918, 
countering the rightist argument appealing to ‘reason of state’ and arguing 
for the inclusion of female voters in ‘the people’. Axel Sterne of the Social 
Democrats advocated popular sovereignty as the principle on which the 
polity should be based.1536 Also in the language of the far le, ‘the will of 
the people’ was the rst authority to be obeyed,1537 which diered from 
the Bolshevik claim that universal surage was outdated.1538 But in spring 
1918, the Swedish people would still need to wait for the extension of their 
political rights. Parliamentarism alone did not bring about democracy.
5.3.5  All parties on the side of parliamentarism  
 – but different kinds of parliamentarism 
Sweden is generally regarded as having moved to parliamentary government 
as a result of the elections of 1917 and the nomination of the Liberal-Social 
Democrat coalition. is change does not mean that parliamentarism was 
generally accepted, given the remaining doubts among e Right that were 
manifested in their opposition to the extension of surage. For the Liberals 
and Social Democrats, the Finnish Civil War made it all the more necessary 
to demonstrate that Swedish parliamentarism – as introduced a few months 
previously – was working and involved no risk of a similar degradation of 
ordered government. 
Debates on the Finnish crisis nevertheless reected the diverse un-
derstandings of parliamentarism that existed. According to the leist Ivar 
Vennerström, the Finnish crisis of parliamentarism had emerged out of an 
alliance between the bourgeoisie and the tsarist regime aimed at annulling 
the reforms demanded by the Social Democratic parliamentary majority; 
this repeated the Finnish socialists’ interpretation. As a consequence of 
the obstruction of the reforms supported by the Social Democrats and the 
nullication of their work, ‘the anti-parliamentary and extra-parliamentary 
mood was growing, and Social Democracy was gradually being forced 
from the solid ground of parliamentary ways of thinking’. is suggested 
that Social Democracy was inherently parliamentary and that the rise of 
anti-parliamentarism among its ranks arose out of bourgeois abuses. 
Developments since the Russian Revolution had restored ‘the parliamentary 
beliefs of the Social Democrats’ but the Finnish bourgeoisie had made 
a  coup against the Social Democratic parliament in ignoring the law on 
parliamentary sovereignty. From a radical Marxist point of view shared 
by the Swedish far le, it was a natural consequence of the actions of the 
bourgeoisie that the Finnish Social Democrats had been alienated from 
1535 Social-Demokraten, ‘Kvinnornas protestmöte’, 29 April 1918.
1536 AK, Axel Sterne, 8 June 1918, 72:4
1537 FK, Fredrik Ström, 8 June 1918, 48:15.
1538 Dagens Nyheter, ‘Regeringens ställning till Finland’, 21 February 1918.
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parliamentary measures and forced to engage in anti-parliamentary 
activities.1539 Parliamentarism had failed in Finland as a consequence of 
the deeds of the bourgeoisie and not because of any anti-parliamentary 
sentiments among the socialists who, Vennerström repeated, had previously 
stood for parliamentary principles.1540 e Finnish bourgeoisie had, 
furthermore, rejected the genuinely parliamentary republic of the Swiss 
type proposed by the socialists and advocated a ‘masked monarchy’.1541 is 
standpoint, which was critical of parliamentarism in its Western European 
form, constituted a further justication for the radical measures of the Red 
Finns, who were to be viewed as inherently parliamentarian in a Marxist 
sense.
e other groups did not share such an understanding of radical 
Marxist parliamentarism. e rightists did not speak for parliamentarism 
as such, but their leader Arvid Lindman nevertheless welcomed the Social 
Democratic rejection of a violent uprising against a parliament elected by 
the broadest possible popular vote.1542 e Social Democrat leader Hjalmar 
Branting reasserted the stand of his party by denouncing violent opposition 
to a parliamentary majority1543 – a stance that was valid in Sweden as 
well. Even Per Albin Hansson from the le of the party said that it would 
have been the responsibility of the Finnish Social Democrats to employ 
parliamentary means to achieve their goals. ey were unlikely to gain with 
violence against the parliamentary majority what they failed to achieve 
through parliament.1544 Such consistent defence of parliamentary strategies 
by the more radical of the Swedish Social Democrats – recognised by e 
Right with a certain irony – demonstrated their dedication to parliamentary 
government and perhaps convinced some among e Right that the 
social order in Sweden might not be threatened under this parliamentary 
ministry. As even the Swedish far le refrained from openly defending 
the armed rising in Finland, the Finnish crisis helped the Swedish parties 
to view parliamentarism in the form it had taken on in autumn 1917 in 
predominantly positive terms: Swedish parliamentarism was, and should 
remain, something dierent from the Finnish version. 
e Right had no particular reason to question parliamentarism in 
the upper house given the majority with which they were able to vote 
down any constitutional reconguration. In the lower chamber, a leading 
rightist nevertheless continued to attack parliamentarism: Karl Hildebrand 
challenged the extension of surage by referring to anti-parliamentary 
sentiments among the public arising from the actions of the members elected 
to the parliament aer previous reforms: ‘It has above all not heightened the 
quality of the Second Chamber of the Riksdag, and it contributes decisively 
to the increase of that disgust with the parliament (parlamentsleda), the 
1539 AK, Ivar Vennerström, 20 February 1918, 16:12.
1540 AK, Ivar Vennerström, 20 February 1918, 16:12.
1541 AK, Ivar Vennerström, 20 February 1918, 16:13.
1542 AK, Arvid Lindman, 20 February 1918, 16:32.
1543 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 20 February 1918, 16:40.
1544 AK, Per Albin Hansson, 20 February 1918, 16:58.
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contempt for the national assembly, which continues to spread in our 
country as in other countries.’1545 is speech deplored the fact that popular 
representative bodies had replaced parliaments whose members were 
gentlemen, a reection of the conservatives’ elitist view of the parliament as 
a kind of gentlemen’s club. Hildebrand was convinced that a new extension 
would reduce the quality of parliamentary representation further: doubling 
the number of voters and including women would increase ‘that great and 
formidable section of voters who are uninterested and ignorant and who act 
erratically’.1546 e ministry ignored this anti-parliamentary criticism; e 
Right were free to recycle their old-fashioned views on parliamentarism. 
Hjalmar Branting, frustrated at the delayed progress in the democratisation 
of surage, brought up the possibility of aggravated confrontations and 
extra-parliamentary action if there was any further postponement. Branting 
had indirectly referred to the threat of extra-parliamentary forces being used 
in spring 1917 and had consistently emphasised the parliamentary stance of 
his party during the Finnish Civil War. Now he opted for a tactic used by 
Social Democrats in all parliaments: if the conservatives blocked a moderate 
reform, they should be ready to face a more revolutionary attempt by the 
radicals or the Social Democratic voters. Branting suggested that the longer 
the justied reform demands were ignored ‘the more compelled the masses 
are to consider such extra-parliamentary measures as something they 
nevertheless need [to resort to] to counter the unreasonable’.1547 is was 
a two-edged argument from a moderate socialist leader: instead of merely 
trying to persuade e Right to give up their resistance, it referred to the 
possibility of an outbreak of the irregular power of the masses. Hildebrand 
protested immediately against ‘the once again repeated threat presented by 
Mr Branting – it comes up in this form a few times a year – concerning 
the use of outright extra-parliamentary means’.1548 Social-Demokraten again 
rejected rightist appeals to the constitution, dismissing the alleged ‘threat 
of democracy’ as pathetic.1549 is debate certainly did not bring the two 
sides closer to a compromise. Frustration had led a government party to 
hint at extra-parliamentary measures, which hardly advanced conciliation. 
Further accusations about the readiness of the rival bloc to turn to ‘extra-
parliamentary’ or ‘illegal’ means followed. e Social Democrats then 
assured the Riksdag that extra-parliamentary means would not be used by 
the supporters of the Swedish democracy provided a reform was passed. 
However, parliamentary means might be employed to force the reform 
through.1550 In other words, an extraordinary joint vote of the two chambers 
might follow.1551 
1545 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 27 April 1918, 44:26.
1546 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 27 April 1918, 44:26.
1547 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 27 April 1918, 44:75; Aonbladet, 28 April 1918 and 9 
June 1918; Social-Demokraten, 10 June 1918.
1548 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 27 April 1918, 44:76.
1549 Social-Demokraten, 10 June 1918.
1550 AK, Axel Sterne, 8 June 1918, 72:4; Arthur Engberg, 8 June 1918, 72:18. 
1551 Social-Demokraten, 10 June 1918.
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e Right did not use threats of extra-parliamentary measures but 
rather criticised the Social Democrats for their alleged readiness to 
employ them.1552 Ernst Trygger still maintained that parliamentarism 
had not brought about any positive eects in countries which had 
adopted it.1553 He problematised the distinction between ‘parliamentary 
and extra-parliamentary means of coercion’, concluding that Branting’s 
suggested ‘parliamentary means of coercion’ by procedural means were 
illegal.1554 e rightist press also expressed concern about the challenges 
to the established parliamentary order: Aonbladet predicted a risk of ‘the 
triumph of demagogy’, but concluded that the interest of ‘the parliament of 
the street’ was modest in comparison with ‘the breakthrough of the spring 
of liberty’, i.e. spring 1917.1555 e debate thus illustrates the possibility 
of parliamentary procedure being manipulated in the atmosphere of an 
obstructed reform. Had the le violated what e Right saw as established 
parliamentary procedure, a  deeper crisis of parliamentary legitimacy of 
the type experienced in Finland in 1917 might have emerged even though 
the discursive and ideological confrontation had not reached comparable 
tensions. In Finland, a very dierent kind of constitutional confrontation 
ensued when the Civil War was followed by a revived parliamentary debate.
5.4  Finland reconstructed to resemble a little Prussia 
5.4.1  The attempt to restrict reform by restoring  
 the monarchy 
At the moment of declaring independence in December 1917, the Finnish 
parliament had been deeply divided over the nature and degree of democracy 
and parliamentarism and over the right policies to pursue in solving the 
multiple problems that the country faced. Confrontations of class, ideology 
and party, accelerated by Bolshevik intrusions, had led to an armed conict 
that had raged from late January to April 1918. No fewer than 37,000 Finns 
(including both those who perished in the wartime terror and those who 
died in post-war prison camps) lost their lives as a consequence of the Civil 
War. e war caused implacable bitterness for generations on both sides and 
had many international implications as well.
e leaders of the Finnish Social Democrats had been unable or 
unwilling to stop the process of radicalisation within the party in 1917. 
In the parliamentary debates, many of them entertained the possibility of 
extra-parliamentary, even violent, action once parliamentary means did 
not seem to be producing reforms to their liking. e rejection of their 
Power Act of July 1917, which would have concentrated political power 
in the hands of the Social Democratic majority of that parliament, by the 
1552 See AK, David Norman, 8 June 1918, 72:33, 49. 
1553 FK, Ernst Trygger, 8 June 1918, 47:54.
1554 FK, Ernst Trygger, 8 June 1918, 48:35.
1555 Aonbladet, ‘Författningsfrågan inför riksdagen’, 7 June 1918; ‘Enfaldens rösträtt’, 
9 June 1918. Also Dagens Nyheter, 9 June 1918.
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Russian Provisional Government aer encouragement from the Finnish 
bourgeois parties together with the loss of their majority in the new election 
of October 1917 added to the disappointments that had accumulated from 
previous obstructions of reform. In addition to a long tradition of agitating 
bitter class antagonism of a kind not traceable to the same extent in the 
countries of comparison, the situation induced Social Democratic voters 
to engage in extra-parliamentary action. e model and active support of 
the Bolsheviks, in particular, made several Social Democratic leaders ready 
for a  revolution.1556 Ideologically, it appeared to them to be their world-
historical duty to make a revolution; they had a unique chance – a kind of 
second 1905–6 – to force reforms through.
Unlike the British Labour Party or the German or Swedish Social 
Democratic Parties, the majority of the leaders of the Finnish Social 
Democrats in the end chose revolution rather than parliamentary measures. 
It has been oen emphasised that the Finnish revolutionaries were not 
Bolsheviks, and that it was White wartime propaganda that presented them 
as such.1557 Sociological explanations for the Civil War and descriptions of 
the suering of the losers of the war have been favoured, especially since 
the 1960s. As for the proposed constitution of Red Finland, it has been 
seen as not aiming at a system of soviets but rather resembling a Swiss 
or French type of republic so that the principle of the sovereignty of the 
people would have executed by ‘a parliament of the people’ (described to 
some extent by Otto Wille Kuusinen in the parliament on 5 December 1917, 
as was analysed in subsection 4.4.5). e people themselves would make 
legislative initiatives, participate in referenda and dissolve the parliament 
should its majority violate the constitution – the last formulation implying 
a continuous revolution by the workers. e denition of ‘the people’ in 
the proposal stood for the workers only, which was in line with radical 
Marxist and Bolshevik discourse and made contemporary observers regard 
the proposal as class-based. e proposal was formulated by Kuusinen, 
debated in unclear circumstances during the Civil War in February 1918 but 
never enacted aer a referendum.1558 In the wartime propaganda of the Red 
government, the people as a united wielder of power was dened in such a way 
that any bourgeois government appeared as an illegitimate representative of 
property-owners and was to be replaced with the ‘democratic’ revolutionary 
bodies of the workers. ese, in turn, were identical with ‘the people’s own 
trustworthy hands’.1559 All of this echoed conceptualisations of the people 
and democracy typical of Russian revolutionary and especially Bolshevik 
discourse. e actions of the Red government, furthermore, were presented 
as the defence of ‘the democratic achievements of the revolution’ of the 
previous year1560 without distinguishing between the Bolshevik and Finnish 
1556 Jussila, Hentilä & Nevakivi 1999, 107.
1557 Haapala & Tikka 2013, 109.
1558 Suomen kansanvaltuuskunnan ehdotus, 1918, 5, 7, 9, 14–15; Rinta-Tassi 1986, 
322–6, 330; Alapuro 1988, 174–5; Jussila, Hentilä & Nevakivi 1999, 109; Haapala 
& Tikka 2013, 111.
1559 Hyvärinen 2003, 81–2.
1560 Alapuro 2003, 541.
317
5.4 Finland reconstructed to resemble a little Prussia
revolutions. ese wartime examples call for a serious consideration of the 
discursive process that led to the Civil War, as analysed in sections 3.4 and 
4.4 above.
e analysis showed that the Social Democratic discourse consistently 
constructed concepts of democracy and parliamentarism that were in 
conict with what was usually understood by ‘Western’ democracy and 
‘bourgeois’ parliamentarism and which allowed for no negotiation on 
alternative concepts. e way in which the Reds continued to talk about 
‘the rule by the people’ during the Civil War made some bourgeois parties 
increasingly cautious about the concept; they rather contrasted the ‘arbitrary 
power’ of the Reds with the sovereignty of the parliament (with few 
references to the sovereignty of the people, though the concept ‘the people’ 
remained in use).1561 In the battle between the supporters of parliamentary 
and revolutionary means within the ranks of Finnish socialists, the latter 
had clearly prevailed with the inspiration of the Bolsheviks to support them; 
this was the conclusion drawn not only by the Finnish bourgeois parties 
but also much of the le in Sweden. e relationship of the Finnish labour 
movement to both democracy and parliamentarism would need to be 
fundamentally rethought in the aermath of the failed revolution. Aer the 
Civil War, two entirely new socialist parties would emerge.
e attempt of the revolutionaries to introduce what appeared as no less 
than a dictatorship of the proletariat, and their rejection of the parliament as 
a forum for societal reform, led to a gradually growing monarchical reaction 
among the parties of the right aptly analysed by Vesa Vares among others. 
In some cases, this reaction progressed during spring 1918 to embrace 
outright anti-democratic and anti-parliamentary ideas, and some bourgeois 
politicians who had spoken for democracy and parliamentarism in autumn 
1917 began to reconsider their stance. e monarchical reaction was 
inspired especially by military help from imperial Germany, which, in the 
circumstances of spring and summer 1918, appeared to most non-socialist 
Finns as the only foreign power from which security guarantees against the 
Russian and domestic Bolsheviks were available. e possibility of asking 
for military assistance from Germany had already been discussed at the time 
of the declaration of independence, since the Germans clearly sympathised 
with Finnish aspirations for independence. In mid-January, the Finnish 
government asked Germany to return activist Finnish volunteers who 
were receiving military training in Germany during the war. However, on 
14 February, Edvard Hjelt and Rafael Erich – representatives of the Finnish 
government in Berlin – contacted the German General Sta, without the 
permission of the Finnish government, asking for troops. Germany did send 
troops but only in early April, aer the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-
Litovsk, when the intervention served German interests by turning Finland 
into a German military bridgehead. Such a direct involvement in the Finnish 
Civil War was uncomfortable for the White government and especially for the 
anglophile Commander-in-Chief of the White Army C. G. E. Mannerheim. 
e intervention may not have been decisive for the result of the war, but 
1561 Hyvärinen 2003, 82.
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it shortened the conict,1562 and it aected the course of the constitutional 
debate in Finland aer the war. e fact that the German troops appeared as 
the liberators of Helsinki was psychologically decisive in that it turned the 
non-socialist inhabitants of the city into uncritical admirers of Germany as 
being the only possible guarantor of Finnish independence.1563 
e White Finnish government would have preferred military assistance 
from Sweden, but that was not available for the domestic political reasons 
discussed in the subsection 5.3.1: the Liberal-Social Democratic coalition 
prioritised surage reform at home over getting involved in a war that was 
ideologically divisive in Sweden as well. Instead, Sweden did try to occupy 
the Åland Islands, an intervention that was condemned by White and 
Red Finland, Germany and Bolshevik Russia alike,1564 and which led to an 
exceptional exclusion of references to Sweden from Finnish constitutional 
debates for years to come. 
us there followed a radical turn in the constitutional views of Finnish 
centre-right parliamentarians, who had mostly been republican in autumn 
1917: a growing number of conservatives and liberals turned monarchist, 
emphasising the Swedish monarchical Instrument of Government of 1772 
as the proper basis for a new constitution. e apparent strength of the 
German monarchy in spring 1918 induced some to refer to paragraph 38 
of this constitution (already applied during 1917), according to which the 
Diet was entitled to elect a new king aer the demise of a dynasty. is 
view gained ground in the new government and in the Rump Parliament 
(consisting of no more than 111 members) that convened between 15 May 
1918 and 28 February 1919. e socialists had been practically excluded 
from participation as a result of their rebellion against the parliamentary 
majority; only a single Social Democrat, who had outspokenly opposed 
the revolution, was allowed to attend. e logic of this rising monarchism 
derived from the assured belief that Germany would win the war and that 
a Fenno-German military alliance conrmed with the election of a German 
prince to the Finnish throne constituted the wisest foreign and constitutional 
policy in the prevailing circumstances by creating a link with ‘the large 
politico-economic bloc of the Central Powers’ that was believed to be taking 
shape1565. It was believed that a monarchical link would persuade Germany 
to support the national romantic dream of the annexation of Russian Karelia 
as well.1566 Given the long-term cultural connections with Germany, the 
Entente’s recent support for Russia and the suspension of recognition of 
Finnish independence by the West, few Finnish parliamentarians regarded 
Western democracies and parliamentary governments either as helpful 
sources of security or as models for making a constitution in spring and 
summer 1918.1567 
1562 Jussila, Hentilä & Nevakivi 1999, 116–17, 119; Vares 2006, 91–2, 99.
1563 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Förslaget till regeringsformen’, 12 June 1918; Kolbe 2008, 
112, 114, 116; Nyström 2013, 303.
1564 Jussila, Hentilä & Nevakivi 1999, 117.
1565 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Förslaget till regeringsformen’, 12 June 1918.
1566 Sihvonen 1997, 11; Jussila, Hentilä & Nevakivi 1999, 121–3; Vares 2006, 101.
1567 Ikonen 1995, 343.
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e monarchical and pro-German reaction thus emerged out of the fact 
that the bourgeois parties had experienced an attempted socialist revolution 
partly imported from Russia and overcome with German military help. 
In the new constitution, monarchical prerogatives would surpass those 
proposed for the president of the republic in 1917 and include an absolute 
veto on constitutional changes.1568 ey resembled those of the seemingly 
stable German polity, and it was believed that they would keep excessive 
reformism and possible reincarnations of Bolshevism in check. Many 
Swedish-speakers, supporters of the Finnish Party and nationalist activists 
were deeply disappointed with the lack of maturity of the Finnish people, 
as they put it, feeling that the radical parliamentary reform and universal 
surage of 1906 had failed and had consequently persuaded some to oppose 
the very principles of democracy. e 10-year experience of parliamentary 
life suggested that parliamentarism, too, needed to be strictly restricted if not 
rejected, universal surage reconsidered and parliament perhaps divided 
into two chambers as in more ‘advanced’ countries with a representative 
institution such as Sweden, Germany and Britain. Many parliamentarians 
were frustrated about the constant parliamentary elections and unproductive 
sessions that had oen ended with an Imperial dissolution of the parliament. 
e class-based, radical and anti-elitist attitudes of fellow parliamentarians, 
embodied in the Social Democratic Party but also visible in the Agrarian 
League – not to mention the rebellion that the socialists had nally made 
– had antagonised conservatives. Most rightist MPs consequently saw 
monarchy as the only stabilising option, while most centrists continued to 
favour a republic, democracy and parliamentarism.1569 A new discursive 
confrontation on the form of government, democracy, the political role of 
the people and parliamentarism followed. e divide permeated the civil 
society, with popular meetings in the countryside and the liberal press being 
at rst nearly unanimously in favour of a republic,1570 while the old elites of 
the capital argued for a monarchy.
Aer the defeat of the Reds in May, the right saw a unique opportunity to 
restore the traditional political order and to set the politically immature Finns 
back on the correct path aer a failed experiment with extreme democracy. 
e course of the world war, as they understood it, seemed to support 
this goal: the successful war eort of Prussia against superior numbers 
demonstrated the strength of that monarchical polity. Many Finnish liberals, 
unlike their brethren in Sweden, considered German support essential for 
safeguarding the country’s fragile independence in circumstances in which 
no help was to be expected from the West or Sweden. is might involve 
constitutional imitation of Germany as well. ey tended to view Finland 
1568 Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Kaksi hallitusmuotoesitystä’, 12 June 1918.
1569 Lindman 1937, 13; Sihvonen 1997, 10; Vares 1998, 56, 64–6; Jussila, Hentilä & 
Nevakivi 1999, 123; Vares 2006, 109.
1570 Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Hallitusmuotokysymyksemme kansalaiskokousten poh dit-
tawana’ and ‘Mitä merkitsee  “monarkia”?’, 12 June 1918; note, however, the low 
number of deputies who attended the constitutional debate, Helsingin Sanomat, 
‘Eduskunnan lehtereillä’, 13 June 1918.
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as a Western outpost against Bolshevik Russia, an attitude that reects the 
Finnish view of Germany as the strongest representative of Western values 
vis-à-vis Russia at a time when the West generally understood the war as 
a battle for Western democracy and against the Prussian political order.1571
e campaign for a monarchy, which was launched in April by activists 
of the Swedish People’s Party and extended in May and June to the Finnish 
Party, produced a monarchist majority in the Rump Parliament, which 
passed a proposal aiming at an updated monarchical constitution. According 
to the tendentious monarchist argument, the republican formulations 
of the Declaration of Independence had been merely a temporary break 
from the Swedish-Finnish constitutional tradition inspired by the Russian 
Revolution1572 and they had not changed the eighteenth-century Gustavian 
constitution, which, in comparison with a republic, would save the state 
from the political ferment associated with presidential elections, ensure 
continuity in foreign policy, protect the rights of the Swedish-speaking 
minority and restrict the powers of the parliament as ‘an institution of 
agitation’ (yllytyslaitos) abused by political amateurs and revolutionaries.1573 
e argument was built on respect for the Swedish constitutional tradition 
among the bourgeoisie – a respect that had been strengthened by the 
legalistic defence of Swedish law during the period of Russication aer 
1899.1574 is questioning of the existence of the Republic of Finland caused 
the republicans to assert that the Declaration of Independence had indeed 
founded a republic, the constitution of which just needed to be nalised. 
In their view, the Red rebellion had not been a justied revolution, and it 
was hence unfair to associate republicanism with such a violent outbreak.1575 
Many conservatives who had spoken for a republic, democracy and 
limited parliamentarism in autumn 1917 now responded by representing 
monarchy as compatible with democracy and progress, as they were unable 
to completely reject the republic or the principle of the rule by the people 
even though they currently painted both in dark colours.1576 Others declared 
republicanism to be no more than ‘the product of the revolution and bloody 
rebellions’,1577 imported from Russia and without roots in the Swedish-
Finnish tradition. 
In the new monarchical constitution, a German rather than a Scandinavian 
monarchy would be implemented. e principle of parliamentarism would 
remain, but there would be no explicit reference to the responsibility of the 
ministers to parliament.1578 e republicans opposed this, using minority 
provisions to prevent the passed motions from coming into force before 
a new election. e republican counter-proposals were correspondingly 
1571 Vares 1998, 69–72; Ihalainen 2016b.
1572 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Förslaget till regeringsformen’, 12 June 1918; ‘Statsformen 
och vår utrikespolitiska ställning’, 13 June 1918.
1573 Vares 1998, 74–5, 152, 157; Vares 2006, 108.
1574 Ihalainen 2015.
1575 VP, Juho Kokko, 13 June 1918, 1309. 
1576 Vares 1998, 80–1, 104, 160–1.
1577 VP, Bror Hannes Päivänsalo, 13 June 1918, 1304.
1578 Vares 1998, 171–2, 174.
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voted down by the majority.1579 When the attempts to pass a monarchical 
constitution failed and the monarchists knew that the next parliament, 
which the Social Democrats would again be attending, would not accept 
one anyway, they launched the election of a king in accordance with the 
Gustavian constitution. is took place on 8 August 1918 – the very day 
on which the German Western Front began to waver.1580 However, no news 
from the front or Berlin would change the conviction of the monarchical 
majority of the Rump Parliament: Finland was now proceeding towards the 
accession of a German prince.
5.4.2  A counter-revolution built on an assumed  
 German victory
In the circumstances of late spring 1918, aer a rebellion associated 
with Bolshevism and at a time of a pro-German monarchical reaction, 
constitutional debates in the Finnish parliament were transnational in 
a very biased way – even to the extent that German representatives in 
Helsinki sought to inuence the course of decision-making or were asked 
by Finnish politicians to do so: General Rüdiger von der Goltz, the leader 
of the German troops in Finland, pressurised leading republicans. e 
German Ambassador August von Brück let Finnish politicians know that 
the establishment of a strong monarchy would serve the interests of both 
countries. is pressure may in fact have been initiated by the Finnish 
government to support their monarchical cause – a case of international 
contacts being exploited in domestic disputes – and this was eective in that 
a few republicans did indeed change sides. e Finnish press, which one-
sidedly emphasized German successes and ignored any problems on the 
Western Front, also attempted to sway public opinion.1581 e United States, 
in particular, was presented as a warning case of a degenerate plutocratic 
republic, whereas Germany, Britain, Japan and the Scandinavian countries 
were viewed as examples of highly developed societies with monarchical 
constitutions that Finland should imitate.1582 
Foreign policy and the future constitution were inseparably intertwined 
in this monarchist discourse. As we have seen, imperial Germany was 
viewed in Finland as a European, ‘Western’, force counterbalancing Russia. 
is conception built on the one hand on nineteenth-century discursive 
practices of understanding Germany culturally as part of the West in 
contradistinction to Russia. On the other hand, it accepted wartime German 
propaganda that contrasted German culture with Western civilization and 
condemned Western democracies and republics.1583 Consequently, according 
1579 Vares 1998, 84, 177; Jussila, Hentilä & Nevakivi 1999, 124.
1580 Sihvonen 1997, 11; Vares 1998, 204–209.
1581 Huldén 1989, 97–104. Germany had recognised the Republic of Finland on 
4 January 1918. Georg Schauman saw the intervention as initiated by the 
Finns, and this is also the conclusion of Anders Huldén, who presents evidence 
demonstrating such activity; Vares 1998, 178–80, 192; Vares 2006, 118; Nyström 
2013, 320; Hentilä & Hentilä 2016, 294.
1582 Vares 1998, 188–9.
1583 Bavaj & Steber 2015, 1, 4, 8–20; Llanque 2015, 70–1.
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to Prime Minister J. K. Paasikivi, Finland should not move over to the side 
of the Entente by introducing a republic; it needed to build on German 
support by keeping the monarchy instead.1584 Aer the Treaty of Brest-
Litovsk, a German victory in the east was taken as inevitable even by Finnish 
republicans when they studied the map of Europe. Germany appeared as 
source of support against the Bolsheviks, vengeful Reds and enthusiasts 
of democracy and parliamentarism. Foodstus were available only via the 
Baltic Sea, which was controlled by the Germans. e Germans themselves 
continued to believe in victory, at least ocially. Not even the joining of 
the United States in the war had changed the monarchists’ condence in 
Germany; the US was, aer all, considered to be a materialistic upstart state 
that lacked a culture comparable to that of Germany. e Western Allies 
were, besides, excessively cosmopolitan and liberal and had recently allied 
themselves with Russia. It would be useless to turn to them as they lacked any 
genuine interest in supporting Finland against a potential Russian invasion. 
Germany, by contrast, was treated uncritically in Finnish discourse owing to 
feelings of gratitude for concrete German help in crushing the Red rebellion. 
Old cultural ties were emphasised, and the Finnish identity was dened 
as being derived from Germanic cultural roots, despite the very dierent 
languages of the two countries. e organ of Paasikivi’s party, for instance, 
connected the Finnish Civil War with the participation of Finns in the 
Swedish troops in the irty Years’ War: ‘Luther’s Germany had […] paid 
its old debt to the people who had participated in liberating it from Catholic 
servitude.’ Germany was linguistically, culturally and academically a much 
more familiar country to the Finns than Britain, France or the United States. 
For many conservatives, as for the Swedish right, Germany constituted the 
model of a civilised and well organised society, the people of which were 
ready to sacrice themselves for the fatherland. Swedish-speaking Finns 
emphasized their ethnic ties with the Germans, and many Finnish-speaking 
activists (Jägers) had been socialised in the Prussian system through military 
training. Even cultural liberals like the author Juhani Aho admired ‘Prussian 
discipline and education’.1585 e alliance of White Finland with Germany 
was a strong one, as Allied press reports also suggest. 
e British or other Western models of parliamentary democracy 
did not appear attractive, also for foreign policy reasons. From early July 
onwards, there was even a risk of military conict between Britain and 
Finland, Finland having condemned British military activity in Petsamo, 
which the Finnish government regarded as part of Finnish territory. is 
confrontation made the Germans propose a military alliance – provided that 
Finland conrmed its monarchical constitution and elected a Hohenzollern 
prince to the throne. e Finnish government persuaded the majority of 
the Rump Parliament to support the alliance, the monarchists being assured 
that a German king served Finnish interests and disregarding news of 
German setbacks on the Western Front, but the republicans continued to 
1584 Huldén 1989, 105.
1585 Vares 1998, 106–10, 114–15; Nyström 2013, 320–1; Soutou 2014, 520. On the 
continuity of the Lutheran national identity, see Ihalainen 2005b.
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oppose such a dynastic link. In early October, aer news about the German 
peace proposal and constitutional changes had been read, the monarchists 
continued to reject all suggestions about contacting the Entente, claiming that 
German support against Russia would be lost as a result, an English prince 
installed or a republic restored, the rule of the Reds introduced, territories 
lost and the entire nation disgraced. When the monarchical constitution 
made no progress in parliament, provisions from the constitution of 1772 
were used to elect a king.1586 
e international comparisons and transnational references in these 
discussions diered clearly from those of 1917. In the Rump Parliament, 
Russia was consistently viewed as ‘the other’, if not the enemy. Bolshevism 
was associated with eastern barbarism imported to Finland through cross-
border contacts. According to R. A. Wrede (Swedish People’s Party), a former 
professor of Roman law and vice-chairman of the Judicial Department of the 
Finnish Senate, the Civil War followed from ‘Russian anarchy . . . of the most 
barbaric, primitive and socially disintegrating kind, a real oriental pestilent 
infection’ imported by Russian soldiers and Russian Social Democracy.1587 
Annie Furuhjelm (Swedish People’s Party) recalled how Lenin had intended 
to reconquer Finland by permeating Finnish society with Bolshevism.1588
At the same time, Sweden was removed from the objects of comparison 
as a result of its limited help during the Civil War and the Åland crisis; only 
early-modern Sweden, from which the Finnish constitution was inherited, 
was used as a source of reference.1589 e Norwegian example of holding 
a referendum on the monarchy provided a precedent that the republicans 
used to try to postpone the decision to establish a monarchy, counting on 
a republican majority among the population at large, but the monarchists 
responded by emphasising the compatibility of monarchy and democracy 
in Norway.1590 
For the monarchists, the Western Powers were suspect because of their 
inapplicable republicanism and parliamentarism and their alleged plotting 
against Finland with plans for an intervention in favour of a republican 
constitution.1591 Britain provided a suitable example only in arguing for 
a  constitutional monarchy, not with regard to parliamentarism.1592 Wäinö 
Valkama (Finnish Party) questioned the democratic character of the 
United States, seeing it as a polity run by trusts, money and oligarchies in 
contradistinction to the ‘democratic’ features of the cooperative movement 
1586 Vares 1998, 122–3, 127–8, 199; Nyström 2013, 321.
1587 VP, Rabbe Axel Wrede, 12 June 1918, 1251. Even Santeri Alkio, a moderate 
centrist leader, also used the metaphor of ‘an international plague’ to describe the 
Bolshevik rebellion in Finland. 12 June 1918, 1254. See also Emil Schybergson, 
12 June 1918, 1261; Alapuro 1988, 200.
1588 VP, 13 June 1918, 1308.
1589 Ihalainen 2015.
1590 VP, Antti Rentola, 13 June 1918, 1291; Artur Wuorimaa, 13 July 1918, 1691–2; 
13 July 1918, 1679–80; Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Parantumattomain estelyjä’, 12 July 
1918.
1591 See VP, Gustaf Arokallio, 12 July 1918, 1656; Lauri Ingman, 13 July 1918, 1677.
1592 VP, 13 June 1918, 1303.
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of German origin. As Bismarck had stated, republics such as France were 
not comparable with constitutional monarchies like Germany in military 
terms.1593 Also for Annie Furuhjelm, the daughter of a former governor 
of Russian America (Alaska), the United States was no wonderland of 
democracy but a country of oligarchies, plutocracy and political corruption, 
followed on the road of degeneration by republics like France. e German 
monarchy, by contrast, had introduced social reforms and education 
to transform an initially revolutionary Social Democratic Party into 
a  benevolent radical social reformist party.1594 Such military strength and 
attenuation of socialism through reforms oered a model that White Finland 
could follow. British parliamentarism would be re-evaluated and the United 
States introduced as a source of positive examples only in summer 1919 aer 
the Western Allies had won the war and recognised Finnish independence, 
which is illustrative of the contingent nature of international references in 
the constitutional debates of a newly independent state. 
Germany had become a nonpareil model polity. As Prime Minister 
Paasikivi put it, Finnish independence was a result of Germany’s victorious 
war and had been maintained with diplomatic and military help from 
Germany. Consequently, in formulating the Finnish constitution, the 
parliament ‘should not disregard’ the fact that the German political system 
was based on monarchy.1595 Gustaf Arokallio, a supposedly liberal Young 
Finn, thanked Providence for the help sent by the Kaiser and called for 
a monarchical constitution with a German king.1596 Even some who remained 
republicans praised the Kaiser for being a friend to the (German) people 
and argued that Germany did not wish to intervene in the construction of 
the Finnish constitution like the Entente.1597 In the midst of a world war, in 
a small new state dependent on foreign powers, applications of international 
models tended to be opportunistic. e reference to the Kaiser as a people’s 
monarch could hence even be used to defend a republican constitution for 
Finland. 
K. J. Ståhlberg (Young Finn), a leading spokesman for the republican 
minority, challenged the monarchical constitutional proposal – convincingly 
for the republican audience1598 but as mere a repetition of the polemic 
published in Helsingin Sanomat for the monarchists.1599 Ståhlberg questioned 
the assumption of a monarchy being a pre-condition for cooperation with 
Germany, pointing out that even Bismarck had conceded that there were 
1593 VP, Wäinö Valkama, 13 June 1918, 1287–8.
1594 VP, Annie Furuhjelm, 13 June 1918, 1307.
1595 VP, Juho Kusti Paasikivi, 12 June 1918, 1242, 1244.
1596 VP, Gustaf Arokallio, 12 July 1918, 1656; cf. Pekka Pennanen (Young Finn), 
12 July 1918, 1659.
1597 VP, Artur Wuorimaa (Agrarian), 13 July 1918, 1691. Some members of the Red 
government had tried to persuade Britain and the United States to come over to 
their side but in vain. Rinta-Tassi 1986, 504. 
1598 Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Eduskunnan lehtereillä’, 13 June 1918, advised every 
republican family to read Ståhlberg’s speech aloud and then send it to their 
neighbours; ‘Ewästyskeskustelu hallitusmuotoasiasta’, 14 June 1918.
1599 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Remissdebatten’, 12 June 1918.
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republican elements in the German constitution.1600 Santeri Alkio (Agrarians) 
claimed that the strength of the German polity lay in its educational system 
rather than its constitution.1601 Kusti Arman added that it was nationalism 
rather than its constitution that had made Germany a leading power.1602 Alkio 
anticipated that Germany would not lag behind in democratic development 
for long but would soon lead the way. Spring 1917 had demonstrated that 
Prussia was preparing for a democratic parliamentary reform: ‘e mighty 
ruler of Prussia aims at a closer relation with the German people so that 
the inuence of the Prussian people on the composition of parliament 
would be more extensive than it has ever been there.’1603 is tendentious 
representation of the constitutional reform in Germany – of which there was 
no evidence in Germany in summer 1918 – was intended to persuade the 
Finnish monarchists to reconsider their anti-republican stands. e leading 
republicans still remained German-oriented for much of 1918, trying to 
demonstrate that a republican and parliamentary Finland would remain 
a loyal ally of imperial Germany. e republican press, too, supported an 
alliance with Germany against British aims for global supremacy.1604 Unlike 
Sweden, there was no active Anglophile minority in the Finnish parliament 
in 1918.
Academic authorities encountered each other in this debate. R. A. 
Wrede referred to Aristotle and Cicero, who had evaluated dierent types 
of constitution. According to Wrede, the Swiss and American models 
were inapplicable owing to the special circumstances of the countries 
involved, while the fruitfulness of the French republican constitution 
was doubtful. For Germanic countries, to which Finland culturally 
belonged, only a constitutional monarchy was thinkable, the Norwegian 
‘republican’ exception deserving to be disregarded in this respect.1605 K. J. 
Ståhlberg responded by defending the French republican constitution and 
questioning parallels between the Germanic countries and Finland.1606 
Some MPs were already beginning to doubt a German victory and hence the 
sense of establishing a Germanic monarchy: Matts Björk, a court of appeal 
judge and a representative of the Swedish People’s Party, diered from the 
party line in questioning the prevailing predictions for a future Europe,1607 
a contribution that was welcomed by the republicans but censured by the 
monarchists.1608 All the same, the future Finnish constitution seemed to 
depend on international trends rather than on the will of the Finnish people 
or the suitability of a particular system for the country. e constitutional 
debate remained inter- and transnational albeit in a very unbalanced way.
1600 VP, Kaarlo Juho Ståhlberg, 12 June 1918, 1247.
1601 VP, Santeri Alkio, 12 June 1918, 1256.
1602 VP, Kusti Arman, 13 June 1918, 1314.
1603 VP, Santeri Alkio, 12 July 1918, 1661–2.
1604 Vares 1998, 138–46, 149–50.
1605 VP, Rabbe Axel Wrede, 12 July 1918, 1648–9, 1653.
1606 VP, Kaarlo Juho Ståhlberg, 12 July 1918, 1666.
1607 VP, Matts Björk, 13 July 1918, 1698.
1608 Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Eduskunnassa’, 14 July 1918.
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5.4.3  Redescribed rightist or principled centrist 
 democracy – or no democracy at all?
Even if the Finnish Civil War had been preceded by a discursive and ideo-
logical confrontation on the meaning of democracy in which the bourgeois 
parties had seen themselves as defending the established constitutional 
order, which included representative government, against socialist 
radicalism, the construction of a democratic polity did not appear to be 
a primary goal for the victors aer the war. e militant socialist rhetoric 
of democracy used in parliament before the war had associated the Finnish 
vocabulary of democracy with socialist extremism. e constitutional 
proposal of the Reds formulated by Otto Wille Kuusinen had echoed 
demands for ‘true rule by the people’ as opposed to ‘the rule of the masters’, 
emphasising the power of the people over the parliament, democracy, the 
executive power and the courts of law.1609 Such socialist forms of democracy 
were denitely rejected by the bourgeois parties. 
Even in autumn 1917, all bourgeois groups had still recognised the need 
for at least a degree of democracy based on universal surage in the future 
republican constitution. e majority of them had already conceded in 1906 
that universal surage served the interests of the Finnish nation as part 
of the Russian Empire, but they had been seriously disappointed with its 
results. Extremes were hence to be avoided; on the one hand, reactionary 
views risked one being associated with conservative aspects of Prussianism 
while, on the other, calls for extended democracy might provoke accusations 
of defending the notorious Power Act, i.e. of being a crypto-Bolshevik. 
A suitable degree of popular power was sought, but the victors of the war 
were deeply divided over what the right amount was: some held principled 
views in favour of extended democracy, others redened the monarchical 
order as democracy.
e rule by the people was most consistently defended by centrist 
politicians who had been involved in the planning of the republican 
constitution in 1917. K. J. Ståhlberg (Young Finns) insisted that ‘the Finnish 
people are inclined [to favour] the rule by the people’.1610 Augusta Laine 
also believed in ‘democratic progress’, which would not be achieved under 
a monarchy.1611 Even Gustaf Arokallio, who considered that the Finns 
currently lacked the prerequisites for a democratic republic, nevertheless 
counted on the democratic spirit of the Finnish people and on their support 
for ‘a purely democratic constitution’, provided that Bolshevism were 
prevented from again confounding conceptions of democracy.1612 
e strongest arguments for the rule by the people originated from the 
Agrarian League, whose leader Santeri Alkio insisted that it was ‘a natural law’ 
that ‘the development of all humankind proceeds towards rule by the people’ 
and that, in 1918 too, despite the standstill in the German reform process 
and the Bolshevik Revolution, he stated: ‘e rule by the people is rising 
1609 Suomen kansanvaltuuskunnan ehdotus 1918, 3, 17, 20.
1610 VP, Kaarlo Juho Ståhlberg, 12 June 1918, 1246.
1611 VP, Augusta Laine, 7 August 1918, 1839.
1612 VP, Gustaf Arokallio, 12 July 1918, 1653, 1655–6.
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everywhere in the world, while oligarchies and monarchical authorities are 
declining.’1613 Alkio was convinced that humankind was at a ‘turning point’ 
and that any future constitution must be based on popular participation in 
government. In an era of advancing democracy, the Finns could not possibly 
build on outdated models of government but needed to have trust in ‘the 
development of the people, the inner power of the people, the education 
of the people and a constitution that enables the realisation of the rule by 
the people.’1614 Building on Fennoman idealism, which emphasised the 
potential of education, Alkio insisted that the Finns should keep their hold 
on ‘the sceptre of the rule by the people, which has already been admired 
here for a number of years’, and not let the Civil War change that.1615 Alkio 
was saying that Finnish political culture had already become so democratic 
that there was no turning back to a political order that had existed before 
universal surage and the introduction of parliamentary government. Alkio 
saw democracy and parliamentarism as inseparable: democracy would 
guarantee parliamentarism, whereas reactionary autocracy, which the 
right seemed to be campaigning for, would destroy both.1616 e only way 
to restore domestic peace was to support ‘democratic progress’ within the 
nation. Democracy had not caused the Red rebellion; that had been a purely 
Bolshevik uprising that had been a reection of a Russian reaction to Russian 
ultra-monarchism,1617 imported into Finland along with Bolshevik demands 
for a spurious form of democracy. Democracy proper had found a home in 
Finland, while Bolshevism was foreign to such a democracy. 
e speeches made by Agrarians with a farming background reinforced 
this principled demand for democracy. In summer 1917, the farmers had 
supported the sovereignty of parliament, and in summer 1918 they were 
determined to prevent the restoration of the monarchy; this reects the 
politically self-assured standing of Finnish farmers, an assurance that derived 
from the long tradition of the representation of a free peasantry.1618 Bertta 
Pykälä, the mistress of a farmhouse, distinguished between the perverted 
socialist and the true peasant rule by the people, which many Finns had 
demonstrated during the Civil War: ‘e peasant population of Finland 
had for long listened to the socialist clamour about the rule by the people 
and wanted to show them what the true rule by the people was.’1619 Pykälä 
presented peasant democracy as realisable peacefully through parliament 
but as being currently threatened by the undemocratic rightist plans against 
both democracy and parliamentarism.1620 Eetu Takkula deplored the way in 
which the so-called Social Democrats had betrayed the rule by the people 
in launching a rebellion against the parliament and the legal government 
1613 VP, Santeri Alkio, 12 June 1918, 1254.
1614 VP, Santeri Alkio, 12 July 1918, 1659–60.
1615 VP, Santeri Alkio, 12 June 1918, 1256.
1616 VP, Santeri Alkio, 12 July 1918, 1664.
1617 VP, Santeri Alkio, 12 July 1918, 1662.
1618 Ihalainen 2015.
1619 VP, Bertta Pykälä, 13 June 1918, 1282.
1620 VP, Bertta Pykälä, 13 June 1918, 1282.
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‘to steal the rule by the people for themselves and to use it arbitrarily to 
advance their own ends.’1621 Pekka Saarelainen called for the construction 
of a democratic polity that would follow the global democratic trend, while 
he saw monarchy as leading only to further socialism and anarchy.1622 Juho 
Niukkanen, an independence activist, added that the suggested bureaucratic 
system without responsibility to the people would constitute a complete 
opposite to democracy. It would not work, as the Finnish people had 
demonstrated in the Civil War how much they valued a democratic and 
republican constitution.1623 Artur Wuorimaa summarised this constitutional 
confrontation as one between the democracy of the people on the one 
hand and the aristocracy and the bureaucracy of the old elites on the other. 
According to the Agrarians, the people proper (that is, the peasantry) had 
saved the country in the Civil War and was now supporting democracy to 
the same end.1624 Even though the Agrarian defence of democracy had its 
class aspects, idealising the role of the peasantry and challenging the old 
elites, it was nevertheless noteworthy in international comparative terms 
for its unreserved non-socialist advocacy of mass democracy, comparable 
in this respect with Swedish and some British and German liberals but 
dierent from Swedish rightist uses of peasant liberty as an argument.
What threatened democracy was, according to Alkio, the monarchical 
proposals, which did not so much arise out of foreign policy pressures 
but were rather aimed at crushing the rule by the people, the rightist talk 
about ‘democratic’ monarchy being mere humbug. e rightist attempt 
was doomed to fail as democracy was a force of nature that could not 
be prevented from breaking through and from redening the order of 
society.1625 Such natural metaphors of breakthrough brought Alkio’s rhetoric 
again close to that of the Swedish le, reecting the distinctly more leist 
views of the Agrarian League in comparison with the conservative peasant 
parties in Sweden; in fact, Alkio’s group constituted the republican le in 
the Rump Parliament. e Agrarians were also disappointed with those 
centrists who had changed their minds about democracy, Onni Talas 
(Young Finns) included. On 6 December 1917, as the minister responsible 
minister for constitutional issues, Talas had presented the Finnish people 
as essentially democratic.1626 During the Civil War, he had welcomed the 
Germans into Helsinki as protectors against Bolshevism,1627 and now he was 
insisting that a monarchical constitution as well as a republican one could 
be democratic.1628 is speech was the rst of a series of rightist rhetorical 
redecriptions of a monarchical constitution as democratic. 
As a result of the unwavering determination of the Agrarians and the 
remaining liberal republicans to defend democracy as the only political 
1621 VP, Eetu Takkula, 13 June 1918, 1284.
1622 VP, Pekka Saarelainen, 13 June 1918, 1316.
1623 VP, Juho Niukkanen, 13 July 1918, 1693.
1624 VP, Artur Wuorimaa, 13 July 1918, 1690–1.
1625 VP, Santeri Alkio, 7 August 1918, 1848–9.
1626 VP, Santeri Alkio, 12 June 1918, 1258.
1627 Kolbe 2008, 124–5.
1628 VP, Onni Talas, 12 June 1918, 1264.
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system suitable for the Finnish people, the monarchists (the Finnish Party, 
the Swedish People’s Party and some of the Young Finns) found it necessarily 
to show that their constitutional proposal was reconcilable with democracy. 
is meant an implicit recognition that without democracy in the sense of 
universal surage a modern constitution was unthinkable. Especially Young 
Finns like Pekka Ahmavaara who opted for monarchy to counter-balance 
extreme forms of democracy pointed to the fact that the experiences of 
Britain and the Scandinavian countries demonstrated that limited monarchy 
was in no way undemocratic.1629 Tekla Hultin, a liberal activist famous for 
her earlier campaigns for constitutionalism and women’s rights, asserted 
that both the Finnish national character and international trends spoke for 
a democratic constitution but that democracy was also achievable under 
a monarchical constitution – as in Norway.1630 What was to be avoided was 
a  ‘wrong democracy’ of the Bolshevik kind based on the unpredictable 
will of popular assemblies.1631 Annie Furuhjelm (Swedish People’s Party), 
a women’s surage activist with international connections, presented both 
Britain and Germany as examples of successful combinations of democratic 
reforms and monarchy, especially when contrasted with the republican 
United States.1632 
e Finnish Party, known for its previous social reformism, likewise set 
out to sell monarchy to the republicans by redescribing it as a democratic 
institution; this stemmed from the necessity to dene any future political 
system as ‘democratic’ – even in a purely bourgeois parliament. Prime 
Minister Paasikivi, who had studied law in Germany as a doctoral student, 
described the German constitutional monarchy both as the best option 
with regard to security policy and as entirely reconcilable with the rule by 
the people,1633 even though this Fennoman conservative would never be 
quite happy about democracy. Paavo Virkkunen, the Speaker of the Rump 
Parliament and a clergyman who had had a public role in the ceremonies 
that welcomed the German liberators to Helsinki,1634 carried the rhetorical 
redescription of democracy as reconcilable with constitutional monarchy to 
the extreme, insisting: ‘Demands for a king represent at the present moment 
the most mature expression of democratic notions. e people know and 
acknowledge that they need a royal head of their democratic constitution. 
erefore they want to establish a royal democracy.’1635 Wilhelmi Malmivaara, 
an inuential Pietist leader, likewise declared that the proposed monarchical 
constitution was ‘entirely democratic’ in the correct sense of the word, and 
Ernst Nevanlinna, the Chairman of the Finnish Party, insisted that the 
proposal would lead to one of ‘the most democratic constitutions in the 
1629 VP, Pekka Ahmavaara, 12 June 1918, 1249.
1630 VP, Tekla Hultin, 13 July 1918, 1678, 1680.
1631 VP, Tekla Hultin, 7 August 1918, 1833.
1632 VP, Annie Furuhjelm, 13 June 1918, 1308.
1633 VP, Juho Kusti Paasikivi, 7 August 1918, 1816.
1634 Kolbe 2008, 131.
1635 VP, Paavo Virkkunen, 7 August 1918, 1824. See Bruendel 2003, 242–3 on 
‘Demokratie und Kaisertum’ and ‘Volkskönigtum’ in German debates. 
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world’.1636 A similar denition of the Prussian monarchy would have been 
unthinkable among the German right in summer 1918, although some 
attempts to describe it in such a way would follow in spring 1919; in Swedish 
rightist or British opposition Unionist discourse, on the other hand, such 
redescriptions of the established order were commonplace. Iisa Räsänen 
has pointed out that the Finnish-speaking monarchists were redening the 
concept of ‘true’ democracy as being realisable through monarchical power 
as an expression of the rule by the people.1637 e same point was used in 
Swedish and Finnish political arguments based on the common past1638 and 
appeared in German political theory, which was well known in Finland. 
Another strategy that was used was to quibble about what real democracy 
in its classical sense meant. is was done by E. N. Setälä, a professor of 
the Finnish language, who had participated in the formulation of the 
constitutional proposal of 1917. He claimed in very orthodox terms that the 
Finnish system could never be democratic in the proper sense of the word 
as the people simply could not come together to make decisions.1639 In 1919 
Setälä would also criticise the choice of certain words, in a dra constitution 
which he feared tended to lead to extreme forms of democracy. Finally, the 
Finnish Party contained a conservative segment of peasant opinion that was 
shocked by the catastrophic economic consequences of the people wielding 
supreme power through parliament in 1917 and saw the associated decline 
in respect for the government as an argument against a democratic polity.1640 
Nevertheless the avoidance of openly anti-democratic argumentation by 
the Finnish Party, which basically favoured the people, albeit somewhat 
patronisingly, is noteworthy.
Many MPs from the ultraconservative Swedish People’s Party were openly 
sceptical about democracy aer the Civil War, which, they claimed, had 
endangered law and order, property and minority rights. R. A. Wrede, who 
was a devoted adherent of German academic scholarship, and a participant 
in the constitutional proposal of 1917, argued that the development towards 
increasing democracy and parliamentarism since the French Revolution had 
already culminated and that both were in decline as a result of party strife 
and political corruption. What had taken place in the unicameral Finnish 
parliament, within which democratic and parliamentary principles had been 
uncritically admired by several political groups, was for Wrede exemplary of 
such a degeneration and threatened to destroy the entire society. e only 
solution was to combine representation with a constitutional monarchy1641 
if ‘majority oppression’ in parliamentary democracies – worse than any 
1636 VP, Wilhelmi Malmivaara, 7 August 1918, 1837, 1856. Malmivaara’s counter-
concept kansanvallattomuus is dicult to translate into English, but it meant 
something like ‘the unruliness of the people’; See also Juho Snellman (Young 
Finns), 7 August 1918, 1845; Ernst Nevanlinna (Finnish), 7 August 1918, 1852.
1637 Räsänen 1998 267–8.
1638 Ihalainen 2015.
1639 VP, Emil Nestor Setälä, 7 August 1918, 1829.
1640 VP, Juho Erkki Antila, 7 August 1918, 1835.
1641 VP, Rabbe Axel Wrede, 12 June 1918, 1253; reviewed in an abridged form in 
Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Remissdebatten’, 13 June 1918.
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seen under absolutist power – was to be avoided,1642 the reference being to 
the Social Democratic attempts of 1917 and 1918 and to the experiences of 
the Swedish-speaking members of the old elite in general. Democracy and 
parliamentarism had been seriously misunderstood in Finland, and hence 
the future constitution should curb rather than support such principles. 
Wrede nevertheless joined in the rhetorical redescriptions of democracy 
with the authority of a former rector of the Imperial Alexander University, 
insisting that the proposal for a monarchical constitution was ‘built entirely 
on a democratic basis’;1643 ‘went further in democracy . . . than any other 
constitution’;1644 and was ‘particularly liberal and democratic’.1645 Even this 
authoritative gure with his anti-democratic views thought that in 1918 any 
constitution should be ‘democratic’ at least in name. e most openly anti-
democratic views in the Finnish Rump Parliament thus came from a few 
academics of the Swedish People’s Party. While concern about the rights 
of the Swedish-speaking minority explains much of this constitutional 
conservatism, there was no way of avoiding the impression that their aim 
was the continuation of restrictions on the political inuence of the Finnish-
speaking majority of the people.1646
5.4.4  Disappointment with the Finnish people or  
 continuing confidence in it
e discursive confrontation over the rule by the people demonstrated that 
the Agrarians continued to hold an optimistic conception of the Finnish 
people, while many both in the Finnish Party and the Swedish People’s Party 
could not hide their deep disappointment with the Finns as a people. is 
inability to trust the people at large aer a civil war led to them to exclude 
what they considered to be excessively democratic and parliamentary 
constitutional solutions. e Finnish Party, with its Fennoman roots, had 
initially believed in the Finnish common people but now wavered in its 
optimism, while some MPs of the Swedish People’s Party did not hesitate 
to express their doubts about the masses as they thought that the rights of 
the Swedish-speaking inhabitants would be in danger under any form of 
majority rule.
Disappointment with the Finnish people is reected in the views of the 
historian Artturi Virkkunen, a civil servant in the National Schools Board 
and the editor-in-chief of Uusi Suometar, the organ of the Fennoman 
movement, which had traditionally believed in the importance of educating 
the people. According to Virkkunen, only the common eorts of ‘the better 
1642 VP, Rabbe Axel Wrede, 12 July 1918, 1651; Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Från kammare 
och kuloar’, 13 July 1918, regarded this anti-parliamentary speech as one of the 
best heard in the unicameral parliament. 
1643 VP, Rabbe Axel Wrede, 13 June 1918, 1313.
1644 VP, Rabbe Axel Wrede, 12 July 1918, 1652.
1645 VP, Rabbe Axel Wrede, 7 August 1918, 1847–8.
1646 Cf. a statement of Gustaf Rosenqvist claiming that ‘the principles of the rule by 
the people and demagogy’ had no role in his thinking although he defended 
a republic and new elections. VP, Gustaf Rosenqvist, 13 July 1918, 1675; this was 
welcomed in Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Eduskunnassa’, 14 July 1918.
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elements of our people’ had crushed the Red rebellion. His evaluation of both 
the Finnish elite and the masses was harsh, and it reinforced conservative 
scepticism about democracy in the aermath of the Civil War:1647
. . . we have been too credulous in thinking the best of our people, also its 
lower strata, and accepted the fallacy that our people are both ethically and 
informatively on a high level. is conception has however shown itself to be 
a complete fallacy.
Such a negative re-evaluation of the Finns as a people by a leading Fennoman 
made any type of mass democracy impossible until the masses were re-
educated for proper citizenship.
Bror Hannes Päivänsalo, the leader of a missionary organisation, pursued 
Virkkunen’s argument, lamenting how the so-called representatives of the 
people did not really know ‘the soul of our people’ – as his collective concept 
had it. e Civil War had made this Lutheran clergyman entertain severe 
doubts about the spiritual and consequently the political state of the Finnish 
people. ese doubts turned into a criticism of the optimistic republicans 
and their appeals to the will of the people:1648
ere is a lot of talk about the people here, about the people as if the people could 
be carried in one’s pocket and as if some had a particular privilege to talk about 
the people, about the will and the soul of the people. Who of you has found the 
key with which the soul of the Finnish people can be opened? I at least am greatly 
amazed when I see phenomena in the life of our people that I could have never 
foreseen, and I must say that I nd myself facing great, great problems. I would 
not dare to say at this moment that I know the people and its soul.
Few Finnish conservatives dared to be this sceptical about the possibilities 
of understanding the people. Lauri Ingman, a professor of theology and the 
leader of the Finnish Party, now also set out to challenge the suggestions 
of the republicans that a republican constitution would be based on the 
prevailing wishes of the people. A republic was not possible as it would ‘take 
our people into such circumstances that the best elements of our people 
cannot want it’.1649 e sceptical views of the Finnish-speaking right about 
democracy were oen connected with Lutheran conceptions of a sinful 
people,1650 a view that had been reinforced by the experiences of the Civil 
War. Some speakers of the German and Swedish right exhibited a similar 
level of scepticism and questioned the whole basis of mass democracy and 
extended parliamentarism, but they rarely employed religious arguments; 
the British Conservatives avoided such religiously oriented argumentation, 
having party-political reasons for being optimistic about the people.
Instead of merely emphasising the collective guilt of the people for their 
national tragedy, many externalised it, thereby opening up possibilities 
1647 VP, Artturi Virkkunen, 13 June 1918, 1302.
1648 VP, Bror Hans Päivänsalo, 13 June 1918, 1305.
1649 VP, Lauri Ingman, 13 July 1918, 1677–8.
1650 Discussed in Ihalainen 2005a.
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for the construction of a new unied nation state. is strategy united 
republicans and monarchists by making the previous and current Russian 
political systems scapegoats for the crisis of the Finnish polity. R. A. Wrede 
(Swedish People’s Party), an old constitutionalist, regretted the inuence on 
the Finnish people of Russian autocracy, the lawlessness inspired by the war 
and outright ‘Russian anarchy’ in the form of ‘Russian Social Democracy’.1651 
It was the pernicious inuence of Russia rather than the Finnish people as 
such that was to blame. e Russian Revolution had reduced the Finnish 
people into a state of ‘nightmare’ and ‘induced an almost pathological 
condition in broad levels of the people’, a malady that had at times (in July and 
November 1917) entered the parliament as well.1652 Such a pathologisation 
of the rebellion, even if patronising towards the people at large as a political 
force, tended to exculpate the Finns from responsibility for their national 
tragedy. is was the easiest way to explain away the Civil War, forgetting the 
active participation of domestic political groups in the preceding political 
process.
Vesa Vares has suggested that the Finnish Party saw the people as basically 
good but misled before the Civil War, while the Swedish People’s Party 
considered the fallen people to be in need of strict guidance;1653 the above 
examples would suggest the contrary, but certainly many of these views were 
shared by the conservatives. e Finnish Party opposed a referendum on 
the constitution and emphasised the moral duty of the parliament to solve 
the constitutional issues.1654 e members of the Swedish People’s Party 
continued to employ legalistic argumentation, sometimes with conicting 
results. Gustaf Rosenqvist, a retired professor of theology whose views 
had been ultra-conservative and legalistic in relation to the extension of 
parliamentary power and who had resigned from the parliament as a protest 
in 1917, spoke in 1918 in favour of new elections before constitutional 
changes could be made, insisting that ‘we do not now represent the entire 
people of Finland, we do not represent the Finnish people in a way that 
our constitution expressly presupposes’.1655 Rosenqvist asserted that he 
believed in ‘the historical mission and role of the people, even of the little 
people [småfolket]’; the pre-conditions for their surage should, however, 
depend on the ethical standing of each person,1656 which would exclude 
many Reds. Nevertheless, the people, including the workers, needed to be 
heard as the current parliament did not express the will of the people in any 
reliable way. is could not be measured mechanically by a majority vote; 
it was an organic phenomenon that could be expressed only by a legally 
1651 VP, Rabbe Axel Wrede, 12 June 1918, 1251.
1652 VP, Rabbe Axel Wrede, 12 July 1918, 1650. For Gustav Rosenqvist’s critical 
response from within the same party, see VP, 13 July 1918, 1674; also Helsingin 
Sanomat, ‘Eduskunnassa’, 14 July 1918.
1653 Vares 1998, 164.
1654 Vares 1998, 165.
1655 VP, Gustaf Rosenqvist, 13 June 1918, 1299.
1656 VP, Gustaf Rosenqvist, 13 July 1918, 1674.
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assembled representative body of the people, i.e. a parliament.1657 Rosenqvist 
declared:1658  
I am optimistic as far as our development and the development of all humanity 
is concerned. . . . [H]ence I cannot agree with the pessimistic, downright 
generalising and disparaging conception of our people and the representative 
institution of our people that is now being expressed in many quarters. 
A man who can be assumed to have favoured conservative constitutional 
solutions wanted to have the Social Democrats back in parliament as a matter 
of principle instead of advocating the monarchist and Swedish-speaking 
interests of his party. Rosenqvist’s optimism diers from the attitudes that 
prevailed among the Swedish right in the yet unresolved issue of surage 
reform and from the views of hard-liner conservatives within the Finnish 
Party and the Swedish People’s Party in Finland. e Swedish parliamentary 
group remained polyphonic in its understanding of the political role of the 
people, even though the sceptics tended to dominate the discourse.
e liberal Young Finns were divided even more in their conceptions 
of the people. Pekka Ahmavaara, a former Speaker of the Peasant Estate, 
emphasised the great contribution of the peasantry during the Civil War, 
while lamenting the questionable characteristics of the people at large 
that had come out in it.1659 Gustaf Arokallio saw the Bolshevik spirit as 
having extended itself even to non-socialist groups of the people; this was 
reected in the appearance of delegations threatening a new rebellion if 
their demands were not met.1660 ese Young Finns would in autumn 1918 
join the conservative National Coalition Party, which gathered together 
monarchists who were suspicious of an extended popular government. 
Led by K. J. Ståhlberg, the republicans among the Young Finns rejected 
doubts about the political abilities of the Finns: aer all, ‘the healthy 
elements of our people rose up to defend our social order’ and put the 
rebellion down.1661 e new constitution should be based ‘on trust and not 
distrust of our people and their internal and external vigour’.1662 is was 
to say that the new polity should be based on the people themselves rather 
than on any foreign support,1663 implying that the decision should not be 
inuenced by German models and wishes. Ståhlberg’s consistent defence 
of popular government and opposition to monarchism would earn him the 
rst presidency of the republic in 1919 and large support in later presidential 
elections despite the limited size of the Progressivist Party, which the 
republican Young Finns formed in late 1918.
1657 VP, Gustaf Rosenqvist, 13 July 1918, 1675–6. 
1658 VP, Gustaf Rosenqvist, 13 July 1918, 1676.
1659 VP, Pekka Ahmavaara, 12 June 1918, 1250.
1660 VP, Gustaf Arokallio, 12 July 1918, 1655.
1661 VP, Kaarlo Juho Ståhlberg, 12 June 1918, 1246.
1662 VP, Kaarlo Juho Ståhlberg, 12 June 1918, 1246.
1663 VP, Kaarlo Juho Ståhlberg, 12 June 1918, 1247. 
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e concept of the people remained central for the uncompromisingly 
republican Agrarians, who justied their rejection of the monarchy as being 
derived from ‘the living and healthy force of the people’.1664 Santeri Alkio 
did not deny the ‘sin of the Finnish people’ in allowing the Civil War to 
happen, but (like Wrede) saw the reason in an international epidemic that 
was initiated by Russian autocracy and manifested in the Bolshevik Russian 
Revolution and the connected Bolshevik rebellion in Finland. Among the 
Finns, the Social Democrats were to blame for misleading and provoking 
some credulous persons into revolutionary ideas and activities:1665 
Here the people, the people who hold Social Democratic beliefs, have been 
inculcated with the idea that a social revolution is inevitable. is belief 
hypnotised our Social Democrat leaders and their ocks to the extent that they 
believed that the time had come when the predicted social revolution must 
be implemented by violent means. We all know that they were mistaken. at 
moment has not arrived. Finland stands, and no social revolution has been 
implemented. 
Alkio’s analysis was not unfounded: as we saw in section 4.4, the revolu-
tionary language of Finnish Social Democratic discourse in November and 
December 1917 suggests that the Bolshevik example together with previous 
Marxist agitation on the necessity of revolution had played a major role in 
the process of disintegration of parliamentary government and progress 
towards a civil war. Alkio’s explanation of the rebellion as being caused by 
external inuence and involving only misled Social Democrats allowed him 
to maintain his optimistic conclusions about the capability of the Finnish 
people – and the peoples of Europe in general – to develop politically. 
According to him, a great advance would take place as a consequence of 
increased democracy and the intensied political education of the people by 
nation-states aer the war:1666
[P]olitical life will be renewed and brightened as peoples grow. e political life 
which the deep ranks of the people currently live in Europe is not the kind of 
political life they would like to have. Our political life has taken on this form 
to a great extent as a result of the state not having taken sucient care of the 
education of the people. 
e Parliamentary Reform of 1906 had already politically educated the 
Finnish people to the extent that they were demanding political inuence. 
In Alkio’s populist description of the political situation of the country, it was 
‘the Finnish people’ itself that was actively ‘forming a state here’ and not just 
parliamentarians arguing over constitutional alternatives. Alkio referred 
to this popular activism in representing the attempts by the monarchical 
parliamentary majority to ignore the people in the formulation of the 
constitution as doomed to fail: the Finnish people simply had to be awarded 
1664 VP, Antti Juutilainen, 13 July 1918, 1685.
1665 VP, Santeri Alkio, 12 June 1918, 1254.
1666 VP, Santeri Alkio, 12 June 1918, 1256.
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the democratic power that they had learned they had the right to possess. 
e same people needed to be educated in such a way that they would be 
able to recruit new political leaders who would ‘have the courage to believe 
in and venture forth with this people’.1667 is was the Agrarians’ approach to 
realising the rule by the people and at the same time their way of challenging 
the conservative political elite. 
Alkio went on to argue that Finland should base its political future 
on ‘the development of its people, the inner power of the people, the 
education of the people and a constitution in which the rule by the people 
is implemented’.1668 Elitist doubts about the trustworthiness of the Finns as 
a people to govern themselves were unfounded. Instead, ‘in this momentous 
period, power should still be entrusted to the people themselves [in the 
form of a referendum or new elections], as ‘this realm will not be created by 
any other might but by this people itself ’.1669 Finland should never become 
a  military state of the Prussian type but ‘a state which lives primarily for 
itself, for the happiness of its people’.1670 Such an unwavering belief in the 
potential of the people to grow politically through education brought Alkio’s 
thinking close to that of the Swedish le. 
Alkio further extended his criticism of a monarchical constitution into 
an analysis of what he saw as an ongoing Europe-wide transformation 
of political systems brought about by the war and Wilsonian ideas, 
a  phenomenon that should be understood by the Finnish parliamentary 
majority. Alkio was positive that ‘future foreign policy between peoples will 
not be the policy of kings, but rather a policy of peoples’ since, aer the 
‘education’ provided by the war, ‘the power and inuence of peoples will rise 
everywhere’ and progress towards an eternal peace would follow. Finland 
currently seemed unable to follow ‘a policy of the people’ (kansanpolitiikka) 
vis-à-vis foreign nations (Russia and Germany) and to be fundamentally 
divided on foreign policy, but this would need to change. Finnish foreign 
policy, too, would need to follow guidelines set by the parliament; it should 
be consistent and public, just as domestic governance should be based ‘on 
the principles of a modern democratically governed state’. Even the Germans 
were – Alkio claimed – willing to accept in Finland a constitution ‘dependent 
on the people and supported by the people’, including the currently excluded 
workers.1671 Alkio went back to the attempts for reform in Germany in 1917, 
which in his view (despite the fact that they had been halted) reected the 
willingness of the Kaiser to have a closer interaction with his people via 
parliament.1672 Alkio used his entire rhetorical arsenal with references to 
both national and international recent history in his endeavour to stop the 
monarchists by appealing to the political will and potential of the people.
1667 VP, Santeri Alkio, 12 June 1918, 1256.
1668 VP, Santeri Alkio, 13 July 1918, 1660. 
1669 VP, Santeri Alkio, 13 July 1918, 1660.
1670 VP, Santeri Alkio, 13 July 1918, 1660.
1671 VP, Santeri Alkio, 13 July 1918, 1660–1. 
1672 VP, Santeri Alkio, 13 July 1918, 1662.
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In the Rump Parliament, republicanism was a characteristically Agrarian 
phenomenon derived from deep-rooted conceptions of peasant democracy. 
Alkio’s party fellow Kyösti Kallio highlighted the bravery and glory of the 
people that had been demonstrated in the Civil War and emphasised the 
disappointment of the people over the distrust in them implied by the 
government’s proposal.1673 Kallio would resign from his ministerial post 
a month later as a result of a disagreement over the constitution. Santeri 
Haapanen provocatively implied that the reintroduction of a monarchical 
constitution entailed the risk of a new revolution.1674 Some Agrarians, such as 
Juho Kokko, a teacher himself, recommended the re-education of the people 
to republicanism and parliamentarism as the way forward. Kokko put his 
argument in organic terms that were downright early modern in spirit: the 
people should learn to know ‘what type of plague Tokoi-Mannerism is in our 
political body’; learn to ‘abhor the Russian Red danger’ and ‘wrong socialism’; 
and grow into becoming ‘elements of a Finnish people striving for healthy 
principles’.1675 By contrast, Kusti Arman held a more optimistic conception 
of the current state of the Finns’ political conscience and capabilities: the 
past decades of resistance to foreign autocracy and the suppression of the 
Red rebellion had demonstrated the strength of the Finnish culture and 
national identity and the potential of the Finns to govern themselves under 
a republican constitution.1676 Arman had obtained a broader perspective 
from the long period he had spent as an emigrant in the United States.
Among the right, who supported monarchical notions and were 
suspicious of extended democracy and parliamentarism, the overall 
conception of the people was coloured by pessimism and scepticism. e 
centrists, on the other hand, although they also sometimes expressed their 
disappointment with some sections of the people, consistently emphasised 
the political health of the core of the people and the possibilities to improve 
the situation through a republican constitution and suitable political 
education. is would allow a proper parliamentary democracy to emerge.
5.4.5 Limited debates on parliamentarism in the Rump 
Parliament
e debates on the political role of the people in the future Finnish polity 
– monarchical or republican – lead us to more limited discussions on the 
nature of parliamentarism. Parliamentarism had been esteemed, though in 
the case of the non-socialist parties with clear limitations, by all sides in the 
parliamentary debates of summer and autumn 1917. It was viewed in much 
more negative terms and oen ignored by many in the aermath of the Civil 
War. e parliamentary process had not been able to solve the problems 
of Finnish society or to prevent the escalation of the conict in 1917; 
instead, the violent parliamentary debates and the uncompromising views 
expressed in them had contributed to this escalation. Some representatives 
of the right blamed universal surage and the unicameral parliament for 
1673 VP, Kyösti Kallio, 12 June 1918, 1257. 
1674 VP, Santeri Haapanen, 12 June 1918, 1261. 
1675 VP, Juho Kokko, 13 June 1918, 1311.
1676 VP, Kusti Arman, 13 June 1918, 1314.
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the crisis. e MPs disagreed about whether the parliament should remain 
a body that merely ratied legislation and a forum for public debate of the 
pre-war Finnish, Swedish and German types or whether it should be given 
an independent supervisory role by the introduction of full ministerial 
responsibility.
Republicans continued to advocate parliamentarism, Helsingin Sano-
mat as the largest newspaper in the country insisting that either form of 
government (monarchic or republican) should be rst and foremost 
parliamentary.1677 But the republicans found themselves in a weakened 
position in post-Civil War Finland: the critics of parliamentarism could 
argue that its worst consequences had already been seen in Finland. e 
defenders of parliamentarism could rely on the republican sympathies of the 
majority of the Finnish electorate once they were allowed to vote again. But 
in summer 1918 they could not yet count on countries with parliamentary 
governments winning the war. Furthermore, republicanism had no strong 
ideological roots in Finland – unless we take into account some eighteenth-
century republican proclivities among the Swedish nobility1678 – and the 
rule of the estates in the Swedish Age of Liberty could not be taken as 
parliamentarism in any modern or positive sense;  on the contrary, in the 
circumstances of 1918, it rather served as a warning example.1679 What was 
more, the parliamentary ministries of 1917 had not functioned properly as 
the crisis deteriorated. 
Vesa Vares has shown that the republicans, oen younger and less highly 
educated and despised for their inexperience by the monarchists,1680 were 
nevertheless convinced of the progressive character of their ideals and hence 
unwilling to compromise: for them, a parliamentary republic remained the 
only democratic form of government which the majority of the people 
supported. Republicanism stood for the conviction that a republican form 
of government would produce a better future in a national democracy. 
Monarchism, by contrast, appeared to the republicans as a downright 
criminal reactionary plot of the Swedish-speakers,1681 or at least the defence 
of an outdated aristocratic and bureaucratic system that lacked responsibility 
to the parliament and the people. Santeri Alkio had serious doubts as to 
whether the proposed monarchical constitution would lead to the king 
ruling in accordance with the will of the parliament.1682
To counter republican doubts about a monarchical constitution, the 
ministry emphasised the stability and continuity it would bring. e 
government also referred to limitations to monarchical power that would 
guarantee ‘the rights of parliament and the people’.1683 Even the most fervent 
advocates of monarchy were ready to recognise the current and future 
1677 Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Ewästyskeskustelu hallitusmuotoasiasta’, 14 June 1918.
1678 Wol 2009.
1679 Ihalainen 2015.
1680 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Vår stora fråga’, 13 July 1918.
1681 Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Kenelle lankeaa edeswastuu?’, 14 July 1918; Vares 1998, 
131–3.
1682 VP, Santeri Alkio, 12 June 1918, 1255.
1683 VP, Juho Kusti Paasikivi, 12 June 1918, 1244.
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constitution as ‘parliamentary’1684 – using a rhetorical redescription familiar 
from the uses of ‘democracy’. Hufvudstadsbladet, for instance, asserted that 
ministerial responsibility and the inuence of the representative institution 
would be maintained despite extensive monarchical prerogatives.1685 is 
denition of what ‘proper’ parliamentarism meant diered radically from the 
conceptions of the republicans. e monarchists mentioned parliamentarism 
mainly to appease the republicans although they nevertheless implicitly 
recognised its value.
Despite continuing uncertainty about the outcome of the war, from July 
1918 onwards the republicans were increasingly condent in their defence 
of parliamentarism, bringing up the possibility that Germany might not 
win. In this sense, the Finnish republicans were preparing the kind of turn 
away from Germany towards Western parliamentary democracies that 
was taking place in Sweden, though more cautiously. Santeri Alkio argued 
against monarchy, identifying parliamentarism with republicanism, and 
described a Europe-wide development that Finland should follow1686: 
In all countries the conclusion has been that absolute monarchy needs to be 
limited by parliamentary power. is has led to parliamentarism, which is nothing 
else but development towards a republic. In the future, beyond parliamentarism, 
republicanism is imminent everywhere, whatever else may be claimed.
e implication was that not only did the Entente consist of parliamentary 
governments but that Germany, too, was ready to parliamentarise its 
government as soon as the war was over. e future of the reigning 
monarchs was not certain, either. It hence made no sense to create a new 
throne at a time when parliamentarism, followed by increasing democracy, 
was making historical progress at the cost of monarchies.1687 is was still in 
mid-July 1918 an overly optimistic claim, yet one that would soon turn into 
a reality. Hufvudstadbladet took it as mere prophecy.1688
e monarchists ignored the claim. Gustaf Rosenqvist – an independent 
thinker who was critical of what he considered excessive parliamentarism 
but supportive of popular participation in politics and contemptuous of the 
idealisation of monarchy – responded by expressing his disrespect for such 
admirers of ‘a power-seeking, autocratic representation of the people’.1689 
Many intellectuals like this retired professor of theology remained doubtful 
about a ruling parliament but wished to see the established conventions of the 
polity observed. ere was no proper pro et contra debate on parliamentarism 
in the Finnish parliament in connection with the question of whether or not 
to have a German king. e Finns would nd themselves in an entirely new 
position once the parliamentarisation of the German government got under 
way in autumn 1918, although even then the monarchists would remain 
unwilling to change their minds.
1684 VP, Ernst Estlander, 13 July 1918, 1703.
1685 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Förslaget till regeringsformen’, 12 June 1918.
1686 VP, Santeri Alkio, 12 July 1918, 1663.
1687 VK, 12 July 1918, 1663–4.
1688 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Från kammare och kuloar’, 13 July 1918.
1689 VP, Gustaf Rosenqvist, 13 July 1918, 1675.
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6.  The autumn of 1918: German, Swedish 
 and Finnish constitutional debates  
 in the face of a democratic turn
6.1 Democratic surage applied in Britain for the rst time
e British Representation of the People Act had passed Parliament in 
February 1918, waiting for immediate implementation as soon as the war 
was over. e general election was held accordingly on 14 December 1918, 
only about a month aer the conclusion of the armistice. e War Cabinet 
had reformed electoral legislation and planned this election during the war, 
but the voters were far from ready for such political mobilisation, and this 
resulted in low participation levels. With hindsight, the elections appealing 
to ‘the new democracy’ of 21 million voters, may appear to have been 
a decisive turning point in British political history, but contemporaries did 
not generally see them that way: many were apathetic.1690 Only 57.2 of the 
electorate per cent voted in the midst of a post-war crisis, many abstaining 
because of a lack of interest, distrust in Parliament, private concerns or bad 
weather. Over eighty per cent had voted in 1910, and nearly ninety per cent 
would vote in the German election only a month later.1691 
Prime Minister Lloyd George wanted the electorate to vote so early in 
order to prevent the Labour Party from beneting from a longer campaign. 
Labour had adopted a socialist agenda, breaking the party truce in June, 
leaving the coalition in November and declaring ‘Hands O Democracy!’ 
in its election manifesto which welcomed ‘the extension of liberty and 
democracy in Europe’, the advancement of ‘world-democracy’ through 
the Workers International and building by constitutional means ‘a new 
world’ based on ‘permanent democratic principles’. It was implying that the 
ministry opposed ‘the young democracies of the Continent’ and rejected 
a British intervention in Russia, which reinforced associations between 
its demands for socialist democracy and the Bolshevik notion of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, even though it had denounced Bolshevism 
in favour of parliamentary democracy. In domestic politics, ‘the immediate 
1690 e Manchester Guardian, ‘e Real Issues of the Election’, 1 December 1918; 
‘e Real King’, 14 December 1918. Press sources are used here as the the British 
reform had already been passed.
1691 Ball 1991, 246; Turner 1992, 329, 332; Pugh 2002, 161.
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nationalisation and democratic control of vital public services’ was 
demanded. In foreign policy, a call for ‘democratic diplomacy’ might sound 
like exibility with Germany.1692 To counter socialist advances and expected 
Liberal losses, Lloyd George allied himself with the Conservatives, making 
an advance agreement with them on the distribution of seats. He also 
turned in his election campaign propaganda from reconstruction and social 
reforms to Germanophobic declarations of the need to punish the Germans 
collectively.1693 e joint election manifesto of Lloyd George and Bonar Law 
made no mention of democracy but emphasised how ‘the hosts of freedom’ 
had crushed ‘military autocracy’ on the Continent for ever, appealed to 
the patriotism and unity of ‘our people’, ‘our nation’ and ‘our Empire’ and 
promised a further parliamentary reform based on direct contract with the 
people’.1694 e supposedly universal cause of democracy was in actual fact 
taken over by chauvinistic and party-political interests and tended to be 
discursively constructed as a socialist project.
Lenin’s declarations about the necessity of civil war as the proper form 
of class struggle in a revolutionary epoch1695 and the fate of Kerensky’s 
government in the Russian Bolshevik Revolution suggested that the risk of 
a socialist government obtaining power existed, and it was feared that this 
would to lead to a take-over by even more radical revolutionaries – especially 
so as revolutionary movements were growing in the Central Powers. 
e British electorate did not generally care much about constitutional 
developments on the Continent; the systems there were regarded as 
fundamentally dierent from the British one, and hence domestic and 
imperial perspectives dominated the debate. However, the Home Oce 
reported that there were more Bolsheviks per capita in Britain than in Russia 
at the time of the Revolution and that British ‘Bolshevism’ was supported not 
only by Russian but also by German and Swedish ‘Bolsheviks’. e election 
nevertheless showed overwhelming support for continued cooperation 
between the Conservatives and Lloyd George’s Liberals. e winners were 
backed by the predominant Germanophobic feeling in the country and the 
inclination of women on the home front to vote against the Germans and the 
Kaiser and in favour of the Conservatives.1696 e Conservatives had played 
a visible role during the ultimately victorious war and mostly supported the 
enfranchisement of women in 1917–18, partly because they expected that 
women would favour their party and partly to obviate any female hostility 
that might rise from continued opposition. ose soldiers who bothered 
to vote probably also supported the coalition. As the electoral support for 
Labour was much lower than expected, resulting in just 63 seats, the election 
1692 Labour’s call for the people, 1918.
1693 e Manchester Guardian, ‘e Labour Appeal’, 28 November 1918, ‘Mr. 
Arthur Henderson’, 2 December 1918; Cowden 1984, 26, 30; Wrigley 1990, 1–2; 
Smith 1997, 66–7; Cook 1998, 73; McCrillis 1998, 35, 38; orpe 2001, 39–40; 
Cunningham 2001, 239; Pugh 2011, 122–3; Dutton 2013, 68, 70.
1694 e Manifesto of Lloyd George and Bonar Law, 1918.
1695 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Bolsheviks Busy’, 17 November 1918.
1696 Suggested also in e Manchester Guardian, ‘e Real Issues of the Election’, 
1 December 1918.
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demonstrated the restored strength of the Conservatives and lent support for 
their increasingly optimistic visions. At the same time, the election revealed 
divisions within the Liberal Party, in which concerns caused by the possible 
consequences of universal surage, and also the still modest rise of Labour, 
began to materialise.1697 e hurried election and Lloyd George’s steering of 
the result caused opposition Liberals to argue that the Prime Minister was 
not following the ways of ‘democracy, as in England at least it is understood’. 
us not even all Liberals were happy about the way that democracy had 
been implemented: H. H. Asquith said that ‘the democracy of this country’ 
should have been free to send its spokesmen to the Commons.1698 Lloyd 
George’s rival candidate Austin Harrison suggested that the Prime Minister 
had replaced ‘free democracy’ with ‘autocracy’.1699
Nevertheless, the British Conservatives had successfully adapted to 
the transition to universal surage and majority democracy, as some of 
their reformist MPs had optimistically foreseen: it had paid o to trust the 
people and to move towards what e Manchester Guardian characterised 
as ‘Tory democracy’1700. In Germany, Sweden and Finland, the right would 
be less successful in recruiting electoral support to retain their pre-reform 
positions. In these countries, the reformation of the attitudes of the right 
with regard to democracy and parliamentarism was only beginning; the 
decisive turn to democracy would, or would not as the case may be, follow 
in the early 1930s. One explanation for the successful transfer to the era of 
universal surage in Britain, in addition to the steered election result, may 
be the fact that there existed no previously established group that would 
lose its power or felt its interests violated as a result; hence there was no 
necessity to challenge democracy. Continuity rather than change remained 
a characteristic of the British political system, with the same political elite 
continuing to run politics. is made the British aristocracy readier to accept 
the compromises of evolutionary democratisation and remain supportive 
of the system – in contrast to the deeply reactionary and antidemocratic 
Prussian nobility,1701 and the partly doubtful right in Sweden and Finland. 
In Britain, the Conservatives launched a ten-year project to attract support 
under universal surage1702 and did quite well in the new circumstances.
Was the implementation of nearly universal surage understood to 
constitute ‘democracy’ then? On the pages of e Times in late 1918, the 
understanding of the reformed British electoral system as a ‘democracy’ was 
rather limited. e paper had used the term to justify the early election, 
insisting: ‘Once the Reform Bill was carried, a prompt appeal to the country 
1697 Wrigley 1990, 14; Turner 1992, 330, 332; Ball 1995, 61–4; Rose 1995, 31; Smith 
1997, 69–70; McCrillis 1998, 16; Pugh 2002, 161–2; Bogdanor (ed.) 2003, 724–5; 
Charmley 2008, 97; Harris 2011, 267.
1698 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Mr. Asquith’s Speech’ and ‘Mr. Asquith’s Election 
Policy’, 19 November 1918.
1699 e Manchester Guardian, ‘e Premier’s Seat’, 12 December 1918.
1700 e Manchester Guardian, ‘New Food Controller’, 10 July 1918.
1701 Retallack 1988, 2; Garrard 2001, 4; Retallack 2006, 11; Jeerys 2007, 16–17.
1702 McCrillis 1998, 19.
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became an essential step to a conclusive and democratic victory.’1703 is 
‘victory’ referred to the achievement of the war goal internationally rather 
than to the establishment of a new political system at home. In this spirit, 
the paper lauded the ‘democratic instinct’ of Lloyd George for making 
a  ‘democratic decision’ about an early election.1704 On the other hand, the 
possibilities for democracy in India, for instance, were doubted.1705 e 
Times denounced Labour’s politicisation of democracy in the domestic 
debate and rather urged ‘every democracy’ (in the generalising sense of 
free states) to ght against Bolshevism, Britain being associated with ‘the 
established democracies of the world’, and more particularly with the 
United States.1706 is was ‘rational democracy’ as opposed to the ‘rapid 
revolution’ demanded by ‘Bolshevist’ candidates during the British election 
campaign.1707 Britain was a democracy by denition, but no reformist 
conclusions were to be drawn from this in the immediate post-war situation. 
Indeed, the only reform demanded was training for citizenship in the name 
of ‘true democracy’,1708 which was a call typical of liberal and conservative 
parties at the time of the reforms of 1918–19. 
ose newspapers that were inclined to Liberal views and supported 
Lloyd George praised the progress of democracy in British domestic politics, 
an editorial of e Manchester Guardian in July 1918 assuming that ‘popular 
or representative government, or democracy’ in its British form had been 
generally accepted as a model in ‘Western countries’.1709 In September, the 
paper asserted that ‘[d]emocracy in England has made a gigantic stride 
during the war’ and called for a parliament that would represent ‘the 
democracy as a whole’ in advancing economic equality and opposing extra-
parliamentary (socialist) reformers.1710 e paper also took up the need 
to advance the democratisation of India now that ‘the contagion . . . of 
democracy’ had, as a consequence of the war, reached Asia. Its suggestion 
was that the British people should thereby contribute to ‘our own new era of 
democracy’ concomitantly with ‘ghting with America to make the world 
safe for democracy’.1711 Obviously, some Liberals were ready to rethink both 
economic policies and the structures of the British Empire in democratic 
terms. 
However, only rarely were interpretations of the implications of ‘the new 
era of enlarged democracy aer the war’ extended to promote ‘the welfare, 
1703 e Times, ‘A Patriotic Programme’, 1 August 1918.
1704 e Times, ‘Towards a Programme’, 14 November 1918, ‘e Voter’s Choice’, 
12 December 1918.
1705 e Times, ‘e Indian Report’, 10 July 1918.
1706 e Times, ‘e Labour Party’s Manifesto’, 29 November 1918.
1707 e Times, ‘Bolshevist Candidate’, 28 November 1918.
1708 e Times, ‘Educational Issues’, 13 December 1918.
1709 e Manchester Guardian, ‘e Government of India’, 6 July 1918.
1710 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Trade Unionism and Democracy’, 2 September 1918.
1711 e Manchester Guardian, ‘e Government of India’, 6 July 1918, ‘A New Epoch 
in India’, 7 July 1918, ‘Indian Reforms’, 12 July 1918, ‘e New Era in India’, 
18 August 1918.
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progress, status, and power of the people’.1712 When such proposals were 
made, they oen ended up with suggestions combining the brotherhood of 
mankind, British patriotism, imperial unity and ‘progressive democracy’1713 
with calls for devolution as a way to advance the functioning of democracy1714 
or with demands for reforming the educational system to support 
democracy.1715 In mid-September one theoretical contribution concluded 
that modern democracy stood not only for elections and the parliament as 
instruments of human progress and brotherhood between nations but also 
for ‘equality of opportunity for all, freedom of conscience, the maximum of 
individual liberty that is consistent with the good of the whole, a relation of 
mutual condence between the governors and the governed’. e author, 
aware of his idealism, listed several problems involved in the practice of 
democracy but concluded that it should be given a chance, for the rst 
time, to demonstrate what it was capable of.1716 On the election day, e 
Manchester Guardian claimed that the voting was a test of the value of 
elections and Parliament as instruments of democracy – something that was 
self-evident in Britain but not in Bolshevik Russia or Germany, or indeed in 
the programme of Labour.1717 
e rhetoric of democracy was most pronounced in demonstrations 
of alliance with the Americans, as in Asquith’s attering talk about 
America as ‘a great democracy’ and his inclusion of Britain in a reference 
to ‘these great democracies’.1718 ‘Democratisation’ or ‘parliamentarisation’, 
however, remained something that the Allied leaders (and the German 
opposition) were calling for Germany. At the same time, the promises of 
the German government to democratise the political system were treated 
with scepticism.1719 When the war was over, the conclusion was that it had 
‘justied democracy’ since the Western democracies, which represented 
systems based on the will of the people, had won. Furthermore, it was ‘the 
democratic element’ within these democracies that had won.1720 When the 
election result was known, e Manchester Guardian declared it to be the 
voice of ‘the new democracy’.1721 For Liberals, democracy had thus become 
a vague but overwhelmingly positive concept which could be used to 
legitimate the established British system and possible minor reforms of it.
During the election campaign, Labour had called not only for support 
for the democracies of the Continent but also for ‘the completion of political 
democracy’ at home with further electoral reforms and the abolition 
1712 e Observer, ‘“Clear the Line”’, 21 July 1918.
1713 e Observer, ‘Hope and Unity’, 11 August 1918.
1714 e Observer, ‘“e Round Table”’, 8 September 1918.
1715 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Election News’, 14 October 1918.
1716 e Manchester Guardian, L.S., ‘Democracy’, 14 September 1918.
1717 e Manchester Guardian, ‘e Election and Aer’, 14 December 1918.
1718 e Manchester Guardian, ‘League of Nations’, 13 July 1918.
1719 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Unrest in Germany’, 7 September 1918, ‘Lord Grey on 
the League of Nations’, 11 October 1918, ‘Press Comments on the German Reply’, 
22 October 1918. e quoted Daily Chronicle was supportive of Lloyd George.
1720 e Manchester Guardian, H., ‘It Never Shall Happen Again’, 16 November 1918.
1721 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Britain’s Voice’, 29 December 1918.
345
6.1 Democratic suffrage applied in Britain for the first time
of the Lords. Furthermore, it had demanded ‘such far-reaching social, 
economic, moral, and political reforms as will make our country worthy of 
democracy’;1722 in this respect it diered little from Continental revisionist 
Social Democratic parties. e Herald, representing the far le, had little 
constructive to write about democracy or parliamentarism as practised in 
Britain. Its writers advocated ‘a democratic or Republican Europe’, supported 
American endeavours ‘to democratise Europe’ and opposed polities based 
on imperialism or nationalism. ey called for the democratisation of 
education and welcomed labour activism in promoting the realisation of ‘the 
democratic ideal’.1723 With the approach of peace, e Herald complained that 
it had not been concluded much earlier in ‘fair, honest, democratic terms’ as 
opposed to demanding an unconditional surrender from Germany now that 
a victory was expected; this was ‘a repudiation of democracy’. If these tough 
terms failed to produce peace, British soldiers had died ‘not for democracy’ 
but ‘for the blood-lust of the Northclie Press’, i.e. e Times, e Daily Mail 
and other papers that supported the government, and ‘the reactionaries 
of Britain’ who, e Herald claimed, thought like ‘the reactionaries of 
Germany’.1724 e paper attacked Lloyd George’s Liberals by accusing them 
of having ‘boasted [their] belief in democracy – and denied the democratic 
rights of half the people’.1725 Aer the election, e Herald questioned 
the legitimacy of the new parliament: the hasty election made it ‘no true 
representative of the people’. As the prevailing antiquated constitution 
gave the people no political power over the Commons, the workers should 
be prepared to put extra-parliamentary pressure on the government to 
secure ‘political democracy’.1726 e British far le was thus in line with its 
continental brethren. As for Labour politicians, Ramsay MacDonald was 
reported to have said that he remained ‘a believer in Parliamentary action’ 
albeit supported with industrial action.1727
While Liberal public discourse was turning more favourable towards 
democracy in Britain – though it was still cautious about using the term 
to characterise any detailed reform programme – the le was far from 
convinced that any noticeable advances in democracy had taken place. 
Democratisation in Germany was an even more complicated matter from the 
British point of view. Soutou has claimed that Lloyd George was condent 
that Germany would be quickly transformed into a trustworthy member of 
the family of Western liberal democracies.1728 Some other researchers have 
suggested that he encouraged democracy in Germany but did not insist on 
1722 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Labour’s Policy’, 26 November 1918.
1723 e Herald, Austin Harrison, ‘e Better “Ole”’, 31 August 1918.
1724 e Herald, ‘Get On With Peace’, 2 November 1918; Lord Northclie had indeed 
inuentially used his papers to support or criticise politicians and generals 
during the war. ompson 1999, vii–viii, 238.
1725 e Herald, ‘An Appeal to Liberals’, 5 October 1918.
1726 e Herald, ‘e Dud Parliament’, 21 December 1918.
1727 e Herald, ‘Up the International’, 7 December 1918.
1728 Soutou 2014, 537.
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a regime change.1729 However, support for German democratisation was not 
so straightforward. In mid-October 1918, e Manchester Guardian reported 
that Max von Baden’s dedication to democracy and parliamentarisation was 
not a genuine one.1730 During the Reichstag debates on a new parliamentary 
constitution in late October, the paper summarised President Wilson’s 
demands, which included the democratisation of the Prussian franchise, 
the abolition of the Prussian veto in the Bundesrat and the granting to 
the Reichstag of the initiative in legislation.1731 e November Revolution 
in Germany appeared to the paper to be a manifestation of the potential 
advancement of Bolshevism at the cost of Social Democratic attempts to 
democratise Germany. is non-parliamentary revolution seemed to be 
progressing in all too radical a direction, recalling the Russian Revolution. 
Any counter-revolutionary foreign policy was to be avoided, however, in 
order not to encourage extremism in Germany.1732 e Conservatives were 
known to be sceptical about the fruitfulness of making an alliance with 
‘the democracy of Germany’, i.e. with the Social Democrats, in the search 
for peace.1733 e Times doubted the sincerity of the German talk about 
democratisation and parliamentarisation.1734 
e public debate seems to have been in line with Douglas Newton’s 
suggestion that Lloyd George’s government was hostile to the revolution 
in Germany and the emerging Weimar Republic and that this attitude 
contributed to the bad name that ‘democracy’ would gain in Germany in 
the course of 1919. Newton challenges interpretations which claimed that 
German democracy failed because of an overreaction from the moderate 
German socialists to the danger of Bolshevism and their consequent 
attack on the far le. Newton demonstrates the complex dynamic of the 
transnational discourse on democracy; in particular he considers that the 
British far le became radicalised as a reaction to the actions of the German 
SPD. Lloyd George’s election campaign expressed strongly anti-German 
views and fears of international socialism, both of which led him to call for 
harder peace terms with Germany. He emphasised the collective war guilt 
of the Germans, denied the possibility of Germany becoming democratised 
1729 Fry 2011, 145, 147, who does not really discuss Lloyd George’s concept of 
democracy even though he calls him ‘the rst democratic statesman’.
1730 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Toward Parliamentarisation’, 14 October 1918, and 
‘Prince Max’s Sincerity’, e Manchester Guardian, 15 October 1918. Against the 
background of Max von Baden’s previous attacks on Western democracy and 
parliamentarism this was the correct conclusion. Seils 2011, 625.
1731 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Our London Correspondence’, 25 October 1918.
1732 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Turmoil in the Central Powers’, 5 November 1918, 
‘e German Government’s Plight’, 8 November 1918, ‘Germany and Bolshevism’, 
26 November 1918.
1733 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Mr. Balfour & Peace’, 9 August 1918.
1734 e Times, ‘Truth About the “Crisis”’, 25 September 1918, ‘e German Crisis’, 
4 October 1918, ‘Fluttered German Scribes’, 1 October 1918, ‘President Wilson’s 
Reply’, 10 October 1918, ‘Need for Joint Allied Action’, 25 October 1918, ‘German 
“Democratization”’, 31 October 1918, reviewing an answer by Robert Cecil, 
Assistant Secretary of Foreign Aairs. ese news were again reviewed in Berlin 
papers. Seils 2011, 638.
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and declared that his leist opponents in Britain were pro-German and 
pro-Bolshevist. He rejected all suggestions for a more moderate policy 
on Germany. In Germany, these relentless policies further demonstrated 
to many on the right that Western ‘democracy’ had indeed been a mere 
delusion, that it was rightfully associated with the national humiliation of 
Germany and that the rightist opposition to wartime suggestions about 
democracy from both home and abroad had been well-founded.1735
e Herald, a major opponent of Lloyd George, was undeniably pro-
German. It rmly believed in the democratisation of Germany through 
legislation: ministers had been made responsible to the Reichstag and the 
military placed under civilian control. ‘Democratic procedures’ in the 
nomination of a ‘parliamentary government’ were observed better there 
than recently in Britain. e paper ‘proved’ the change in Germany by 
citing the Conservatives’ opposition to the constitutional reform and leist 
demands for the abdication and punishment of the Kaiser.1736 e British 
far le clearly overestimated the degree of parliamentarisation that had 
taken place in Germany since summer 1917,1737 using these interpretations 
and idealising the activities and popular support for the German le to 
pressurise domestic political rivals. 
e Swedish reform of late 1918 also gained some attention in the 
British Liberal press.1738 e Social Democratic leader Hjalmar Branting, 
who had good contacts in Britain and France, was allowed to explain the 
Swedish position with regard to the war. According to Branting, Swedish 
neutrality did not arise from the mere search for an economic advantage 
or from a lack of democratic ideals. e Swedish government was actually 
pursuing a ‘revolutionary’ reform that would create ‘a rmly democratic 
Sweden’ resembling ‘a Western democracy’. Sweden had kept a distance 
from ‘the Finland troubles’, which had provided ‘an example which none 
of the northern nations can fail to regard with understanding eyes’.1739 
Branting spoke for ‘a democratic peace’ and suggested an international 
labour conference in support of democracy as soon as Prussian militarism 
was crushed.1740 At home he reported about ‘the free democratic spirit’ of 
the armies of the Entente, who were ghting for freedom against German 
1735 Shipway 1988, 62; Wrigley 1990, 8; Newton 1997, 1, 10–11, 415, 417, 424–5; also 
McCrillis 1998, 39, 42, and Fry 2011, 184–5.
1736 e Herald, ‘Towards German Democracy’, 28 September 1918, ‘e Coming 
Peace!’, 5 October 1918, ‘e New Germany’, 12 October 1918, ‘Raising the 
Terms’, 26 October 1918, and ‘Get On With Peace’, 2 November 1918, all evidently 
authored by H. N. Brailsford.
1737 e Herald, H. N. Brailsford, ‘Is It a New Germany?’, 9 November 1918.
1738 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Swedish Reforms’, 16 November 1918, ‘Sweden and 
a Republic by Referendum’, 18 November 1918.
1739 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Abroad’, 26 July 1918, ‘Sweden and the Allies’, 
8 September 1918.
1740 e Times, ‘M. Branting’s Tribute to British Army’, 22 July 1918; e Manchester 
Guardian, ‘M. Branting’s Visit’, 28 July 1918, ‘Socialist Appeal to Mr. Henderson’, 
17 November 1918.
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hegemony.1741 Ludvig Nordström, a journalist, further explained the Swedish 
rightist fears of democracy as a reaction to the rising trade unions and 
Bolshevism; it was not to be regarded as a pro-German attitude (which was 
not true). Indeed, an Allied victory would liberate Sweden from German 
domination.1742 Sweden also gured as a general spokesman for democracy 
when President Wilson arrived in Europe. Branting then declared that ‘the 
entire democratic world’ hailed Wilson and that the Swedish working class 
totally supported his plans.1743 
e news from Finland was much more negative as far as democracy 
was concerned. e country was criticised in the aermath of its civil 
war for ‘the Germanisation of Finland’.1744 e Germanophile Fennomans 
seemed prepared for the complete German domination of their country, 
by imposing policies that were supportive of Germany, restricting civil 
liberties, treating the Reds (or ‘Finnish Bolsheviks’) with mercilessness, 
denying equal constitutional rights to Swedish-speakers1745 and aiming at 
a Prussian-style monarchy. Finland had been going backwards ‘at a furious 
pace since the proclamation of a democratic republic at the end of 1917’. 
As a result, ‘the most democratic country in the world, as the Finns were 
accustomed to boast, has become a stronghold of frantic reaction’, in which 
the Russians, British, Americans and Swedes were all hated.1746 e Times 
concluded that ‘[a] democratic Finland . . . does not suit German policy’, 
which wished to deny the principle of national self-determination and 
impose a limited monarchy or German military rule on the Finns.1747 e 
Germans were making Prussian cultural propaganda in the country, and 
dubious German methods were being used in Finnish politics.1748 Foreign 
Secretary Arthur Balfour took up the Finnish case in a Commons debate 
as an example of ideologically driven German power politics.1749 Aer the 
Finnish election of a German king, e Times wondered about the sense of 
destroying possibilities for understanding with the Entente, particularly as 
the Finns were ‘too democratic in spirit to love [Germans] or their ways’. 
Nevertheless, the Finns would ‘probably be the last people in all Europe, 
including Germany, to abandon belief in the intellectual pre-eminence and 
material invincibility of the Germans.’1750 ere was no uncertainty about 
Finland having turned into another Prussia at the decisive stages of the 
Great War.
1741 e Times, ‘M. Branting with the Allied Armies’, 16 August 1918.
1742 e Manchester Guardian, ‘e Position of Sweden’, 15 December 1918.
1743 e Times, ‘Greetings from Sweden’, 17 December 1918.
1744 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Preparing for the Future’, 17 August 1918.
1745 e Times, ‘Racial Oppression in Finland’, 3 July 1918.
1746 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Reaction in Finland’, 20 July1918, ‘e Fate of 
Finland’, 26 July 1918, ‘Lenin’s Work for Germany’, 11 August 1918.
1747 e Times, ‘German Dictation to Finland’, 2 August 1918.
1748 e Times, ‘Kultur Ideals for Finland’, 20 August 1918, on the basis of Vorwärts, 
and ‘Finland Learning from the Germans’, 6 September 1918.
1749 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Mr. Balfour & Peace’, 9 August 1918.
1750 e Times, ‘Finland under the Germans’, 11 October 1918.
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e Herald further recalled that the Finnish bourgeoisie had crushed 
a revolution with terror and German support and suggested that the appeal 
of the White government for British help to keep that revolution down might 
be successful unless the Labour Party set out to oppose this.1751 A leist 
Finnish correspondent reported how Finnish democrats (referring to the 
socialists as ‘the Finnish democracy’) were hoping for the advance of Labour 
in the British election and the formation of a government that would not 
recognise Finland until there had been a free election. e Finnish socialists 
had, under the inuence of Bolshevism, renounced parliamentarism, but 
the White government (amongst whose supporters admiration of the Kaiser 
still continued) was practising postwar terror, using courts formed on the 
basis of class to punish all socialists and oppressing the workers both in and 
out of prison camps. e only hope was that the British democracy would 
save the Finns from both Bolshevism and the current reaction to it.1752 is 
was all far-le discourse on democracy but not very far removed from 
critical non-socialist views about what was going on in Finland. 
6.2  Germany loses the war, introduces parliamentary government  
 and experiences a revolution 
6.2.1 The course of the German Revolution  
 up to the fall of the Kaiser
German politics in autumn 1918 was conditioned by the nal war eorts 
aer the losses of the summer. From the beginning of August, the leading 
generals were already looking for ways out of a war that would no longer be 
won. Among the parliamentarians, the Inter-Party Committee readdressed 
the possibilities for the parliamentarisation of the Reich from 12 September 
onwards. When the military nally announced the likelihood of a defeat 
on 28 September, the general public, used to optimistic news about the 
ghting, was totally surprised. e legitimacy of the Prussian state, which 
now appeared as unable to respond to the expectations and sacrices of the 
people, began to deteriorate rapidly. Once Bulgaria agreed on an armistice, 
Field Marshal Erich Ludendor asked for a ceasere in order to save the 
army. Without consulting either the Kaiser or the leading politicians, he 
demanded that peace negotiations should be opened and the constitution 
parliamentarised. Ludendor ’s evident intention was to persuade the 
Americans to oer better peace terms for this new ‘democratic nation’ on 
the basis of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points of January 1918. is was 
not as such intended to advance the cause of German parliamentarism, 
even though the appeasement of German popular opinion was also 
a goal: the people should blame the political system rather than the 
military for the defeat. e monarchy and the politicians, particularly the 
Social Democrats, should accept the responsibility for it and carry out 
1751 e Herald, ‘e Way of the World’, 30 November 1918. e Herald itself was 
subject to ocial censorship regarding its news on Russia. Rise 1995, 69.
1752 e Herald, ‘e Facts About Finland’, 28 December 1918.
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a constitutional revolution from above. e problem was that neither the 
government, the Reichstag, the press nor the public had been prepared for 
a defeat and a sudden constitutional reform: aer all, even in the spring 
there had still been a general belief in victory. e Kaiser and the majority 
parties, despite their amazement and disappointment, agreed to the 
suggested policy: on 30 September, the Kaiser issued a decree promising 
not a system change but continued parliamentarisation on the basis of the 
German model. On 3 October, he appointed Prince Max of Baden to the 
leadership of the new government. On 5 October, the new Chancellor made 
a government declaration that was endorsed by various parties, although 
the Reichstag was not allowed to discuss this programme. is unexpected 
parliamentarisation from above without the involvement of the people 
implied that responsibility for the defeat and its political consequences had 
indeed been attributed to the emerging parliamentary government. is, 
together with hostile Western attitudes, would be fatal for the emerging new 
political system named ‘parliamentarism’ or ‘democracy’,1753 which tended 
to be viewed as a foreign import supported by domestic traitors, as the 
reformist parties were dubbed.
is constitutional change was, as in summer 1917, linked to the peace 
eort so that the national debate on the future polity became confused 
with relations with the Entente. e goal of the military leaders was to 
demonstrate to the Entente that the political changes they had demanded 
were happening and that exibility in the negotiations for a truce was hence 
needed. e German proposal for a truce of 3 October 1918 explicitly 
referred to Wilson’s Fourteen Points as the starting point for negotiations.1754 
e initiative to parliamentarise Germany had not this time originated from 
the Reichstag as in summer 1917, which weakened this body’s legitimacy 
further.1755 e Inter-Party Committee had renewed the demands for 
a  reform, but the Reichstag did not convene between 5 and 22 October, 
when the new constitution was formulated.1756 Nor did the public expect 
much from a parliament that had already failed in this respect in 1917. It 
was well known that many politicians accepted the reform only to obtain 
more favourable peace terms,1757 not to change the German political system 
as such, just as the Western press had suspected. e le may have been 
enthusiastic about the transformation, but the right was never committed 
to it. e limited role of the Reichstag and the pragmatic if not downright 
reluctant attitude of many politicians give reason to treat interpretations of 
a gradual parliamentarisation (discussed in section 3.2) with caution.1758 
1753 Verhandlungen, Max von Baden, 5 October 1918, 6154; Gusy 1997, 6–8; Pohl 
2002, 9–10; Bruendel 2003, 247; Becker 2014, 30; Smith 2007, 187–8; Dahlmann 
2014, 49–50; Bessel 2014, 131; Mick 2014, 162; Soutou 2014, 530–1; Leonhard 
2014, 877. Cf. Grosser 1970, 149, which emphasises the activities of the opposition 
parties in the transition to parliamentary government.
1754 Winkler  2005; Leonhard 2014, 808, 877.
1755 Llanque 2000, 208.
1756 Leonhard 2014, 878.
1757 Mergel 2002, 42; Seils 2011, 624.
1758 is connection has been recently pointed out in Leonhard 2014, 739, 763, 876.
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e constitutional transformation proceeded rapidly, the only extensive 
parliamentary debate taking place from 22 to 26 October. Surage in Prussia 
was democratised, and by 28 October Germany had been transformed 
into a constitutional parliamentary monarchy. e chancellor was made 
responsible to the Reichstag, but universal surage was not yet adopted. e 
new constitution became obsolete within two weeks, however, as a result 
of a search for more radical constitutional solutions by revolutionaries 
who were unhappy with what they considered to be the slow pace of 
democratisation.1759 For this obvious reason, previous German research 
has paid modest attention to the conceptualisations of their future polity 
by German MPs in October 1918. ey are, however, of particular interest 
both for an understanding of democratisation and parliamentarisation in 
Germany and for comparative purposes. 
6.2.2  Comparing the German Revolution  
 with the Bismarckian system and the Finnish 
 counterrevolution
On one issue the parties of the le and centre were agreed, as might be 
expected from the debates of spring 1917: the war had demonstrated the 
imperative need for immediate democratisation. As the German people had 
made such far-reaching sacrices, they deserved to be awarded a clearer say 
in both domestic and foreign policy matters.1760 
In the discourse of the Social Democrats, now that the party had 
suddenly risen from being an object of political discrimination to leading 
the emergence of a new polity, the proposed reform constituted a regulated 
revolution by the people. According to Friedrich Ebert, it did indeed entail 
‘a system change of great consequences’ that created a ‘new Germany’ while 
removing the need for more radical (Bolshevik-style) upheavals.1761 Ebert’s 
rhetorical choice to contrast this positive development in Germany – in 
probably the most important parliamentary speech he ever made – with the 
frightening events in Finland in the aermath of a civil war that had begun 
as an uprising of radicalised Social Democrats is signicant. e same kind 
of thing would not happen in Germany. As Marjaliisa and Seppo Hentilä 
have shown, Finnish Social Democrats and other republicans had informed 
the German parliamentary le on circumstances in Finland, which had 
made them criticise German intervention as an instance of a capitalist 
class war already in March. German Social Democratic papers had likewise 
published critical news on the German presense in Finland.1762 Ebert 
now condemned the treatment of Social Democratic parliamentarians in 
Finland, reporting that six of them had been sentenced to death and others 
to lifelong imprisonment, which in his view constituted ‘undoubtedly brutal 
class verdicts’. He did not directly accuse the Prussian system of pursuing 
the same kind of policies as the Finnish government, but he suggested 
1759 Gusy 1997, 8–9; Bessel 2014, 131; Soutou 2014, 531.
1760 Bollmeyer 2007, 104–105.
1761 Verhandlungen, Friedrich Ebert, 22 October 1918, 6061.
1762 Hentilä & Hentilä 2016, 102–103, 222–3, 299. 
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that von Baden’s ministry should use its inuence to bring this violence in 
Finland to an end.1763 is repeated previous Social Democratic criticism 
of interventions in the eastern border states. e continuing German 
involvement with the Finnish government clearly appeared as a problem 
particularly now that the international Social Democratic movement had 
brought the situation of the country to public knowledge.
Gustav Noske used socialist discourse in referring to the election of 
a German prince to the Finnish throne as illustrative of the dynastic aims of 
the Prussian monarchy and as an example of a militarism that disregarded 
the interests of the people and was planning a civil war against them.1764 He 
implied that the German presence in Finland had enabled the upper classes 
to elect a German king without the people proper being heard. He went 
on to describe how the supporters of democratisation in Germany were at 
the same time constantly being attacked by reactionary forces who were 
plotting revenge.1765 
Ebert’s and Noske’s speeches, as well as simultaneous criticism in 
Vorwärts of mistaken attempts to use German forces to ‘create order’ against 
the will of the peoples concerned1766 and news about the death sentences 
passed on Finnish Social Democrats,1767 are illustrative of the extent of 
transnational awareness in late 1918 – especially among Social Democrats 
– and the signicance of even a minor nation as a warning example at 
a moment when a great power was about to make a turn towards democracy. 
e German Social Democrats did not want to see anything like the Finnish 
situation taking place in their country, at the instigation of either the far le 
or the right, which meant that their party would cooperate peacefully in 
the parliament, denounce radicalism and avoid oering any justication for 
revolutionary or counterrevolutionary actions against Social Democracy. 
e concerns of Hugo Haase of the Independent Social Democrats bear 
witness to the dierent perspectives on the transnational revolution and the 
1763 Verhandlungen, Friedrich Ebert, 22 October 1918, 6164. Social-Demokraten had 
described the exclusion of the Finnish Social Democratic MPs from parliamentary 
work as an ‘International Scandal’. e Manchester Guardian, ‘Disappearance of 
Finnish Social Democrats’, 7 September 1918. Hjalmar Branting had proposed 
a protest against their imprisonment at the Inter-Parliamentary Congress in 
Copenhagen, which rapidly gave international prominence to the matter just 
before the German debates. e Manchester Guardian, 21 October 1918. is was 
a reaction to a report introduced by Väinö Tanner during his visit to Sweden and 
Denmark in August. Hentilä & Hentilä 2016, 229.
1764 e Manchester Guardian, ‘“A War of Conquest”’, 16 July 1918 (on the leist 
politicians, see ‘Beyer’s’, [probably Gustav Bauer’s] speech at the Reichstag) 
‘Scheidemann & the German Dynasts’, 22 October 1918, originally published in 
Vorwärts on 10 September 1918.
1765 Verhandlungen, Gustav Noske, 24 October 1918, 6215.
1766 Vorwärts, 23 October 1918.
1767 Vorwärts, 24 October 1918. e paper reported that Hjalmar Branting had 
taken an appeal for clemency signed by 118 MPs to the Finnish Embassy in 
Stockholm, which demonstrates the international prominence given to the 
Finnish measures of repression aer the Civil War. e issue was brought into 
the German constitutional debates as well, through Vorwärts.
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contingent signicance of the Finnish case for the German le. Haase took 
the German transformation as part of ‘the world revolution initiated by this 
war’ and employed natural metaphors (possibly inspired by the autumn 
season) for the unavoidable transformation in talking about ‘profound 
upheavals’ characterised by ‘a stormy development’ and ‘a hurricane 
sweeping across the world. e revolution had not only toppled the Russian 
Tsar, the Austrian-Hungarian Emperor and the King of Bulgaria from their 
thrones, but also the minor crowns of Finland, Kurland and Lithuania 
– which the Germans thought they already had in their possession – would 
soon fall. Republican regimes were advancing everywhere, which made it 
impossible to maintain the monarchy in Germany too.1768 Coming as he did 
from Königsberg and being an advocate of the small landowners, Haase was 
particularly interested in the aairs of the Baltic region. He questioned the 
future of the Kingdom of Finland two weeks aer the election of Friedrich 
Karl, a son-in-law of the Kaiser, to that throne. is illustrates the highly 
controversial nature of the measure of the Finnish Rump Parliament. In 
the eyes of the German le, all this appeared as just a manifestation of the 
desperate throes of the Hohenzollern dynasty. e Finnish polity, which 
imitated and was supported by the Prussians, had lost all credibility: it was 
‘a regime of terror of a kind that has never been experienced in the world 
before’, having slaughtered thousands of workers aer forcing them to dig 
their own graves. Haase was informed that 80,000 Finnish revolutionaries 
had been imprisoned and 50,000 had become victims of ‘the the Finnish 
government’s orgy of blood’. e gures were exaggerated, but the point 
was clear: It had become necessary for German politics and for the sake 
of humanity and the Finnish workers that Germany should immediately 
withdraw its troops from Finland.1769 
For Haase, the acts of the Finnish bourgeois government and also the 
Prussian support for it exemplied counter-revolutionary forces of the 
worst kind. ey oered a topical transnational argument for preventing 
the same from happening in Germany and for demanding the abolition of 
a monarchy that was potentially leading the way to such disasters. Haase, 
previously known for his sympathies for the Russian Revolution, distanced 
himself from the Bolshevik attempts to create a socialist order, however, 
emphasising that his parliamentary group did not agree with all the measures 
of ‘the revolutionary labour government in Russia’.1770 e German far le 
would consistently maintain its distance from Soviet power. For Haase, the 
German transformation was, nevertheless, about a revolution to advance 
the cause of the workers and a republic, not so much about changing the 
1768 Verhandlungen, Hugo Haase, 22 October 1918, 6185.
1769 Verhandlungen, Hugo Haase, 22 October 1918, 6189. e number of the 
dead would rise to 13,446, in addition to the 7370 Reds executed during the 
war. 1914–22 War Victims in Finland, http://vesta.narc./cgi-bin/db2www/
sotasurmaetusivu/results. Haase also referred to the arrest of the former Social 
Democratic minister Väinö Tanner, which is a further instance of transnational 
contacts between German and Finnish Social Democrats.
1770 Verhandlungen, Hugo Haase, 22 October 1918, 6189.
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system through democratisation and parliamentarisation as it was for the 
Social Democrats.
For the liberals, too, the German transition constituted a revolution 
to a more limited extent. e Progressivist Friedrich Naumann, while 
recognising the value of the Bismarckian ‘mixed dictatorial-parliamentary 
system’ at the time of German unication together with its economic and 
cultural achievements, greeted the transition to a new system with pleasure. 
However, he stressed that the constitution should be altered rather than 
completely overturned,1771 which reects a higher degree of continuity in 
the attitudes of the German liberals than among their Swedish counterparts 
and nds parallels among contemporary monarchist Young Finns. Gustav 
Stresemann (National Liberals) recognised the role of his party as a key 
supporter of the Bismarckian system but, ‘aer the experience of the 
biggest revolutionising [Revolutionierung] that the world has ever seen’ saw 
no reason to stick to its solutions,1772 which made the le-liberal Berliner 
Tageblatt satirically claim that Stresemann had misjudged everything.1773 
e attitudes of Count von Westarp, described as a typical ‘Junker from 
east of the Elbe’, had not altered.1774 He viewed the reforms as constituting 
‘a fatal change’ that removed the ‘invaluable foundations’ of the German 
fatherland and endangered its future. ey introduced no less than ‘a state 
ruled by parliamentary means according to the principles of the Western 
democracies’, something that the Conservatives had consistently opposed 
in their party manifesto and in public speeches. e party asserted that 
they would make no concessions in their opposition to the ‘radicalisation, 
democratisation and one-sided mass rule’ that was threatening the country 
and rejected all suggestions by the government that they represented the 
‘dark forces of counter-revolution’.1775 e contrast between what the right 
saw as the proper constitutional monarchical order and perverted Western 
parliamentary democracy could not have been presented more clearly. e 
gap remained irreconcilable, and so did the contrast between the moderate 
reformist Social Democrats and the le-liberals on the one hand and the 
right on the other. e centre took no distinct stand. e Reichstag also 
witnessed a violent clash between anti-Semitic and Polish members, protests 
against the speakers of the rival socialist party and conservative objections 
to anti-monarchical statements, all reecting the highly confrontational 
atmosphere of the assembly.1776 Would this turn into a democracy recognised 
by one or two parties only?
1771 Verhandlungen, Friedrich Naumann, 22 October 1918, 6167; also Berliner 
Tageblatt, 23 October 1918. 
1772 Verhandlungen, Gustav Stresemann, 22 October 1918, 6174.
1773 Berliner Tageblatt, 23 October 1918.
1774 Berliner Tageblatt, 23 October 1918.
1775 Verhandlungen, Kuno von Westarp, 22 October 1918, 6177–8.
1776 Berliner Tageblatt, 24 October 1918.
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6.2.3 Divergent understandings of German democracy
Chancellor Max von Baden recognised that the system change implied the 
implementation of new ideas such as democracy,1777 although he avoided 
the use of such a term in his public speeches. For the Social Democratic 
Party, sensing that it was capable of inuencing the course of politics for the 
rst time, the constitutional reform – with a government approved by the 
Reichstag, broad circles of the people and ‘the trusted men of the workers’ as 
Friedrich Ebert put it – stood for no less than the longed-for breakthrough 
of democracy. Ebert was ready to declare that 22 October 1918 was ‘the 
birthday of German democracy’, which ended the alliance between the civil 
service and the Junkers – although he said nothing about the monarchy 
here. Democratisation had, according to him, become a necessity. It enabled 
the mobilisation of the people and guaranteed the security of the Reich. is 
democracy, he maintained, had arisen out of the initiative of the Germans 
themselves and hence could in no way represent a betrayal of the German 
people as the right tended to suggest. At the same time, Ebert emphasised that 
safeguarding ‘the new democracy’ against ‘military power’ required further 
constitutional reforms. His socialist call for ‘economic democracy’ through 
the removal of class dierences and economic exploitation must have 
been controversial with the bourgeois parties.1778 Neue Preußische Zeitung 
would immediately react to such suggestions by associating democracy 
with socialism.1779 e fact that only the Social Democrats applauded what 
Ebert had to say about democracy and the new political role of the people 
reects the limits of this reformist cause. e party was also in a dicult 
position in trying to please its supporters, who desired further reforms, 
while cooperating with non-socialist parties and countering radicalisation 
on the far le. Its organ Vorwärts nevertheless declared condently that ‘the 
bankrupt Junker regime, the failed system of Prussian feudalism’ had now 
been buried1780 and that the Reichstag had made ‘a decision for democracy’.1781 
e representatives of the far le, while welcoming the revolution, did 
not speak much about democracy in this context. Aer the government 
declaration, their chairman had protested against the continued closure 
of the Reichstag at the very moment of the democratisation of Germany. 
Using Marxist language, Hugo Haase associated a ‘democratic peace’ 
with the involvement of the international proletariat.1782 Otto Rühle, who 
sympathised with Soviet Russia and would join the council movement in 
a few weeks’ time, rejected ‘this so-called democracy [granted] by the grace 
of Hindenburg’ together with parliamentarism as a deception that should be 
replaced with the democracy of socialism created by a revolution.1783
1777 Bruendel 2003, 249.
1778 Verhandlungen, Friedrich Ebert, 22 October 1918, 6160–2, 6165; Seils 2011, 633.
1779 Neue Preußische Zeitung, 24 October 1918.
1780 Vorwärts, 23 October 1918.
1781 Vorwärts, 27 October 1918.
1782 Verhandlungen, Hugo Haase, 5 October 1918, 6154.
1783 Verhandlungen, Otto Rühle, 25 October 1918, 6270.
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e le-liberals were clearly supportive of the constitutional change. 
eir leader, Friedrich Naumann, said that traditional theories about the 
strengths of monarchy over democracy had been proven wrong by the 
war: the monarchy had not succeeded any better in maintaining national 
unity. e Prussian regime had failed to facilitate the kind of development 
in political liberty that had taken place in Britain and France, even though 
demands had already been presented in the Frankfurt Parliament.1784 e 
old order was responsible for the peculiar course of German history vis-à-
vis the ‘democratic countries’, which, he implied were worthy of imitation. 
is ignored the doubts about Western democracy that had been typical of 
German political theory and public discourse. Naumann did not hesitate 
to defend the democratic system,1785 and Berliner Tageblatt also demanded 
‘democratic administrative personnel’ at all levels in ‘a democratic era’.1786 
e National Liberals and the Catholic Centre did not join this discourse, 
however, so that only a part of the political centre was involved.
When the le-liberals made comparisons with the West, the Conservatives 
immediately reacted: in their view, ‘the German democracy’ (in the sense 
of the reformist groups of the le and the centre, from which the rightists 
expressly disassociated themselves) had now allied themselves with ‘the 
desire of our enemies’.1787 No conservative redescriptions of the existing 
system as ‘democracy’ emerged, but there were instead denouncements of 
the supporters of democratisation as traitors; in other words, an early form 
of the stab-in-the-back myth was emerging. e constitutional discourses 
of the reformists and the supporters of the old Prussian order were moving 
in completely opposite directions from the very beginning. Neue Preußische 
Zeitung condemned ‘our democracy’ with its ‘democratic criticism’ as 
harmful to the army and nationalism, complaining that it produced untried 
ideas that were immediately taken to the parliament without proper 
preparation. A major constitutional monarchy was being transformed into 
‘a modern democracy’ in accordance with Wilson’s guidelines by socialist 
enthusiasts of a supposed democratic breakthrough;1788 in other words, this 
was all a socialist plot. Reporting the debates, the organ of the Prussian 
right contrasted Max von Baden’s recognition of the rightist opposition 
to democratisation with Friedrich Ebert’s suggestion that such opposition 
was ‘playing with re’ and continued by sneering at highying descriptions 
of ‘the democratic El Dorado in which we may now live’. Neue Preußische 
Zeitung attacked Naumann’s ‘glorication of democracy’ as being ‘in strong 
contrast with the experiences of history’. Besides, the Western democracies 
were equally involved in the war, and ‘the German democracy’ had never 
established itself and was only opportunistically carrying out demands that 
had been made by the enemy. e paper wondered how even the National 
1784 Verhandlungen, Friedrich Naumann, 22 October 1918, 6167–8. 
1785 Verhandlungen, Friedrich Naumann, 22 October 1918, 6169.
1786 Berliner Tageblatt, 23 October 1918.
1787 Verhandlungen, Kuno von Westarp, 22 October 1918, 6173.
1788 Neue Preußische Zeitung, 21 October 1918. Interestingly, on the same day the 
paper printed a pledge by Berlin professors to serve the new political order.
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Liberal leader had been able to reject Bismarck’s glorious system. According 
to the paper, only Count von Westarp had called in a manly way for ‘devotion 
to God and blood’ in a continued ght against the enemy.1789 e mouthpiece 
of the Junkers implied that the le was cooperating with the Russians to 
launch a German and thereby a worldwide revolution, while the liberals 
were fraternising with the West in their glorication of democracy.1790 Both 
had let the war-faring fatherland down.
Democracy had been introduced as a programmatic concept in the process 
of the constitutional transformation, but this was done almost exclusively by 
the Social Democrats. e le-liberals used the concept more cautiously, 
and it was not employed by the other parties. Since express support for 
democracy from the centre had not really widened, the Social Democrats 
were nearly alone in their enthusiasm for a democratic breakthrough. In 
1917 doubts had arisen among the right about the patriotism of the le and 
the centre, and this was even more the case in autumn 1918. ‘Democracy’ 
was condemned as a party-political term in a way unknown in Britain, 
Sweden and Finland. ere were also many more conservatives in Germany 
who denied the existence of a national tradition of democracy on which to 
build. 
6.2.4 The German people as a political agent
In principle, the transition of October 1918 implied the involvement of 
the German people in political decision-making processes for the rst 
time. Heiko Bollmeyer has shown how during much of the war the terms 
‘the will of the people’ (Volkswille) and ‘the sovereignty of the people’ 
(Volkssouveränität) had been seldom mentioned, while the concept of Volk 
(people or nation) as such was frequently used in war propaganda. Aer, 
the initial phase of constitutional rethinking in 1917, too, the words ‘the 
people’ and ‘the German people’ rather than more explicit terms for popular 
sovereignty had been in use, and they were used mostly in senses that 
supported the maintenance of the established imperial order.1791 
During the constitutional negotiations of autumn 1918, the parties 
continued to hold divergent views on the connection between the Reichstag 
and the Volk: liberal and centrist parliamentarians equated the Reichstag 
with the Volk, while the Social Democrats maintained that, because of the 
unequal surage, which excluded women, the Reichstag was not yet a direct 
reection of the views and conceptions of the entire population. Chancellor 
Max von Baden stressed that his policy was rooted in ‘the sympathy’ and ‘the 
will of the majority of the people’.1792 e Speaker, Constantin Fehrenbach 
(Catholic Centre), expected the ministry to maintain constant contact with 
the people and work for the people’s best.1793 In October 1918, however, it 
was only the far le that urged the Germans to adopt ‘the sovereignty of the 
1789 Neue Preußische Zeitung, 23 October 1918.
1790 Neue Preußische Zeitung, 24 October 1918.
1791 Bollmeyer 2007, 91.
1792 Verhandlungen, Max von Baden, 5 October 1918, 6151; Bollmeyer 2007, 104.
1793 Verhandlungen, Constantin Fehrenbach, 5 October 1918, 6150.
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people’;1794 even the Social Democrats remained cautious about using the 
phrase in order to avoid associations with a radical revolution.
Max von Baden presented ‘the political maturity of the German people’ as 
‘the goal’ of the new constitution. is illustrates his patronising aristocratic 
attitude to popular government and the divided political elite. Von Baden 
chose to use a metaphor which, albeit based on an over-estimation, reected 
a noble optimism about the power of the people being derived from local 
self-government, universal male surage, the budgetary power of the 
Reichstag and the activation of the parliamentary groups since 1917: ‘e 
German people has for a long time sat in the saddle, it should now just 
ride.’ e point was that the people had until 1917 lacked ‘the political will 
for power’ but had, as a result of the war (and not because of any external 
pressures) changed its attitude.1795 
Friedrich Ebert, in line with Social Democratic ideology, stressed 
a positive connection between the people and the government: the German 
people were creating a new German state. According to Ebert, revolutions 
like the one at hand (a moderate Social Democratic revolution) emerge 
when constitutions remain stagnant while the position of the people 
progresses. What was happening in Germany was ‘a transition to a new 
political system in which the people would shape its future through its freely 
elected representatives’. ese should also include women: their wartime 
contributions had already been recognised by awarding surage to them 
in enemy countries such as Britain and Russia, as well as in Finland, and 
female surage was being prepared in the USA.1796 Vorwärts declared that 
an election would allow ‘the people itself to speak out’, possibly in favour 
of socialism,1797 and would leave future progress dependent on universal 
surage and parliamentary work.
Ebert presented the inuence of ‘the will of the people’ on decision-
making in ‘the German people’s state’ (der deutsche Volksstaat – a concept 
that emphasised the unity of the people and a specically German alternative 
to the old regime1798 and was used by liberal and Social Democratic 
reformists to translate the concepts ‘democracy’ or ‘republic’) as an antidote 
to the danger of Bolshevism.1799 is concept had been used by the le-
liberals already in spring 1917 in order to play down the implications of 
transforming a monarchical state into a more republican one.1800 Ebert’s use 
of the concept reects a patently revisionist strategy shared by the British 
Labour Party and the Swedish Social Democrats. However, an understanding 
of popular government resembling the unifying concept Volksgemeinscha 
1794 Verhandlungen, 5 October 1918, 6154; 22 October, 6189.
1795 Verhandlungen, Max von Baden, 22 October 1918, 6158–9.
1796 Verhandlungen, Friedrich Ebert, 22 October 1918, 6161, 6164; Verhandlungen, 
Gustav Noske, 24 October 1918, 6218; Bollmeyer 2007, 90.
1797 Vorwärts, 27 October 1918.
1798 Cf. Emil Nestor Setälä’s suggestion in June 1919 that the Finnish Republic be 
called kansanvaltio (a people’s state); Müller 2014, 43; Llanque 2015, 75.
1799 Verhandlungen, 22 October 1918, 6161; Llanque 2000, 307.
1800 Bollmeyer 2007, 131.
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(a community of the people) is readable in Ebert’s insistence that in the 
future ‘only one will, that of the government of the people carried out by the 
trustees of the people’1801 would prevail – as opposed to allowing the military 
to intervene in politics. Popular government did not necessarily stand for 
a democratic process characterised by a plurality of views; the people as 
a collective unit would decide.
e le-liberals welcomed such popular government. According to 
them, the imperial system had not constituted ‘any complete people’s state’. 
It had not achieved ‘the embodiment of the national notion of unity’;1802 
this notion also suggests a commitment to political unity – a value that 
could be problematic from the point of view of political pluralism. A further 
noteworthy feature is Naumann’s stereotypical description of the Germans 
as ‘a people of order’ rather than one of ‘liberty’ despite the shortcomings 
of the old system that he was criticising.1803 Carl Herold from the Catholic 
Centre did not have anything against ‘the broadest masses of the people’ 
participating in aairs of state and the government becoming ‘the executive 
body of the popular will’.1804 Nor would Gustav Stresemann of the National 
Liberals doubt the political maturity of the German people in comparison 
with that of other peoples.1805 
For Kuno von Westarp of the Conservatives, by contrast, the reform still 
represented nothing but contempt for the great achievements of the German 
people in the war.1806 Only aer the November Revolution would the Prussian 
Conservatives replace the Kaiser and the fatherland with ‘the people’ in their 
political manifestos and rename themselves a ‘people’s’ party (the German 
National People’s Party).1807 eir basic conceptions about the people would 
not change, however, as the nal debates on the Weimar constitution in July 
1919 would demonstrate. ey held a pessimistic conception that many 
conservatives in Sweden and Finland readily shared.
6.2.5 Crypto-parliamentarism comes into the open
e Prussian elite had traditionally been unashamedly anti-parliamentary, 
and in 1917 calls for parliamentarism had also been qualied among most 
other political groups. Despite his task to parliamentarise the polity of 
Germany, Max von Baden continued to hold the view that, although his 
government had been formed with the cooperation of the Reichstag, it 
remained responsible to the Kaiser. He did imply, however, that governments 
would never again in peacetime be created without the support of the 
1801 Verhandlungen, Friedrich Ebert, 22 October 1918, 6160–6; Bruendel 2003, 106.
1802 Verhandlungen, Friedrich Naumann, 22 October 1918, 6168.
1803 Verhandlungen, Friedrich Naumann, 22 October 1918, 6168.
1804 Verhandlungen, Carl Herold, 22 October 1918, 6159.
1805 Verhandlungen, Gustav Stresemann, 22 October 1918, 6176.
1806 Verhandlungen, Kuno von Westarp, 22 October 1918, 6173–7; Neue Preußische 
Zeitung likewise complained about contempt for ‘the people’s army’ on 23 
October 1918.
1807 Smith 2007, 196–7. Cf. the Swedish People’s Party in Finland, which was at that 
stage equally critical of democracy.
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parliament and without leading parliamentarians being nominated as 
ministers.1808 
e concept of parliamentarism was thus rapidly entering German 
political discourse in October 1918. In his introductory speech on the 
constitutional proposal on 22 October, von Baden emphasised contacts, 
cooperation and mutual trust between the Reichstag and the executive. is 
would ‘open new ways to reach a responsible leadership of the aairs of the 
Reich: the parliamentary way’ and engage ‘the previously inactive forces 
of the people’. While any express reference to the concept of governmental 
responsibility to the parliament was missing, the leading minister did 
emphasise ‘the independence of the parliament’ and made the important 
promise that in questions of war and peace the Reichstag as ‘the appointed 
representative of the people’ would decide together with the government.1809 
Berliner Tageblatt interpreted this speech as a criticism of the parliament for 
not having previously curbed executive power through the use of budgetary 
power.1810
e Social Democrats were not satised with von Baden’s formulations 
of ministerial responsibility and insisted that ‘the future of the parliamentary 
form of government’ would only be ensured when the chancellor was 
nominated and deposed according to the will of the Reichstag. ey also 
considered it of the utmost importance that foreign policy, especially on 
the use of military force and the conclusion of international treaties, should 
take place in agreement with the Reichstag. Finally, the Prussian ‘parliament 
of classes’ was to be replaced with ‘the parliament of the people’.1811 Such 
further parliamentarisation of both the Reich and Prussia, forcefully echoed 
by Vorwärts,1812 would soon also be implemented. 
e representatives of the far le remained sceptical about the proposed 
kind of parliamentarism. Georg Ledebour criticised the proposal for not 
parliamentarising the government and the Reichstag procedure properly. 
What should be done was to institute ‘a parliamentary combat’, by which 
he meant pro et contra debate,1813 which, in principle, demonstrates a far-
going adoption of a parliamentary ideal. Ledebour even saw a federal state 
of Europe governed in a parliamentary way by ‘a European parliament’, 
created by ‘a process of revolutionising’ as the solution to economic tensions 
in Europe.1814 is was a visionary view of parliamentarism rising from the 
Wilsonian plans for a league of nations.
For the Catholic Centre, the involvement of leading parliamentarians 
in the government suced to create ‘the closest connections between the 
government and the representation of the people’, and to produce ‘a new 
Germany with a free constitution’.1815 ‘Parliamentarism’ was not the right 
1808 Verhandlungen, Max von Baden, 5 October 1918, 6150–2.
1809 Verhandlungen, Max von Baden, 22 October 1918, 6156.
1810 Berliner Tageblatt, 23 October 1918.
1811 Verhandlungen, 22 October 1918, 6062; also Berliner Tageblatt, 23 October 1918. 
1812 Vorwärts, 27 October 1918.
1813 Verhandlungen, Georg Ledebour, 24 October 1918, 6228; Grosser 1970, 158.
1814 Verhandlungen, Georg Ledebour, 24 October 1918, 6235–6.
1815 Verhandlungen, Carl Herold, 22 October 1918, 6159.
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term to describe this arrangement. is can be contrasted with the consistent 
support for parliamentarisation by the liberal leaders, including those of 
the National Liberal Party, which had initially been created to oppose such 
a system. Friedrich Naumann (Progressivists) recognised ‘the logic of the 
mechanism of the parliamentary system’ provided that the people could 
sometimes intervene in decision-making.1816 is hinted at the institution 
of the referendum that would be introduced in the Weimar constitution. 
Berliner Tageblatt interpreted the vote of condence of 25 October as ‘the rst 
technical use of the parliamentary system in the Reichstag’,1817 an expression 
of le-liberal satisfaction with what they viewed as parliamentarism making 
a breakthrough.
e right-liberals were divided over this issue. Gustav Stresemann 
referred to the fact that Bismarck himself had in 1892, aer his resignation, 
regretted his failure to reach a balance between the parliament and the 
government with a suciently strong parliament being able to criticise and 
control the government. is view of the ‘parliamentary’ stance of the leading 
authority in German politics of the past, together with the experiences of the 
war, which had proved previous conceptions of the weaknesses of decision-
making in parliamentary systems in comparison with the Prussian order 
to be wrong, allowed Stresemann to speak for parliamentarisation despite 
opposition within his party and to head the Constitutional Committee in 
the introduction of a parliamentary system in 1917. Stresemann stuck to 
his argument despite the lack of ‘political education’ among the people and 
the gentry, which Bismarck (presented consistently by Stresemann as an 
alternative authority to political theory) had considered a precondition of 
parliamentarism. Stresemann accepted the fact that the new constitution 
made the Reichstag more clearly the source of governmental power.1818 us 
the leader of the right-liberals, if not the party as a whole, expressly supported 
‘parliamentarism’ albeit not ‘democracy’ in a wider sense. A month earlier, in 
an interview with the Swedish conservative paper Aonbladet, Stresemann 
had nevertheless still listed a number of obstacles to parliamentarism in 
Germany, which reect his remaining doubts about the system.1819
e Conservatives interpreted such parliamentarisation as synonymous 
with the rejection of the leadership of the Kaiser and the Bundesrat in favour 
of parties standing behind a ‘committee of the people’ (Volksausschuss) that 
constructed occasional parliamentary majorities (probably referring to the 
1816 Verhandlungen, Friedrich Naumann, 22 October 1918, 6171; Grosser 1970, 
165–6.
1817 Berliner Tageblatt, 23 October 1918, 25 October 1918.
1818 Verhandlungen, Gustav Stresemann, 22 October 1918, 6174, 6176. Stresemann 
referred to his speech in the plenary on 27 March 1917, but he had then only 
discussed taxation. In the plenary of 29 March 1917 (2853–4), he reacted to 
debates in the Herrenhaus, alluding to the need arising from the experiences of 
the war to reform Prussian surage and to strengthen the parliamentary system. 
Bismarck was quoted to the same end by Ernst Müller-Meinigen (Progressivist) 
in Verhandlungen, 26 October 1918, 6279. Mommsen 2002, 76; Grosser 1970, 
115.
1819 Grosser 1970, 171–2.
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abominated Inter-Party Committee). e creation of ‘the new parliamentary 
system’ endangered the war eort. For Kuno von Westarp, the new 
constitution also entailed ‘the parliamentarisation and politicisation of the 
independent civil service’, making this particular strength of the German 
state dependent on the ‘party life of the parliament’ and leading simply to 
the ‘one-sided rule of the masses’ (Massenherrscha).1820 is argument in 
favour of an independent civil service summed up many of the prevailing 
fears of the right not only in Germany but also in Sweden and Finland 
and possibly also in Britain: the established power of elite experts would 
be replaced by that of parties plotting in the name of the gullible people. 
In criticising the way in which the government had acted by referring to 
violations of ‘the practices and principles of the parliamentary system’, 
von Westarp recognised in passing the existence of such rules,1821 albeit 
only for the sake of argument. In late September, he had still seen military 
dictatorship as the only way out of the crisis,1822 and in late October he 
continued to oppose the advocates of democracy by attempting to obstruct 
the new constitution with procedural points.1823 Likewise, Graf Arthur 
von Posadowsky-Wehner, a representative of the Prussian nobility and 
a civil servant, whose exploits included implementing laws against Social 
Democracy, was deeply disturbed by the fall of the Bismarckian order. He saw 
‘crypto-parliamentarism’ (a term used by the opponents of parliamentarism 
before the war as secret or concealed) as having already made progress in 
the Reich with the legislative power interfering in the aairs of the executive 
power (probably referring to parliamentary questions and interpellations 
as well as the foreign policy initiative of 1917) and the ministry now 
suggesting complete parliamentary government. In von Posadowsky-
Wehner’s view, the objections to parliamentary government in federal 
states were undeniable; the constitution of the United States illustrated 
this1824 – the new circumstances of autumn 1918 made the USA a relevant 
object of comparison even for the German right (as it was for the Finnish 
right in summer 1919). Parliamentarism remained a notion condemned by 
the right, welcomed without enthusiasm by the centre, celebrated by the 
liberals, advocated by the Social Democrats and viewed positively even 
by some within the revolutionary far le. Processes of democratisation 
and parliamentarisation had started as administrative orders but come 
to dominate parliamentary debate in late October 1918. e views of the 
parties had changed little in comparison with those they had expressed 
in spring 1917, but the arguments for parliamentarism in particular had 
become stronger than those for democracy.
1820 Verhandlungen, Kuno von Westarp, 22 October 1918, 6177–8.
1821 Verhandlungen, Kuno von Westarp, 22 October 1918, 6179.
1822 Grosser 1970, 179.
1823 Berliner Tageblatt, 27 October 1918.
1824 Verhandlungen, Arthur von Posadowsky-Wehner, 23 October 1918, 6199.
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6.2.6 The radical phase of the revolution in November 
and December 1918
Social tensions, strikes and mutinies had constituted a fertile ground for 
far-le agitation in Germany in 1918. Few Independent Social Democrats 
were content with parliamentarisation as it took shape during October. 
Some radicals were uncompromising in their demands that the Prussian 
political order be overthrown and set out to launch a revolution in late 
October. Opposition in the Navy to the Army General Sta began to rise on 
28 October, soon aer the constitutional debates analysed above. On 7 and 
8 November the Bavarian monarchy fell aer a council of workers, soldiers 
and farmers assumed control. e rhetoric of these councils sounded radical 
to those who feared a Bolshevik-type revolution even though their measures 
remained quite moderate.1825 
By 9 November 1918, the revolution1826 had reached Berlin and led 
to the fall of the imperial monarchy, an unprecedented event in German 
constitutional history. e Kaiser’s known resistance to parliamentarism 
had become irreconcilable with the goals of the new regime, as had been 
suggested by some in the debates, aer the US government declared 
on 23 October that no peace with such an autocratic ruler would be 
concluded. e Kaiser was therefore simply forced to abdicate.1827 Max 
von Baden proposed that Friedrich Ebert should be made Chancellor and 
that a national constituent assembly be convened to legislate on a future 
constitution. Philipp Scheidemann (SPD), however, proclaimed without 
any wider authorisation, a ‘German Republic’ and the formation of 
a government by ‘all socialist parties’, which ruled out the continuation of 
the monarchy. e Independents, led by Karl Liebknecht, who was believed 
to be a Bolshevik, set out strict conditions for participation in the new 
government, demanding a ‘social republic’ in which all executive, legislative 
and judicial powers would be given into the hands of the working people. 
Various councils seemed to be attempting to take over. In the Council of the 
People’s Deputies, the provisional cabinet, only Majority and Independent 
Social Democrats were represented. Instead of a soviet system of the Russian 
type, however, this council decided to move towards a parliamentary 
system based on universal surage for both sexes. Lacking support from 
the Majority Social Democrats, the far le thus failed to radicalise their 
revolution. e Independents, too, accepted that the future polity be 
formulated in a national constituent assembly, although they did not give up 
their calls for a ‘socialist democracy’.1828 
1825 Gusy 1997, 9–12.
1826 Armin Burkhard has concluded that this was no real revolution, as the political 
change was already taking place. Burkhardt 2003, 38. However, this revolution 
had much more radical aims than that of October. According to Christoph Gusy, 
the November revolution was a real one as far as constitutional law is concerned. 
Gusy 1997, 17.
1827 Gusy 1997, 14; Gusy 2008a, 421.
1828 Gusy 1997, 15–16; Pohl 2002, 17, 26; Bollmeyer 2007, 187; Geyer 2011, 191, 218; 
Gerwarth & Horne 2013, 68; Dahlmann 2014, 50; Leonhard 2014, 890, 892.
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e socialist parties saw the constitutional changes of October in very 
dierent terms. e Social Democrat leader Friedrich Ebert maintained 
that a central constitutional aim had been reached with parliamentarisation. 
Having distanced themselves from revolutionary methods of societal 
change, the Majority Social Democrats were unwilling to engage in 
revolutionary activity, preferring to maintain law and order.1829 Rejecting 
the Bolshevik Revolution, they feared such a dictatorial political order and 
prioritised cooperation within bourgeois forms of democracy,1830 just like 
the Swedish Social Democrats. Democracy in this general sense became 
a common denominator for cooperation between the Social Democrats and 
the bourgeois parties of the centre and distinguished them both from the far 
le, who sympathised with the Bolshevik Revolution,1831 and certainly from 
the right. ough by no means a decisive factor, the Finnish experience of 
a failed revolution in the name of Social Democracy, debated on 22 and 
23 October, perhaps reinforced revisionist stands in the party. In German 
historiography the relevance of such a marginal case has been bypassed.
e Independent Social Democrats rejected royal prerogatives, still part 
of the October constitution, as incompatible with the principle of popular 
sovereignty and parliamentarism as they understood it.1832 eir calls for the 
removal of the monarchy and the extension of democracy put pressure on 
the Social Democrats and, for instance, provided a model for the Swedish 
far le. Some Independents saw the direct democracy of council rule as 
an alternative to parliamentary democracy despite its obvious associations 
with Bolshevism. It has been suggested that the German councils were not 
Bolshevist but rather a form of political organisation launched by local 
activists.1833 Nevertheless they represented examples of undesirable radical 
political and social change.1834 Especially for the Spartacus League (a Marxist 
revolutionary movement), the revolution was to be continued through the 
work of the councils or by other revolutionary means.
e bourgeois parties, too, were ideologically and conceptually divided 
aer this revolution. Some liberals were enthusiastic supporters of the 
reforms, while many only accepted democratisation in the lack of any 
better alternatives, hoping for the survival of the old political order in an 
updated form.1835 ose who had believed in an evolutionary transition were 
deeply disappointed with the outbreak of an openly socialist revolution with 
1829 Pohl 2002, 14; Bollmeyer 2007, 112, 118. See, however, Grosser 1970, 162, 
on the failure of the party leaders to communicate their new, more positive 
understanding of ‘bourgeois’ parliamentarism to many of their supporters.
1830 Llanque 2000, 207. 
1831 Llanque 2000, 307.
1832 Bollmeyer 2007, 108, 114.
1833 Llanque 2000, 313–14; Bessel 2014, 131; Leonhard 2014, 937.
1834 Leonhard 2014, 888, 937. e potentially radical nature of the councils has 
been played down and their democratic nature emphasised in German 
historiographical interpretations that aim at a reconciliation between the dierent 
ideological camps; this may correspond with Finnish historians emphasising the 
non-Bolshevik intentions of the Red regime. See also section 5.4.
1835 Llanque 2000, 307.
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demands going beyond the gradual democratisation that had been planned 
in October. Once the ferment of November was over, many saw the National 
Constitutive Assembly as the only sensible way to move forward.1836 e 
Conservatives, already doubtful about the October reforms, regarded the 
November Revolution as totally unnecessary, and many supporters of 
the Catholic Centre remained sceptical about democratisation.1837 e 
revolution appeared for them as a demonstration of the confusion to which 
democratisation and parliamentarisation would lead. e political change 
then turned violent aer the Provisional Government began to use military 
force to prevent the revolutionary goals of the far le.1838
On 15 November 1918, Ebert appointed Hugo Preuß, an independent 
constitutional thinker, to prepare a dra for a republican constitution that 
would reconcile the conicting demands. In 1915 Preuß had demanded 
the ‘politicisation of the people’ to facilitate a transition from the system 
of an authoritative state to a modern system of a ‘people’s state’ (Volksstaat, 
not ‘democracy’, which like ‘parliamentarism’ sounded ‘Western’ and 
therefore objectionable;1839 this was relevant also for Swedish and Finnish 
conceptualisations of the future polity as it led to what Jörn Leonhard has 
called ‘imitating translations’).1840 Preuß aimed at a democratic republican 
constitution based on power derived from the people and including 
a  parliament, although he avoided referring to ‘popular sovereignty’. e 
vernacular terms he favoured emphasised the specically German nature of 
the new polity, maintaining a distance from ‘Western’ democracies. Preuß 
favoured the concept ‘will of the people’ (Volkswille), a favourite term also 
with traditionalists during the war. Another authority participating in the 
preparatory work was Max Weber, whose notion of a presidency elected by 
the people as counterbalance to the parliament likewise challenged ‘Western’ 
parliamentarism. Both Preuß and Weber, in addition to being members 
of the German academic elite, who were traditionally sceptical of British 
and French ‘parliamentary absolutism’ (Parlamentsabsolutismus), had been 
inuenced by Robert Redslob’s book Die parlamentarische Regierung in ihrer 
wahren und in ihrer unechten Form (1918), which, recycling notions of the 
duality of government,  dened parliamentary democracy as a ‘system of 
balance between the executive and the legislative power’. Weber argued, in 
line with the prevailing scepticism about parliaments, for the limitation of 
their power.1841 e republican compromise between popular presidency, the 
parliament and the referendum suggested by Preuß and Weber on the basis 
of German and international theoretical debates provided a model or point 
of comparison for many other republican constitutions. e situation in 
1917 had been and would again in spring 1919 be rather similar in Finland. 
1836 Llanque 2000, 308.
1837 Llanque 2000, 309. 
1838 Bessel 2014, 132. 
1839 Llanque 2000, 68; Bruendel 2003, 105–107.
1840 Leonhard 2012, 256.
1841 Mergel 2002, 75; Pohl 2002, 58, 64, 84, 86; Bollmeyer, 2007, 220, 222, 224, 228–9; 
Wirsching 2008, 10. 
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In the meantime, the bourgeoisie regrouped themselves according to 
their constitutional views. e German Democratic Party was founded by 
members of the le-liberal Progressives and the republican National Liberals 
to support the emerging new polity, their aim being a democratic republic 
in which political power would be used by representatives acting according 
to the will of the people.1842 e Catholic Centre supported the introduction 
of parliamentarism and democracy1843 but did so mainly in name only. e 
German People’s Party was based on the traditions of the National Liberals 
revamped by Gustav Stresemann.1844 e conservative German National 
People’s Party continued to oppose parliamentarisation and promised 
to work for the fatherland by defending the monarchical elements of the 
democratic constitution.1845 ere were no politicians in this party who were 
ready to adapt their views to accept democracy. Its stance resembled that of 
the right in Sweden and the Swedish People’s Party in Finland, among whom 
it found keen followers.
e ‘democrats’ in Germany continued to entertain dierent 
understandings of what democracy stood for, oen using ‘democracy’ 
as a mere slogan in order to obtain favourable terms of peace and giving 
it meanings that served particular interests. is loose use of the term 
‘democracy’ is particularly understandable in the discursive circumstances 
of late autumn 1918; it was indeed typical in all the countries studied here. 
President Woodrow Wilson had explicitly demanded the introduction of 
democracy as a precondition for peace, setting the concept of democracy as 
the norm to which the Germans should bend themselves. On the other hand, 
the Russian Bolshevik Revolution and its consequences in Russia and other 
countries with their very dierent claims for ‘democracy’, had convinced the 
German bourgeois parties to accept parliamentary democracy as a tolerable 
form of government in comparison with the councils advocated by the far 
le.1846 In Germany, as elsewhere, democratisation and parliamentarisation 
were products of party-political compromises, but they were enforced by 
external pressures more clearly than in the other countries, a factor that 
made these concepts even more disputable. e Germans did not spend so 
much time negotiating on the nature of their compromise and searching for 
common denominators for their competing concepts of democracy as the 
British, Swedish and Finnish parliamentarians did, though the debates were 
equally confrontational in Sweden and Finland. In any case, democracy 
continued to appear for many Germans an externally imposed concept that 
did not inspire devotion or even sophisticated pro et contra debate beyond 
the Social Democrats and the le-liberals.
1842 Pohl 2002, 28, 31. 
1843 Pohl 2002, 32.
1844 Pohl 2002, 32.
1845 Boden 2000, 39; Pohl 2002, 37. 
1846 Pohl 2002, 39–41, 45. 
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6.3  Sweden introduces an electoral reform: No revolution  
 like those in Russia, Finland or Germany 
6.3.1  A reluctant rightist opposition gives in after  
 the fall of the German monarchy
Sweden was not yet a universal model for democracy even within the 
country itself in the late 1910s, like in later times. Furthermore, its transition 
to democracy was moulded by transnational inuences to a greater extent 
than has usually been recognised. Political upheavals that changed political 
constellations in nearby countries – especially the Russian and German 
Revolutions, the victory of the Entente and the Finnish Civil War – aected 
the course of the Swedish constitutional debate and set the timetable for the 
realisation of the reform. e British example of extending surage, as well 
as the opportunity to bring a long struggle to an end once parliamentary 
government had been established and a desire to avoid the fate of Finland 
encouraged the reformists in 1918, but it was the German defeat that 
nally made the Swedish monarchy and e Right ready for a compromise 
– reluctantly and without really giving up their scepticism. e logic of this 
resistance and its transnational background, as well as those of reformism, 
deserve further consideration. 
e transition to parliamentary government in autumn 1917 had, 
despite complicated negotiations and opposition from the King, taken 
place fairly smoothly. ere were problems caused by the war and some 
extra-parliamentary calls for a revolution, but no major political grouping 
expected one to take place in Sweden. e leading Social Democrats, aer 
seeing what the Bolshevik Revolution and the Finnish Civil War had brought 
about, nally rejected revolution as a goal and opted for democracy obtained 
by legal means and in cooperation with the Liberals.1847 e reform attempt 
of the new coalition in spring 1918, however, had resulted in increased 
frustration as a result of continuous rightist opposition. e King had 
continued to oppose such democratisation, and e Right with its majority 
in the upper chamber had easily blocked the proposals. e constitutional 
confrontation thus remained unresolved. e only concession which e 
Right had made was to call for an examination of the issue, which could be 
interpreted as a readiness to consider some kind of reform instead of just 
categorically rejecting any.1848 
By autumn 1918, the state of international aairs had changed, and 
these circumstances led to a reassessment of the situation by the King 
and e Right. It had become clear that Germany would not win the war 
and was reconsidering its political system as a way out. It was rather the 
Western democracies that were likely to prevail in the future. Germany 
was in transition towards constitutional monarchy, the parliamentarisation 
of its administration and the democratisation of surage. A period of 
constitutional upheaval and demonstrations led to the abdication of the 
Kaiser on 9 November 1918 and to the rise of the council movement. 
1847 Olsson 2000, 121–2.
1848 Gerdner 1946, 31.
368
6. The autumn of 1918: German, Swedish and Finnish constitutional debates
Prussia, the model polity of the Swedish royal family and e Right, no 
longer existed in its old form and, what was even worse, seemed to be sliding 
towards a socialist revolution.
Indeed, a revolution in Sweden had become, once again, a possible 
scenario aer Germany experienced one and the domestic constitutional 
debate heated up once more.1849 Although the Social Democrats had rejected 
revolutionary methods, some far leists continued to entertain revolutionary 
ideas.1850 However, the Russian Revolution hardly oered an encouraging 
example, the failure of the revolution in Finland had kept socialist radicalism 
within bounds, and the German revolution with its councils was not that 
promising either, even if transnational ideological inuence continued to be 
transmitted from Germany. 
German demonstrators were calling for universal surage and the 
abolition of the monarchy. King Gustav V felt that revolutionary tendencies 
were endangering his throne just as they had led to the fall of the Kaiser, his 
wife’s cousin. Aware of this and related concerns on e Right, the Liberal-
Social Democratic ministry decided to force through a reform proposal based 
on previous Liberal motions. e revolutionary atmosphere was increased 
by calls by the far le, encouraged by the German revolutionary process, 
for a national constitutive assembly, a republic, universal surage and the 
abolition of the First Chamber. Not even the possibility of a revolution of 
the Russian type was out of the question given that the far le continued 
to oppose surage reform in the form proposed by the government.1851 
However, all sides were persuaded to moderation by the warning example 
of not only Germany but also Finland, where a failed socialist revolution 
had turned into the misery of prison camps. 
By late summer and early autumn, the Swedish debate on constitutional 
issues had changed somewhat as a reection of the course of the war. 
Politicians were reconsidering their relationship with Germany and the 
Entente and their attitude to the respective constitutional models. is 
happened earlier and more clearly than in Finland, where the majority of 
the Rump Parliament continued to believe in a German victory or stuck to 
the possibility of introducing their favoured constitution no matter how the 
war might end. In Sweden, the British model was increasingly seen as worth 
emulating, some historical research having found resemblances between the 
two political systems from the eighteenth century on. It has been suggested 
that the proposal by a commission led by Viscount Bryce to reform the House 
of Lords, even if it did not lead to constitutional changes in Britain, had 
a transnational impact in Sweden, where the Liberal press took it up during 
August. Conservative papers reacted by defending the First Chamber and 
called for the reinforcement of its traditional status, questioning the Liberals’ 
idealisation of the British model. At the same time, the more radical Social 
Democrat leaders Gustav Möller and Per Albin Hansson were revising their 
conceptions of a political and social revolution, concluding that socialisation 
1849 Gerdner 1966, 104.
1850 Olsson 2000, 157–8.
1851 Gerdner 1966, 97; Stjernquist 1993, 139–40.
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could take place gradually and by parliamentary means. Such ideological 
rethinking, already visible in the discourses analysed in previous chapters, 
increased unity within the Social Democratic Labour Party and further 
distanced it from socialist radicalism.1852 It reinforced the parliamentary 
and revisionist message of the party and perhaps to some extent facilitated 
a rightist willingness to experiment with universal surage. e Social 
Democratic leaders spoke for the continuing participation of the party in 
the government at times of a major crisis in international politics, the goal 
being to prevent a Bolshevik upheaval in Sweden, to maintain ‘democratic 
government’ and to gain a surage reform.1853 Both the Social Democrats 
and e Right were thus becoming readier for a partial and gradual reform 
of the Swedish constitution, something that the Liberals had long advocated. 
e debate on a new constitution could well have been postponed 
further if the German Western Front had not been folding and the German 
leaders had not contacted the US government about the possibility of peace 
negotiations. Aer this turn, the Prussian political order was expected 
to fall, with obvious consequences for Sweden. e Social Democrats 
took the initiative and persuaded the coalition government to summon 
an extraordinary parliamentary session to discuss some minor political 
questions. Aer this session met on 30 October 1918, in the rapidly 
changing international circumstances (with the German constitution 
based on a parliamentary monarchy just adopted) and pressures from the 
press, it placed constitutional questions on its agenda1854 – which e Right 
complained about, claiming that it was an illegitimate procedure.
Late October and early November 1918 marked a period of major 
rethinking for the Swedish political elite, linked transnationally to the 
fall of the Prussian political order and to the expected universal victory 
of parliamentary democracy. As Björn von Sydow has put it, the Swedish 
surage reform saw the light of day as a direct consequence of the German 
defeat and the revolution there. Reforms were considered necessary to stop 
a socialist revolution.1855 A readiness for constitutional reform was rising 
within the previously sceptical royal family, the King and the Crown Prince 
hoping that the political parties would reach a compromise on the issue. 
Some postponement was, nevertheless, still in the air: it was proposed that 
resolution of the surage question should be put o until the ordinary 
parliamentary session of spring 1919. is, too, changed with news of the 
revolution in Germany on 9 November.1856 King Gustav V changed his mind 
when it became clear that the German monarchy would also be abolished 
and started to urge the rightist leaders Arvid Lindman and Ernst Trygger, 
who had consistently opposed all concessions, to accept some sort of surage 
reform.1857 e Swedish monarchy thus adapted itself to the democratisation 
1852 Gerdner 1946, 31; Andræ 1998, 243–6, 271.
1853 Gerdner 1946, 30.
1854 Gerdner 1966, 92; Olsson 2000, 132–3.
1855 von Sydow 1997, 59; Nilsson 2004, 145.
1856 Gerdner 1946, 32; Gerdner 1966, 93.
1857 von Sydow 1997, 118.
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of surage once this seemed unavoidable aer the fall of the polity that 
had served as a model for the duality of government. For many members 
of the bourgeoisie in Sweden and Finland, imperial Germany had set the 
norm for an established political order. ey wanted to see Swedish and 
Finnish monarchies stand as rmly as the German monarchy; now both 
were wavering. 
For Swedish socialists, too, the revolution in Germany constituted a more 
fundamental ideological turn than the preceding upheavals in Russia and 
Finland. Transnational ties with Germany were much stronger: the views of 
the German far le were directly relevant for the Swedish le-wing Social 
Democrats, who had also traditionally looked to Germany for ideological 
models. Encouraged by what really seemed to be becoming an international 
revolution, they called for a socialist republic based on councils or soviets 
and attacked the majority Social Democrats over the country’s economic 
problems and the delayed reforms. In a dra manifesto, their leaders 
represented Sweden as one of the backward countries of an old Europe, 
possessing a ‘medieval’ system of representation in the First Chamber, and 
demanded its immediate abolition. Like their German ideological brethren 
and the Finnish Social Democrats in autumn 1917, these le-wingers also 
called for the summoning of a national constituent assembly. A minority led 
by Zeth Höglund indeed questioned the potential of bourgeois democracy 
and parliamentarism to produce true liberty and were ready to turn to 
violence, in the spirit of classical Marxism if not Bolshevism. However, they 
failed to win support among their party comrades, who were concerned 
about the brutality of the Bolshevik system and the consequences of the 
Red rebellion in Finland. MPs such as Ivar Vennerström rather sought 
cooperation with the Majority Social Democrats in order to obtain a 
radicalised parliamentarism and shunned extra-parliamentary action, thus 
rejecting the German example. Utopians such as Carl Lindhagen and anti-
bureaucrats such as Fabian Månsson represented yet other alternative lines 
within this small and fragmented parliamentary group.1858
Despite the marginality of revolutionary fervour among the far le, 
the Liberal-Social Democratic coalition and especially the majority Social 
Democrats made deliberate use of the looming fears of revolution to force 
e Right to nally accept the extension of surage. Hjalmar Branting 
had tried to introduce the issue during the extraordinary parliamentary 
session, but the motion moved forward only aer the fall of the German 
monarchy. Prime Minister Nils Edén contacted the leaders of e Right, 
urging them to work for an immediate solution to the surage question. 
ey – aware of the revolutionary events in Finland and Germany and of 
the royal family’s reconsideration – recognised the necessity of reform to 
avoid further radicalisation of the le. Aer this concession by e Right, 
the members of government coalition just needed to reach a compromise 
among themselves,1859 and to face parliamentary debates in which the 
relentless rhetorical opposition would continue. 
1858 Andræ 1998, 13–14, 208, 221–5, 228, 233.
1859 Gerdner 1946, 31–2; Andræ 1998, 13–14, 211; Olsson 2000, 134–5, 137.
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e majority of the government wanted to solve the situation by 
bringing a reform proposal immediately before the parliament. In the 
meantime, extra-parliamentary measures were employed, which added to 
the revolutionary atmosphere: the Social Democrats organised a hunger 
demonstration in Stockholm on the day following the revolution in Germany. 
Some demonstrators shouted out, calling for a republic as they passed 
the Royal Palace. e Social Democrat leaders used the demonstrations, 
popular demands for reform and the risk of extended revolutionary action 
to put pressure on the Liberals to get the proposal dealt with already during 
the extraordinary session. ey aimed at universal and equal surage in 
both local and national elections as well as the extension of parliamentary 
government; these would satisfy the majority of the workers, who generally 
wished to avoid an open conict. A plebiscite on a republic and the First 
Chamber could wait until universal surage took eect. ey held to the 
view that all democratisation measures should take place through legal 
means.1860 is caution may well have been vital for the success of the 
Swedish reform: demands for the abolition of the monarchy might have 
made the First Chamber once again vote the proposal down.1861 
e coalition reached a compromise on 14 November: a proposal on 
universal surage in local elections would be brought before the extraordinary 
parliamentary session while one on national elections and female surage 
would wait until the ordinary session of spring 1919.1862 A committee was 
nominated to prepare the new election system. e proposal was introduced 
before the parliament on 22 November and approved by the Special 
Committee aer minor technical compromises on electoral practices were 
agreed. Extra-parliamentary pressurising continued in public meetings and 
the press, with ‘democratic citizens’ and ‘the democratic masses’ urging ‘the 
democratic coalition’ and ‘the entire Swedish democracy’ to unite in forcing 
through a development towards a ‘Sweden ruled by the people’ (folkstyrt 
Sverige). e Prime Minister presented the proposal as the minimum 
demand, talking about a universal democratic movement that made 
fundamental political reforms unavoidable in neutral states as well. Hjalmar 
Branting, when speaking to the crowd, described the Swedish movement 
as being carried by ‘the democratic wave that rushes forth over the world’. 
News from Germany reported a socialist revolution by ‘Berlin Bolshevism’ 
calling for democracy and the takeover of power by a national constituent 
assembly.1863 Per Albin Hansson hinted that the Swedish Second Chamber 
might also declare itself a national constituent assembly if the reform was 
1860 Gerdner 1946, 32–4, 36; von Sydow 1997, 118; Andræ 1998, 248–57; Olsson 138.
1861 Olsson 2000, 170.
1862 Gerdner 1946, 33.
1863 Social-Demokraten, ‘Väldig anslutning till söndagens demokratiska medborgar-
möte i Stockholm’, ‘Tyska riksregeringen i händerna på Berlins arbetar- och 
soldatsråd’ and ‘Den stora författningspropositionen’, 25 November 1918; ‘Starkt 
motstånd i Tyskland mot Berlinbolsjevismen’, 26 November 1918; e liberal 
Dagens Nyheter also reported on ‘Den samling för fullt folkstyre’ [the meeting for 
full people’s rule], 25 November 1918, using a vernacular term for the concept of 
democracy at this key moment. 
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stopped, which provoked rightist protests about what they claimed to be 
extra-parliamentary measures. Nevertheless many in the parliament opted 
for a reform to avoid any German-like acerbation of the crisis. e Right 
seemed to be giving up its opposition to equal voting and female surage,1864 
but, as the analysis of the actual contents of the debates below will show, this 
was far from a clear or easy change of mind.
e more moderate leaders of e Right were moving towards 
a compromise despite their continued reluctance. ey considered it unlikely 
that a rightist minority government would last or that new elections would 
produce a rightist majority, given the prevailing reformist and downright 
revolutionary atmosphere.1865 e former prime minister Carl Swartz, who 
had expressed some vague readiness for reform in 1917 and had been in 
contact with the current prime minister about such a possibility,1866 caused 
a sensation by speaking in the parliament in favour of the democratisation 
of the constitution1867 – this makes for an interesting parallel with H. H. 
Asquith, a former opponent of reform who spoke for it when he deemed 
its time had come. In Sweden, however, Swartz was one of the very few 
rightists to do so, and his motives were suspected.1868 Swartz’s point was that 
the Swedes were equally capable of living under a democratic constitution as 
surrounding peoples, though a sucient amount of time would (again) be 
needed to deliberate the nature of the reform. Other rightist leaders rather 
played down the danger of a revolution. e ministry, by contrast, viewed 
an immediate reform as quintessential. According to Stefan Olsson, both the 
monarch and business interests were ready for concessions by November, 
suggesting that e Right should give in.1869 As we shall see, however, rightist 
businessmen still continued to obstruct the reform in parliament.
Several scholars have argued that now that German military strength 
and economic power were withering away, the business world welcomed 
constitutional reforms that would make Sweden resemble the Western 
powers (like Britain, an old trading partner) and distance the country 
from the allegedly autocratic Prussianism with which Sweden had been 
predominantly associated both home and abroad. Leading entrepreneurs 
did not fear a socialist takeover and were hence ready to give democracy 
a chance since the public demanded it so persistently. In a world in which 
Western democracies would prevail, it would be advantageous to have 
a democracy in Sweden, too.1870 e American Ambassador had proclaimed: 
‘One common bond united us all – Democracy.’1871 And Hjalmar Branting 
1864 Gerdner 1946, 36–7; Andræ 1998, 259–60. News from Britain reported about 
women voting more actively than men in the election of mid-December. Social-
Demokraten, ‘En stor dag för England kvinnor’, 17 November 1918; Aonbladet, 
17 December 1918.
1865 von Sydow 1997, 118.
1866 Gerdner 1966, 91.
1867 Palmstierna 1953, 27 November 1918, 248.
1868 Social-Demokraten, ‘Förpostfäktningen’, 27 November 1918.
1869 Olsson 2000, 142, 144–5.
1870 Söderpalm 1969; Carlsson 1985, 86; Hadenius 2008, 44–5; Olsson 2000, 147.
1871 e Times, ‘e Bond of Democracy’, 19 August 1918.
373
6.3 Sweden introduces an electoral reform: No revolution
had already assured the British press that a ‘Western’ democracy was in 
the process of being formed in Sweden. us economic opportunism and 
the optimistic reception of the transnational discourse on democracy both 
supported the Swedish turn from Prussian to Western democratic models. 
is had not been a purely domestic evolutionary long-term development 
towards representative democracy, as contemporary rightist discourse and 
much of later nation-state-centred historiography suggested: its course and 
timing were determined essentially by international events and transnational 
interaction. Furthermore, opposition to the transition among e Right was 
still deep-rooted. 
While the Special Committee, led by Branting, was still working, much of 
the leist press greeted the reform as a breakthrough of democracy, although 
some disappointment about the compromise was also expressed.1872 e 
parliamentary debates inspired little enthusiasm either in- or outside the 
parliament,1873 and the vote of 17 December 1918, which sealed the reform, 
has been oen represented as a mere formality.1874 In the Second Chamber, 
only the far le openly rejected the proposal, while some rightist members 
abstained. e First Chamber approved it although opposing arguments 
from e Right continued with no indication of a  surrender from that 
part. According to Aonbladet, all this was a mere coup carried out using 
extra-parliamentary agitation to which even members of the government 
had resorted.1875 As we shall see, the discursive battles on democracy, the 
political role of the people and parliamentarism continued irrespective of 
any party-political compromises that had been made. 
6.3.2  The war and revolution as agents of domestic 
 reform 
Sweden seemed to be on the point of experiencing a revolution produced by 
external impulses as the introduction of the proposal to the parliament on 
26 November 1918 was accompanied with demonstrations that intimated 
a more serious confrontation should the proposal be rejected.1876 From 
a  Liberal perspective, international events seemed to have made the 
members of right change their minds.1877 Even the Aonbladet of the day 
reported from ‘the Germany of the revolution’ about ‘the disintegrated 
Habsburg monarchy’, asking whether France would also soon experience 
a revolution.1878 Hjalmar Branting presented the reform bill to the parliament 
in the spirit of Social Democratic internationalism as ‘part of the great 
global settlement aer the war’. e international situation implied that even 
countries that had not directly participated in the war were being inuenced 
1872 Andræ 1998, 264–5.
1873 Palmstierna 1953, 18 December 1918, 262; Social-Demokraten, ‘Den stora 
reformen i hamnen’ and ‘Den stora dagen’, 18 December 1918.
1874 Andræ 1998, 265, 288; Olsson 2000, 149–52.
1875 Aonbladet, ‘Kuppen har lyckats. Vad skall nu ske?’, 18 December 1918.
1876 Palmstierna 1953, 27 November 1918, 247.
1877 Dagens Nyheter, ‘Förspelet till författingsrevisionen’, 27 November 1918.
1878 Aonbladet, ‘Står det segrande Frankrike inför revolution?’, ‘Från revolutionens 
Tyskland’ and ‘Den sönderfallna Habsburgska monarkien’, 26 November 1918.
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by ‘the great events out in the world’.1879 Natural metaphors of currents and 
winds coming into Sweden from outside and forcing change were again used 
to emphasise the unavoidable nature of the reform and the dangers involved 
in any opposition to it: if e Right prevented this reform, the parliamentary 
Social Democratic Labour Party would no longer be able ‘to restrain a storm 
that must then spontaneously rise everywhere in the country’.1880 Extra-
parliamentary opinion was used to pressurise the opponents of the reform 
but in much more moderate terms than in Finland a year before.
is was not an open threat of revolution but was based on a strategy 
typical of moderate Socialists elsewhere as well: should the compromise 
on reform be obstructed, the moderates would not be able to prevent the 
radicals from proceeding to a revolution. Per Albin Hansson – a critic of 
the coalition, which in his opinion was not radical enough – simplied the 
meaning of the war for Sweden, claiming that e Right had fought for the 
imperial armies while the le had joined ‘the democratic people’s army’.1881 
e internationally oriented Minister of Naval Defence, Erik Palmstierna, 
rejoicing over the restoration of peace in Europe and condent about the 
nal breakthrough of democracy, envisaged a future where democratic 
states would contribute ‘to the future of culture and the duration of peace 
in the world community of nations’,1882 referring here to plans to found the 
League of Nations. Another description of the turn towards ‘a new Sweden’ 
was presented by Minister of Finance Fredrik Vilhelm orsson, according 
to whom the world war had ‘revolutionised perceptions far beyond the 
circles of the working class’ and there was hence no going back to the old 
economic and political order.1883 
Liberal ministers concentrated on proving to e Right and their 
supporters that no revolutionary change would follow from universal 
surage1884 and that no threats of revolution had been used to force through the 
reform.1885 Jakob Pettersson, the chairman of the Law Committee, conceded 
that ‘a quite profound transformation of society’ could be expected, but 
that e Right should nevertheless contribute to the construction of a new 
political system like many supporters of the old regime in Germany (which 
of course was not a correct description of the German situation). Leist 
calls for more radical solutions were unfounded owing to the fundamental 
dierences that existed between Sweden and Soviet Russia.1886 e Finnish 
case demonstrated to Erik Röing, an inter-parliamentary activist, that 
rightist opposition might lead to unpredictable internal strife. e Swedes 
should continue to avoid involvement in the war ‘out there in the world’ by 
adopting the reform.1887 
1879 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 26 November 1918, 9:23.
1880 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 26 November 1918, 9:24.
1881 AK, Per Albin Hansson, 26 November 1918, 9:46.
1882 AK, Erik Palmstierna, 26 November 1918, 9:14–15.
1883 FK, Fredrik Vilhelm orsson, 26 November 1918, 5:44.
1884 AK, Axel Schotte, 26 November 1918, 9:10.
1885 FK, Nils Edén, 6 November 1918, 5:18.
1886 AK, Jakob Pettersson, 26 November 1918, 9:32–4.
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Suggestions about an unavoidable uprising in case of continued 
opposition were interpreted as threats of revolution by the spokesmen of 
e Right. Karl Hildebrand referred to an extra-parliamentary speech by 
Hjalmar Branting, which contained visions of ‘a complete revolution’.1888 
Such intimidation was, in Hildebrand’s view, unjustied as e Right had 
already conceded that the war had initiated a global movement aiming at 
making the people at large directly responsible for political aairs. ey 
were already participating in legislating constitutional changes despite 
the potentially ‘revolutionising’ consequences of these.1889 e German 
experiences with councils demonstrated what revolutionary constitutional 
change might produce.1890 e Right recommended postponement in ways 
that recalled the actions of the British Conservatives in spring 1917 and the 
Finnish bourgeois parties in summer 1917: a new elections could be called 
to nd out ‘if the number of supporters of a radical upheaval has grown or 
whether hesitation has grown in the country’.1891 
David Norman, the chairman of an anti-socialist propaganda organi-
sation, was even more condemnatory of Branting’s suggestion about 
unstoppable international revolutionary movements spreading to Sweden, 
implying that popular opposition to them might also rise.1892 Such visions 
of extra-parliamentary movements emerging on both the le and the right 
suggested the possibility of a major confrontation. erefore, according to 
Norman, the ‘revolutionary spirit amongst the people’ should not be agitated 
and abused in order not to arouse conservative forces too (like in Finland). 
Both extremes would be avoided by dropping the reform. Norman also 
referred to the dynamics of revolution: the Russian and German revolutions 
demonstrated how the more rightist Social Democrats tended to lose power 
to radicals, which would ultimately present a challenge to Social Democracy 
as well.1893
Reective of the inter-party compromise was the aforementioned 
speech made by the former prime minister Carl Swartz. In 1917 Swartz had 
implicitly recognised the necessity of having a parliamentary government. 
Now he conceded that democracy was making very fast progress ‘around 
us’ (presumably in Germany) and that he had heard no one oppose 
a  similar development in Sweden.1894 Karl Ekman, a rightist lawyer who 
had participated in the planning of extended surage, likewise conceded 
that the time for the old political order was over and hoped that a new one 
would be built through consensus based on universal surage rather than 
by a  revolution.1895 Discursively, these two rightist politicians had moved 
over to the side of democracy, whereas the majority of the party carried on 
its rhetorical opposition.
1888 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 26 November 1918, 9:25.
1889 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 26 November 1918, 9:25.
1890 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 26 November 1918, 9:32.
1891 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 26 November 1918, 9:28.
1892 AK, David Norman, 26 November 1918, 9:39.
1893 AK, David Norman, 26 November 1918, 9:49.
1894 FK, Carl Swartz, 26 November 1918, 5:30.
1895 FK, Karl Ekman, 26 November 1918, 5:45.
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On the far le, disappointment with the proposal gave rise to speculations 
about the possibility of a revolution even among those who favoured 
parliamentarism. Ivar Vennerström asserted that the Swedes were capable 
of creating a democratic society without turning to violent revolutionary 
means, but they would nevertheless decide on the need for a revolution 
themselves.1896 e policies of e Right increased the threat of even 
moderate Swedes turning to revolutionary measures. e Right seemed to 
want to control voting even when the German Junkers and industrialists 
were ready to accept a national constituent assembly elected by universal 
surage.1897 Fredrik Ström emphasised the importance of the international 
context in an era ‘when we see how thrones fall and how houses of lords 
founder everywhere’.1898 e situation of late 1918 corresponded with 
Marxist predictions of the conditions for revolution:1899 
We are now in the middle of a world revolution without a counterpart in history. 
is world revolution, which is going to ll the following years and probably 
decades with its events, is increasingly taking the form and character of a duel 
between the world of capital and the working class. 
Revolutionary language of the kind used in the Finnish parliament in 1917 
had entered the Swedish upper house as well. Ström hardly facilitated changes 
in rightist attitudes as he went on to depict the fall of ‘capitalist humbug’.1900 
e world war had been initiated by capitalism, while the ongoing world 
revolution had been made by the working class and socialism. e future 
would be one of a socialist social and political order – not only in Russia 
but also in Austria, Hungary and Germany, and by implication in Sweden as 
well. e German precedent was, as a result of the transnational links of the 
Swedish monarchy and e Right with Germany, of particular importance: 
Bismarckian militarism had been replaced by a combination of workers’ 
and soldiers’ councils and a socialist government.1901 Ström went on with his 
predictions, suggesting that the revolution would next aect the countries of 
the Entente: the British election campaign suggested this (which was a very 
optimistic estimate); the Social Democrats would gain power in Italy; and 
the leists would take over the Socialist Party in France. e only choice for 
Swedes to make was whether they preferred a violent or a peaceful ‘social 
revolution’; ‘the red ag of the International and Social Democracy’ would 
in any case also be ying ‘over Stockholm, over this house and over the Royal 
Palace’.1902 is was all socialist revolutionary rhetoric. Such a revolution 
was, however, only taking place in the minds and speech of the far le. 
By 17 December 1918, when the time for a nal vote had come, the 
arguments remained much the same and awareness of a transnational 
1896 AK, Ivar Vennerström, 6 November 1918, 9:15, 18.
1897 AK, Ivar Vennerström, 26 November 1918, 9:17–18.
1898 FK, Fredrik Ström, 26 November 1918, 5:35.
1899 FK, Fredrik Ström, 26 November 1918, 5:32.
1900 FK, Fredrik Ström, 26 November 1918, 5:32.
1901 FK, Fredrik Ström, 26 November 1918, 5:32–3.
1902 FK, Fredrik Ström, 26 November 1918, 5:33, 36.
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change high. Hjalmar Branting presented the war as having ‘revolutionised 
the world’, destroying those who had initiated it. e global transformation 
had started with the Russian Revolution in spring 1917 but had been 
accelerated with the German Revolution, which had direct implications for 
the Swedish political system:1903
But now that one sees the German Revolution, sees how it is growing in strength 
with this total upheaval of everything that has previously been exalted and highly 
esteemed there, yes, then one understands that no country which is as closely in 
contact with Central Europe as Sweden, owing to its location, has always been 
and must always be, can remain as before.
e common mission was the building of ‘the new Sweden’1904 now that the 
revolution in Germany had convinced e Right about the inevitability of 
reform. For the Social Democrats, the new Germany oered a convenient 
model for transnational change, perhaps one that e Right would accept in 
the name of the old cultural ties:1905
When we see how, south of the Baltic Sea, a social republic is proclaimed, since 
the Social Democratic Party seems to be the leading one there, and is undertaking 
the necessary measures of socialisation at an unexpected pace but with prudence 
and moderation, then one understands that our people indeed will not want to 
delay in following when the great nations make progress in social reforms.
Sweden needed to follow the German model of introducing Social Democracy 
moderately but without delay. Branting’s transnational Social Democratic 
revolution was a compromise between retaining the formal constitution and 
proceeding to further the reforms aspired to by the socialists.
e party secretary Gustav Möller stated that never since the rise of the 
workers’ movement had Sweden been closer to a revolution but that the 
Social Democrats, willing to introduce democracy without open conict, 
had no intention of launching an actual revolution. e proposal would turn 
Sweden into a majority democracy surpassing in that respect Switzerland or 
the unicameral parliamentary polities of Norway and Finland, which were 
limited by provisions for minorities.1906 Harald Hallén emphasised that this 
transformation would happen in Sweden, unlike in many other countries, 
without outbreaks of violence.1907 e transnational connections of the 
revolution were self-evident for Arthur Engberg, too, who saw the spread 
of its ideas across borders as unavoidable.1908 Transnational inuences from 
Germany were at their strongest at the time of the German revolutionary 
1903 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 17 December 1918, 17:21–2.
1904 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 17 December 1918, 17:24; 17 December 1918, 18:57.
1905 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 17 December 1918, 17:30.
1906 AK, Gustav Möller, 17 December 1918, 17:45, 47.
1907 AK, Harald Hallén, 17 December 1918, 17:56; also Arthur Engman, 17 December 
1918, 17:79.
1908 AK, Arthur Engberg, 17 December 1918, 17:72.
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experience in late 1918, when they were manifested by the Swedish le and 
indeed by some of the right as well.
Liberal descriptions of a Europe transformed by war, civil strife and 
revolution from a continent of imperialism and militarism into one of 
democracy and peace were equally optimistic and deterministic. eir 
persuasive rhetoric built on claims of the nation’s unanimity and its ability to 
surpass other nations in the degree of popular involvement.1909 e coalition 
partners were thanked (and advised for the future) about ‘a continuous battle 
against revolutionary propensities for violence’.1910 Prime Minister Nils Edén 
emphasised the fact that it was question of a peaceful Swedish adaptation to 
the global transformation and denied all accusations of a coup.1911 He talked 
about ‘this age revolutionising the world’, when a new foundation for the 
future of Sweden, too, was being laid.1912 ‘A trying and globally regenerating 
time’ had rapidly changed the prevailing views in Sweden as well.1913 
According to Edén, ‘the enormous break in European and Swedish societal 
life’ had initiated a legislative process in which the coalition government had 
no alternatives.1914 He expressed this using a natural metaphor typical of the 
Swedish reform discourse, talking about ‘this gust of the stormy season from 
the shaking world around’1915 that had le the government no alternative but 
to act. 
Unanimity may have been proclaimed by the le, but it was not exhibited 
by e Right. David Norman saw the proposal as challenging the limits of 
legality, being against the spirit of the constitution and tantamount to a coup. 
is conservative politician rejected the way that the German Revolution 
had been used by the le ‘to enforce a fast and forceful radicalisation of 
our entire social order through reckless agitation’.1916 e Social Democrats 
seemed ready to proceed ‘by all possible means’ (med all gewalt, derived 
from the German word Gewalt [power, force or violence], thus insinuating 
that extra-parliamentary methods might also be used) to the edge of an abyss 
should e Right oppose their demands. Norman questioned claims that 
the Swedish reform was a necessary part of a pan-European transformation; 
the le was merely ‘violently’ exaggerating the shortcomings of the Swedish 
constitution and threatening the parliament with open violence.1917 is 
vocabulary of violence demonstrates the seriousness with which some of 
e Right viewed the confrontation. According to David Pettersson, too, 
‘threats of revolution, a general strike and other violent measures’ had been 
used mischievously to ‘instil an atmosphere of panic among the Swedish 
1909 AK, Raoul Hamilton, 17 December 1918, 17:33.
1910 AK, Minister of Justice Eliel Löfgren, 17 December 1918, 18:38.
1911 AK, Nils Edén, 17 December 1918, 18:53.
1912 AK, Nils Edén, 17 December 1918, 18:6.
1913 AK, Nils Edén, 17 December 1918, 18:7.
1914 FK, Nils Edén, 17 December 1918, 10:11.
1915 FK, Nils Edén, 17 December 1918, 10:10.
1916 AK, David Norman, 17 December 1918, 17:35, 38.
1917 AK, David Norman, 17 December 1918, 17:35, 37.
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people’.1918 It was a dangerous precedent to introduce constitutional reform 
‘under the threat of a revolution’.1919 
Edvard Lithander, a cosmopolitan businessman who showed no reformist 
views that have been claimed to have been typical of Swedish entrepreneurs, 
denied the validity of arguments derived from foreign revolutions: the 
Russian Revolution was ‘not comparable with circumstances in our country’ 
and the German Revolution had been caused by an unexpected defeat in 
a war that did not concern Sweden.1920 Ernst Trygger’s interpretation of the 
global trends also continued to dier drastically from those of the Prime 
Minister. is conservative lawyer saw nothing abnormal in the age that 
would require the Swedes to reject their old customs: even if relations 
between states and political systems had changed as a consequence of the 
war, contingent world events had not changed the norms according to 
which Swedish politicians should act. Transformations in countries that 
had lost the war such as Russia, Germany and Austria had resulted from 
revolutions that were ‘contrary to law and justice and the ordered societal 
order’.1921 Such revolutions were not the model for Swedes to follow as no 
violent attempts to change the political order had emerged from circles 
other than the current government, which had ‘through violence or 
a failure to prevent violence’ pushed through the reform.1922 is repeated 
association between the unconventional manoeuvres of a reformist 
government with potential revolutionary violence, suggesting that the 
constitution and established parliamentary order had been violated and 
questioning the legitimacy of governmental action, is familiar to us from 
the rhetoric of opposition conservatives in Britain in spring 19171923 and 
from Finnish debates throughout 1917 and 1918. Trygger suggested that 
the government had rejected the historical principle of building the country 
in accordance with the law and now regarded ‘the opinion of the day’ as 
‘sovereign’.1924 Indeed, open violence in the form of ‘mutual strife between 
dierent social classes’ threatened as the government’s policy diminished 
the Swedes’ obedience to the law.1925 ere was no sign of commitment to 
a constitutional compromise in the speech of this rightist leader. Edén felt 
compelled to respond to such claims, stating that the reform was a result of 
a long domestic reform movement and not of temporary demonstrations 
connected with the German Revolution.1926
1918 AK, David Pettersson, 17 December 1918, 17:57.
1919 AK, David Pettersson, 17 December 1918, 17:57.
1920 AK, Edvard Lithander, 17 December 1918, 17:39–40.
1921 FK, Ernst Trygger, 17 December 1918, 10:11–12.
1922 FK, Ernst Trygger, 17 December 1918, 10:12–13; see also Ollas Anders Ericsson, 
17 December 1918, 10:23.
1923 e similarity with British conservatives can also be found in the claim that 
the current parliament was not formally competent to decide on constitutional 
change. FK, Ernst Trygger, 17 December 1918, 10:14. Noteworthy is the late stage 
at which these legalistic arguments were introduced – as a last possible means to 
stop the reform.
1924 FK, Ernst Trygger, 17 December 1918, 10:13.
1925 FK, Ernst Trygger, 17 December 1918, 10:13.
1926 FK, Nils Edén, 17 December 1918, 11:18.
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e Right continued to express their reservations on a broad front; 
defenders of the compromise resolution remained rare. According to August 
Bellinder, the Swedish political order was much further developed than 
those of Russia or Germany; indeed, he asked, whether the soviets of those 
countries were compatible with ‘true and full democratism’ demanded by the 
le.1927 Many were highly pessimistic about the prospects of a future Sweden 
should the reform come. Ernst Lindblad suggestively lamented the fact that 
the Social Democrats were taking over all power just when the Finnish Civil 
War had shown the Swedes where ‘a Social Democratic conception can take 
us in the future’.1928 Lieutenant General Herman Wrangel insisted that the 
French Revolution had already demonstrated how a reaction would always 
follow revolutionary excesses.1929 References from e Right to the possibility 
of violence arising suggest that the risk of a civil war still loomed in their 
minds. e Swedish constitutional crisis of November and December 1918 
was a deep and transnational one, not a mere formality.
e rightists were still ercely opposed to the reform in their words if 
not in their voting. Karl Hildebrand was a rare exception when he conceded, 
despite his previous doubts, that foreign revolutions had changed opinions 
in Sweden. Hildebrand, previously a most consistent opponent to reform, 
employed natural metaphors for the inevitable political change, revealing 
his rightist adaptation to the reform through the (possibly unintended) 
imitation of initially leist language: ‘[A] mighty wind of revolution blows 
over countries and has demonstrated its power to overthrow thrones and to 
revolutionise constitutions.’ Such a revolution still involved risks, however, 
since it had provoked ‘the atrocities of Bolshevism’ as well.1930 e concerns 
of e Right remained unchanged despite the compromise. Nevertheless, to 
counterbalance the extensive discourse of crisis, Ernst Trygger concluded 
his nal speech by declaring that he was ready to meet what the new electoral 
system would bring and to adapt to it.1931 e Right had, however, made it 
clear that it was still in principle opposed to the reform.
Nor was the far le happy with the Social Democrats’ claims of having 
avoided a revolution despite the rise of ‘a revolutionary ood’ from Germany. 
e government had failed to introduce social equality of the kind that 
existed in Belgium or France or even political equality to the extent of that 
now existing in Germany, where 20-year-olds would be allowed to vote.1932 
Fredrik Ström reinforced the rightist fears of a revolution, declaring (like the 
Social Democrats in the Finnish parliament one year earlier) that age limits 
for surage would not stop ‘revolutionary socialism’.1933 Ivar Vennerström 
suggested that more could have been demanded by the reformists without 
it leading to a civil war – even though the workers would have been ready 
1927 FK, August Bellinder, 17 December 1918, 10:41.
1928 FK, Ernst Lindblad, 17 December 1918, 10:37.
1929 FK, Herman Wrangel, 17 December 1918, 10:28–9.
1930 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 17 December 1918, 18:45.
1931 FK, Ernst Trygger, 17 December 1918, 11:22. 
1932 AK, Ivar Vennerström, 17 December 1918, 17:61, 65.
1933 FK, Fredrik Ström, 17 December 1918, 10:44.
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to launch one anyway.1934 e Swedish revolutionaries could not accept this 
compromise, but their claims were countered with references to the violent 
nature of radical socialism in Finland, Russia and Germany, which had only 
led to civil wars.1935 
6.3.3  Optimistic and pessimistic visions of a democratic 
 Sweden
e very meaning of democracy still was a topic of heated dispute between 
the Social Democrats and e Right at the time of the extension of surage. 
What had changed in comparison to the previous debates of 1917 and 1918 
was that once democracy had been increasingly set as the goal of the future 
polity in Germany (mainly by the Social Democrats), the postponing of 
democratic reforms in Sweden began to appear impossible. 
Confrontational ideological understandings of democracy were visible 
in that in Sweden, as in Germany, the Social Democrats had a tendency to 
monopolise the concept. ey could do so now that they were condent 
of their ultimate victory: if the German Social Democrats had managed 
to force through democratisation, why would the Swedish party fail? e 
negotiations between the coalition and e Right had already led to decisive 
concessions by the opposition, and the parliamentary phase was expected to 
merely conrm this historical compromise. Erik Palmstierna expressed his 
happiness at Sweden ‘taking its place among the democratically governed 
countries of the world’.1936 He continued to exclude e Right from the 
collective of democrats owing to their ‘lack of democracy which is the spirit 
of the very essence of e Right’. e Right continued to talk in ways that did 
not represent ‘sincere democracy’ but merely covered their undemocratic 
aims ‘in democratic attire’.1937 e arguments used by the Swedish right 
indeed demonstrate the existence of such a dual policy. e inclusion of the 
Swedish right in the democratic front did not seem discursively possible on 
either side of the political divide. 
e Social Democrats built on their internationalist approach, 
emphasising external pressures (the global progress of Western democracy 
and the German example of a democratic breakthrough), in addition to 
internal ones, that forced Sweden to change. Arthur Engberg saw democracy 
as the system ‘where peoples now search for protection against the forces 
of dissolution’ and ‘ideas of dictatorship’.1938 Hjalmar Branting, who was 
internationally well connected within the Social Democratic movement, 
presented the government’s proposal as being based on ‘the minimum 
demands of the democratic expressions of the people’ and emphasised that 
the Swedish people demanded ‘complete democratisation’. e proposal was 
not negotiable: e Right had to choose whether it would allow Sweden 
to follow ‘democratic opinion in the world’ (Branting was here employing 
1934 AK, Ivar Vennerström, 17 December 1918, 17:68.
1935 FK, Carl Gustaf Ekman, 17 December 1918, 11:13.
1936 AK, Erik Palmstierna, 26 November 1918, 9:14.
1937 AK, Erik Palmstierna, 26 November 1918, 9:30.
1938 AK, Arthur Engberg, 26 November 1918, 9:53–4.
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Wilsonian rhetoric) and nally become a democracy. It had become 
impossible to continue protecting the privileges of a plutocracy that was 
irreconcilable with ‘the democratic era in which we live’.1939 
As for the democracy that would follow, Branting dened it with 
attributes such as ‘mature’ (mogen) and ‘informed’ or ‘enlightened’ (upplyst), 
promising that democracy would proceed with caution and respect the 
common good,1940 i.e. reassuring e Right that that they had no reason to 
fear the expected rise of the Social Democrats so much. e nationalised 
‘Swedish democracy’ would be able to solve all future problems in accordance 
with the will of the people.1941 Branting concluded that democratisation was 
required by the historical process – narratives of a thousand years of Swedish 
democracy and Marxist theories both supported this interpretation – and 
the ‘old democratic struggle’.1942 Whether this referred to the early twentieth 
century reform movements or actually to a thousand years of supposedly 
democratic tradition was deliberately le unclear. 
e Social Democrats were so sure about the success of the reform that 
they almost neglected to attend the upper house in November – implying 
thereby that parliamentarism would in the future be realised mainly through 
the lower chamber. ey did this again in December, despite continued 
attacks on democracy in the upper house. ey let the rightists complain 
among themselves, knowing that the composition of the chamber would 
change as soon as universal surage was implemented, and focused on 
the lower chamber, where they did not hide their expectations of further 
progress aer the victory that was at hand. Hjalmar Branting again used 
natural metaphors to describe the situation:1943 
A new wave, more forceful than ever, of the democratic swell has arrived. Already 
in spring 1917 this swell set all minds on re and showed already then that this 
was something new, making it clear that the old could not remain as it had been 
before. 
ere was no way of stopping the pan-European wave: it would be 
a ‘humiliation’ for the Swedish people if the country remained backward in 
the realisation of popular power when progress was being made everywhere 
else. 
Addressing those Social Democrats who were disappointed about the 
extent of the reform, Branting conceded that the proposal was a compromise 
that postponed some aspects of further democratisation1944 but saw no 
limits to later progress. e democratic breakthrough would be so clear that 
privileged minorities could no longer bypass the popular will; future policies 
would be based on the principles of democracy; and the democratisation 
would be ‘so radical, so thorough’ that the rule of the privileged would 
1939 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 26 November 1918, 9:19, 24.
1940 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 26 November 1918, 9:22.
1941 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 26 November 1918, 9:24.
1942 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 26 November 1918, 9:24.
1943 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 17 December 1918, 17:20.
1944 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 17 December 1918, 17:22.
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completely disappear.1945 Socialism, rarely publicly proclaimed in the 
parliament, was openly stated as the goal: the struggle for ‘our socialist 
and democratic ideals’ would continue.1946 e Social Democratic vision 
of a  future democracy, as formulated in the manifesto of the party, even 
included a ‘democratic republic’, which might soon become the established 
polity but could be postponed for the time being. Democratic government 
might be possible without a unicameral parliament as well.1947 
Here Branting was bargaining with dissatised supporters, whom he 
counselled to patiently wait for further democratic and socialist reforms 
and not join the radicalism of the far le, whom the Social Democratic 
organ Social-Demokraten had dubbed ‘domestic Bolsheviks’.1948 Gustav 
Möller emphasised the fact that the Social Democrats had been ghting for 
both democracy and socialism, believing that the latter was to be achieved 
through democracy rather than revolution. A ‘true democracy’ was now at 
hand.1949 A notion of Sweden as more democratic than other countries was 
already being constructed, and this would be a particularly favoured myth 
for the Social Democrats during their later ascendancy.1950 
Harald Hallén, an old radical and ‘a democratic representative of the 
people’,1951 dened the reform as the advancement of the cause of ‘Swedish 
democracy’ against its enemies on the right.1952 As Per Albin Hansson put it, 
e Right still seemed to be ghting for the cause of Prussian order against 
Western democracy, despite the German defeat.1953 Even if the compromise 
le further reforms to be hoped for, it already entailed the introduction of 
‘Social Democracy’ in that the Social Democrats would soon gain power at 
all levels.1954 In the Social Democratic discourse on democracy, the concepts 
of democracy and socialism were now constantly associated and reconciled 
with the realities of the compromise in order to unite all socialists: ‘the old 
reactionary and oligarchically governed Sweden’ would be brought to an 
end, and ‘plutocracy’, too, would disappear once the capitalist order was 
crushed.1955 
e Social Democratic expectations for democracy began to diversify 
somewhat as soon as the realisation of the reform seemed certain. Oskar 
Sjölander, a teacher by profession, remained a little doubtful about the 
potential of democracy: ‘full democracy’ called for the adoption of virtues 
such as a nobility of soul, a sense of responsibility and dedication to one’s 
1945 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 17 December 1918, 17:24.
1946 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 17 December 1918, 17:32; also Social-Demokraten, ‘Den 
stora dagen’, 18 December 1918.
1947 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 17 December 1918, 17:29.
1948 Social-Demokraten, ‘Regeringens program’, 26 November 1918.
1949 AK, Gustav Möller, 17 December 1918, 17:44–5. 
1950 See Linderborg 2001 for later Social Democratic historiography.
1951 AK, 17 December 1918, 17:53.
1952 AK, 17 December 1918, 17:52.
1953 AK, Per Albin Hansson, 26 November 1918, 9:45–6.
1954 AK, Harald Hallén, 17 December 1918, 17:52–3.
1955 AK, 17 December 1918, 17:55.
384
6. The autumn of 1918: German, Swedish and Finnish constitutional debates
mission in life.1956 ese were quite traditional values, but Sjölander was 
speaking for the strengthening of the people through education which would 
allow them to attain these qualities. Per Albin Hansson, repeating arguments 
from the party organ, called for the democratisation of foreign policy in the 
aermath of the experiences of the First World War in accordance with a 
general Social Democratic goal, the question being how ‘the inuence of 
democracy on foreign policy should be organised’. e planned government 
reports to the parliament on foreign policy did not suce to constitute 
‘democratic control’ of this eld ‘in a democratic period’; the parliament 
should be allowed to participate in decision-making on war and treaties 
with foreign powers and a committee established to constantly control the 
running of foreign policy.1957 Even the Liberal Prime Minister recognised 
that the democratisation of foreign policy would be an essential part of ‘the 
democratic reorganisation’, but he considered that more concrete measures 
were to be decided later.1958 
e Right simply refused to give in despite the crumbling of the German 
type of monarchical polity: old opponents of excessive democratisation 
continued to list their preconditions. As Karl Hildebrand put it, e 
Right was indeed ready to accept ‘a far-reaching democratisation of our 
constitution and society, [though] they realised that this can lead to an 
upheaval of a revolutionary nature’. However, they wished for guarantees 
against ‘a democratic degeneration’ (demokratisk urartning) and ‘its 
perversions’ (averter).1959 Western democracy, in particular, continued to 
have its problems. Hildebrand, who had published a book on democracy 
in 1913, found evidence in the United States, France, Germany and South 
American republics to demonstrate the double-edged nature of democracy 
as either strengthening or weakening the nation state:1960
Should not everyone understand that the fruit of democracy has both good 
and bad sides? e democratisation of society can in certain situations and in 
certain periods imply a rise in the power and strength of the people, but such 
a development can also lead to the ruin of the country if the pernicious powers 
in democratic development are allowed to exert an inuence unhindered.
1956 AK, 17 December 1918, 17:60.
1957 AK, Per Albin Hansson, 17 December 1918, 18:34–5; Hansson’s Social-
Demokraten had written about ‘Kontroll över utrikespolitiken’ on 25 November 
1918.
1958 FK, 17 December 1918, 10:9.
1959 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 26 November 1918, 9:25, 27. Minister of Naval Defence 
Erik Palmstierna immediately challenged the use of such expressions, pointing 
to the degeneration of social circumstances under the current electoral system. 
26 November 1918, 9:29–30. is made Hildebrand repeat his point and add: ‘It 
is not so simple to remove the fears of the degeneration of democracy from the 
world.’ 26 November 1918, 9:32.
1960 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 26 November 1918, 9:26; extended in 26 November 1918, 
9:32.
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Economy was a sector that was potentially endangered: ‘a developed 
democratic Riksdag’ might become ‘violently experimental’ in industrial 
policies, for instance.1961 
Hildebrand tried to explain exactly what e Right was concerned 
about: they feared that democracy would not be built on ‘the mature will 
of the people based on understanding’ but instead on ‘a primitive and 
immature one that makes unjustied use of the name of the will of the 
people’. Democracy as such could be welcomed, but the degeneration that 
it threatened had to be prevented. Hildebrand warned about the risk that 
recently gained power tended to be abused, especially by the masses.1962 
Democracy remained in Hildebrand’s understanding a tree that yielded 
both good and bad fruit: the recent war had demonstrated that it could 
strengthen a people in times of crisis, but it could also split and thereby 
weaken a people. e fruit of democracy was dependent on education 
and the organisation of the democratic system, and these remained to be 
arranged in satisfactory ways.1963 Hildebrand’s statement of his readiness for 
democracy caused Prime Minister Nils Edén to express his understanding 
with an equally compromise-seeking metaphor, demonstrating his own 
readiness to carry on negotiations about the nature of the future polity:1964
Let us then help each other to tend the new tree and nurse it so that the bad 
fruit will be increasingly pushed aside by the good ones. Let us be agreed on all 
that can be done so that this Swedish democracy will full its task when it sets 
to work. 
Some leaders of e Right and the Liberals were able to nd consensual 
ground in the eld of education – a topical issue in many contemporary 
debates on democracy – despite their remaining disagreements on 
democracy. Branting of the Social Democrats, too, turned in his nal speech 
to the rhetoric of reconciliation, suggesting that everyone should have a share 
and responsibility in the democratisation of the Swedish constitution.1965 e 
transition would nally be discussed in the lower house in fairly conciliatory 
terms, which recalls the Finnish compromise in June 1919 but diers from 
the German vote of July 1919.
Doubts about democracy had been presented rather modestly by e 
Right of the lower chamber in November, partly owing to mere frustration. 
In December, the rightist hardliners expressed their continuous scepticism 
about democracy, and 37 of them opposed the proposal in the nal vote. 
Edvard Lithander condemned Branting’s deliberations on a democratic 
republic and questioned the argument that changes abroad made 
democratisation in Sweden necessary, reiterating the rightist interpretation 
1961 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 26 November 1918, 9:27–8.
1962 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 17 December 1918, 18:44.
1963 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 17 December 1918, 18:45.
1964 AK, Nils Edén, 17 December 1918, 18:55.
1965 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 17 December 1918, 18:57.
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that democratisation had already taken place. Such a ‘rule by the masses’ 
(massvälde) was being created with ‘the hasty democratisation’ that the 
people could not accept it. At the very least, ‘democracy’ demanded a new 
election before the enactment of the reform.1966 David Pettersson expressed 
similar doubts by reporting how ‘the Swedish common people in the 
countryside’ – the members of the old peasant estate – were dumbfounded 
by democratisation and rejected it.1967 rough his experience of working 
in Britain and Germany as well as via his British wife, Lithander may have 
been informed about British opposition Conservative discourse and calls for 
a new election. His German business contacts, too, were probably suspicious 
of democratisation. 
David Norman, an old anti-socialist, was alarmed about suggestions that 
the Social Democrats aimed at further democratisation in the future.1968 Erik 
Räf, a Junker-like landowner, was provoked by claims that Sweden was about 
to become the most democratically governed country in the world. Dening 
himself as a ‘democrat’, he viewed the reform of 1918 rather as an attempt 
to introduce Social Democracy and indeed socialism.1969 Alexander ore, 
a high-ranking military ocer, likewise presented himself as a ‘democrat’ 
but was doubtful about ‘the unlimited democracy’ or ‘the mass democracy 
which they now aim to establish’.1970 e Swedish rightists presented 
themselves as democrats with the same purpose as the British Conservative 
opponents to universal surage and the Finnish monarchists of 1918: to 
stop the reform by claiming that the current system already constituted 
democracy. For the representatives of the traditionalist values of e 
Right, the proposed change in the constitution stood for the destruction of 
‘democracy’ in a nineteenth-century sense, which would limit parliaments 
to being forums of informed debate. ese rightist critics were bitter not 
only towards the leist reformists but also towards the leaders of their own 
party, who seemed to them to be compromising this tradition. However, 
such opponents within e Right – in line with similar sceptics among 
British and Finnish conservatives – were unable to prevent the party from 
assenting to the reform. ey nevertheless wished, and were allowed, to 
express their dissent without anyone bothering to counter their arguments. 
ey were excluded from the mainstream discourse on democracy, which 
proceeded on leist terms. 
e conception of democracy of Ernst Trygger, the rightist leader of the 
upper house, had not really changed: he deplored the fact that society could 
be subverted through the introduction of democratisation by seemingly legal 
means. Such a transformation could only be allowed because the alternative, 
‘violent agitation’ leading to ‘attempts to overthrow the established social 
order by illegal means’, was even worse.1971 In December, Trygger was still 
1966 AK, Edvard Lithander, 17 December 1918, 17:40–2.
1967 AK, David Pettersson, 17 December 1918, 17:57.
1968 AK, David Norman, 17 December 1918, 17:36–7.
1969 AK, Erik Räf, 17 December 1918, 18:1–2.
1970 AK, Alexander ore, 17 December 1918, 18:19.
1971 FK, Ernst Trygger, 26 November 1918, 5:9.
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reiterating general rightist concerns about democratisation, complaining 
about the haste and insisting on a higher age limit for the election of the upper 
chamber. He found it dicult to believe that democratisation would really 
strengthen the people so as to allow them to full their responsibilities to the 
fatherland.1972 Trygger was unhappy about how ‘the democratic principles as 
embraced by the le’ had been used to prevent real compromises with e 
Right and about the fact that the full democratisation of the First Chamber 
was also intended.1973 e implication was that e Right had not really 
been heard and that the leaders of the party were hence not to blame for the 
consequences of the unhappy reform. 
Even the Deputy Speaker of the First Chamber, eodor Odelberg, 
put forward a procedural point against the reform, asking whether there 
was really ‘such a hurry to democratise our country’ that the proposal 
could not be postponed to the next ordinary parliamentary session. His 
suggestion, not unlike those of Conservative opponents to the surage 
reform in Britain in 1917, was that the members had not known when 
they had been summoned to the extraordinary parliamentary session that 
such a consequential constitutional proposal would be introduced ‘a few 
days before Christmas and aer the report has been tabled for one day’.1974 
e Swedish constitutional debate did not give rise to so many procedural 
disagreements as the Finnish one, but in Sweden, too, the opponents of the 
reform expressed their unhappiness by questioning the legitimacy of the 
entire procedure. 
Samuel Clason, with his authority as a professor of history, vacillated 
between compromise and scepticism: in November, this old anti-reformist, 
too, recognised metaphorically that ‘a strong democratic wave is currently 
going across the world’ and considered it necessary for e Right to make 
sacrices in allowing this process of democratisation to proceed in Sweden. 
At the same time, he could not avoid reminding the chamber of historical 
precedents in which ‘an unrestrained power of the masses has only too 
soon led rst to anarchy and then to despotism’.1975 e Right carried on its 
warnings about democracy, placing responsibility for the consequences of 
the reform on the shoulders of the le. In December, Clason warned about 
the risk of the degeneration of democracy into ‘demagogy’, so that ‘the rule of 
the masses dependent on the moods of the moment, of daily opinion’ would 
rule without there being any constitutional counter-balance1976 in a strong 
upper chamber. Karl Ekman feared the consequences of the le continuing 
to engage in ‘constitutional battles’ aer the reform to take ‘democratisation’ 
further.1977 Harald Hjärne had great diculty with the entire concept of 
democratisation: he was positive that many of its advocates would change 
their minds as soon as they saw the consequences of democratisation 
1972 FK, Ernst Trygger, 17 December 1918, 10:15–18.
1973 FK, Ernst Trygger, 17 December 1918, 11:20–1.
1974 FK, eodor Odelberg, 17 December 1918, 11:16.
1975 FK, Samuel Clason, 26 November 1918, 5:40–1.
1976 FK, Samuel Clason, 17 December 1918, 10:60.
1977 FK, Karl Ekman, 17 December 1918, 11:2.
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in Sweden and internationally. Hjärne was uncompromising in his 
condemnation: appeals to the will of the people in the name of democracy 
were as unreal as appeals to divine providence had been in autocracies, i.e. 
democracy in no way advanced modernity. e will of the people produced 
by ‘democratic’ elections was a product of manipulation – so the classical 
accusation against democracy went – and democracy tended to turn into 
plutocracy or oligarchy or even back to monarchy.1978 e leading academic 
ideologists of e Right, whose political theory was closely connected to 
German thinking, had by no means changed their minds about the character 
of democracy.
At the same time, several ultra-conservative rightists expressed their 
anxieties about universal surage regardless of the fact that their counter-
arguments were unlikely to aect the result. eir arguments included the 
old rightist contention that democratisation had already taken place. Johan 
Östberg insisted that previous reforms had already led to democratisation 
and allowed radicals to gain power at the local level and could not accept 
the inclusion of what he saw as ‘purely Bolshevik features’ and ‘a democratic 
autocracy’ in the government’s proposal.1979 Herman Wrangel insisted that 
full equality violated the principles of nature and could never be achieved 
and that attempts to realise it only led to a barren land and an enslaved 
people.1980 Major Aaby Ericsson rejected the future ‘rule by the masses’, 
which was likely to lead to a ‘forest of barbarians’, where all values would 
be neglected.1981 Hugo Hammarskjöld, a former minister for ecclesiastical 
aairs, did not hesitate to declare: ‘I am no democrat and am too old to 
convert. I do not believe in the ability of democracy to make a people happier, 
and least of all in the type of democracy which is being discussed here and 
which is likely to soon lead to the rule by the masses.’ History had shown the 
intolerable nature of tyranny from below even in comparison with tyranny 
from above, and there was a threat that this would happen again if power 
were given ‘into the hands of those who are the least capable of dealing with 
it.’1982 Numerous examples show that considerable principled opposition to 
democracy – and downright anti-democratic ideas – continued to appear in 
the ranks of the Swedish right; by no means its members had converted to 
democracy.
e only notable exception within the rightist upper chamber opposition 
was the former prime minister Carl Swartz. In November 1918 this former 
opponent of reforms was given the task of conceding on behalf of e Right 
(as its only clearly positive voice in the First Chamber) that ‘the time for the 
change of our constitution in a purely democratic direction has come’ as 
‘the Swedish people are just as capable as many other peoples of taking care 
of their aairs under a democratic constitution’.1983 Swartz had studied in 
1978 FK, Harald Hjärne, 17 December 1918, 11:9–10.
1979 FK, Johan Östberg, 26 November 1918, 5:19, 22–3.
1980 FK, Herman Wrangel, 17 December 1918, 10:28.
1981 FK, Aaby Ericsson, 17 December 1918, 10:21.
1982 FK, Hugo Hammarskjöld, 17 December 1918, 10:68–9.
1983 FK, Carl Swartz, 26 November 1918, 5:30.
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Bonn, which had made him transnationally informed about developments 
in Germany – including an understanding of the signicance for Sweden 
of the German transition to democracy aer the fall of the Kaiser. Again 
in December, Swartz was the only rightist in the upper chamber to point 
out that no one denied the arrival of ‘a democratisation of our type of 
society’.1984 Other recognitions of the inevitability of the transition were 
rather half-hearted. Ernst Lindblad, who had played a role in the surage 
compromise of 1907, emphasised the readiness of e Right to award 
universal surage and to welcome ‘the victory of democracy’ but challenged 
all endeavours to establish ‘Social Democratic omnipotence’.1985 For Baron 
Richard Hermelin, ‘full democracy’ might be acceptable but a ‘Social 
Democratic victory, a Social Democratic majority’ that was being prepared 
with the extension of surage was not ‘the really genuine democracy’ and 
thus remained unacceptable.1986 August Bellinder, while recognising that it 
was impossible to stop the progress of democracy, considered it essential to 
direct ‘the democratic torrent that is roaring on’ along lines that it would 
allow it to benet and not harm the country. e suggested solution of this 
conservative, who employed natural metaphors to describe the unavoidable 
nature of the reform, was the creation of a stronger upper house.1987 Carl 
Boberg engaged in word play by referring to ‘full citizens’ (fulla medborgare) 
and ‘full democracy’ (full demokrati) as they appeared in the proposal, the 
Swedish adjective full meaning both ‘complete’ and ‘intoxicated’ or ‘drunken’. 
His hackneyed conservative suggestion thus was that democracy was likely 
to lack both sense and moderation.1988 e ability to joke, on the other hand, 
reects a recognition among some rightists that the reform would take place 
in any case and that the best course might be to ridicule it by the means of 
humour rather than with more serious counter-arguments.
e Liberals, despite being one of the coalition parties and long-term 
campaigners for reform, were le on the sidelines in these debates. ey 
spoke in principle for a dynamic, progressive and process-like concept of 
democracy but it was one that had little concrete content. Prime Minister 
Nils Edén presented his ministry as being in the lead of ‘the democratic 
movement’,1989 while Raoul Hamilton saw ‘the great step towards 
democracy’ that was at hand as transferring Sweden ‘into a new era, the 
era of democracy’.1990 According to the Minister of Public Administration, 
Axel Schotte, democratisation was to be seen as a medium for further 
transformation ‘which has everywhere and in all times been essential for 
a  society that wishes to live’.1991 e coalition with the Social Democrats 
made the Liberals emphasise the common cause and downplay their 
concerns about the party-political implications of the reformed system. 
1984 FK, Carl Swartz, 17 December 1918, 10:25.
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1986 FK, Richard Hermelin, 17 December 1918, 10:76.
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1990 AK, Raoul Hamilton, 17 December 1918, 17:33–4.
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Erik Röing, a businessman, welcomed the search for extended democracy 
within the reformist coalition.1992 Jakob Pettersson used natural metaphors 
in a hackneyed way to describe ‘the storm wave of democracy that surges all 
over Europe’ and which was impossible to stop.1993 He advised e Right to 
accommodate itself to popular demands for democracy while accusing the 
leists of idealising Bolshevik rule and its system of soviets.1994
On the second round in December, the Prime Minister tried to persuade 
the upper chamber by emphasising ‘the maturity of democracy’ which the 
Swedes had already reached. It could now be realised in ‘the gust of this 
tempestuous time’ originating ‘from the shaking world around us’ (natural 
metaphors again).1995 e crisis that threatened from outside would be 
solved by creating a ‘Swedish democracy’ at both the national and the 
local level that would enable the construction of consensus.1996 e Prime 
Minister apparently thought that using nationalistic discourse of this kind 
in dening democracy might persuade e Right:1997
It is only in this way that Sweden can provide space for all of its human forces 
to present their justied claims and will also have an opportunity to unite all of 
them into a common eort for the good of the fatherland, . . . On this great and 
simple truth we base our trust that Swedish democracy will become a medium 
that will allow Sweden to endure the troubled time which we like other peoples 
nd before us. 
Otherwise Liberal members contributed to the debate on a rather general 
 level. Otto von Zweigbergk suggested ironically that for e Right 
democratisation continued to be ‘a veritable Pandora’s box containing all 
the world’s ills’, whereas the Liberals, as democrats, had been consistently 
campaigning for a surage reform since the 1860s.1998 Johan Bergman was 
exceptional in that he saw the abolition of poverty as one of the duties 
of a  democratic state,1999 thus extending the meaning of ‘democracy’ 
in bourgeois circles as well. Carl Gustaf Ekman, the editor-in-chief of 
Aontidningen, stood out as a defender of bourgeois democracy as opposed 
to ‘the pure line’ of democratisation of the far le that had been manifested 
in foreign examples. Ekman saw good prospects for ‘the development of 
a bourgeois democracy which is ready to realise what it considers to be right’ 
independently of the consequences for its own interests.2000 is contrast 
between socialist and bourgeois concepts of democracy is illustrative of the 
compromise that Liberals in all the countries studied here were searching 
for.
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e leists did not hide their unhappiness with the democracy that the 
government had to oer; it would not allow Sweden to reach the degree 
of democracy of countries which were ‘in these days proceeding towards 
a  complete democratic transformation’.2001 is referred essentially to 
Germany, where the formation of councils was under way; the German 
example also questioned the inclusion of monarchy in a future democracy.2002 
In addition to the parliamentary struggle for democratic reforms, the 
realisation of democracy called for the mobilisation of the Swedish people 
against the continued resistance from e Right;2003 this was a further hint 
at direct action in the name of democracy. Ivar Vennerström attacked 
the Social Democratic promises of societal development and peace that 
would result from the reform and called for an extension of the concept 
of democracy. e proposal did not oer just solutions to ‘fundamental 
democratic problems’ as it failed to give everyone (especially the young) 
equal rights to participate in decision-making; no ‘full democracy’ would 
thus be achieved. e constitution should rather have been wholly rethought 
and made an instrument for achieving a ‘socialist republic’.2004 Fredrik 
Ström saw the new era as calling for progress ‘towards a far more distinct 
and complete democracy’ than the one that the government proposed. 
Democracy should be realised in Sweden through a constituent national 
assembly – as the intention had been in revolutionary Russia, as had been 
demanded in Finland in autumn 1917 and as was expected to happen in 
revolutionary Germany. Such an assembly would introduce a unicameral 
parliament and proceed to political, social and economic reforms that 
would extend democracy beyond mere surage.2005 Ström also complained 
that e Right had prevailed over the Social Democrats at a moment when 
real advances in democracy could have been made, calling not only for 
‘constitutional democracy’ instead of monarchy but also for ‘social and 
economic democracy’;2006 here he was possibly motivated by similar calls 
from the German Social Democrats and especially the council movement 
as well as by universal expectations among the radicals that the revolution 
would be carried further. However, the Social Democrats would win the 
vote and would dominate the discourse on democracy and Swedish politics 
more generally in the decades to come, and the other parties would accept 
their interpretation of democracy, which would be extended to practically 
all areas of societal life.
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6.3.4  The relationship between the will of ‘the people’ 
 and the interests of ‘the realm’ is problematised 
A special feature of the Swedish reform debates of late 1918 was the 
contrasting use of the collective concepts of the people and the realm. e 
parties of the le had long been calling for a clearer engagement of the 
people in politics via universal surage and possibly referenda, but their 
endeavours had been thwarted by the rightist majority in the upper house 
using arguments that the real people were already represented. Even aer the 
fall of the old order in Germany, idealised by many members of the Swedish 
right, they remained unwilling to redene the concept ‘the people’, which 
reects continuities in conceptions of estate representation as opposed to 
democratic parliamentary one.
For leists such as Ivar Vennerström, the people were the agent that 
should decide about the future form of government. e Right should trust 
the Swedish people and give them full civic rights since the people would 
take those rights for themselves anyway.2007 Fredrik Ström declared that ‘the 
great, deep mass of the people’ would soon liberate themselves and establish 
a new social order,2008 a prediction that sounded very revolutionary in the 
ears of e Right. 
Hjalmar Branting of the Social Democrats was equally clear about the 
relationship between the people and political power. According to him, the 
Swedish people as a whole were considering whether they were2009 
ready to really take the nal determined step and let democracy prevail and reject 
privileges which have all too long restrained the wide layers of the people from 
enjoying the right which they can justiably demand: a proper inuence on the 
formation of the political community. 
Extra-parliamentary popular means were used by the Social Democrats to 
put pressure on e Right during the process of persuasion, and Branting 
declared: ‘Now it is demanded outside among the people’ (nu vill man 
ute bland folket, original emphasis) that the reform be implemented.2010 
Branting argued that the government and the parliament were only allowing 
‘the Swedish people in these circumstances to take the decisive step forward 
towards democratisation’ which they had demanded for a long time, 
a transition that was also prompted by external pressures;2011 the point here 
was that internal forces were more important than external ones. More far-
sighted Social Democratic visions were also presented: for Harald Hallén, 17 
December 1918 meant that ‘the politically and morally thinking people’ of 
Sweden ‘are lied onto a higher level and obtain a lasting accretion of power 
that is of invaluable importance’.2012 Party Secretary Gustav Möller talked 
about a future when the Social Democratic Party would have a majority 
2007 AK, Ivar Vennerström, 26 November 1918, 9:16–17.
2008 FK, Fredrik Ström, 26 November 1918, 5:36.
2009 AK, Hjalmar Branting, 26 November 1918, 9:19.
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in the parliament and be able to make the goals of the party a reality.2013 
e party was already seen as victorious even though the debates on the 
reform were still going on. When Arvid Lindman of e Right maintained 
that ‘allowing the people to state their opinion’ through new elections would 
be the correct way to proceed,2014 this produced an ironic response from 
Arthur Engberg, who referred to this recognition of the need to subject the 
political balance of power to the determination of the people as a whole in 
the future.2015 
Liberal contributions to the subject of the political role of the people 
were extensive in comparison with the other themes studied here. Jakob 
Pettersson turned to patronising irony in criticising the negative attitude of 
e Right towards ‘popular movements’: e Right had simply held political 
and administrative power for so long that they could not accommodate 
themselves to present-day realities. His recommendation was that they 
should attempt to recognise the strong reform demands of ‘the mighty 
popular movement’ that was changing Sweden and contributing to the 
common good of the entire country.2016 Petterson’s analysis may well have 
been accurate: even stronger suggestions about the right defending the 
inherited privileges of the civil service were heard in Finland, and the two 
countries had a lot in common (also with Prussia) as far as the central role 
of administrators in politics was concerned. 
In the argumentative battle over surage reform in December 1918, 
Axel Schotte, the Liberal minister responsible for public administration, 
dened the constitutional reform as realising ‘the will of the people’ so 
that ‘the Swedish people may henceforth have full possibilities to shape 
their destinies on their own’.2017 According to other leading Liberals, too, 
‘power has been given into the hands of the people’, and the Swedish people 
deserved this transition of power just like many other European peoples.2018 
From a Liberal point of view, the Swedish people were mature enough to 
use power responsibly, respecting law and justice and were ready to reject 
all attempts to contravene justice with violence.2019 e Right could appeal 
to old traditions of representation, but the fact was that they did not serve 
the needs of modern times. Some reservations were nevertheless expressed: 
Johan Bergman believed in the superiority of democracy even though he 
could not regard the people as ‘perfect or awless’ and consequently called 
for ‘an intensive and increased general instruction of the people’ through the 
reformation of school education.2020 According to Edvard Alkman, editor-
in-chief of Göteborgs-Posten, the reform nally reconstructed the Swedish 
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constitution to include the people: ‘e Swedish people want to move into 
this house in a such way that they cannot anymore be set aside or ousted.’2021 
Minister of Justice Eliel Löfgren was assured that, as a consequence of the 
reform, ‘the great mass of our people . . . has a more secure foundation for 
their hopes in the future’.2022 In Sweden, Liberal optimism about the people 
was more considerable and united than was the case in Germany, Finland 
or even Britain.
e nal debate saw a further semantic battle over what ‘the people’ 
stood for. e Liberal Prime Minister, redening the relationship between 
the realm and the people, challenged the traditionalist rightist conceptions 
of the nature of the political community as a realm, a concept that had been 
extensively used in the November debate. According to Nils Edén, ‘the 
Swedish realm depends nevertheless on the Swedish people’, and the two 
needed to be conceptually united so that ‘the existence and future of the 
realm is placed on the shoulders of the entire people’.2023 Edén thus succinctly 
expressed the very core of the spirit of the reform. 
Whether Arvid Lindman of e Right agreed with such a denition 
remained far from clear: he did hope that the reform would benet ‘the 
people of Sweden and the realm of Sweden’2024 but this suggested no 
explicit connection between the two concepts; he preferred to retain their 
conceptual distinction. MPs from e Right were generally displeased about 
continuous pressurising with references to the extra-parliamentary popular 
will – particularly as the party had already decided to capitulate and accept 
constitutional changes that could make ‘broad layers of the people directly 
responsible for the fates of countries’.2025 
Even Karl Hildebrand, the leader of the lower house opposition, 
continued to express doubts about the political consequences of ‘a rise in 
the power and strength of the people’.2026 He did not mean ‘the elimination 
of the will of the people in decisions on the fate of the country’ but rather 
called for ‘aspirations to produce a more mature popular will’.2027 Particularly 
irritating for him was Ivar Vennerström’s suggestion that the people would 
rise against e Right, a use of the concept of the people that appeared to 
Hildebrand to refer to only a particular section of the people (the workers) 
and not necessarily to the majority; it seemed to exclude the peasants and the 
merchant class (the burghers) – the traditional non-noble estates of the realm 
– from ‘the people’.2028 e suggestion was that the street demonstrations 
of the workers mobilised by the le did not provide sucient evidence of 
the will of the people and that extraordinary parliamentary elections were 
2021 FK, Edvard Alkman, 17 December 1918, 10:62.
2022 AK, Eliel Löfgren, 17 December 1918, 18:41; see also Carl Gustaf Ekman, FK, 17 
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needed. is rightist argument built on a very traditionalist concept of the 
people, indeed on that of ‘the common people’ in an early modern sense of 
estate representation. 
Edvard Lithander, chairman of the conservative cultural association 
Götiska Förbundet, tried to redescribe the state of aairs on the basis of this 
traditionalist concept by suggesting that the Prime Minister himself was not 
respecting ‘the will of the people’ by not ordering new elections.2029 David 
Norman questioned the validity of appeals to the will of the people in the 
proposal as being based on a concept deliberately constructed by the le:2030
 
[W]hat is then this Swedish people or the great layers of the Swedish people that 
is referred to here? Is it all the Swedish people? Is it a genuine representation of 
the people of Sweden that has demanded these profound constitutional reforms? 
I can only imagine that this demand has received its expression partly in the 
radical press and partly in statements made in popular meetings.
Only the workers and not the peasantry, the largest class, had been consulted, 
and there was thus no question of the genuine voice of the people being 
heard. is claim, which was based on a long native tradition of appeals 
to the people, would be elaborated by the rightist opposition in the upper 
house in December. In late November, Ernst Trygger bypassed the concept 
of the people in his speech, while Carl Swartz, a former prime minister, was 
again the only rightist leader to express his trust in the Swedish people being 
able to govern themselves under a democratic constitution.2031
e Social Democrats interpreted the rightist demands for new election 
as an unwillingness to bend before the will of the majority of the people and 
as a desire to reject the reform once again. e Right, or ironically ‘the legal 
guardians of the people’, seemed willing to simply ignore what the people 
had said in the election of autumn 1917 despite the limitations to surage 
that had then been in force.2032 e Right also seemed to be misusing 
warning examples from abroad in order to frighten the people away from 
attempting to create a ‘people’s state’ (folkstat)2033 – this term was an obvious 
literal translation from the contemporary German discourse on democracy 
as a Volksstaat (which appeared in subsections 6.2.4. and 6.2.6 above and the 
connotations of which are discussed in subsections 7.2.3 and 7.4.4; see also 
the discussion of the Finnish word kansanvaltio in subsection 7.4.4).
Most speakers of e Right continued to criticise leist denitions of 
the people. David Norman could not accept suggestions that Sweden lacked 
popular freedom,2034 whereas David Pettersson accused the government of 
agitating panic among the people.2035 Karl Hildebrand was the only one to 
2029 AK, Edvard Lithander, 26 November 1918, 9:37.
2030 AK, David Norman, 26 November 1918, 9:37.
2031 FK, Carl Swartz, 26 November 1918, 5:30.
2032 AK, Per Albin Hansson, 26 November 1918, 9:45; Arthur Engberg, 26 November 
1918, 9:53; FK, Ernst Kleeck, 26 November 1918, 5:27.
2033 AK, Arthur Engberg, 26 November 1918, 9:51.
2034 AK, David Norman, 17 December 1918, 17:37.
2035 AK, David Pettersson, 17 December 1918, 17:57.
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recognise that the social groups which e Right represented were about 
to ‘relinquish their status as political leaders’.2036 He conceded at the same 
time that there were plenty of good forces ‘in the great mass of the people 
of Sweden’.2037 However, he challenged the government’s use of the concept 
‘the will of the people’ as a motivation for the reform, suspecting that only 
the class interests of the workers had been allowed to dene ‘the will of the 
people’, which he described as ‘a phrase of popular meetings’ (folkmötesfras). 
Class interests threatened to characterise democracy. e Right agreed that 
‘the people should be the lord in its own house’, but it remained unclear what 
exactly the ministers meant by ‘the popular will’. From the point of view 
of e Right, the risk of ‘the primitive and immature popular will’ taking 
over remained, and this made Hildebrand doubt whether democracy would 
strengthen the people in the end.2038 
Ernst Trygger complained in the upper house about ‘a strongly 
overexcited popular mood’, which complicated the solution of constitutional 
issues.2039 A conceptual contrast with the Prime Minister’s speech became 
evident when he presented the future of ‘the realm’ as the key issue and 
called on the Swedish people to ‘full their duties to the fatherland’ – the 
concepts ‘the realm’ and ‘the people’ being kept distinctly separate. In 
Trygger’s view, the Swedish people could only benet from the reform if 
the considerable power that was placed in the hands of ‘the broad layers 
of the people’ was used ‘under a living feeling of love of the fatherland and 
duty to the common good’.2040 All of these formulations suggest that the 
traditionalist conceptual world of the rightist leader had not been modied 
under the pressures of constitutional reform: in conservative ideology, the 
people remained subordinate to the realm and the fatherland, the interests 
of which were primary and those of individual social groups secondary. 
Some highly conservative ideas continued to be expressed in the nal 
debate as many rightists wanted to have their dissenting opinion recorded 
at the end of a legislative process the result of which they viewed with 
considerable doubt. Professor Harald Hjärne unashamedly insisted that 
the extension of surage ‘to large new masses of the people’ threatened the 
Swedish polity as a whole.2041 For this leading historian, ‘the will of the people’ 
was no more than ‘a mere metaphysical’ concept with no obvious equivalent 
in political reality.2042 Hjärne’s rejection of the popular will as a foundation 
for political power illustrates that no fundamental transition to democracy 
had taken place in the mental world of the Swedish right – academic or 
not – withstanding the compromise which would be soon approved in the 
upper chamber.
2036 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 17 December 1918, 18:43.
2037 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 17 December 1918, 18:45.
2038 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 17 December 1918, 18:44.
2039 FK, Ernst Trygger, 17 December 1918, 10:13. Agitators were accused also by FK, 
Jöns Jesperson, 17 December 1918, 11:15.
2040 FK, Ernst Trygger, 17 December 1918, 10:18.
2041 FK, Harald Hjärne, 17 December 1918, 11:9.
2042 FK, Harald Hjärne, 17 December 1918, 11:10.
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Baron Richard Hermelin challenged the use of the concept ‘the people’ 
in the government’s arguments for its proposal and its earlier employment 
by Carl Swartz of e Right as well: their ‘people’ only stood for the Swedish 
working class, and even the Swedish workers and the Social Democrats were 
not the same thing. Hermelin, a factory-owner, claimed that many workers 
associated themselves with the common people, the peasantry, who had 
been completely ignored and ‘sacriced’ in the preparation of this bill.2043 
Nils Åkesson, a farmer and thus a spokesman for those people who had 
not been heard, joined the debate, insisting that only tax-payers constituted 
the people in a political sense: civic rights should be dependent on the 
performance of civic duties. is connection would no longer be realised 
under ‘the rule of the masses’.2044 e same view was heard from Adolf 
Lindgren, a representative of the rising class of successful entrepreneurs (at 
least three of whom appear as anything but democrats in this discussion, 
which questions the claim about industrialists having converted to support 
the reform); he claimed that the majority of the Swedish people would 
have rejected the removal of tax limits had they been asked in elections. 
In Lindberg’s rhetoric, ‘the century-old constitution of the country’ was 
‘such an invaluable property of the people’ that ‘their representatives in the 
parliament’ had no right to discard it ‘without listening to the people and 
receiving their consent’.2045 Indeed, from this agrarian and entrepreneurial 
conservative perspective, the entire reform appeared to be a parliamentary 
violation of the rights of the Swedish people rather than an extension of 
them. e only solution which the rightists regarded as legitimate was to 
hold new elections under the old surage system.
Aaby Ericsson likewise continued to emphasise ‘the daylight-clear right 
of the Swedish people’ to have new election when ‘their representatives are 
sacricing the true and future good of their native land’.2046 Ericsson could 
see a positive future only in what he considered to be the likely continuity 
of old peasant values: ‘the Swedish tribe is healthy and based on that section 
of the Swedish people with landed property’. According to Ericsson, the 
peasantry would once again draw together the other sections of the people 
who wished to preserve the political community,2047 ensuring the continuity 
of the established political order against the questionable masses. Alexis 
Hammarström, Governor of the County of Kronoberg, likewise insisted that 
the peasantry, always ready to consider the common good, formed ‘the core 
of the people’ and that their wishes diered from those of the group that the 
le meant when talking about ‘the people’.2048 
Interestingly, even Carl Swartz, who had clearly recognised the necessity of 
the reform, agreed with Ericsson that the Swedish people were exceptionally 
2043 FK, Richard Hermelin, 17 December 1918, 10:77.
2044 FK, Nils Åkesson, 17 December 1918, 11:11.
2045 FK, Adolf Lindgren, 17 December 1918, 11:14.
2046 FK, Aaby Ericsson, 17 December 1918, 10:21.
2047 FK, Aaby Ericsson, 17 December 1918, 10:22. 
2048 FK, Alexis Hammarström, 17 December 1918, 10:57.
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well prepared to meet the consequences of the reform2049 – either because he 
genuinely thought so or to persuade fellow members of e Right to accept 
the compromise anyway. Karl Ekman by contrast, combined an expression 
of his appreciation of the Swedish people with a protest on power being 
given to only one group of the masses, i.e. the workers, without rst asking 
the ‘people’ proper in an election.2050 
e Right continued to defend the established political order using the 
term ‘the people’ as applicable to an estate society. On the side of the Social 
Democrats, their suggestions that only the peasantry could be counted on 
were received as defamatory of the workers. Ernst Söderberg asserted that 
the latter, too, were aware of their responsibilities to their country. Allowing 
the workers to ‘be full participants in their native land’ would only increase 
their sense of responsibility.2051 Mauritz Hellberg lamented the unwillingness 
of e Right to rethink their policy, which had, according to him, been 
characterised throughout by ‘distrust of the lower layers of our people’ and 
had been counter-productive in that it had only caused negative reactions 
among the excluded.2052
e o-repeated agrarian and estate-based understanding of the Swedish 
nation was a manifestation not only of the Swedish conservatives’ desperate 
opposition but also of the continuing early-modern conception of society 
that prevailed among them. e fact that the Swedish constitution dated 
from 1809 and that subsequent parliamentary reforms had maintained 
a considerable peasant element in the parliament had contributed to the 
continuity of this agrarian conception of the political community, one 
which can hardly be seen as consistent with democracy in any twentieth-
century sense. Similar ultra-traditionalist views were also held among the 
representatives of the Finnish right, as can be seen in the notion of a peasant 
king advocated by the monarchists in summer and autumn 1918 and 
among some Swedish-speaking traditionalists still in summer 1919.2053 is 
notion was mostly rejected by Finnish-speaking farmers as represented by 
the Agrarian League. It needs to be added, however, that there were also 
individual Swedish rightists, such as the former foreign minister Knut 
Agathon Wallenberg, who had ‘an unwavering belief in the good sense of 
the Swedish people and their love of their country’ and who were ready 
to support the proposal without qualication.2054 However, surprisingly few 
rightists were able to voice an unreservedly positive attitude to universal 
surage aloud, Swartz and Wallenberg being the only exceptions in the 
upper chamber.
2049 FK, Carl Swartz, 17 December 1918, 10:26.
2050 FK, Karl Ekman, 17 December 1918, 11:4.
2051 FK, Ernst Söderberg, 17 December 1918, 10:75.
2052 FK, Mauriz Hellberg, 17 December 1918, 11:8.
2053 In the royal election, the motion was proposed by a Finnish-speaking farmer, 
which was supposed to demonstrate that both the intellectual elite and the 
whole peasantry supported a monarchy. Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Inför avgörandet’, 8 
October 1918, ‘Regeringsform och konungaval’, 10 October 1918.
2054 FK, Knut Agathon Wallenberg, 17 December 1918, 10:40–1.
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6.3.5 Parliamentarism under democratised suffrage
e reform debates of autumn 1918 concerned democracy and the political 
role of the people rather than parliamentarism as such. No particular need 
to discuss the concept was felt: it had become dicult for e Right to 
openly dispute its principles once a parliamentary government had been 
in oce since autumn 1917, parliamentary democracies had won the war, 
and even Germany was being transformed into a parliamentary democracy. 
e victory of the reformists, both internationally and nationally, was so 
undeniable that the rightist opposition did not question parliamentarism 
to the extent that its counterparts had done in Finland and continued to do 
so in Germany and they themselves had done on previous reform rounds. 
e Swedish Social Democrats willingly presented themselves as 
dedicated defenders of parliamentarism – not only in comparison with other 
countries and in relation to e Right but also among socialists in Sweden. In 
spring 1917 and again in spring 1918, Branting had suggested that a delay in 
passing the reform might lead to the adoption of extra-parliamentary means 
by radical forces, at the same time emphasising that his party only opted for 
parliamentary means. In November 1918, this ‘communist card’ was used 
by Minister of Finance Fredrik Vilhelm orsson, a former radical agitator. 
According to orsson, two varieties of socialism coexisted in Sweden: one 
group was more than prepared to ‘go the extra-parliamentary way forward 
in order to reach the goal which they have set for themselves’. e other line 
wanted ‘to increase their inuence in the municipalities, the regions and the 
parliament, and to try to construct [a new society] by making decisions one 
at a time’.2055 It went without saying that the former line was Bolshevism as 
represented by the far le, while the latter was parliamentary democracy as 
represented by the Social Democrats. As for e Right, they had to choose 
between these alternatives: if e Right were to say ‘no’ again, that might give 
a decisive push to those who were enamoured of the extra-parliamentary 
alternative, leading to a much worse scenario than the one provided by the 
well-organised and moderate Social Democrats, who had demonstrated 
their capacity to engage in parliamentary work.2056 In the circumstances 
of late November 1918, few among e Right disputed this analysis. Many 
knew, aer all, that it was not only in Russia that Bolshevism had taken over 
and that leist radicalism had made an unsuccessful attempt in Finland and 
was making progress in Germany as well. In these circumstances, it might 
indeed make sense to give in to the Social Democratic and Liberal proposal 
if that would halt any further radicalisation – although of course there 
was no certainty that it would do so. No speaker questioned the existence 
of a  Bolshevist threat, but some continued to be concerned about the 
possibility of extra-parliamentary measures or to question the legitimacy of 
the observed parliamentary procedure. 
e reactions of the far le to the compromise reached between the le and 
the right served as evidence that they were tending to become increasingly 
2055 AK, Fredrik Vilhelm orsson, 26 November 1918, 5:42.
2056 AK, Fredrik Vilhelm orsson, 26 November 1918, 5:42–3.
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radicalised2057 and work outside the parliamentary system. Fabian Månsson 
attacked the academics of e Right for their ‘doctrine of minority rule’ 
by referring to German academic literature, which was supposedly highly 
regarded by the professors and which argued that ‘parliamentarism is mere 
humbug, that the power of the people is a mere joke – that the power of the 
minority is the only one that is good enough!’2058 Fredrik Ström said that the 
planned watered-down reform was likely to benet the anti-parliamentarian 
syndicalist movement. He foresaw an increased struggle both in- and 
outside the parliament to rectify the lack of social and economic democracy, 
as these were issues that were likely to divide parties in the parliament and 
as the workers would shi the emphasis of their struggle to the labour 
market once the parliament had proved unable to solve their problems.2059 
e extra- and even anti-parliamentary tendencies of the far le came into 
the open, recalling the theoretical debate among German Socialists2060 and 
radicalised Social Democracy in Finland in 1917.
Most majority Social Democrats considered it best to live with the 
compromise, in spite of its shortcomings. Per Albin Hansson wanted to 
proceed further by calling in an internationalist Marxist fashion for the 
parliamentarisation of foreign policy. Hansson wanted to see an institution 
that would not only be informed about what had already been done or what 
was being prepared but a parliament that would actually decide on foreign 
policy. A permanent committee for foreign aairs taking part in decision-
making would not suce: the parliament should be allowed to control 
foreign policy and the people allowed to control the parliament. is could 
only be done by extending the public discussion of foreign policy matters. 
e goal was to bring secret diplomacy, as experienced during the war, to 
an end.2061 Hansson’s views represent an idealism that appeared in all the 
parliaments studied here in the aermath of the First World War. It was 
shared not only by internationally oriented Social Democrats but also by 
some Liberals. However, while standing committees were introduced in 
many countries, little was done to properly parliamentarise foreign policy.2062 
Attempts to transnationalise foreign policy through the League of Nations 
would have equally modest results.
Conservative concerns about parliamentarism had not entirely 
withered away as a result of the experiences of parliamentary work aer 
autumn 1917 or the outcome of the First World War. Karl Hildebrand, 
although the voice of the compromise-willing rightists in the parliament, 
still had his suspicions that a democratically elected parliament might 
adopt economic measures that could lead to disastrous consequences.2063 
2057 Ivar Vennerström forecast that the shortcomings of the reform would only lead 
to the rise of anti-parliamentarism. AK, 17 December 1918, 17:66.
2058 AK, Fabian Månsson, 17 December 1918, 18:27.
2059 FK, Fredrik Ström, 17 December 1918, 10:44, 46.
2060 Jörke & Llanque 2016.
2061 AK, Per Albin Hansson, 17 December 1918, 18:35–6.
2062 See Ihalainen & Matikainen 2016. 
2063 AK, Karl Hildebrand, 26 November 1918, 5:27.
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Some other members continued to raise procedural points, questioning 
the legitimacy of introducing the reform in this particular session. Per 
Andersson claimed that the rapid procedural actions aer mid-November 
had failed to provide sucient time for deliberation and could not hence be 
regarded as ‘parliamentary’.2064 Ernst Trygger claimed that the introduction 
of the proposal diered from what constitutional changes demanded 
and questioned ‘the so-called parliamentarism’ of the parties of the le, 
which aimed at pushing the reform through without allowing the people 
to vote about it rst in an election.2065 e worst kind of rightist scenario 
was presented by Ollas Anders Ericsson, who warned the Swedes of ‘extra-
parliamentary adventures’ that would have the disastrous consequences that 
had been seen in revolutionary Russian and were expected to soon follow in 
Germany as well.2066 
Noteworthy in the comments of the opposition right is that parlia-
mentarism as a principle was no longer attacked. However, disagreements 
between the Swedish right and le about the proper form of parliamentary 
government had by no means been resolved by the compromise of November 
and December 1918; these would need to be negotiated in the years to come. 
In Finland, the right and the centre were in even deeper disagreement in 
autumn 1918.
6.4  e monarchist majority of the Finnish Rump Parliament  
 in search of a stable polity 
6.4.1  The strange logic of Finnish constitutional 
 politics in late summer and autumn 1918
e attempts of the monarchist majority of the post-Civil-War Finnish Rump 
Parliament to introduce a reformulated monarchical constitution during 
summer 1918 were prevented by a republican parliamentary minority on 
7 August under minority provisions, which stipulated that a constitutional 
proposal could only be declared urgent with a 5/6 majority and accepted with 
a 2/3 majority; that was not the case, and a new election was needed instead. 
Since the monarchist ministry did not want a republican victory in such 
an election, it started preparations for the election of a king on the basis of 
paragraph 38 of the Swedish Form of Government of 1772. is constitutional 
law had already been used by the bourgeois parties in November 1917 to 
justify parliamentary sovereignty, although the republicans had remained 
sceptical about its applicability. When the Rump Parliament decided on the 
election on 9 August 1918, it was clear that a German prince was being sought, 
regardless of a major setback in the German war eort on the preceding 
day. News of developments in the West (and on the constitutional changes 
2064 AK, Per Andersson, 17 December 1918, 18:34.
2065 FK, Ernst Trygger, 17 December 1918, 10:12–14.
2066 FK, Ollas Anders Ericsson, 17 December 1918, 10:23.
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in Germany in early October2067) were simply disregarded. e German 
General Sta understandably remained supportive of the project. Aer the 
parliament did not pass the constitutional proposals to establish a monarchy, 
a legalistic approach was adopted and stubbornly followed regardless of 
the course of international aairs. Even diculties in nding a  suitable 
candidate during the rising military and domestic crisis in Germany did 
not stop the monarchists. In early September, Friedrich Karl of Hesse, the 
brother-in-law of Kaiser Wilhelm, gave his consent to the election, ignoring 
claims from the German le and the Finnish republicans that the election 
procedure was questionable and that he risked never enjoying the support 
of the majority of the Finnish people. Aer the postponement of a further 
monarchical proposal, which would have included ministerial responsibility 
to the parliament, the election took place. e monarchists paid no heed 
to Santeri Alkio of the Agrarians appealing to constitutional changes in 
Germany and declaring that republicanism rather than monarchism was 
the true connection between Finland and the new Germany, which now 
had a centre-le government. Nevertheless, as late as 9 October 1918, aer 
a vote (64 to 41) on whether or not to proceed, the election took place. In 
a secret session, aer a heated debate and a republican boycott, the Finnish 
parliament was nominally unanimous in choosing Friedrich Karl King of 
Finland with merely 64 MPs out of 200 attending.2068 
e election was forced through regardless of the fact that the German 
army leaders had informed the Reichstag that the war would not be won and 
that the German government had declared its readiness to negotiate on the 
basis of Wilson’s demands.2069 Even the nomination of Max von Baden and 
the expected constitutional rearrangements did not stop the monarchists, 
while the republicans were encouraged by the German liberals and le to 
carry on their opposition in the expectation of major domestic and foreign 
2067 Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Waltiollinen pula Saksassa’, 4 October 1918. On 5 October 
1918, an article ‘Tyska regeringskrisens avveckling’ in Hufvudstadsbladet, reported 
about ‘a new political development in German political life’, but without making 
any connection with the coming Finnish royal election. On the following day, 
summaries of items in German papers in an article entitled ‘Krisens avveckling 
i Tyskland’ suggested that parliamentarism had been introduced in Germany 
but that more was demanded by democratic forces of the le and the centre. See 
also ‘Regeringskrisens avveckling i Tyskland’, 8 October 1918. ere was thus 
clearly sucient information in Finland about constitutional developments 
in Germany. Suomen Sosialidemokraatti had already argued in ‘Monarkistit 
huolissaan’ on 4 October 1918 that the German reforms removed the basis 
for a monarchy in Finland and suggested on 5 October 1918 in ‘Waikutelmia 
Saksasta’ that the German intervention in the constitutional question had been 
initiated by Finns and that the majority in the Reichstag were opposed to the 
candidacy of Friedrich Karl.
2068 Aspelmeier 1967, 69–70, 72; Huldén 1989, 180; Sihvonen 1997, 12–13, 30; Jussila, 
Hentilä & Nevakivi 1999, 124; Vares 2006, 123, 126–8.
2069 Sondhaus 2011, 433.
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policy changes.2070 Republican opposition was not allowed to obstruct 
the nominally legal process, which aimed at the establishment of a strong 
monarchy following the Swedish Gustavian and German imperial traditions. 
e eighteenth-century constitution was to be commended precisely 
because of its permanence and its ability to develop increased parliamentary 
participation.2071 Nevertheless, the stubbornness of the Finnish right in 
proceeding to a royal election at a time when Reds, vanquished in the Civil 
War, languished in prison camps, provoked amazement in the Entente and 
protests by the German le against the German government, which was 
supporting the White Finnish government (see subsection 6.2.2 above). 
6.4.2  A controversy over the excessive transnational 
 influence of Germany 
e international situation continued to be interpreted by the monarchists 
in ways that supported their constitutional goals. Speaking to the parliament 
on 7 August 1918, Prime Minister J. K. Paasikivi (Finnish Party) rejected 
republican suggestions about the unavoidability of democratisation, quoting 
constitutional comparisons made by Professor Gustav von Schmoller, 
a social reformist and a leading gure of the German historical school of 
economics, who sat in the Prussian Herrenhaus. Schmoller had concluded 
that states that combined a hereditary monarchy with a free constitution 
and institutions were the most likely to prosper thanks to the moderation of 
class confrontations – which certainly existed and needed to be addressed 
in Finland. According to the Prime Minister, conservative, centralising and 
state-strengthening currents (like those in Germany before the collapse of the 
Western Front on the same day) would dominate aer the war, and Finland 
should adapt itself to such a world. e German example demonstrated, 
furthermore, that democracy was entirely reconcilable with constitutional 
monarchy, whereas in the leading republics – France and the United States 
– it had been eclipsed by plutocracy.2072 
e Speaker of the Rump Parliament, Paavo Virkkunen (who was not 
in the chair at the time), a member of the same Finnish Party, associated 
the internationalist character of socialism with republicanism and rejected 
both. e Bolsheviks and their Finnish collaborators had aimed at 
establishing ‘a Red reign of terror and a branch of the Russian Revolution’. 
e idea of a republic had been imported into Finland by the Russian 
Revolution, the assumption of the revolutionaries being that the Finnish 
republic would be both revolutionary and socialist.2073 Virkkunen claimed 
2070 Huldén 1989, 180; Vares 2006, 126; in article column entitled ‘Från kammare och 
kuloar’, Hufvudstadsbladet ridiculed the Agrarians for being simple-minded in 
their interpretations of German domestic and foreign policies and accused them 
of abusing the contingency of politics, 10 October 1918.
2071 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Tärningen är kastad’, 10 August 1918.
2072 VP, Juho Kusti Paasikivi, 7 August 1918, 1815–17. Plutocracy in the American 
republic was also rejected by VP, Anshelm Sjöstedt-Jussila (Finnish), 7 August 
1918, 1841; Bruendel 2003, 187, 242–3.
2073 VP, Paavo Virkkunen, 7 August 1918, 1821.
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that neither socialism2074 nor republicanism had any national basis but were 
mere imports and implied that the republicans were advancing the cause 
of socialism – or were actually socialists in disguise, as Hufvudstadsbladet 
frequently claimed.2075 Finnish independence had been achieved through 
a struggle against the Russian Revolution and its Bolshevik ideas in the Civil 
War, Virkkunen argued.2076 According to Wilhelmi Malmivaara, the Red 
rebels continued to claim in the Russian and Swedish press that Finland’s 
revolution was still continuing.2077 For these Old Finns, Finland was located 
in the nexus of great power interests and forced to choose sides; for them 
that meant pro-German monarchism. Virkkunen viewed a thousand years 
of monarchy in Germany and the current supremacy of the country as the 
proper model for solving the Finnish constitutional situation and insisted 
that the Finns stood united in alliance with Germany. e Entente provided 
no relevant constitutional models; instead it was preparing an intervention 
in Finland by plotting to introduce a republican constitution and thereby 
distance Finland from Germany.2078 e implication was that all republicans 
were advancing the cause of Western republicanism. Other Old Finns 
echoed related views: according to Oswald Kairamo, Otto von Bismarck had 
been right when he had supposedly proclaimed that ‘the fate of the world 
will be solved with blood and iron’ and not with parliamentary procedures. 
e world war had been such a battle between cultures, ideologies, eras. 
In contrast to the old cultural and ideological links with Germany as well 
as concrete help from there, Britain and France were trying to prevent the 
establishment of a monarchy supported by Germany, ‘our only reliable friend 
in the world’.2079 For Waldemar Bergroth, too, the adoption of a republican 
constitution implied the rejection of German help, dependence on the 
Entente and the restoration of Russian oppression. No republic, furthermore, 
was capable of providing the kind of welfare for the lower orders that was 
ensured by monarchical Germany.2080 e Finnish Party was uncritically 
pro-German, just as the British press claimed, and its conservative views 
were frequently articulated by Lutheran clergymen (three of the preceding 
speakers were vicars).
In the midst of this pro-German and monarchist rhetorical oensive, 
the republicans lacked convincing foreign examples because republics were 
generally ghting on the side of the Entente. Germany was hence the source 
of arguments for them as well. Eero Hahl of the Agrarians suggested that 
2074 Cf. Santeri Alkio’s point on the un-Finnish origins of Social Democracy in the 
same debate: VP, 7 August 1918, 1849.
2075 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Brådskande afgörande’, 7 August 1918; ‘Politisk nihilism’, 9 
August 1918; ‘Agrarerna och frågan om statsskicket’, 6 October 1918.
2076 VP, Paavo Virkkunen, 7 August 1918, 1822–3.
2077 VP, Wilhelmi Malmivaara, 7 August 1918, 1837.
2078 VP, Paavo Virkkunen, 7 August 1918, 1822–3.
2079 VP, Oswald Kairamo, 7 August 1918, 1824–5. Essentially the same pro-German 
views were presented by Pekka Paavolainen (Young Finns) on 7 August 1918, 
1832, and Wilhelmi Malmivaara (Finnish Party) on 7 August 1918, 1837. On 
Entente plotting, see Tekla Hultin, 8 August 1918, 1867.
2080 VP, Waldemar Bergroth, 7 August 1918, 1840.
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the development in Germany was towards increased democracy as could 
be seen in wartime promises for the extension of surage there.2081 Antti 
Juutilainen insinuated that it was Finns rather than the Germans themselves 
that were behind the wishes expressed by Germany concerning the Finnish 
constitution.2082 One solution might be to hold a referendum on the form 
of government, as had been done in Norway, with Switzerland providing 
another example of frequent use of the referendum.2083 e Young Finns 
referred to republican examples from the Entente as well. K. J. Ståhlberg 
presented the Finnish situation as analogous with that of France in 1871: 
the country had been declared a republic during a revolution but had not 
yet received a republican constitution.2084 Such a claim was dismissed by R. 
A. Wrede with the authority of a former rector of the University of Helsinki 
educated in the spirit of German constitutional theory.2085 ese men had 
both contributed to the preparation of the original republican proposal but 
in the circumstances of 1918 they were clear political opponents. 
e republican arguments intensied with the changing international 
and German domestic situation. For the monarchists, neither the German 
war troubles nor the announcement of a constitutional reform there made 
any dierence other than causing them to avoid ostentatious admiration 
of the German monarchy. Ernst Nevanlinna, the Chairman of the Finnish 
Party, instead insisted that Finland could not aord the ‘bankruptcy’ of 
a republican constitution: it would lead to constant agitation, repeated 
elections and endless disputes at a time when the aairs of the whole of 
Europe and the world were in the process of being resettled.2086 
On the day of the election, the republicans were nevertheless determined 
to challenge the monarchical polity. e Agrarians insisted that no clear 
German demand concerning the introduction of a monarchy had been heard 
and that mere monarchical manipulation was behind such suggestions.2087 
Moreover, the Bulgarian monarchy had just fallen despite support from the 
Central Powers.2088 Antti Rentola foresaw the current constitutional changes 
in Germany leading to strengthened parliamentarism over a weakening 
monarchy and to the renunciation of the export of German princes. 
It followed that good relations with Germany would be guaranteed by 
advancing parliamentarism rather than by adding to dynastic problems.’2089 
Artur Vuorimaa was informed about the German press rejecting the idea of 
a German king for Finland as being against the German national interest. 
2081 VP, Eero Hahl, 7 August 1918, 1844.
2082 VP, Antti Juutilainen, 9 August 1918, 1889.
2083 VP, Artur Wuorimaa, 9 August 1918, 1880.
2084 VP, Kaarlo Juho Ståhlberg, 8 August 1918, 1860.
2085 VP, Rabbe Axel Wrede, 8 August 1918, 1862.
2086 VP, Ernst Nevanlinna, 8 October 1918, 68.
2087 VP, Antti Juutilainen, 4 October 1918, 28. On the denial of such manipulation, 
see Pekka Ahmavaara (Young Finns), 8 October 1918, 61. 
2088 VP, Antti Juutilainen, 5 October 1918, 40; Lindman 1968, 275.
2089 VP, Antti Rentola, 4 October 1918, 29; also Bertta Pykälä (Agrarians), 8 October 
1918, 84, and Kalle Lohi (Agrarians), 9 October 1918, 118.
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According to him, it did not serve Finnish interests either, as a British 
recognition of Finnish independence was still lacking.2090 
Without questioning the common interests and intimate cultural 
connections between Germany and Finland,2091 the Agrarians maintained 
that the connections would still be cherished under a republican consti-
tution. Once the Social Democrats and the centrists had been incorporated 
in the German government, the focus would be on relations between the 
two peoples rather than between the monarchies. Santeri Alkio foresaw 
the German le and centre soon recommending a parliamentary system, 
‘which they have already now been able to realise in their country’, for 
Finland as well;2092 this illustrates a high transnational awareness of the 
course of the German constitutional reform and the dependence of Finnish 
solutions on it. According to Alkio, however, it was rather time for the Finns 
themselves to formulate their constitution independently of all foreign 
powers.2093 e transnational comparisons were extended to intertextuality: 
Vilkku Joukahainen quoted Max von Baden’s governmental declaration, 
emphasising its appeal to support by the majority of the people, the workers 
 included, which he thought should demonstrate to the Finnish monarchists 
the value of popular principles.2094 e Agrarian republicans studied every 
available utterance of the new leaders of Germany to nd arguments to 
oppose the royal election. Such transnational awareness served current 
political interests rather than being based on any established contacts with 
German party politicians. It was facilitated by the generally held conception 
of the cultural similarity of the two countries and the tendency of both sides 
in the Rump Parliament to regard Germany as a leading constitutional model. 
German developments were in 1918 generally considered to be directly 
relevant for the Finnish constitution. Matti Paasivuori, the only Social 
Democrat attending the debate, was even more explicit in the knowledge 
that his ideological brethren were about to take over in Germany: he called 
the Finnish monarchists ‘our Junkers’ and advised them to enquire from 
the new leist German government whether it was still willing to deliver 
a monarch to Finland.2095 e parallel between the constitutions of Germany 
and Finland was thus emphasised by both of the largest republican groups 
in Finland, just as it had been by the monarchists previously. In its editorial 
on the day of the royal election, Hufvudstadsbladet responded by attacking 
the Social Democrats for still holding notions about a dictatorship of the 
2090 VP, Artur Vuorimaa, 5 October 1918, 37.
2091 VP, Artur Vuorimaa, 5 October 1918, 37. Vuorimaa used the German constitution 
as an object of comparison in calling for changes in the proposed Finnish one. 
8 October 1918, 86; Santeri Alkio, 5 October 1918, 46; is united the Agrarians 
with Young Finns such as Pekka Ahmavaara, 8 October 1918, 61.
2092 VP, Santeri Alkio, 5 October 1918, 47; 8 October 1918, 56. For a denial of Germany 
calling for parliamentarism in Finland, which already had a parliamentary 
government, see Pekka Ahmavaara, 8 October 1918, 61.
2093 VP, Santeri Alkio, 8 October 1918, 59.
2094 VP, Vilkku Joukahainen, 8 October 1918, 79–80. Antti Rentola repeated the point 
with reference to Kaiser Wilhelm on 9 October 1918, 102; Lindman 1968, 275.
2095 VP, Matti Paasivuori, 8 October 1918, 72; 9 October 1918, 99.
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proletariat and by questioning its appeals to a democratic development 
in Germany. It recommended to Finnish Social Democrats the kind of 
patriotism demonstrated during the war by their German brethren.2096 
Once the Prussian monarchical order began to waver, the monarchists 
turned to anti-Entente rhetoric. Pekka Pennanen (Young Finns) contrasted 
the tendency of the United States to intervene in Finnish internal aairs 
rather than helping it with the actions of ‘the mighty Germany’, the only 
friend of Finland.2097 Ernst Nevanlinna played down republican claims about 
the German constitutional changes aecting Finland, emphasising that the 
democratisation of Prussia was being carried out by a prince and that it 
was merely bringing Prussia to the same level of democracy that Finland 
already enjoyed.2098 What was happening in international relations or within 
the German polity was not to be allowed to prevent the reinforcement of 
a monarchical constitution in Finland. However, the continued dependence 
of Finnish political discourse on German developments is visible in 
detailed reports in the press of the Reichstag debates in late October;2099 
by comparison, news of the Swedish reform was inconspicuous.2100 e 
two sides of the Finnish constitutional dispute made use of international 
comparisons and transnational points as best served their current domestic 
political goals, but there was no denying their major importance. 
6.4.3 Monarchical vs. republican democracy 
Two very dierent notions of ‘bourgeois democracy’ manifested themselves 
as the monarchist majority set out to prepare the election of a king, not least 
because a ministry that had initially aimed at a republic now seemed to be 
demolishing democracy.2101 e Agrarians responded by arguing consistently 
in favour of a ‘rule by the people’ of the kind they had demanded throughout 
1917. Artur Wuorimaa urged the government to bring to the parliament 
a proposal for a new democratic constitution that distanced itself from the 
‘autocratic principle’ that dominated the monarchical proposals.2102 ‘Real’ 
democracy would reject both the mistaken democracy of ‘the Reds’ and the 
proposed bureaucratic and aristocratic system that was being hypocritically 
described by the conservatives as ‘the most democratic constitutional 
2096 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Agitationen mot regeringen och lantdagen’, 9 October 1918. 
is was a heated response to a reasonably moderate editorial entitled ‘Suomi 
hengittää yhdellä keuhkolla’ published in Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, 8 October 
1918.
2097 VP, Pekka Pennanen, 5 October 1918, 39.
2098 VP, Ernst Nevanlinna, 8 October 1918, 68–9.
2099 Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Saksan waltiopäiwät’, 25 and 27 October 1918. Suomen 
Sosialidemokraatti concluded aer the German debates that the Finnish 
ministry was no longer supported by the German extreme right. ‘Nykyisen 
hallitusjärjestelmämme wararikko’, 29 October 1918.
2100 Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Ruotsin waltiosääntökysymys’, 28 November 1918; ‘Perus-
tus lakiuudistus Ruotsissa’, 19 December 1918; Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, ‘Halli-
tus muotokysymys Ruotsissa’, 19 December 1918.
2101 Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Pakotus hallitusmuotokysymyksessä’, 7 August 1918.
2102 VP, Artur Wuorimaa, 8 August 1918, 1861.
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monarchy’.2103 Antti Juutilainen suggested that the monarchists had let the 
people down by working against and not in favour of a ‘democratic society’. 
It was outrageous to claim that the people were tired of democracy and 
to promote monarchy, aristocracy, bureaucracy and plutocracy when the 
majority of the Finnish people were known to abhor these.2104 
e rightist response to accusations of betraying democracy was to turn 
to rhetorical redescriptions of their constitutional proposal as representing 
popular power. Against the background of the debates of 1917 and the 
advances that democracy might make (despite contrary signs during the 
preceding year), the Finnish-speaking conservatives, who had long had 
a reformist agenda, saw it as unthinkable to plan a new political order without 
appealing to democratic ideals. eir spokesman Lauri Ingman accused the 
Agrarians of having themselves prevented ‘a more democratic constitution’ 
than that of 1772 being passed.2105 Pekka Pennanen (Young Finns) conceded 
that the monarchists were ready to democratise the constitution as far as 
was rationally possible.2106 
In early October, Santeri Alkio, encouraged by the ongoing political 
changes in Germany, which could be interpreted as ‘the complete victory 
of democracy’ and supportive of rule by the people in Finland as well,2107 
spoke strongly in favour of democracy from the point of view of a centrist 
republican. He saw it as senseless for the government to try and stop ‘the shock 
waves of democracy’ (a Wilsonian metaphor emphasising the irresistible 
nature of the change) by maintaining monarchy and oligarchy. In applying 
a natural metaphor resembling those of the German and Swedish reformists 
later in the autumn of 1918, Alkio foresaw such stubborn conservatism as 
productive of nothing but the reactivation of class struggles.2108 According 
to Antti Rentola, too, the government was introducing a monarchy ‘in an 
undemocratic way’ on the basis of misleading claims about the decline of 
democracy at a time when even the right already knew that true democracy 
would prevail.2109 Antti Juutilainen urged the ministry ‘to return to the 
road of the rule by the people,2110 to recognise that democracy was making 
a breakthrough internationally and more particularly in Germany, to 
realise that all Finnish supporters of democracy abhorred monarchy and to 
understand that only a democratic republic would unite the people aer the 
crimes of the Social Democrats.2111 Kyösti Kallio interpreted the republican 
constitutional proposal of December 1917 as having already recognised 
a transnational development towards democracy2112 and considered that 
2103 VP, Artur Wuorimaa, 9 August 1918, 1880.
2104 VP, Antti Juutilainen, 9 August 1918, 1889.
2105 VP, Lauri Ingman, 8 August 1918, 1872; 9 August 1918, 1878; Juho Erkki Antila, 
9 August 1918, 1888.
2106 VP, Pekka Pennanen, 9 August 1918, 1884.
2107 Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, ‘Monarkistit huolissaan’, 4 October 1918.
2108 VP, Santeri Alkio, 4 October 1918, 24–6.
2109 VP, Antti Rentola, 4 October 1918, 29; 8 October 1918, 76.
2110 VP, Antti Juutilainen, 4 October 1918, 28.
2111 VP, Antti Juutilainen, 4 October 1918, 40–1.
2112 VP, Kyösti Kallio, 8 October 1918, 77. 
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there was no way of turning the clock back. Ivar Lantto expressly dened 
the Agrarian League as a democratic party, demanding that the voice of 
the people should be heard in the preparation of the constitution ‘in this 
so-called democratic country’.2113 e Social Democrats went further: their 
organ cited Vorwärts, according to which democracy was from now on 
to be the basis of both constitutions and international relations.2114 In the 
parliament, Matti Paasivuori ordered the monarchists to stop their ‘mockery 
of democracy’ and renounce their attempts to establish a reactionary 
political order that would delay the breakthrough of democracy in Finland. 
e Rump Parliament lacked the legitimacy to solve the constitutional 
issue in a way that would satisfy ‘democratic opinion’ outside.2115 Only aer 
the return of the Social Democrats to the parliament could a satisfactorily 
democratic constitution be adopted.
e monarchists stubbornly continued to describe the government’s 
proposal as ‘democratic’2116 or ‘liberal, democratic’,2117 which had been the 
consistent claim of Hufvudstadsbladet, for example: a constitutional mon-
archy was needed to advance the common good in the spirit of democracy 
as opposed to the special interests of party leaders in a  republic.2118 e 
proposal was more ‘democratic’ than any in force in another monarchy, 
including the new Germany,2119 while the ‘democratic’ nature of the 
republican obstruction in the parliament was questionable.2120 Annie 
Furuhjelm (Swedish People’s Party) asserted that she was not afraid of ‘the 
democratic spirit’ of the proposal.2121 For Kyösti Haataja (Finnish Party), the 
monarch was a guarantor of ‘real democratic reforms’ and the maintenance 
of ‘a constructive democratic spirit’.2122 Pekka Pennanen of the Young Finns 
presented the proposal as advancing democracy to an exceptional degree,2123 
even though some liberals continued to doubt whether the people’s rights vis-
à-vis the king had been suciently considered.2124 All the monarchist groups 
2113 VP, Ivar Lantto, 8 October 1918, 83; see also Santeri Alkio, 8 October 1918, 85. 
2114 Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, ‘“Vorwärts”, uusi hallitus ja rauhankysymys’, 
8 October 1918.
2115 VP, Matti Paasivuori, 4 October 1918, 28; 8 October 1918, 72; 9 October 1918, 99. 
Suomen Sosialidemokraatti wrote on 8 October 1918 in an article entitled ‘Suomi 
hengittää yhdellä keuhkolla’ that global events were heading towards democracy 
and that the Finns should join this trend.
2116 VP, Ernst Nevanlinna, 4 October 1918, 26; Pekka Ahmavaara, 8 October 1918, 
59; Tekla Hultin, 8 October 1918, 64.
2117 VP, Rabbe Axel Wrede, 4 October 1918, 35.
2118 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Brådskande afgörande’, 7 August 1918; ‘Gårdagens landt-
dagsbeslut’, 8 August 1918.
2119 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Tärningen är kastad’, 10 August 1918; ‘Inför avgörandet’, 
8 October 1918; ‘Agitationen mot regeringen och lantdagen’, 9 October 1918.
2120 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Frågan om regeringsformen’, 5 October 1918; ‘Regeringsform 
och konungaval’, 10 October 1918.
2121 VP, Annie Furuhjelm, 9 October 1918, 116; Wilhelm Roos, 9 October 1918, 118.
2122 VP, Kyösti Haataja, 8 October 1918, 89.
2123 VP, Pekka Pennanen, 4 October 1918, 38.
2124 Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Hallitusmuotokysymys nykyisessä waiheessaan’, 5 October 
1918; ‘Kuninkaanwaali toimitettu’, 10 October 1918.
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thus recognised democracy as a concept that was needed to legitimate even 
a monarchical mixed constitution, although it was a democracy dened by 
themselves. Prime Minister J. K. Paasikivi insisted with irony that Bolshevik 
democracy was the only type not satised by the proposal – if indeed the 
people really wanted democracy, about which he was not so sure:2125
And hence it is not possible to maintain that democracy [demokratia, 
kansanvaltaisuus], unless it is understood to stand for an ultra-socialist people’s 
commissariat, . . . could not freely develop if it has support among the people 
and in the parliament. 
Paasikivi remained a man of tradition in that he viewed democracy as no 
more than one element in a traditional mixed constitution; the entire system 
could not be called a democracy. As for the socialist democracy experienced 
at the beginning of 1918, it had been a project in which a radical minority 
of two per cent had misled the citizens while the majority had condemned 
the rebellion – the implication being that the Finns as a whole were not 
to blame. e Prime Minister conceded that a democratic constitution 
might be possible but doubted the readiness of the people for it, democracy 
presumably meaning that ‘the views of the majority of citizens who are 
enlightened and thinking and who have defended and support the legal 
social order must be decisive.’2126 Majority democracy was possible provided 
that the supporters of the established order constituted that majority, and 
regulation was needed to ensure this. 
For the Agrarians, ‘the rule by the people’ had become such a sacred 
concept that Paasikivi’s representation of ‘the Red terror’ as a type of 
democracy made Artur Wuorimaa denounce the Red uprising as ‘a rebellion 
against the rule by the people’.2127 Democracy was to be saved from 
associations with socialism as it was peasant democracy that constituted 
real democracy. e Agrarians, encouraged by the increasingly probable 
reforms in Germany, carried on their deterministic interpretation that the 
advent of democracy was unavoidable. While the historical development 
was proceeding internationally and irresistibly towards ‘humanity, 
fraternity, equality’, the monarchists were plotting a totally opposite future 
for Finland.2128 e Agrarians refused to recognise any democracy in the 
proposal.
A few ultra-conservatives of the Finnish Party and the Swedish People’s 
Party remained openly sceptical about democracy. Oswald Kairamo 
characterised ‘belief in the power of unlimited democracy to make people 
happy’ as ‘unwavering amongst the le’ (i.e. the centre in the Rump 
Parliament), who would do better to understand that not everyone might 
hold such a belief in the aermath of a civil war.2129 R. A. Wrede saw the 
2125 VP, Juho Kusti Paasikivi, 8 October 1918, 53.
2126 VP, Juho Kusti Paasikivi, 8 October 1918, 54.
2127 VP, Artur Wuorimaa, 8 October 1918, 85.
2128 VP, Artur Wuorimaa, 8 October 1918, 87.
2129 VP, Oswald Kairamo, 8 October 1918, 65.
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republicans as mistaken in advocating this supposed democracy.2130 Ernst 
Nevanlinna, a professor of political economy whose learning was linked to 
German scholarship, concluded that ‘a wave of so-called democracy’ could 
be expected aer the end of the war; the news from Germany had made that 
clear. But Finland did not need to follow such a movement as independence 
had already entailed a democratic breakthrough; here the Fennoman leader 
was representing national self-determination and democracy as identical. 
No need to strive for the extension of democracy existed as there were no 
political forces that opposed it, not even among the old civil service class 
(which hardly was true). Right to the end of the constitutional struggle 
of 1918, Nevanlinna insisted that the proposed monarchical constitution 
would be one of the most democratic polities in contemporary Europe, 
surpassing those in Sweden or the Netherlands, for instance. e Socialists’ 
demands for further democracy were to be ignored since nothing would 
satisfy them anyway.2131 
e argument of the Finnish right was thus that Finnish democracy 
(as an element of the constitution) would be secured by the monarchical 
constitutional proposal. Republican understandings of democracy were 
ignored and a monarchical polity implemented in mid-October. e fall 
of the German monarchy in November, described by Hufvudstadsbladet 
as ‘democratic constitutional changes in Germany’,2132 redened the 
situation, however, removing any possibilities for the implementation of 
a monarchy in Finland. e Swedish reform might still be interpreted in 
line with the Swedish right as resulting from threats of a revolution by the 
government.2133 e German defeat in the war nevertheless made a new 
election a  precondition for the recognition of Finnish independence by 
the Anglo-American Entente powers. ese international developments 
thus had major transnational impacts in Finland, giving republican 
understandings of democracy a new chance to inuence the formation of 
the constitution. A compromise between the monarchical and republican 
understandings of democracy just needed to be found in order to end the 
frustrating constitutional interregnum.
6.4.4  ‘The will of the people’ interpreted for  
 and against a republic
Notwithstanding the prevailing disappointment with the socialist segment 
of the population, appeals to the will of the people remained a major 
argumentative strategy for both the monarchists and the republicans of the 
Rump Parliament. Both claimed to be better aware of the true will of the 
people and to be promoting its realisation. However, the degree of trust 
in the political potential of the Finnish people varied dramatically, with 
2130 VP, Rabbe Axel Wrede, 8 October 1918, 88.
2131 VP, Enrnt Nevanlinna, 8 October 1918, 67–9.
2132 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Kejsar Wilhelm har avgått’, 10 November 1918.
2133 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Sverges författningsfråga inför riksdagen’, 20 December 
1918.
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the conservatives in particular doubting the ability of the people to grasp 
constitutional questions.2134 
Prime Minister J. K. Paasikivi maintained that the suitability of diverse 
constitutional solutions was determined not only by the needs of the people 
but also by the international standing of the country. e tendency of Old 
Finns to both trust and to suspect the people can be seen in how Paasikivi 
urged the parliament to ‘trust the people as they will nd leaders from among 
themselves’, on the other hand adding that ‘we . . . have a sad experience of 
what kind of leaders can rise from among the people’.2135 is was a reference 
to the continued support for the Social Democrats and the risk that the 
Finns might again vote for such ‘public enemies’. e Prime Minister 
doubted whether the Finns had demonstrated such political abilities as 
would allow a monarchy to be replaced by a republic, concluding that no 
further demonstrations of the immaturity of the people could be permitted 
if independence was to be retained.2136 e exclusion of the Reds from 
the parliament was justied as they had committed ‘the biggest of crimes 
known in the history of our people’; they had ‘no moral right to demand 
the postponement of the issue until their representatives can again attend’; 
and these ‘mentally ill’ people should rst recover before they could return 
to the parliament.2137 e rebels were to blame for the current crisis of the 
Finnish people: ‘e respect enjoyed by our people has, as a consequences of 
the horrendous crime of the socialists, decreased to a frightening extent. In 
internal aairs, divisions are spreading and trust diminishing day by day.’2138 
ere was no way in which ‘Red Finland’ could be allowed to decide about 
the constitution; it remained ‘for White Finland to decide’.2139 e winners 
of the Civil War, and more particularly its healthiest elements, had the sole 
authorisation to construct the kind of polity they considered best.
e Prime Minister’s pessimistic descriptions of the state of the nation 
were aimed to endorse the immediate adoption of the controversial 
constitutional proposal of his ministry. To describe the future of the Finns, 
Paasikivi employed a conventional conservative organic analogy: ‘We all, 
of course, hope and believe that the Finnish people can be again joined 
together as a strong people and that the mental illness that has corrupted 
great parts of them will be healed.’2140 e interpretation that a section of the 
people was mentally deranged called for authoritative political healing by 
the monarchy, not for democracy or parliamentarism. 
Paasikivi’s pessimistic views on humanity had evident consequences 
for the formation of the constitution: it could not be based simply on 
2134 Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Pakotus hallitusmuotokysymyksessä’, 7 August 1918.
2135 VP, Juho Kusti Paasikivi, 7 August 1918, 1815.
2136 Paavo Virkkunen echoed the point on the immaturity of the Finnish people 
in politics in VP, 7 August 1918, 1822, and Emil Nestor Setälä advised the 
parliament to demonstrate the contrary by approving the new proposal, 7 August 
1918, 1830.
2137 VP, Juho Kusti Paasikivi, 7 August 1918, 1817–18.
2138 VP, Juho Kusti Paasikivi, 7 August 1918, 1819.
2139 VP, Juho Kusti Paasikivi, 7 August 1918, 1846. 
2140 VP, Juho Kusti Paasikivi, 7 August 1918, 1818.
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popular rule. Many in his party – including several Lutheran clergymen 
– shared a gloomy conception of the Finnish people and the future of the 
polity, concluding that the strengthening of the monarchy was imperative. 
Waldemar Bergroth, a vicar by calling, justied a strong executive power with 
the argument that the people had abandoned God and turned to selshness, 
party animosities, hatred of their brethren and illegality. For him, a republic 
was incapable of bringing about a spiritual reform that would enable ‘the 
real rule by the people’.2141 e Speaker of the Parliament, Paavo Virkkunen, 
another clergyman, considered that the people were seeking security from 
a monarchy.2142 e Minister of Education Professor E. N. Setälä, spoke 
derisively about republicans who ‘solemnly appeal to the majesty of the 
majority of the people’, implying that they would allow the former rebels 
to decide about the structures of the polity. e involvement of the people 
in the process through referenda hence remained out of the question.2143 
Wilhelmi Malmivaara nevertheless asserted that the right trusted the people 
and were aiming at a proper rule by the people as opposed to ‘popular 
mischief ’ (kansanvallattomuus, a coinage that could even be construed 
as ‘anti-democracy’) and lack of respect for law and order.2144 Juho Erkki 
Antila, a farmer who would put the motion for the election of a king, further 
denigrated a republic as something that the Finns had already experienced 
when ‘the people through their parliament wielded supreme power for 
some time’ in 1917. e results of the people ruling ‘directly through their 
parliament’ had made the food shortage worse, which demonstrated to 
Antila the failure of ‘the rule by of the people’ or ‘a people’s republic’ (kansan 
tasavalta).2145 
is Fennoman rightist attack on popular politics provoked equally 
uncompromising reactions from the centre. Santeri Alkio considered 
a monarchy without responsibility as a direct threat to the people and the 
state.2146 e right’s questioning of a republic and the rule by the people on 
the basis of ‘a dreadful revolt of the people’ was unfounded.2147 In ignoring 
the rule by the people, the monarchists forgot that2148
this country has been liberated by the people, that the blood of the people has 
been shed for this liberty and that the will of this people must be heard when 
a constitution is formulated for the state, which has been created by the force of 
the people.
2141 VP, Waldermat Bergroth, 7 August 1918, 1840; also Leonard Typpö, 7 August 
1918, 1842.
2142 VP, Paavo Virkkunen, 7 August 1918, 1823–4. 
2143 VP, Emil Nestor Setälä, 7 August 1918, 1828–9. Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Eduskunnan 
eilinen merkkipäiwä’, 8 August 1918.
2144 VP, Wilhelmi Malmivaara, 7 August 1918, 1856.
2145 VP, Juho Erkki Antila, 7 August 1918, 1835. 
2146 VP, Santeri Alkio, 7 August 1918, 1820.
2147 VP, Santeri Alkio, 7 August 1918, 1848.
2148 VP, Santeri Alkio, 7 August 1918, 1849. A related point on ‘the feeling of the 
people’s own power’ was repeated by Kyösti Kallio, 8 October 1918, 77.
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Popular sovereignty reinforced by the ght of the White Guards 
against Russian and Red forces in the Civil War spoke for democracy, and 
a republican constitution made a monarchy unsustainable. Antti Juutilainen 
carried on, lamenting the fact that the opinion of the people who had 
liberated the country was distrusted and ignored and that ‘the merit, abilities 
and trustworthiness of our people’ in the eyes of its German allies had been 
questioned by the Finnish Party,2149 a supposed defender of the cause of the 
people. Juho Kokko foresaw that nothing but hatred from the people could 
be expected as a result of such monarchist policies.2150 Alkio further added 
that the natural development of the rule by the people would be prevented 
by the monarchical proposal, which would leave nothing but revolution as 
the only method of changing the constitution.2151 e rightists themselves 
were committing a coup d’état by electing a king on the basis of outdated 
legislation.2152 
Lauri Ingman of the Finnish Party responded by maintaining that the 
Finnish people stood behind the right.2153 Other MPs reasserted that they 
trusted the people and that that people wished for a monarchy.2154 Ingman 
questioned not only Alkio’s suggestion about a coup but also the constitutional 
position of the republicans, disputing the legitimacy and validity of the 
constitutional decisions at the time of the declaration of independence 
(when he himself had spoken for democracy) as ‘revolutionary’, i.e. made 
in extraordinary circumstances and ways.2155 Both the Red rebels and the 
non-socialist republicans were thus accused of attempting a revolution that 
had failed.2156 
e views of the Young Finns were divided and overshadowed by the 
confrontation between the Finnish Party and the Agrarians. Helsingin 
Sanomat, their organ, had still complained in early August about the 
monarchists deliberately misinterpreting ‘the will of the people’ to enforce 
that of their own, just as the socialists had done in 1917, and suggested that 
the people itself should decide through a referendum.2157 By early October 
the party’s stance had become ambivalent: a monarchy might do provided 
that ‘the basic prerequisites of the rule by the people’ were ensured,2158 
although it was believed that the majority of the people remained opposed 
2149 VP, Antti Juutilainen, 9 August 1918, 1889–90.
2150 VP, Juho Kokko, 8 August 1918, 1866.
2151 VP, Santeri Alkio, 7 August 1918, 1848.
2152 VP, Santeri Alkio, 8 August 1918, 1865; see also Matti Paasivuori (Social 
Democrat), 8 August 1918, 1871; 8 October 1917, 52, 72; 9 October 1918, 100. 
Alkio was returning to an analogy he had made between the Red rebellion and 
the monarchist project when talking about ‘the Social Democratic class coup’ on 
8 October 1918, 55; see also Kalle Lohi, 8 October 1918, 70.
2153 VP, Lauri Ingman, 8 August 1918, 1868.
2154 VP, Iida Yrjö-Koskinen, 9 August 1918, 1888.
2155 VP, Lauri Ingman, 9 August 1918, 1877–8.
2156 VP, 9 August 1918, 1878; also Juho Kusti Paasikivi, 9 October 1918, 96.
2157 Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Pakotus hallitusmuotokysymyksessä’, 7 August 1918. 
2158 Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Hallitusmuotokysymys nykyisessä waiheessaan’, 5 October 
1918.
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to monarchy.2159 Some republicans believed in the people being able to unite 
themselves again, restore mutual understanding and make ‘democratic 
progress’ if only they were given a republican constitution,2160 while the 
monarchists believed that the people would still retain their political 
inuence under a king.2161 
As attempts to reach a compromise failed, the royal election approached 
and the German polity was already experiencing a constitutional 
transformation, the monarchical and republican conceptions of the people 
became increasingly militant. On the republican side, Alkio lamented the 
unwillingness of the monarchists – at a decisive moment in European history 
– to listen to complaints from abroad and to let the people decide about their 
constitution through a new election or a referendum.2162 In a republic, power 
would remain in the hands of the people itself, whereas a monarchy allowed 
a single family to decide about the fate of the people, which was contrary to 
the fundamentally democratic and parliamentary character of the Finnish 
people:2163
is form of government would require a contented, humble and lowly people. 
But the Finnish people are a discontented, demanding and proud people. e last 
Russian ruler during his reign made them hostile to all use of power that is not 
based on the sense of justice of the people themselves. e political education of 
the past decades has to an overwhelming extent aroused among this people the 
will to decide on their laws and institutions through their parliament.
It was unacceptable that the people who had liberated themselves were 
denied the right to make its voice heard when the Finnish constitution was 
formulated. Such a violation of civic rights could only be healed with a new 
election; this would restore the lacking consensus between the people, the 
parliament and the government.2164 Alkio urged the old elite to trust the 
people and to respect ‘the sacred will of the people’ as the ‘the sole arbiter’. 
e elite and the people should negotiate so that ‘[t]he people will feel 
they are participating again in the running of aairs and no longer being 
excluded as they now are’.2165 Without such cooperation in the spirit of 
popular sovereignty, the constitution might again become an object of class 
struggles, and confrontations would become a permanent feature of politics 
and potentially lead to renewed civil strife.2166 
Fellow Agrarians likewise emphasised the right of the people as an entity 
to inuence its fate.2167 Antti Rentola cited Woodrow Wilson on the necessity 
2159 Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Kuninkaanwaali toimitettu’, 10 October 1918.
2160 VP, Augusta Laine and Emil Linna, 7 August 1918, 1839. 
2161 VP, Pekka Pennanen and Tilda Löthman, 9 August 1918, 1884–5.
2162 VP, Santeri Alkio, 4 October 1918, 24–5; 8 October 1917, 57.
2163 VP, Santeri Alkio, 4 October 1918, 25.
2164 VP, Santeri Alkio, 4 October 1918, 26; also Ivar Lantto, 8 October 1918, 83.
2165 VP, Santeri Alkio, 5 October 1917, 47; 8 October 1917, 59.
2166 VP, Santeri Alkio, 8 October 1917, 57.
2167 VP, Artur Wuorimaa, 5 October 1918, 36–7; Antti Rentola, 8 October 1918, 72.
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for politicians to follow the will of the people if they wanted to survive,2168 
thereby making a transnational reference to the declared principles which 
the Entente was now imposing on Germany and the prospective change 
in the German constitution. Vilkku Joukahainen likewise spoke about ‘the 
great rising of the people’ taking place around Europe and in Finland, where, 
however, ‘the people threw themselves as one man into the battle against 
the Red rebellion’ only to nd themselves passed over in preparations for 
the constitution. is had made them lose much of their previous political 
enthusiasm.2169 Rentola and Antti Juutilainen ridiculed rightist doubts about 
the political maturity of the people, suggesting that the monarchical project 
reected a spirit of ‘national distrust’ and even a mentality of ‘a vassal people’ 
that was incapable of independence.2170 A social and geographical division 
had emerged: whereas ‘the healthy forces of the people’ had performed 
‘a healthy operation on our national body politic’ (a republican organic 
metaphor for the Civil War), reactionary circles in Helsinki abhorred the 
activities of the people and planned to take over the state. e only antidote 
was the restoration of a regular parliament representing the Finnish people 
and uniting its classes; this would stop the rightist coup, which was no better 
than the Red uprising.2171 
Monarchist responses were equally unbending. Kyösti Haataja (Finnish 
Party) stigmatised Juutilainen’s conception of the will of the people as 
socialism, arising out of ‘that Red spirit which has departed from this 
parliament’.2172 Ernst Nevanlinna claimed that the current parliament 
remained legitimate as it had been elected by the people and consisted of ‘the 
healthy layers of the people who support legal social order’. Here he turned 
to a tendentious interpretation of parliamentary sovereignty, viewing the 
attending MPs as the only legal and ‘healthy’ representatives of the Finnish 
people in a sick world:2173
e people themselves . . . , the healthy layers of the Finnish people, those who 
have retained their mental balance during this upheaval of the world, they are 
now assembled in this house, and it is precisely they and no one else who will 
make the decision.
e Swedish People’s Party, which despite its name, was overwhelmingly 
monarchical and sceptical about extended popular government by the 
Finnish-speaking majority aer the Civil War, le the parliamentary debate 
in this respect to the Finnish-speaking rival sides, although its organ 
criticised the Finnish people for its ‘lack of political culture’ (corresponding 
to the German word Kultur as it was used in German wartime propaganda 
in contradistinction to the ‘civilisation’ of the Western powers).2174 
2168 VP, Antti Rentola, 8 October 1918, 73.
2169 VP, Vilkku Joukahainen, 8 October 1918, 80.
2170 VP, Antti Juutilainen, 5 October 1918, 39; Antti Rentola, 8 October 1918, 74.
2171 VP, Antti Juutilainen, 5 October 1918, 41–2, 46.
2172 VP, Kyösti Haataja, 5 October 1918, 42. 
2173 VP, Ernst Nevanlinna, 8 October 1918, 66.
2174 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Frågan om regeringsformen’, 5 October 1918.
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R. A Wrede did not rate the role of the Finnish people in the political process 
very highly: Finnish independence was a result of favourable international 
trends rather than of the activities of the Finns themselves. is achievement 
was now jeopardised by the corruption of ‘the moral make-up of the 
people’,2175 something that a monarchy would heal. By contrast, Tekla Hultin, 
a monarchical Young Finn, continued to assert that a new monarchical 
constitution would award the will of the people a greater inuence than in 
any other monarchy or most republics.2176 e degree of trust in the people 
was used to justify both republican and monarchical constitutional solutions: 
the optimism of the republicans was inspired by a positive interpretation of 
the contribution of the people to the Civil War, constitutional changes in 
Germany and a belief in national reconciliation, while the pessimism of the 
monarchists found support in the shock caused by the Civil War and was 
reected in a desire to maintain constitutional continuity.
6.4.5 Parliamentarism redefined or endangered  
 by the monarchists? 
It has become clear by now that parliamentarism, too, was understood in 
conicting ways by the two sides of the constitutional struggle depending on 
the extent to which popular representation was valued. Complete rejections 
of parliamentarism were, however, just as much out of the question as full 
denials of democracy would have been. e conservative response was 
to dene parliamentarism with qualications that suited a monarchical 
constitution and in a way that resembled the relationship between the 
executive and the parliament in Prussia before the reforms there. 
In August, once it had become obvious that the parliament would pass no 
new monarchical constitution and that late eighteenth-century provisions 
for a royal election might be applied instead, monarchist suspicions of 
parliamentarism came increasingly into the open. Prime Minister J. K. 
Paasikivi asserted, with references to German authors and experiences, 
that a monarchy would diminish ‘parliamentary and party problems’ 
and introduce reforms that would be benecial to the lower orders of the 
people.2177 Parliamentary procedures appeared to be incapable of producing 
the required reforms and to be rather a source of domestic political strife; 
this comment reects a sceptical if not hostile attitude to parliamentarism 
within the government. In October, aer Germany had declared its 
aim to parliamentarise its government, nervousness within the Finnish 
Party began to rise.2178 Paasikivi insisted that a monarchical constitution 
would realise ‘the parliamentary way of government’ by guaranteeing 
‘the inuence of the parliament on the course of aairs’ provided that 
‘the parliament with its party divisions is able to realise this – which may 
admittedly be questionable’.2179 e Prime Minister was speaking in favour 
2175 VP, Rabbe Axel Wrede, 5 October 1918, 35.
2176 VP, Tekla Hultin, 8 October 1918, 63.
2177 VP, Juho Kusti Paasikivi, 7 August 1918, 1816.
2178 Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, ‘Monarkistit huolissaan’, 4 October 1918.
2179 VP, Juho Kusti Paasikivi, 8 October 1917, 53–4.
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of parliamentary government in principle while denying its potential in the 
political process in practice. Even if the ministry continued to declare its 
readiness for compromise, its measures and rhetoric questioned the basic 
premises of a new parliamentary republic. e Finnish constitutional debate 
was again approaching an impasse. Paasikivi wanted to bring the dispute to 
an end, emphasising the preparations for peace. is could happen only if 
the republican minority joined the majority.2180 
Other hard-liners in the Finnish Party attacked parliamentarism by 
directing blame for the Red rebellion on the current republican opposition, 
especially the Agrarians. Oswald Kairamo, an estate owner embittered by 
the Civil War, claimed that the war had been caused by the extension of 
parliamentarism:2181
[B]ut also that kind of unlimited parliamentary power, which the Social 
Democrats with the help and support of the Agrarian League tried to realise 
last winter, that must also be absolutely rejected as it is not only technically 
impossible but will also certainly lead to national weakness, misery and anarchy, 
as it has already done in this country.
According to Ernst Nevanlinna, the current parliament as an institution 
was a sucient guarantee of the realisation of democracy. Changes in 
Germany altered nothing in Finland: the reconcilability of monarchy and 
parliamentarism was demonstrated by the fact that the German government 
was led by Prince Max von Baden.2182 Pekka Ahmavaara (Young Finns), the 
First Vice-Speaker, maintained that parliamentary government had already 
been established in Finland in 1917, so the need for reform that Germany 
was experiencing did not exist.2183 He believed that reformist Germany 
was coming into line with the Finnish polity rather than the Finnish polity 
sticking to the Prussian political order.
e Agrarians consistently rejected calls for a monarchy as endangering 
both democracy and parliamentarism. Pekka Hahl foresaw the election of 
a king as implying further constitutional changes, perhaps limitations to 
surage and parliamentary power, which diered from what he regarded as 
a pan-European trend to let all layers of the people participate more directly 
in government. According to Hahl, the Finnish government seemed to be 
willing ‘to exclude the vast majority of the people from administering the 
aairs of the state. ey would not be allowed to participate in the building 
of the new Finland which we hopefully thought would be built once the Red 
rebellion had been suppressed’.2184 is statement made Hufvudstadsbladet 
2180 VP, Juho Kusti Paasikivi, 8 October 1917, 54–5. For Santeri Alkio’s response 
suggesting a compromise on the constitution for the same purpose, see 8 October 
1917, 59.
2181 VP, Oswald Kairamo, 8 October 1918, 65.
2182 VP, Ernst Nevanlinna, 8 October 1918, 68–9.
2183 VP, Pekka Ahmavaara, 8 October 1918, 61. e unwillingness of Helsingin 
Sa nomat to write clearly in favour of parliamentarism is visible in ‘Parlamen-
taarinen hallitusjärjestelmä’, 4 October 1918.
2184 VP, Pekka Hahl, 7 August 1918, 1844–5.
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accuse Hahl of socialist agitation and ridicule Agrarian rhetoric in 
general.2185 According to Santeri Alkio, too, a monarchy with extensive 
prerogatives meant limitations to democracy, which might be followed by 
the introduction of a bicameral system, a decrease in the political education 
of the people and give rise to widespread discontent among them.2186 Antti 
Juutilainen was positive that the preparations for a royal election were 
irreconcilable with parliamentarism.2187 
In October, Alkio considered that preparations were being made for 
the installation of a monarchical power that would bypass the opinion of 
the parliamentary majority and prioritise the protection of its oligarchic 
privileges over democracy and parliamentarism.2188 Rightist lawyers 
seemed ready expunge the principle of ministerial responsibility from the 
constitutional proposal.2189 Parliamentary government was in danger of 
losing its contact with the people: parliamentary debates and legislation 
would no longer be related to prevailing trends of thought or organise the 
polity in a satisfactory manner if the parliament failed to appeal to the 
people and cooperate with them.2190 Antti Rentola could not understand this 
tendency to reduce parliamentarism in Finland at a time when that principle 
was making progress in much of Europe. In Germany, the allies of the 
Finnish monarchists were being displaced. e only way for future progress 
was to allow the Finns to engage themselves in parliamentary activities and 
end violent extra-parliamentary pressurising.2191 e Agrarians insisted on 
‘the elevated road of parliamentarism’ being followed. According to Antti 
Juutilainen, parliamentarism was the only consensual method to contain 
the socialism which remained in Finnish society:2192
But if socialism is suppressed and forced to go underground, there is the danger 
that it will rise from there embittered and uncontrollable and that it will be much 
more dicult then to direct it onto the path of parliamentarism and consensual 
cooperation than it is now.
e re-engagement of the people in the running of public aairs was the 
way forward: Antti Rentola disagreed with attempts to prevent the people 
from voting as long as the ‘Bolshevik contagion’ might exist; indeed, the 
monarchist project itself was likely to provoke such radical reactions. If 
Germany was to be taken as a model, its experiences of socialist laws should 
demonstrate to the right the ineciency of trying to conne revolutionary 
ideologies by limiting the political rights of the people to take part in politics 
through parliaments.2193 
2185 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Politisk nihilism’, 9 August 1918.
2186 VP, Santeri Alkio, 7 August 1918, 1849.
2187 VP, Antti Juutilainen, 8 August 1918, 1869.
2188 VP, Santeri Alkio, 4 October 1918, 25.
2189 VP, Santeri Alkio, 4 October 1918, 27.
2190 VP, Santeri Alkio, 8 October 1917, 58.
2191 VP, Antti Rentola, 4 October 1918, 29; see also Santeri Alkio, 8 October 1917, 56, 
73, 76.
2192 VP, Antti Juutilainen, 5 October 1918, 46.
2193 VP, Antti Rentola, 8 October 1918, 75.
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e Agrarian calls for reconciliation were reinforced by the ideological 
interpretations of Matti Paasivuori, the sole voice in the parliament of the 
‘parliamentary Social Democrats’, who were aiming at cooperation with 
bourgeois supporters of parliamentarism.2194 Paasivuori concluded, ignoring 
the Speaker’s explicit request to use a ‘parliamentary’ way of speaking2195, 
that ‘some of the bourgeoisie want to use the current class parliament to do 
as much harm to the Finnish working class as possible and to deprive it of all 
the benets which the working people have achieved through parliamentary 
activity.’2196 According to Paasivuori, the workers saw the current institution 
as no more than a ‘rump’ or ‘residue parliament’. When the Rump Parliament 
had assumed the role of representing the people, ignoring protests from the 
workers, many members of the working class had adapted themselves. But 
this was no longer the case now that the aims of ‘the class parliament’ or 
‘half parliament’ had been revealed and appeared from the perspective of 
the workers to constitute no less than a ght against the majority of the 
people. e actions of the current parliament had shown it to be illegal 
and unrepresentative of the people and no better than the main Red soviet 
during the Civil War.2197 Paasivuori warned the representatives that the royal 
election and the further postponement of a new general election would lead 
to a deepening crisis of parliamentary legitimacy, particularly in view of the 
punishment of the Red rebels that was being practised in the background:2198
You condemn the violent methods of the workers and expect a labour party that 
will focus on parliamentary activity to rise in this country. But at the same time 
you do all you can to turn the minds of the workers away from parliamentarism. 
For what value do you think that the workers give to a parliamentarism that 
provides benets only for the bourgeois classes and oppresses the working class, 
leaving it without representation? Such parliamentarism will have no success, 
and if the current state of aairs continues for some time, it will be useless in 
this country for any worker to try to explain to the masses the good sides of 
parliamentarism. 
Paasivuori thus summarised the key problem in the Finnish crisis of 
legitimacy of parliamentarism that had existed since spring 1917 and was 
continuing and deepening again in autumn 1918: the restoration of trust in 
parliamentarism among the le and the centre called for major a rethinking 
of the policies of the right. 
It remained to be seen how the new polity would be able to solve 
this major crisis of parliamentary legitimacy as long as only one of the 
2194 Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, ‘Suomi hengittää yhdellä keuhkolla’, 8 October 1918.
2195 See also VP, Matti Paasivuori, 10 October 1918, 124.
2196 VP, Matti Paasivuori, 8 October 1918, 71.
2197 VP, Matti Paasivuori, 9 October 1918, 99–100.
2198 VP, Matti Paasivuori, 9 October 1918, 100. e Social Democrats were supported 
in their endeavours by news that parliamentarism had obtained a decisive victory 
in Germany. Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, ‘Monarkistit huolissaan’, 4 October 
1918; ‘Waikutelmia Saksasta’, 5 October 1918; ‘Saksan suurin woitto’, 7 October 
1918.
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parliamentary parties (the Agrarians) was unquestionably in favour of 
parliamentary government while another potentially parliamentary party 
(the reformed Social Democrats) remained excluded owing to its having 
previously abandoned parliamentary means. International pressures were 
also growing: American and British recognition of independence could not 
be expected under a German king, and even France would state that it did not 
regard the Finnish form of government as a legal one.2199 e British were also 
unhappy about the royalist majority in the new government.2200 In Swedish, 
German and British public and parliamentary discourse, the leaders of the 
Finnish regime had received a very bad name as extreme reactionaries. How 
would the Finnish political elite tackle the internal and external crisis of the 
legitimacy of its ‘parliamentary’ government? at –  together with German 
and Swedish transitions to parliamentary democracy – is one of the issues 
we shall explore in the last chapter of this book. 
2199 Also reported in Neue Preußische Zeitung, 22 October 1918.
2200 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Finland’s New Government’, 30 November 1918.
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7.  The spring of 1919: The beginning  
 of an era of democracy and 
 parliamentarism? 
7.1  Britain: Parliamentary democracy established or  
 a bureaucratic state reinforced?
In spring 1919, when the other three national parliaments were still 
deliberating about the details of their constitutional reforms, the British 
wartime coalition had already extended surage and applied it in an election. 
As the public debates of autumn 1918 demonstrated, the democratic 
character of the British parliamentary system was increasingly taken for 
granted (except by the far le). However, the strongly steered nature of the 
reform, which had mobilised only half of the voters in December 1918 and 
produced a parliament in which the same coalition dominated, gave rise 
to criticisms about the existence of what was only seemingly a new type of 
parliamentary democracy in which little had actually changed. e old elite 
continued to hold power. e victorious Conservatives and their Liberal 
allies were happy about the results of the reform and did not hesitate to 
speak favourably about the updated parliamentary system. 
e continued rule of the Coalition certainly smoothed the transition 
to an extended parliamentary democracy. ere had been no socialist 
breakthrough of any signicance in Britain. Despite all the seeming 
continuity, however, the war and the election had changed British party 
politics. While the immediate post-war period was favourable for the 
Conservatives, the party was aected by the new situation. Local party 
organisations needed to address a widened electorate, and many younger 
Conservative MPs had acquainted themselves with the ways of thinking of 
the working class during the war,2201 and this potentially caused them to 
articulate their political views in a more reconciliatory manner. 
Liberal ministers wished to introduce ambitious plans for reconstruction 
and social reforms. ey found support from many Conservatives in the post-
war atmosphere of national unity and a determination to stop Bolshevism. 
e common goal was to prevent radicalisation amongst the working class 
and unemployed former soldiers. e Liberals had been divided during the 
war and they became increasingly so as the government lost and opponents 
2201 Ball 1995, 63–4.
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won seats in by-elections. As the press debates on democratisation during 
1918 had already suggested, the Conservatives would oppose Liberal policies 
on India. Conservative support for the Coalition would also diminish as 
a consequence of harder economic times, increasing social unrest and the 
growing bureaucratisation of government. Most of the planned reforms had 
to be rejected because of economic problems. Neither the Conservatives nor 
the Liberals were, in the end, ready to create a new centre party through 
a fusion of the government parties, as Lloyd George had envisioned when 
manipulating the election result of 1918.2202 
Elsewhere in Europe, the future of democracy appeared far from secure, 
and fears about the spread of the Bolshevik Revolution to Western Europe 
continued to exist. Such fears were strengthened as a result of uprisings 
by radical socialists in several countries, particularly Germany, and by the 
activities of the British far le. Old fears of democracy as the class rule of the 
working class only – and thus as a way to socialism – had not withered away 
among the old elite,2203 and they were constantly reinforced by revolutionary 
discourse among the far le in Russia, Britain and other countries. Ways 
to counteract the feared repercussions of the extension of surage and the 
potentially connected spread of Bolshevism remained high on the agendas 
of both domestic and foreign policy.
ere was some unhappiness among the electorate with the Conservative 
Party as a counterweight to socialism but support for the far-right wing 
remained marginal in Britain.2204 Public discourse was changing, with 
democracy becoming an increasingly usable concept for Conservatives as 
well. e Times, too, wrote about ‘these democratic days’ when the people were 
‘the real principals’ both nationally and internationally.2205 e Marquess of 
Salisbury recognised his belief in ‘Tory democracy’ in the sense of showing 
‘sympathy with the hopes, fears, and interests of the wage-earning classes’.2206 
For young academics, the parliamentary system had been suciently 
reformed, as can be seen in the Oxford Union, a university debating society 
that provided a training ground for politicians, voting against the motion 
that it ‘had ceased to be eective and should be remodelled upon a popular 
and democratic basis’.2207 Ideas about ‘democratising the educational system’ 
and making schools ‘safe for democracy’2208 were published in e Times, 
and the paper advised Britain to lead the world in evolutionary political and 
social change,2209 though it was hardly an advocate of extensive democratic 
reforms.
2202 Ball 1991, 246; Ball 1995, 64–5; Pugh 2002, 157, 182.
2203 Cunningham 2001, 252.
2204 Webber 1986, 16.
2205 e Times, ‘Peace and Publicity’, 17 January 1919, ‘Wanted – a Policy’, 19 February 
1919.
2206 e Times, ‘Peers and the Rent Bill’ (quoting the Marquess of Salisbury), 28 
March 1919.
2207 e Times, ‘e Parliamentary System’, 31 May 1919; Haapala 2012.
2208 e Times, ‘National Education’, 26 March 1919.
2209 e Times, ‘Giving the World a Lead’, 5 March 1919.
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e Liberal Prime Minister Lloyd George argued in the aermath of 
the victorious election that the historic event ‘aorded the democracy an 
opportunity of showing its condence in the Government to change the 
face of the country’,2210 in other words by the public and Parliament giving 
the executive a full mandate. As for socialist direct action, he denounced it 
as Bolshevism and ‘a complete subversion of every democratic doctrine’.2211 
e Manchester Guardian was assured that this prime minister was the best 
man to lead ‘British democracy’ and was capable of appealing directly to 
the people.2212 e paper warned the Conservatives not to forget that ‘the 
nation has never been so truly, keenly, and impatiently democratic in 
its every nerve’ in the expectation of reforms.2213 As for democracy and 
parliamentarism in international relations, issues discussed ‘in the world-
parliament in Paris’ (i.e. the negotiations on the Treaty of Versailles) would 
continue to be subordinated to the British parliament, which constituted 
‘British Democracy’.2214 National sovereignty would not be diminished in 
the face of international idealism.
e relationship to representative democracy of the Labour Party, which 
was accused of harbouring sympathies for Bolshevism, also remained an 
issue of some dispute. For the mainline party, despite its poor election 
results, parliamentary rather than extra-parliamentary activities were to be 
prioritised ‘[i]n a democratic country like ours, where democracy possesses 
political power’.2215 Labour MPs readily used appeals to democracy to 
advance ‘industrial democracy’ and ‘economic democracy’,2216 while 
a leading politician pointed out that democracy did not only belong to the 
workers.2217 J. Ramsay MacDonald, outside Parliament, saw democracy as 
being in danger of becoming a farce2218 and challenged the labour movement 
to discuss ‘the position of Parliament in a system of democracy’ as well.2219 
In his Parliament and Revolution, he did not see parliamentary means as 
sucient for achieving socialism, although he admitted, like the majority 
of the party and the Social Democratic parties on the Continent, that there 
were hardly other ways to advance the interests of the working class. In the 
meantime, more radical Marxists had concluded that, aer the Russian 
Revolution, the time of parliamentary methods was over.2220 According to 
MacDonald, the people had been unhappy with Parliament, representative 
government and representative democracy ‘as the means of expressing the 
2210 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Premier & Government Promises’, 2 January 1919.
2211 e Times, ‘e Prime Minister on Direct Action’, 11 July 1919.
2212 e Manchester Guardian, ‘e Premier and the Future’, 20 April 1919.
2213 e Manchester Guardian, ‘e Task of Parliament’, 9 February 1919.
2214 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Scenes at St. Stephen’s’, 20 April 1919.
2215 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Labour in the New Parliament’ (interview with J. H. 
omas), 1 January 1919.
2216 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Labour’s Policy of Reconstruction’, 16 March 1919; 
e Times, ‘Labour Memorandum’, 27 March 1919.
2217 e Times, ‘Brighter Prospect for Labour’ (quoting J. R. Clynes), 31 March 1919.
2218 e Manchester Guardian, ‘e New House of Commons’, 6 January 1919.
2219 e Times, ‘e Soviet System’, 23 April 1919.
2220 Macintyre 1980, 194–5.
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popular will’ before the war and the election of December 1918 had not 
removed this dissatisfaction. is was particularly true with regard to Lloyd 
George’s abuse of his power to call an immediate election in order to halt 
Labour. For MacDonald, the election had been an instance of ‘an exploitation 
by political leaders moved by unusually low standards of honour, of the 
emotions of a country just released from the horrible stress of the war and 
intoxicated by the delight of victory’. As a consequence, MacDonald argued, 
anti-parliamentary movements were making progress, new political theories 
on parliamentary government were being introduced, and the Soviet system 
was spreading ‘a totally new conception of political control, and of political 
democracy’,2221 though this was not something that MacDonald favoured. 
Challenges to parliamentarism, which had been heard in Sweden 
and Finland in 1917, remained part of the British socialist conscience as 
well. ‘To-day we are in revolutionary times’ that touched ‘Parliamentary 
government’ as being ‘a capitalist institution’, wrote MacDonald. Lenin had 
taught that only revolution would create democracy for the working class, 
and in a real revolution ‘representative democracy’ was out of the question 
as Parliament was ‘an ineective thing’ for the workers.2222 For MacDonald, 
it was also disappointing that ‘surrounded by democratic reforms, the 
“governing classes” have maintained their authority and have used 
democracy to maintain it.’2223 As our analysis on Liberal and Conservative 
discourse and action has shown, this had undoubtedly happened in Britain. 
In some circles, it inspired a readiness for industrial action as a form of ‘direct 
action’ that might bring wage increases if nothing more.2224 MacDonald, 
under whose leadership the Labour Party would rise in a few years’ time, 
did not denounce direct action but declared himself a reformist anyway. 
In his vision, representative government should not be destroyed but 
radically reformed through devolution, a new electoral system that would 
produce MPs who really represented their constituencies. e goal was to 
combine socialism and democracy in a British, not a soviet, manner.2225 is 
represented the mainline Social Democratic policies that then prevailed in 
Germany, Sweden and Finland, too. 
Despite worries among some Conservatives and Liberals that the power 
of Parliament was deteriorating and support for Labour and widespread 
leist disappointment with the practical eect of the extension of surage 
rising, only marginal extremist groups questioned the relevance of 
Parliament and sought alternative models.2226 A relatively small group of 
‘council’ communists were among these extremists, but they were unhappy 
with the ‘nationalist’ and ‘capitalist’ way in which the Russian Revolution 
had progressed. Hence, they preferred to continue working for a world 
revolution as they understood it. e anti-parliamentarism of former 
2221 MacDonald 1919, 1–2.
2222 MacDonald 1919, 11, 13–14, 28, 56–7.
2223 MacDonald 1919, 58.
2224 Pugh 2002, 188.
2225 MacDonald 1919, 64–5, 103–104. 
2226 Ball 1991, 247.
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suragists, on the other hand, had deepened as a result of inspiration from 
Russia. In June 1919 the Worker’s Surage Federation (WSF) adopted an 
anti-parliamentary policy, with Sylvia Pankhurst contacting Lenin and 
allegedly moving towards revolutionary Marxist anarchism. Disputes on 
whether or not to use parliamentary elections for propaganda purposes 
continued among the far le: the Bolsheviks encouraged ‘revolutionary 
parliamentarism’, which aimed at replacing parliaments with soviets. At the 
same time, the WSF rejected elections and instead distributed revolutionary 
propaganda. According to them, parliamentary speaking was an inecient 
way to talk to the people because of the distilling role of the capitalist press. 
Furthermore, once he was an MP, a communist might become a reformist, 
something that Labour MPs were generally accused of. Nevertheless even 
some communists concluded that the majority of the working classes 
considered Parliament legitimate and that it was necessary to participate in 
parliamentary work just to destroy such an illusion.2227 
e transition to democracy was even more complicated in Germany, 
Sweden and Finland. From the point of view of British public discourse, 
dominated by debates on the terms of peace, there was little in German 
democratisation that was promising. e Times initially wrote more 
optimistically about ‘German democracy’ than e Manchester Guardian, 
recognising the German ‘revolutionary’ franchise reform as being based on 
‘the principles of democracy’ advocated by the Allies2228 and the election as 
‘an overwhelming verdict on the side of ordered democracy’.2229 ough there 
was concern about possible Bolshevist advances at the cost of democracy2230 
and therefore a tendency to declare the entire assembly a failure in early 
March,2231 e Manchester Guardian was assured that the new German 
Constitution was ‘strictly democratic’.2232 German reactions to the peace 
terms, on the other hand, manifested the ‘weakness of the people’ as opposed 
to being demonstrations of ‘a manly democratic spirit’,2233 and in late June 
the paper concluded that the foreign policies of ‘democratic Germany’ had 
not really changed from those of ‘reactionary Germany’. Hence, Germany 
did not deserve trust on the part of the Allied ‘democracies’.2234 
Comments in the Liberal press about the Weimar Constituent Assembly 
were sceptical: ‘e Parliament of the German nation . . .  has gone a long 
way towards the restoration of the old regime’ and did not really distinguish 
itself from the former Reichstag, it was suggested. One reporter wondered 
about ‘the complete absence of anything to indicate the advent of a radically 
new era and a new spirit’.2235 Another writer could not believe that Prussia 
would change her temperament and predicted: ‘the kind of democracy being 
2227 Macintyre 1980, 195, 197; Shipway 1988, x, 6–9, 18–20, 62.
2228 e Times, ‘Responsible German Representatives’, 24 January 1919.
2229 e Times, ‘e Struggle in Germany’, 28 February 1919.
2230 e Times, ‘e German Government and its Rivals’, 3 March 1919.
2231 e Times, ‘Failure of Weimar Assembly’, 8 March 1919.
2232 e Times, ‘e German Counter-Proposals’, 29 May 1919.
2233 e Times, ‘e Progress Towards Peace’, 16 May 1919.
2234 e Times, ‘German “Faith”’, 23 June 1919.
2235 e Manchester Guardian, ‘German Government’, 20 February 1919.
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forged under the Republic is very dierent from that which Europe would 
recognise as a guarantee of peace.’2236 One experienced observer did see the 
National Constituent Assembly as seriously trying to create a democratic 
constitution and advised the British not to disrupt the process with 
excessively severe peace terms.2237 All the same, for e Manchester 
Guardian, the Weimar Parliament was a mere ‘hapless assembly’2238 that 
lacked a parliamentary spirit in the eyes of a ‘westerner’.2239 e adoption 
of the Weimar Constitution brought no welcoming comments in British 
papers – rather expressions of superiority.
Swedish democratisation no longer attracted any attention in Britain 
during spring 1919. Sweden mainly appeared in discussions surrounding 
the founding of the League of Nations, with Hjalmar Branting featuring 
as a spokesman for the neutral countries and for extended democracy in 
international relations. In this context, he took up the dispute over the Åland 
Islands with Finland, implying just before the Finnish election that the 
Finnish government remained ‘only the Government of half the people’.2240 
Indicative of the reorientation in Scandinavian political cultures from 
Germany to Britain is Branting’s address to the British Labour Conference, 
in which he stated that Swedish socialism had been initially inuenced by 
the German labour movement but had ‘turned more and more for guidance 
to the democracies of the West’. Indeed, the fall of the Hohenzollern 
monarchy ‘had given a great impetus to democratic forces in Sweden’.2241 
e only worrying news from Sweden was that the far le there seemed to 
be aiming for the ‘true democracy of the Soviet system’, i.e. a dictatorship 
of the proletariat through class war.2242 Branting ostentatiously denounced 
Bolshevism – as seen in Finland and in Petrograd by the Swedes – as the 
negation of socialism. For Branting, socialism stood for the ‘organisation’ of 
democracy.2243 
e Finns, too, had started to rethink their pro-Prussian political 
culture, at rst with the founding of an Anglo-French Club that welcomed 
members ‘who appreciate the culture of the West’.2244 ere was also the 
counterproductive news that some MPs had opposed ‘Finnish humility 
before the Entente, and declared that their sympathies would always remain 
with Germany’.2245 Widespread Bolshevik propaganda was reported to be 
hampering the internal situation in the country,2246 and the promises of the 
2236 e Observer, ‘“e Round Table”’, 2 March 1919.
2237 e Manchester Guardian, George Saunders, ‘e Situation in Germany’, 20 April 
1919.
2238 e Manchester Guardian, ‘e Treaty and Aer’, 4 May 1919.
2239 e Manchester Guardian, ‘How Germany Agreed to Sign’, 25 June 1919.
2240 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Neutrals and League of Nations’, 19 February 1919.
2241 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Labour Conference’, 27 June 1919.
2242 e Manchester Guardian, ‘e Soviet Idea’, 23 July 1919.
2243 e Times, ‘M. Branting’s Denunciation of Bolshevism’, 22 April 1919.
2244 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Anglo-French Club in Finland’, 14 January 1919.
2245 e Times, ‘Germany’s Finnish Friends’, 24 January 1919; see also Hentilä & 
Hentilä 2016, 371.
2246 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Bolshevism Spreading in Finland’, 11 April 1919.
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socialists to use only parliamentary methods were regarded with suspicion.2247 
A republican majority in the new election2248 and progress in plans for 
a  republican constitution, and especially Finnish support for British anti-
Bolshevik measures, earned Finland British recognition of its independence 
as a ‘counter-revolutionary country’. is happened despite continuous 
complaints about the White terror in the British public debate.2249 e Times 
reported via Sweden that that there was an unparalleled class war between 
the Whites and the Reds going on in a country which ‘belongs more to the 
East than the West’ and had ‘the forms without the traditions of democracy 
and freedom’. Not even Russia had yet seen anything corresponding to 
the Finnish hostilities.2250 In a report from Helsinki, William T. Goode 
concluded that this previously democratic country had turned to a ferocity 
in its treatment of the Reds that was only likely to provoke more support for 
Bolshevism.2251 Considerations related to great power politics rather than 
the advancement of democracy would seem to have dominated the change 
in British policy towards Finland. An interesting detail is that the Finnish 
Eduskunta continued to be called ‘the Diet’ rather than ‘the Parliament’ in 
a more progressive sense;2252 this obviously arose from its previous Swedish 
name ‘Lantdag’, a word that associated it with regional estate assemblies in 
Prussia and elsewhere, rather than the contemporary ‘Riksdag’. Clearly, the 
status of Finland as a democratic policy remained doubtful in the British 
public debate, and only the implementation of a new republican constitution 
would gradually start to change these reserved conceptions.
7.2  e construction of a democratic and parliamentary Germany 
 in the Weimar National Assembly
7.2.1  Expert planning for a new constitution 
Aer October 1918, Germany experienced the most dramatic of the 
constitutional upheavals in the four cases studied here. First the Prussian 
political order, which had despised parliamentarism and prioritised 
executive power, was transformed into a parliamentary monarchy in 
October 1918, then the monarchy collapsed on 9 November 1918, and the 
far le attempted to introduce council rule at the local level. is attempt 
failed in the face of what was to be known as the Weimar Coalition, formed 
by the Social Democrats and the centre parties – the Catholic Centre 
had also moved over to the side of parliamentarism.2253 ‘Democracy’ had 
2247 e Times, ‘Finnish Coalition’, 21 April 1919.
2248 e Times, ‘Finnish Republican Majority’, 13 March 1919.
2249 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Recognition for Finland’, 7 May 1919, ‘British 
Squadron o Helsingfors’, 14 May 1919.
2250 e Times, ‘Class War in Finland’, 11 February 1919.
2251 e Manchester Guardian, ‘e White Terror in Finland’, 14 July 1919.
2252 e Times, ‘Class War in Finland’, 11 February 1919; e Manchester Guardian, 
‘Finland and British Recognition’, 8 May 1919, ‘Finland a Republic’, 24 June 1919.
2253 Grosser 1970, 158.
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been almost a party slogan of the Social Democrats in autumn 1918, and 
parliamentarism had been defended by some liberals as well, but the 
rejection of both remained categorical among the right. ere had been 
neither the time nor the willingness for the kind of rethinking which the 
right in many other countries was forced to undertake in these years.
A solution to the constitutionally awkward situation aer the German 
Revolution was to be sought by a national constituent assembly. Convening 
a special assembly to discuss the constitution was nothing new in German 
history: the Frankfurt Parliament of 1848–49 had already tried to nd 
a solution for all of Germany but had failed to do so owing to a Prussian 
intervention. e idea of convening a national constituent assembly was 
supported by most political groups – including the liberals, members of the 
old elite and most socialists. e starting point seemed promising in that 
the assembly constituted a legitimate sovereign body supported by a large 
number of the people and elected on the basis of universal surage.2254 
However, this was not the whole truth: parliamentary traditions, such as 
ministerial responsibility to the parliament, or allowing parliamentary 
decisions to govern policies, were weak and trust in the parliament as an 
institution low. e dissatisfaction of the right resulting from the German 
Revolution was reinforced by the strengthening myth that Germany had lost 
the war as a result of the le plotting with the enemy and the consequent 
deterioration of the situation on the home front aer 1917.2255 e right, 
too, had been ready for some concessions that would allow the people better 
involvement in politics and for the appeasement of the Western powers 
with demonstrations of reforms. But once the Western powers proved 
inexible on the terms of peace – at a time when the constitutional debates 
were approaching a conclusion in Germany – all readiness to advance 
parliamentary government evaporated among the right. eir attitudes 
would not move towards democracy like the majority of the right in Britain, 
Sweden and Finland – though there was a considerable delay in these 
countries, too. 
Despite the rightist doubts, constitutional reforms proceeded with 
speed once the war was over. e general election of 19 January 1919 was 
already based on universal surage and proportional representation. e 
turnout (83%) suggests a high degree of political mobilisation. e SPD was 
successful, winning 37.9 per cent of the votes and 165 seats, which increased 
the self-condence of their parliamentary argumentation. e Independent 
Socialists received just 7.6 per cent of the votes and 22 seats,2256 while the 
Communists boycotted the election,2257 which removed the far le to the 
margins of the assembly. e German Social Democratic Party had avoided 
radicalisation of the kind experienced in Russia or Finland, and it had even 
earned a reputation as a patriotic party that supported the war eort, albeit 
hardly among the right. 
2254 Bollmeyer 2007, 196.
2255 Leonhard 2014, 916.
2256 Bollmeyer 2007, 216.
2257 Gusy 1997, 59.
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Republican, anti-monarchical and parliamentary feelings were 
strong among the voters. e election result led to the creation of the 
Weimar Coalition, which was formed by the SPD, the liberal German 
Democratic Party (DDP) and the Catholic Centre,2258 the supporters of 
parliamentarisation and democratisation now being joined by the Catholics. 
e chances for a  successful adoption of a republican and democratic 
constitution were there. However, deepening economic problems, 
depressing news about the peace negotiations and the looming threat of 
a civil war2259 prevented the realisation of such a possibility. omas Mergel 
has concluded that the election of January 1919 was the only occasion when 
the emerging parliamentary system won the support of the majority of the 
German people.2260 Later in the spring, the moment had passed.
Outside Germany, these developments found a mixed reception: the 
British did not really believe that their former enemy was learning from the 
Western powers and adopting parliamentary government; the doubts were 
deep. On the other hand, the Swedish Liberal-Social Democratic government 
pointed to Germany when asserting to the right that the parliamentarisation 
of government and the democratisation of surage had become inevitable. 
In Finland, the German election suggested not only to republicans but 
also to most monarchists (apart from the Swedish People’s Party) that the 
time for a Prussian-type of monarchy was over. If Germany, the principal 
protector of Finland in 1918, was turning into a parliamentary democracy, 
the same should happen in Finland, particularly when the pressures in that 
direction from the West were so obvious. 
Previous research on the German constitutional debates of spring 1919 
has been more extensive than that on the British, Swedish or Finnish reforms. 
Particularly noteworthy are Heiko Bollmeyer’s discussions of the uses of 
the concepts of the people and democracy by various political groups.2261 
Tina Pohl has explored ‘democratic thought’ in the Weimar National 
Constituent Assembly from the legal point of view, problematising the use 
of the concepts of the people and the state in the debates, though not always 
with complete conceptual historical sensitivity.2262 For omas Mergel, the 
National Constituent Assembly constituted a precursor of parliamentary 
culture in the Weimar Republic.2263 
On 6 February 1919, the elected members of the National Constituent 
Assembly convened in Weimar – symbolically not in the Prussian capital 
but in a capital of German culture, a place where this had taken shape during 
the age of National Romanticism – to adopt a democratic constitution for 
the new republic. However, the representatives wanted to discuss everyday 
problems rather than the basic values of the future German polity, a trait 
that, of course, had been typical of the reform debates in Britain, Sweden and 
2258 Bollmeyer 2007, 218. 
2259 Gusy 1997, 39–40.
2260 Mergel 2002, 38.
2261 Bollmeyer 2007, esp. 368–73.
2262 Pohl 2002, 116.
2263 Mergel 2002.
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Finland as well. Political bitterness had intensied under non-parliamentary 
government, and the Revolution had aected the views of the representatives. 
ey were confronted with a major challenge in replacing the Prussian 
political order with a democratic parliamentary republic. is was not going 
to be easy as a result of the continuing prevailing attitudes and the rightist 
view that the entire process had been imposed from outside. Would the will 
of the people now be recognised as the basis for the new political order, 
as had been vaguely suggested by the Chancellor and the Kaiser in spring 
1917, demanded in Western war propaganda and envisioned in the reforms 
of October 1918? And what would popular sovereignty possibly imply?2264 
While ‘the people’ were indeed generally regarded as the source of political 
authority,2265 understandings of the implications varied dramatically. Given 
the contested meaning of democracy in any polity, ideological dierences 
and the somewhat imported nature of the key notions, the representatives 
held heterogeneous understandings of democracy, popular sovereignty and 
parliamentarism.2266 None of the seven parties had a coherent conception 
of what the constitution should be like either,2267 which complicated the 
negotiations. 
At the opening of the Assembly on 6–7 February 1919, the strongest 
expressions in favour of parliamentary democracy were again heard from 
the Social Democrats, who had since autumn taken the lead in attempts to 
transform the polity of the Reich. eir interpretations were consistently 
disputed by the right – if not always in speeches then at least in pejorative 
interjections. Many members of the right made no contribution, excluding 
themselves from the process of negotiation and reconciliation on democracy, 
as some speakers in October 1918 had already suggested. e rst reading of 
the constitutional proposal took place between 28 February and 4 March 1919 
– at a time when the British electoral reform had already been put into force, 
the Swedish electoral reform was waiting for an extension to the national 
level and to women, and the Finns were voting in their rst parliamentary 
election aer the Civil War. During the committee stage between 4 March 
and 18 June, publicity was limited and prevented transnational transfers to 
Sweden and Finland, both of which were making constitutional decisions 
at the time, their parliaments assuming that Germany was on the way to 
extensive parliamentary democracy. Tina Pohl has suggested that the lack 
of publicity facilitated cooperation between committee members and the 
search for pragmatic solutions to a greater extent than the plenary debates, 
which more easily led to the politicisation of issues,2268 especially given the 
confrontational political culture of the old Reichstag. But the key issues 
were later taken up in the plenaries as well, oen in a radicalised form that 
2264 Bollmeyer 2007, 9.
2265 Bollmeyer 2005, 113.
2266 Pohl 2002, 3.
2267 Bollmeyer 2007, 214.
2268 Pohl 2002, 103–104, 146. is interpretation may have arisen out of a tendency 
in German research to play down the signicance of plenary debates on the basis 
of the issues having been settled elsewhere; Bollmeyer 2005, 119.
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reveals the ideological dierences between the parties. An important factor 
that decreased parliamentary publicity was a general strike in early March, 
which prevented the publication of non-socialist papers and subsequently 
caused them to focus on strike-related unrest.
e last two phases of the legislative process between 2 and 22 July 1919 
and 29 and 31 July 1919 were complicated because of the tense international 
relations aer the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles and a domestic 
political crisis. e passage of the constitution received very modest attention 
in the press, since the parliament was rather expected to provide solutions 
to acute everyday problems (as had been the case in Britain and Finland 
and to a great extent in Sweden as well).2269 e second reading began on 
2 July 1919, just four days aer the Treaty of Versailles had been signed and 
at a time when the economy was rapidly deteriorating. e peace terms had 
led to the replacement of Philipp Scheidemann’s (SPD) government with 
that of Gustav Bauer (SPD) supported only by the Social Democrats and 
the centre, but no longer by the le-liberals. Awareness of the hard terms of 
the treaty captured the attention of the parliamentarians, and unavoidably 
aected the course of the debates on the constitution.2270 
e July debates in Weimar could no longer aect constitutional decisions 
in the Swedish and Finnish national parliaments. With the major ideological 
importance of Germany for both monarchists and republicans, interest in 
the German constitution had nevertheless remained considerable. Many of 
the central issues of the republican constitutions, not least the question of 
the duality of government and the role of the president, were common to the 
debates in Germany and Finland, although there were also major dierences 
arising from the federal nature of the German polity. Federalism was an 
important feature of Germany but secondary for the more uniform nation-
states, so that our attention will next focus on the common issues discussed 
in the other national parliaments as well.
7.2.2 A revolution against dictatorship 
e opening of the National Constituent Assembly was an emotional 
moment, ‘like a dream’, for the Social Democrats.2271 A prominent role 
was played by their leader Friedrich Ebert, who had already been in a key 
position in the transition of power rst from the General Sta to the 
government of Max von Baden and then in a government led by Ebert 
himself. Ebert advocated the summoning of a national constituent assembly 
and suppressed the radical plans of the Independents, which made his 
policies appear as a betrayal of the working class in the eyes of the far le. In 
his opening speech in Weimar, Ebert now defended the limited ‘revolution’ 
as an alternative to both the Russian Revolution and the council movement 
of November 1918. According to Ebert, ‘the German people’ had made 
a revolution against an old, declining ‘dictatorship’ (Gewaltherrscha) – an 
interpretation of the former political order that was shared by the Social 
2269 See, for instance, Berliner Tageblatt, 30 July – 1 August 1919.
2270 Pohl 2002, 210.
2271 Vorwärts, 7 February 1919. 
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Democrats and most liberals, while the right protested with heckling.2272 
Bourgeois circles criticised Ebert aerwards for having spoken from an 
excessively socialist point of view.2273 e far le remained unhappy with 
what they regarded as an incomplete revolution. e division in views of the 
Revolution implied that the project of building a parliamentary polity was 
in danger of remaining one of the Social Democrats only. 
e Social Democrats did not mind monopolising the ideologically 
central concept of revolution:2274 the term ‘revolution’ seemingly allowed 
them to absolve themselves of any responsibility for the miserable state 
into which ‘the German people’ had been taken by ‘the mistaken politics 
of the old powers’.2275 By implication, the right was responsible for the crisis 
of autumn 1918 and hence also for the Revolution. e Social Democrats 
wanted to represent their revolution in a way that distinguished it from the 
less fortunate ones in Russia in 1917 and in Germany by the far le in late 
1918. From the rightist point of view, of course, the Social Democrats and 
their allies remained guilty of the fall of Germany. 
In the second plenary, aer he had been elected Speaker, Eduard David 
(SPD) set out to dene the mission of the new representative body. Once 
the war and the Revolution had ‘demoralised and broken’ the old system of 
government, it was the duty of the Assembly to construct a new constitution 
that would better serve the needs of the polity.2276 David’s general description 
of the state of aairs in the aermath of the war and the Revolution was easy to 
accept for many, but he went further and argued that the Revolution had not 
only been a political coup but should also be seen as an economic and social 
turning point,2277 which brought in a socialist agenda. David’s argument was 
needed in order to challenge the Independent Social Democrats, who were 
demanding further revolutionary measures. It also appeased the le wing 
of his own party. However, such goals were not supported by the bourgeois 
parties.2278 In the other three countries studied here, leading Majority Social 
Democrats were usually careful not to associate constitutional alterations 
with instant changes in economic and social structures, although in Sweden 
the Social Democrats had begun to move in that direction once the surage 
reform was secured. Among the parties of the far le (and the Finnish Social 
Democrats before the Civil War) such views were openly entertained. 
e le-liberal allies held a slightly dierent concept of revolution. 
Hugo Preuß (German Democratic Party), who was a Professor of Law, had 
previously argued in favour of popular government and, as the Minister 
of Interior Aairs, had draed a proposal aiming at a balance between 
2272 Verhandlungen, Friedrich Ebert, 6 February 1919, 1; Berliner Tageblatt, 
7 February 1919.
2273 Berliner Tageblatt, 6 February 1919; Neue Preußische Zeitung, 7 February 1919, 
quoting Berliner Tageblatt. Even Vorwärts, 7 February 1919, recognised that 
Ebert had emphasised socialism. 
2274 Vorwärts, 6 February 1919.
2275 Verhandlungen, Friedrich Ebert, 6 February 1919, 1.
2276 Verhandlungen, Eduard David, 7 February 1919, 8–9.
2277 Verhandlungen, Eduard David, 7 February 1919, 9.
2278 Berliner Tageblatt, 8 February 1919.
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parliamentarism, presidentialism, government and the referendum. He now 
likewise suggested that any opposition by the monarchists to the realisation 
of popular sovereignty (a term not used as such in the dra) had been 
eliminated ‘by the fact of the Revolution’.2279 Now the revolutionary era, too, 
had come to an end; it was time for the Assembly to merely conrm the new 
legal order.2280 
Such ‘attempts to declare the Revolution over’ were strongly opposed 
by the Independent Social Democrats, who considered themselves losers 
in the Social Democratic-centrist settlement and consequently wanted to 
carry on the struggle. For Dr. Oskar Cohn, it was unacceptable that the 
‘Revolution’ should be declared nished and the entire term excluded from 
the dra constitution. ‘Revolution’, aer all, meant that the entire German 
state needed to be recreated.2281 
Very dierent views on the Revolution were voiced by the right. Konrad 
Beyerle, a Bavarian Professor of Law, insisted that the ‘revolutionary confusion’ 
had already established a suciently democratic and parliamentary order 
and that no further measures in that direction were needed.2282 Rudolf 
Heinze of the new German People’s Party, a former Minister of Justice of 
Saxony, ignored any redenition of the polity and instead defended the 
old Bismarckian constitution.2283 Still further to the right, Clemens von 
Delbrück of the German National People’s Party, who had participated in 
the parliamentarisation of the constitution in October 1918, maintained that 
the November Revolution had been totally unnecessary as the reforms of the 
preceding month had already created a new German polity.2284 e rightist 
view was that Germany should remain a parliamentarised constitutional 
monarchy and reject radical reform. Adelbert Düringer consequently urged 
the Social Democrats to nally give up ‘the illusion of a world revolution’.2285 
International comparisons and reections on an ongoing transnational 
transition to parliamentary democracy remained few and far between, which 
reects a German tendency to nationalise the debate aer uncomfortable 
external interventions. Many members, especially lawyers, had studied only 
in German universities, which decreased the number and depth of their 
international contacts in comparison with the rather more cosmopolitan 
(or at least German-oriented) Swedish and Finnish lawyers. e British, for 
their part, although lacking Continental perspectives, oen had common-
law examples from the dominions or the United States in mind. e 
members of the Assembly thus tended to see the German situation in 1919 
as unique in comparison with the circumstances of the other great powers: 
Britain and France had created their parliamentary democracies earlier 
and retained them in wartime, and at the time of the peace negotiations in 
2279 Verhandlungen, Hugo Preuß, 8 February 1919, 12.
2280 Verhandlungen, Hugo Preuß, 8 February 1919, 13; also Berliner Tageblatt, 11 
February 1919.
2281 Verhandlungen, Oskar Cohn, 10 February 1919, 22.
2282 Verhandlungen, Konrad Beyerle, 3 March 1919, 464.
2283 Pohl 2002, 123.
2284 Pohl 2002, 119.
2285 Verhandlungen, Adelbert Düringer, 30 July 1919, 2090.
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Versailles they did not seem to be likely sources of inspiration. Russia had 
gone its revolutionary way, one rejected by a great majority of Germans, and 
the United States – even if a republic with a president preaching the gospel 
of democracy – was seen by many as too dierent (or too upstart) to oer 
an applicable model. Only Oskar Cohn, an Independent Social Democrat 
and Jewish internationalist, argued that the possibilities for ‘a democratic 
culture and tradition’ were much better in republican France and the United 
States because of the dierent attitudes that prevailed among the bourgeoisie 
there. In line with his radical argument, Cohn also questioned the relevance 
of previous German constitutions as starting points for what the German 
republicans should create.2286 is irritated those who continued to regard 
the nineteenth-century tradition of constitutional monarchy as one that 
ensured stability and strength. A particular reason for Cohn to view the 
American and French constitutions so positively may have been their 
recognition of Jews as equal citizens.
According to Christopher Gusy, the US model did play a role in the 
formulation of the German constitution thanks to its presidential nature. 
One initial intention had been, aer all, to formulate a constitution that 
would induce the Americans to grant milder terms of peace. To a more 
limited extent, the French, British and neighbouring Swiss models were 
relevant in theoretical debates, although they were interpreted selectively 
according to traditional German ways of thinking.2287 What was going 
on in minor powers such as the Netherlands, Sweden or Finland was not 
considered to have any signicance. e Swiss model counted because of 
that country’s cultural proximity and perhaps to a limited extent also because 
of international socialist interest in its use of direct appeals to the people 
and its committee-like government, which distinguished it from Western 
European parliamentarism. For many, however, the Frankfurt National 
Constituent Assembly of 1848 was the only point of comparison with the 
one in Weimar in 1919.
7.2.3  Defining ‘the most democratic democracy  
 in the world’
Vorwärts characterised the opening of the National Constituent Assembly 
as a ght for ‘the idea of democracy as always represented by Social 
Democracy’ against both rightist and leist extremes, the Assembly 
being represented as the very ‘bearer of democracy’.2288 Friedrich Ebert, 
who as Chairman of the Social Democratic Party had been directing the 
constitutional transition since November, set the establishment of the new 
democracy in Germany as a goal. However, a wide variety of understandings 
of democracy obviously continued to coexist within the reformist coalition. 
In the debates, the members used the term pragmatically, aiming at solving 
concrete problems,2289 but ‘democracy’ did not constitute a simple answer to 
2286 Verhandlungen, Oskar Cohn, 10 February 1919, 23.
2287 Gusy 1997, 63.
2288 Vorwärts, 6 February 1919.
2289 Gusy 2000a, 23–5; Kühne 2000, 116.
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these. e meanings that the members associated with the word reected 
prevailing political opinions among sections of German society, and 
these varied a lot as no real tradition of democratic thought or historical 
experiences of democracy extending beyond broad male surage in 
Reichstag elections existed. Because of the wartime challenge of ‘Western 
democracy’, the concept continued to have pejorative associations with 
foreign intrusion. e peculiar nature of the Revolution of November 1918, 
with both the right and the far le remaining dissatised with the result, 
accusations that the war had been lost as a result of the activities of socialist 
traitors, the abuses of the councils created by the far le, a state of latent 
civil war during the sessions of the Assembly and the lack of economic relief 
with the transition to parliamentary democracy all made the concept of 
democracy a negatively charged one in the German context.2290 ere were 
numerous similarities with the Finnish constitutional crisis, but the Finns 
had a longer national tradition of representation, had already experienced 
their worst confrontations in 1917–18 and succeeded in bringing most of 
the Social Democrats and the Finnish-speaking right over to the side of 
limited democracy during the constitutional debates of spring 1919.
Without emphasising ‘democracy’ very extensively in these circum-
stances, Friedrich Ebert dened the new constitution in vernacular terms, 
expressing its premises in parlance that might be easier to reconcile with 
the traditions of German politics. Ebert talked about ‘our free people’s 
republic’ (Unsere freie Volksrepublik)2291 rather than ‘democracy’ in any sense 
recommended to Germany by Allied war propaganda. Eduard David, who 
possessed a doctorate in German and thus had a highly sophisticated sense 
of the semantic associations of the words, talked about Volksherrscha (rule 
by the people) as a vernacular alternative to the foreign term, though he also 
sometimes referred to ‘democracy’ becoming central in the new political 
system, which he described as a ‘democratic republic’.2292 ere was a longer 
tradition in Northern Europe of replacing ‘democracy’ with vernacular 
terms that referred to popular government (volksregeering in Dutch, folkstyre 
in Swedish, kansanvalta in Finnish). Such coinages derived from words for 
‘the people’ oen recalled ethnic and organic understandings of the state 
as a community of a uniform or consensual people. In Germany more 
clearly than elsewhere, the war had strengthened notions of the existence of 
a classless Volksgemeinscha (community of the people), within which the 
people shared a common ‘organic’ spirit and were identical with their state. 
Such a polity thus could not be considered a pluralistic society suering from 
conicts of interest. Historians agree that this concept actually constituted 
a powerful alternative to Western parliamentary systems and Western 
political theory. In the context of 1919, Volksgemeinscha provided a basis 
for conceptualising democracy in a positive, ethnic, initially enlightened 
and seemingly apolitical way.2293 However, the fact that it was also able to 
2290 Gusy 2000a, 27; Kühne 2000, 117.
2291 Verhandlungen, Friedrich Ebert, 6 February 1919, 2.
2292 Verhandlungen, Eduard David, 4 March 1919, 498, 500.
2293 See Grosser 1970, 219; Llanque 2000, 322; Bruendel 2003, 259; Leonhard 2006, 
210.
437
7.2 The construction of a democratic and parliamentary Germany
provide an argument for dictatorship would become obvious towards the 
end of the Weimar Republic.
During and aer the Weimar Assembly, Volksgemeinscha was, 
according to omas Mergel, a favourite concept for most German 
political groups, who regarded it as expressing the prevailing wishes of 
the people concerning the German political culture and as characterising 
a harmonious community in which societal conicts of interest had come 
to an end.2294 Volksgemeinscha could be interpreted in nationalist, socialist, 
conservative or völkisch (popular) terms, so that both Social Democrats 
and Conservatives were able to identify with it.2295 Whether the yearning 
aer a harmonious ethnic community was realistic and reconcilable with 
pluralistic democracy seems questionable in hindsight, but this was not 
always apparent to the people of the time. In this kind of collectivistic 
thinking, the concept ‘the people’ included more than just the majority, and 
the will of the people was more than just the current majority opinion. It 
followed from such an understanding of a community of the people that 
a parliament alone could not possibly be regarded as a trustworthy indicator 
of the will of the people,2296 an interpretation that supported the solutions of 
the constitutional proposal draer by liberals.
Volksgemeinscha thus tended to make the concept of the people in 
a  nationalistic sense dominate over democracy and parliamentarism in 
senses that referred to active political participation by the citizens and pro 
et contra debate. Such a way of thinking was by no means inuential in 
Germany only: many rightist MPs in Sweden and Finland also entertained 
notions resembling the concept of a Volksgemeinscha, as we saw in the 
debates of 1918. In Finnish, the customary vernacularisation of democracy 
was kansanvalta, which could be understood to refer to the totality of 
the people rather than mere majority opinion (the Social Democrats had 
monopolised the concept of the will of the people in 1917), though the 
extent of the concept was limited by the bilingual nature of the country 
and connected notions of two peoples (Finnish- and Swedish-speakers) 
within one nation. As we have seen, the Finnish term carried connotations 
derived from ethnicity (kansa = folk) and social dierence, not only from 
‘the people’ in a political sense. e constitutional conclusions that were 
drawn in Finland were similar to those in Germany: a counter-force to the 
parliament was called for, a presidency being seen particularly by the right 
as another and even more genuine representative of the will of the people. As 
section 7.4 will show, monarchist theorists and linguists in Finland therefore 
preferred to translate ‘republic’ with the word kansanvaltio (state of the 
people), which comes very close to contemporary German translations.
Wilhelm Pfannkuch (SPD), the most senior of the German MPs, 
saw no reason to avoid ‘democracy’ but preferred to give it a national 
connotation by emphasising the particular ‘German democracy’ which the 
2294 Mergel 2002, 54; e nobility did not share this view, however. Malinowski 2003, 
603.
2295 Bruendel 2003, 140.
2296 Gusy 1997, 64.
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National Constituent Assembly itself constituted. is implied that some 
suspect Western democracy was not simply being imposed on Germany 
and that German socialists were not merely associating themselves with a 
transnational democratic moment. It suggested that there existed democratic 
traditions on which to build, at least within the Social Democratic move-
ment in Germany. Like parliamentarism, democracy should be seen as the 
result of a national process leading to a fundamentally German political 
system, not one imported from abroad. Anyone who dared to oppose 
this democracy was, according to Pfannkuch, a ‘counter-revolutionary’.2297 
is tendency to nationalise democracy, understandable in the context of 
constant accusations of betrayal by the right, was stronger among German 
than Swedish Social Democrats, while the Finnish Social Democrats acted 
in essentially the same manner.
Eduard David (SPD) was in a position, rst as Speaker of the Assembly, 
to dene ‘democracy’ and then, as the Minister for Internal Aairs, to 
direct the process of constructing the new polity. Clearly happy about the 
proposed constitutional reform, he turned to superlatives in declaring it to 
be productive of ‘the most democratic constitution in the world’. For a Social 
Democrat, democracy was based on the complete equality of the rights of the 
citizens. David recognised that democracy had not so long ago been rejected 
in Germany as ‘a concept with a rather evil reputation’ and that many still 
longed for the so-called good old days. ese opponents of democratisation 
should learn that ‘democracy’ expressed ‘the highest political ideal’ of the 
day. In democracy as dened by David, the people possessed the right of 
self-determination but were also responsible for demonstrating ‘political 
self-denial’ with respect to democratic majority decisions: ‘the democratic 
rights of an individual are limited by the democratic rights of others.’2298 
ese principles still seemed to be something that had to be taught to the 
supporters of the old regime. Advising the members of the Assembly in his 
role as Speaker, David applied the principles of democracy to parliamentary 
procedure: ‘In this house, too, the responsibilities of democracy must be 
observed.’ When David revealingly declared that the house should be ‘a site 
of free democratic subordination of the individual to the will and work 
of the collectivity’, the implication was that the right might not be ready 
to recognise decisions made by the parliamentary majority (which had 
not held such decisive power under the Prussian political order).2299 is 
meant that pre-war traditions of confrontation should be given up and 
majority opinions and votes respected, though there was also a hint of the 
Volksgemeinscha included. e goal for parliamentary work and individual 
MPs was to demonstrate that ‘Germany is a country mature enough for 
democracy’.2300 Doubts among the German right about the maturity of 
2297 Verhandlungen, Wilhelm Pfannkuch, 6 February 1919, 4.
2298 Verhandlungen, Eduard David, 7 February 1919, 8.
2299 Verhandlungen, Eduard David, 7 February 1919, 8.
2300 Verhandlungen, Eduard David, 7 February 1919, 8. See also Friedrich von Payer’s 
similar suggestion on successful parliamentary work as a demonstration of the 
breakthrough of ‘the democratic idea’ on 10 February 1919, 21.
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the people for a democracy found a parallel in rightist sceptics in Sweden 
and Finland. In the British political culture, on the other hand, similar 
conservative doubts had become more dicult to express. e British were 
rather observing whether or not the Germans were mature enough.
David next elevated democracy into the position of a programmatic 
concept, arguing further that the constitution would create ‘a democratic 
republic, a republic in which the supreme state power rests with the 
people, in which the representation of the people is the source of political 
power.’ e use of this power of the people would, furthermore, be based 
on the most ‘democratic’ surage in the world.2301 In the nal debates he 
asserted, as a reaction to claims that the constitution was a mere ‘comedy of 
democracy in the world’, that this ‘most democratic democracy in the world’ 
would ensure peaceful development through legislation,2302 the repetitive 
nature of the attribute reecting the continuously highly contested meaning 
of ‘democracy’. Responding to rightist criticism about how democracy 
was understood by the government, David now explained, employing 
conservative language, that democracy was needed to support ‘the national 
feeling of a state’,2303 nationalising the concept discursively as a concession 
to the discourse of the opposition. David actually assigned senses of 
a  ‘community of the people’ in an ethnic sense to democracy, reinforcing 
its essentially German rather than universal nature. Many leading Social 
Democrats had supported the national eort during the war, and they, too, 
continued to see democracy in more nationalist terms than was the case in 
most other countries, especially in Sweden.
David’s advice to the supposedly non-democratic – or even ‘anti-
democratic’ as Vorwärts more abrasively put it2304 – minority and nationalis-
tic redenitions of democracy hardly convinced the parliamentary right. 
eir reaction was oen to see ‘democracy’ as a concept which the Social 
Democrats were dening to serve merely party-political ends and the 
interests of the victors in the war. It remained dicult for many on the 
right to reconcile themselves with the victors of the German constitutional 
struggle no matter how moderate the German Majority Social Democratic 
discourse was by international standards. Interesting is the collectivistic 
attitude reected by David’s ‘democratic subordination of the individual’ in 
a majority democracy: Would such a democracy tolerate a plurality of views 
and respect minorities? 
Social Democratic speakers, now in inuential political positions, talked 
willingly about ‘the democratic construction of our country’ in ‘the spirit of 
democracy’.2305 Vorwärts asserted that the provisional constitution was ‘purely 
2301 Verhandlungen, Eduard David, 4 March 1919, 498. e formulation resembles 
that of the beginning of the Finnish republican constitution of July 1919.
2302 Verhandlungen, Eduard David, 31 July 1919, 2194–5.
2303 Verhandlungen, Eduard David, 4 March 1919, 500.
2304 Vorwärts, 11 February 1919.
2305 See for instance Verhandlungen, Paul Löbe, 10 February 1919, 20. Löbe had 
been deeply engaged in Social Democratic discourse and activism since his 
early youth and had in November 1918 proclaimed the opening of ‘a cathedral 
of Democracy’ in Breslau.
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democratic’ and guaranteed ‘the democratic development of Germany’.2306 
But did the Social Democrats manage to persuade the representatives of 
other parties with this discourse? eir organ did recognise the le-liberals 
as equal ‘democrats’.2307 In practice, though the le-liberals should have had 
no reason to avoid the concept and had already used it positively in the 
autumn, they nevertheless did not mention democracy very oen. ere 
were some exceptions, to be sure: Friedrich von Payer – a dedicated defender 
of democratisation and parliamentarism, a former Vice Chancellor of the 
Reich and a leader of the German Democratic Party – did not hesitate to 
characterise the new Germany as a ‘democracy’,2308 voicing the long-term 
goal of many liberals from the southern German states. e liberal organ, 
Berliner Tageblatt, also welcomed the provisional constitution as the rst 
building block of a democratic Germany.2309 
Indicative of the limits placed on ‘democracy’ in the new constitution is 
that its formulator Hugo Preuß (German Democratic Party), an advocate 
of the Volksstaat (state of the people), did not talk about the content of 
the concept before the Assembly. Preuß merely stated that in the future 
‘democratically recognised power’ would be exercised and implied that 
democracy required a strong central power as opposed to particularistic 
tendencies;2310 democracy was more about the centralisation of structures 
than about political culture in the future polity. Preuß furthermore 
stated that the power of the Assembly was democratically legitimate,2311 
but otherwise he le the term ‘democracy’ undened. Some le-liberals 
nevertheless joined in the discourse on democracy: Erich Koch-Weser 
emphasised the democratic foundations of the constitution, accusing the far 
le of ‘anti-democratic’ ideas and the right of their inability to recognise that 
there existed no other ways to govern than democratic ones in the post-war 
world.2312 It is noteworthy, however, that Bruno Ablaß, while accusing the 
far le of ‘working against democracy’ and declaring himself a ‘democrat’ 
and a supporter of ‘real democracy’, insisted that democracy called for 
‘powerful men who are active in the enforcement of the rights of freedom 
for the purpose of democracy’,2313 a formulation that indicated support 
for a strong presidency. Anton Erkelenz declared his belief in ‘democratic 
progress’ derived from the realisation of full civic rights and welcomed 
‘the democratisation of industrial relations’, while emphasising that further 
experiments leading to increased democratisation were to be avoided.2314 
ere was clearly a discursive tendency among German liberals to speak for 
the creation of a stable polity constructed around a constitution prepared by 
liberals rather than to envision further societal progress. eir enthusiasm 
2306 Vorwärts, 11 February 1919.
2307 Vorwärts, 6 February 1919.
2308 Verhandlungen, Friedrich von Payer, 10 February 1919, 20. 
2309 Berliner Tageblatt, 11 February 1919.
2310 Verhandlungen, Hugo Preuß, 8 February 1919, 13.
2311 Verhandlungen, Hugo Preuß, 8 February 1919, 12–13.
2312 Verhandlungen, Erich Koch-Weser, 28 February 1919, 391–2.
2313 Verhandlungen, Bruno Ablaß, 4 July 1919, 1309.
2314 Verhandlungen, Anton Erkelenz, 21 July 1919, 1776, 1778.
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for democracy was modest in comparison with Swedish and many Finnish 
liberals.
Gustav Stresemann, the chairman of the right-wing German People’s 
Party, joined in the criticism of the far le, accusing them of a ‘mockery of 
democracy’ and of advocating ‘the absolutism of a minority’,2315 but he had 
little to add in favour of further democratisation. He viewed democracy as 
a partisan concept rather than a common goal, and suggested that ‘the side 
of democracy’ had long been active in criticising Bismarckian politics.2316 
While democracy of this kind could be understood as the oppositional power 
of the Reichstag in relation to the executive power, the audience probably 
understood Stresemann as referring to the Social Democratic and liberal 
front that since 1917 had been demanding reforms and was now ruling the 
country. Stresemann’s own party was not part of the current coalition, and it 
maintained an attitude that was basically critical of democratisation. On the 
last day of the debate, the leader of the parliamentary group of the People’s 
Party, Rudolf Heinze, outspokenly rejected the constitutional proposal 
as being based on ‘the spirit of an extreme democracy’. e right-liberals 
(DVP) saw the proposal as an attempt to make everyone equal; it would lead 
to mistrust between democratic institutions, populism and the rejection of 
the reason of state argument.2317 e German right-liberals clearly did not 
support the new democracy.
Most German reformers in 1919 no longer viewed themselves as 
participants in some pan-European wave of democratisation: their interest 
only concerned Germany. Downright traditionalist understandings of 
democracy also appeared in the speeches of Peter Spahn, the Deputy 
Chairman of the Constitutional Committee and the spokesman for the 
Catholic Centre, which had already been less enthusiastic about reforms in 
1917. e traditional values of the party were still there: the new German 
polity should be democratic, no doubt, but also social and inspired by 
a truly Christian (Catholic) spirit. A constitution alone could not guarantee 
that such values would be achieved: formal political institutions informed 
by a Christian spirit were needed. Spahn still doubted the positive eects of 
female surage as well,2318 even though it had already been implemented and 
female MPs were sitting in the same chamber. ere were evident limits to 
the democratic attitudes of the dierent parties within the Weimar coalition, 
a factor that diers from the reformist attitudes of the ministries that had 
carried through corresponding reforms in Britain and Sweden (and in 
Finland with the exception of the Swedish People’s Party). 
e particularistic interests of the federal states as opposed to Preuß’s 
centralised democracy also received expression in a speech by Konrad 
Beyerle, a Professor of Law representing the Catholic Centre. According to 
this member of the Constitutional Committee, the Revolution of autumn 
1918 had already led to the introduction of a suciently ‘democratic-
2315 Verhandlungen, Gustav Stresemann, 4 March 1919, 491.
2316 Verhandlungen, Gustav Stresemann, 4 March 1919, 491.
2317 Verhandlungen, Rudolf Heinze, 30 July 1919, 2093.
2318 Pohl 2002, 117–18.
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parliamentary form of government’, which only needed minor adjustments 
and no new denitions of the character of the polity. Beyerle did not 
question the legitimacy of the new state as such. What the ‘Socialist cabinet’ 
was proposing, however, was not just democratic but constituted an attempt 
to include the old leist goal of a unitary state in the constitution, which was 
inacceptable. is was being done in the name of democracy, disregarding 
what the socialists otherwise said about democracy as the realisation of the 
will of the people in the state.2319 e federalists thus linked the discourse 
on ‘democracy’ with the problematic concept of a unitary state, which 
diminished its legitimacy among many in the audience.
In addition to a member who explicitly questioned the form of democracy 
proposed by the ministry, a number of ocers, judges, professors and civil 
servants who did not hold democratic views continued to see the restoration 
of an autocratic system as a possibility.2320 Politically active professors in 
Germany (and in Sweden and Finland, and sometimes in Britain as well) 
were almost always supporters of the right.2321 In the atmosphere of the early 
Assembly it was not easy to question democracy, though Neue Preußische 
Zeitung did not hesitate to warn its readers about the risk of both democracy 
and socialism now making a breakthrough.2322 e rightist leader Clemens 
von Delbrück attempted a rhetorical redescription of democracy rst by 
suggesting that the constitutional proposal of October 1918 had already 
created a suciently ‘democratic monarchy’ and that going any further 
entailed ‘endangering democracy itself ’,2323 democracy being used here in 
a completely conservative sense. Albrecht von Graefe declared without 
qualication that democracy had been imposed on the majority of the 
German people against their will.2324 
Ultra-conservatives in Britain, Sweden and Finland expressed their 
doubts about excessive democracy even more frequently and oen 
rhetorically constructed a ‘democracy’ that was to their own liking, while 
the majorities of rightist parties actually reconciled themselves, albeit with 
some delay, to the new democratic order. In Germany, the abstention of most 
of the right from discussing democracy and occasional denouncements of it 
reected the unwillingness of the old elite to reconsider its political attitudes, 
which did not bode well for the future.2325 ey had been traumatised, even 
temporarily paralysed, by the fall of the imperial throne, but maintained 
their anti-democratic and anti-parliamentary principles at least until 1945. 
eir reactionary policies were at rst realised through a strong, nearly 
monarchical, presidency within the political structure of the republic.2326 
eir mouthpiece Neue Preußische Zeitung concluded aer the adoption 
2319 Verhandlungen, Konrad Beyerle, 28 February 1919, 464–5.
2320 Mergel 2002, 38–9.
2321 Mommsen 2002, 116.
2322 Neue Preußische Zeitung, 9 February 1919.
2323 Verhandlungen, Clemens von Delbrück, 28 February 1919, 383.
2324 Mergel 2002, 56.
2325 Cf. Mergel 2002, 59, on readiness among the right and le for cooperation and 
compromises.
2326 Trippe 1995, 13, 194; Leonhard 2002, 32, 35.
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of the Weimar constitution that ‘democracy has not been implemented so 
categorically anywhere’.2327 is reects the rejection of the new polity by the 
German right from the very beginning. 
e representatives of the far le were also dissatised with the degree of 
democracy oered by the dra constitution but for very dierent reasons. 
Oskar Cohn called for the democratisation of all aspects of the lives of the 
German people instead of submission to authority. Another reaction was 
heard when Eduard David repeatedly referred to ‘economic democracy’, 
‘social democracy’ or ‘labour democracy’ as necessary complements to 
‘political democracy’. For the radical Marxists, the reform of the mere 
superstructures of the German political system would not suce: they took 
‘democracy’ as a primary principle which should lead to the abolition of all 
dierences between the governing and the governed, with the German state 
being constituted by all of its citizens.2328 Alfred Henke, a former leader of 
a  council, contrasted the ‘democracy’ supported by the Social Democrats 
and liberals as ‘the covert domination of capitalism’ with ‘real democracy’ in 
the Marxist sense,2329 which was something that the coalition parties did not 
want. According to Wilhelm Koenen, another council activist, this ‘power 
of the people falsied by capitalism’ and mere ‘political democracy’ should 
be replaced with ‘proletarian democracy’ and real ‘social democracy’;2330 this 
sounded like Lenin’s understanding of democracy. e Social Democratic 
response was to reject dictatorship as a means for obtaining socialist 
democracy2331 and to defend political democracy in Germany as ‘a democracy 
of the new era’ that would constitute, in the longer term, a road to socialism 
and ‘economic democracy’.2332 Hans Vogel of the Bavarian Social Democrats, 
a member of the Constitutional Committee, called for the democratisation 
of factories and companies.2333 However, the German Social Democrats did 
not dare to be too insistent in this respect in 1919: they considered it safest 
to guarantee a democratic constitution rst and to postpone economic and 
societal reforms, just as the Swedish Social Democrats had chosen to do in 
1918. Even many le-liberals were not ready to support them, rejecting the 
basic rights included in the constitution as an ‘economic council system’.2334
Demands for the extension of democracy beyond politics resembled 
those put forward by the Swedish far le in this period. e German 
example encouraged them (and later the Social Democrats) to continue 
calling for more extensive democratisation in economic and social matters. 
In Finland, many members of the far le who had put forward radical 
demands in 1917 had either been killed in the Civil War or jailed or had 
ed to Russia and formed the Finnish Communist Party in Moscow, where 
2327 Neue Preußische Zeitung, 1 August 1919.
2328 Verhandlungen, Oskar Cohn & Eduard David, 28 February 1919, 408–409; 
4  March 1919, 500–501; 31 July 1919, 2194; Pohl 2002, 125. 
2329 Verhandlungen, Alfred Henke, 10 July 1919, 1472.
2330 Verhandlungen, Wilhelm Koenen, 21 July 1919, 1780.
2331 Verhandlungen, Hugo Sinzheimer, 21 July 1919, 1796.
2332 Verhandlungen, Simon Katzenstein, 29 July 1919, 2075.
2333 Verhandlungen, Hans Vogel, 3 March 1919, 460.
2334 Berliner Tageblatt, 1 August 1919; see, however, Pohl 2002, 135.
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they denounced ‘bourgeois’ democracy. In 1919 the demands for economic 
and social democracy in the Finnish parliament were modest in comparison 
with Germany and Sweden, although some Social Democrats continued to 
emphasise the existence of economic and social inequality. 
In the aermath of the Treaty of Versailles, any enthusiasm for inter-
national or transnational democracy would have appeared out of place in 
Germany: democracy was a German national issue that simply needed to 
be reasserted by adopting (or rejecting) the constitution. is attitude was 
caused by the fact that the Western democrats seemed to have ‘committed 
a grave betrayal of democracy by assenting to this treaty’.2335 Germany’s note 
to the Entente had emphasised that ‘[t]he new constitution of the German 
Empire and the composition of its People’s Government correspond with 
the strictest principles of democracy’,2336 which revealingly emphasised both 
the German nature of the new system as a Volksstaat and its correspondence 
with Western democracy. e Manchester Guardian had reported that both 
German socialists and liberals looked ‘to the progressive and democratic 
thought of Western nations as the sole hope for the future of Europe’ 
although the paper foresaw the risk of oppressive Western policies leading 
to the revival of a nationalistic spirit in Germany.2337 Labour leaders and 
a commentator in e Observer had also wondered whether the peace had 
been concluded in the spirit of democracy2338 and whether it was sane ‘in this 
twentieth century of all the democratic movements, of the nation-knitting 
intercourse, and the broadening ideas’.2339 e contradictions between the 
rhetoric of democracy in wartime propaganda and the realities of the peace 
treaty were thus widely recognised on both sides. 
e project of democratising Germany clearly already ran into major 
trouble in the rst half of 1919. Little development towards a process-like 
concept or beliefs in the future potential of democracy are visible in the 
Weimar debates, especially outside the Social Democratic group. ere 
was no successful negotiation that would have produced compromises 
on democracy. Most speakers either armed that Germany was already 
a  democratic republic based on popular sovereignty or questioned this 
claim. Reactionary views were becoming more open than in autumn and 
early spring, when even the right had supported democracy by staying quiet 
in the hope of better terms of peace. Clemens von Delbrück – a Prussian 
nobleman and a representative of the German National People’s Party in 
the Constitutional Committee – had merely stated that consenting to the 
proposal was a major sacrice for the right.2340 In summer 1919 he was 
already openly in favour of a ‘democratic’ monarchy or at least a strong 
2335 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Government’s Attitude Endorsed’, 14 May 1919, on 
the basis of what ‘Hausmann’ (the le-liberal Conrad Haußmann, Chair of the 
Constitutional Committee) had said. 
2336 e Manchester Guardian, ‘German Reply to Dra Treaty’, 28 May 1919.
2337 e Manchester Guardian, ‘German Appeals for Moderation’, 30 May 1919.
2338 e Manchester Guardian, ‘Labour Conference’, 27 June 1919; e Times, ‘Labour 
and Peace Terms’, 27 June 1919.
2339 e Observer, ‘First Steps to the Real Settlement’, 18 May 1919.
2340 Verhandlungen, Clemens von Delbrück, 10 February 1919, 21.
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presidency and rejected the radical republic that was about to be created.2341 
e yearning for a constitutional monarchy lived on. In Britain and Sweden, 
the survival of the monarchy certainly helped rightists to adjust their 
attitudes to the circumstances of democratised surage. 
Once the republican constitution was nally adopted on 14 August 1919, 
its proponents among the government parties, mainly Social Democrats, 
expressed their satisfaction in highly laudatory terms. It remained to be 
seen, however, how a constitution so eagerly dened as democratic by some 
Social Democratic and a few liberal advocates would function in practice. 
e degree of optimism surrounding democracy remained modest in 
the German debates in comparison with the British and Swedish ones. It 
resembled the atmosphere in Finland, where only the centre parties were 
strongly committed to the compromise which the parliament was compelled 
to accept in the aermath of a civil war and under pressure from the Entente. 
Despite their similarities, the Finnish republican constitution proved to be 
much longer-lasting than that of the Weimar Republic – thanks to factors 
such as the long estate and parliamentary tradition, the commitment to the 
rule by the people by the great majority already in 1917 and the gradual turn 
of many on the right to the side of democracy by the early 1930s.
7.2.4 ‘Power in the state belongs to the people’ 
While ‘revolution’ and ‘democracy’ were part of the vocabulary of the le 
and some liberals in Germany, ‘the people’ was a concept cherished by 
all political groups in the sense of a community of the people. e long 
tradition of male surage, wartime promises to take the will of the people 
better into account, the slogan ‘To the German People’ on the pediment 
of the parliament building since 1916, and even the right willingly talking 
about the achievement of the people in the war all suggested that ‘the people’ 
was a positive term for all, though of course it had very dierent associations 
Chancellor Friedrich Ebert le no doubt as to the popular legitimacy 
of political power aer the free election: ‘e German people is free, will 
remain free and in the future will always govern itself.’2342 e goal was 
now to create ‘a strong German popular state’,2343 something that had never 
really existed. Ebert emphasised the liberty of the German people aer the 
Revolution and – revealingly – their readiness to full the demands of US 
President Woodrow Wilson concerning the reorganisation of the German 
political system.2344 Such a statement, in an opening speech addressing 
Western diplomats and negotiators in Versailles, was risky in the heated 
domestic setting as it could be interpreted as recognising the imported 
nature of popular government. 
e Social Democratic Father of the House, Wilhelm Pfannkuch, took 
up the revolutionary slogan ‘All for the people and all by the people’ – to 
emphasise intertextually the huge revision which was taking place. He was 
2341 Pohl 2002, 210–13.
2342 Verhandlungen, Friedrich Ebert, 6 February 1919, 1.
2343 Burkhardt 2003, 41.
2344 Verhandlungen, Friedrich Ebert, 6 February 1919, 3.
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addressing the liberals as well, presenting ‘the people’ as both the object 
and the agent of future political decision-making in Germany. e fate of 
‘the German nation’ had changed dramatically as ‘the German people’ had 
become ‘the master, its own supreme power’. e rulers would no longer 
bypass the clear will of the majority of the people: even ‘the majesty of the 
German people’ had thus been established.2345 Vorwärts declared likewise 
that popular sovereignty had been established.2346 While much of this 
could have been heard from a leist or centrist democrat in any country, 
Pfannkuch’s argumentative emphasis on popular agency prepared the way 
for the referendum and a presidency as alternative means of popular rule 
side by side with the parliament.
Eduard David viewed the beginning of the Assembly as a moment when 
‘the people as a whole, free from all dictation, becomes the master of its 
fate’. Such a breakthrough of popular sovereignty meant that the will of the 
majority would prevail in all conicts of opinion and interests.2347 At the 
end of the legislative process, David stated that ‘the will of the people is 
from now on the highest law.’2348 In his vision of majority democracy, the 
people appeared both as an active agent and as an object of the actions 
of the Assembly. Overinterpreting the will of the German people, David 
argued that there existed ‘a new, vast national will’ which demanded the 
reorganisation of the political system and the enforcement of the rights of 
the people – this change in the national mood had emerged endogenously, 
independent of any transnational trends. e duty of the Assembly was to 
express this will and to work in a way that would increase the satisfaction 
of the German people with their institutions.2349 Later David viewed the 
constitution as creating an entirely new, natural and moral relationship 
between the government and the people based on free elections and 
parliamentary representation, making the government responsible to the 
people via a functioning parliament.2350 
e views of the Social Democrats – as one might presume from their 
party manifesto, wartime demands, reactions to the October resolutions 
and leadership in the Revolution of 1918 – were optimistic about the new 
constitution. It could be viewed as a reection of a rapid transition of the 
German people from an autocratic to a republican political system, for the 
rst time in history.2351 e Social Democrats saw themselves as winners in 
a long constitutional confrontation with the monarchy, the right of the old 
elite and the far le. e last-mentioned group, admittedly, declared that 
everyone was now ‘part of the Volksganzen’ (the people as a whole) and ‘the 
2345 Verhandlungen, Wilhelm Pfannkuch, 6 February 1919, 3–4. Interestingly, the 
very same claim about majesty being transferred to the people was used by 
a Finnish conservative in June 1919, when the republican constitution was 
adopted.
2346 Vorwärts, 11 February 1919.
2347 Verhandlungen, Eduard David, 7 February 1919, 8.
2348 Verhandlungen, Eduard David, 31 July 1919, 2194. 
2349 Verhandlungen, Eduard David, 7 February 1919, 10.
2350 Verhandlungen, Eduard David, 4 March 1919, 499; Bruendel 2003, 106.
2351 Pohl 2002, 114.
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state’2352 and welcomed ‘the politicisation of broad layers of the population’,2353 
while simultaneously criticising the limited degree of democracy in the 
proposal, as was noted above.
Some le-liberals referred to the parliament as a medium when 
talking about the political role of the people. Hugo Preuß, the Minister of 
Interior Aairs, who had draed the proposal, dened the Assembly as the 
representative of ‘the will of the sovereign people’.2354 Having recognised the 
popular origins of political power, he proceeded to talk about ‘this sovereign 
Assembly’ which exercised ‘democratically acknowledged power’ on behalf 
of ‘the entire German people’.2355 For the rst time in history, the German 
people was applying the principle that ‘the power of the state is located in the 
people’.2356 is had become necessary as the failure in the war had followed 
from ‘a lack of political leadership and political understanding among the 
people themselves’.2357 Friedrich von Payer also emphasised that ‘sovereignty’ 
was ‘due to the German people’ and that the Assembly was commissioned to 
exercise that sovereignty.2358 is liberal from Wurttemberg saw the German 
people as actively liberating itself from its present deplorable state.2359 
Bruno Ablaß, too, vindicated the principle of popular sovereignty exercised 
through the Reichstag, believing in the ability of the people to secure the 
rights gained in the Revolution, although he also recognised the presidency 
as another ‘organ of control’ originating from the people.2360 e le-
liberals prioritised this sense of democracy being realised through various 
instruments over ‘the sole rule of the parliament’ (Alleinherrscha des 
Parlaments),2361 although many of them set store by the parliament as well. 
An alternative interpretation held by many majority Social Democrats was 
that the will of the people was to be realised through a strong parliament.2362 
Only the socialists and le-liberals talked extensively about the people. 
e centre, the right-liberals and the right did not engage themselves in the 
debate on the rising political role of the people. Such a lack of participation 
in the discursive process would prove to be a fatal for the political system 
as it only served to reinforce the view that there now existed a new Social 
Democratic political order to which the right and even many centrists were 
not committed. In the other studied countries at least, minor adjustments in 
the political argumentation of the right took place during the reform debates 
of 1917–19. In Germany, on the other hand, the right did not recognise the 
parliament as a forum in which to constructively debate the key principles 
2352 Verhandlungen, Oskar Cohn, 28 February 1919, 404.
2353 Verhandlungen, Oskar Cohn, 7 July 1919, 1356.
2354 Verhandlungen, Hugo Preuß, 8 February 1919, 12.
2355 Verhandlungen, Hugo Preuß, 8 February 1919, 13; see also Berliner Tageblatt, 
11 February 1919. 
2356 Pohl 2002, 112.
2357 Verhandlungen, Hugo Preuß, 29 July 1919, 2072.
2358 Verhandlungen, Friedrich von Payer, 10 February 1919, 20.
2359 Verhandlungen, Friedrich von Payer, 10 February 1919, 21.
2360 Verhandlungen, Bruno Ablaß, 4 July 1919, 1309–10.
2361 Verhandlungen, Erich Koch-Weser, 7 July 1919, 1356; Bollmeyer 2005, 130.
2362 Pohl 2002, 199; see also Gusy 1997, 64.
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of the polity: they le it to the Social Democrats and the le-liberals to take 
all responsibility. e seemingly strong, but in reality solitary, position of the 
German Social Democrats distinguishes them from their counterparts in the 
other three countries and added to the fallacy of the Weimar Constitution 
having turned Germany into a polity with popular government. No general 
turn to parliamentary democracy in that sense happened at a conceptual 
and discursive level during the constitutional debates in Weimar.
Earlier research has produced similar interpretations. Heiko Bollmeyer 
has pointed out how challenging it was to dene the relationship between 
the concepts of the Volk and the Reichstag. is was frequently done by 
emphasising the concept of Volkswille (the will of the people), which had 
been used every now and then since 1917 by spokesmen for constitutional 
reform, and from autumn 1918 on also by speaking about Volkssouveränität 
(the sovereignty of the people), which had previously been a rare concept 
in German parliamentary discourse.2363 e nal version of the new 
constitution stated that all state power was derived from the people and 
was exercised by representative institutions.2364 e concept of popular 
sovereignty, which Hugo Preuß used in the sense of both ‘the sovereignty of 
the nation’ and ‘the sovereignty of the people’ when introducing the dra,2365 
was not used in the actual text. e basis of the legitimacy of political power 
was transferred to the people to such an extent that monarchy no longer 
came into the question,2366 though a tendency to make the presidency 
monarchical survived. omas Mergel concludes that the institution of 
Reichspräsident meant the continuation of the monarchical constitution in 
republican circumstances2367 at a time when monarchism proper was losing 
credibility.2368 
Mergel has shown how the argumentation of the republicans continued 
to focus on the concept of the people and the community of the people, 
the aim being agreement but with conicting group interests dividing the 
discourse of the dierent republican groups in reality. Politicians addressed 
both a presumably unied community of the people and the groups whose 
particular interests they represented. Confrontations could be heard in the 
plenary sessions of the Reichstag, as parliamentarians tried to demonstrate 
to their supporters outside that their interests were being cared for.2369 
Christoph Gusy has pointed out that the idea of the people as the origin 
of political power was by no means necessarily democratic, as the Weimar 
2363 Bollmeyer 2007, 260, 267.
2364 Pohl 2002, 150–5, 162–70. In the Constitutional Committee, this had been seen 
by the Social Democratic lawyer Max Quark as the principal idea of the entire 
constitution and the foundation of the democratic form of government. Kühne 
2000, 117.
2365 See his speech on ‘the sovereign people’, Verhandlungen, Hugo Preuß, 8 February 
1919, 12–13.
2366 Bollmeyer 2007, 308.
2367 Mergel 2002, 40.
2368 Mergel 2002, 37.
2369 Mergel 2002, 56–7.
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experience shows: every political ideology could appeal to this principle 
and yet draw radically divergent conclusions regarding it. Neither the anti-
democratic thinkers on the right nor the advocates of the council movement 
completely denied popular sovereignty.2370 In constitutional debates aer 
1919, it was oen assumed that the people were capable of forming one will 
independently of elections and democratic proceedings in general. Such 
a  concept of the popular will presupposed a united collective will rather 
than a collection of diering opinions. ‘e will of the state’, on the other 
hand, was seen as subordinate to this popular will. e people and the state 
were considered identical, which meant that the state had been organised 
by the people in the spirit of a Volksstaat (state of the people), a concept 
that some debaters in Weimar favoured. is way of thinking also led to 
the concepts of the state and society being used to refer automatically 
both to each other and to an emphasis on national unity.2371 Swedish and 
Finnish ways of thinking, especially among conservatives, were not radically 
dierent from this.
e anti-democratic forces of the Weimar Republic – which had had 
little to say in the debates on democratisation – would also base their 
ideologies on the concepts of the people and the will of the people, even 
though they oen qualied these concepts by talking about das wahre Volk 
(the real people) and der wahre Volkswille (the real will of the people), thus 
challenging the democrats. Strong ideas about the political unity of the 
German people (as opposed to the notion of a pluralistic people, which was 
more obvious in Britain and may have strengthened somewhat in Sweden 
during the surage strife and in Finland as a consequence of the Civil War) 
led to the conclusion that the people itself was capable of acting politically 
as a whole,2372 something that Social Democratic and liberal references to 
the people during the Weimar debates reasserted rather than challenged. 
Nevertheless, dierent understandings of the German people coexisted in 
Germany as well, which made it one of the most contested concepts of the 
Weimar Republic.2373 
Wolfram Pyta has emphasised that the concept Volksgemeinscha 
(community of the people), references to which were noted above, was 
distinguished from more pluralistic parliamentary democracy in a Western 
sense, which explains some later political developments in Germany. 
e concept was favoured in the Weimar Republic not only by rightist 
movements but also by many Social Democrats and liberals, who liked to 
talk about a Volksstaat (state of the people)2374 or Volksherrscha (rule by the 
people) or Volksrepublik (republic of the people) in conceptualising popular 
sovereignty. Nevertheless, the notions ‘community of the people’ and ‘state 
2370 Gusy 2000b, 647.
2371 Gusy 2000b 648–9, 652, 658. Such an identity of the state and society can also be 
found in Finnish political discourse. German inuences had played an important 
role in its formulation there; Bruendel 2003, 106.
2372 Gusy 2000a, 26, 30.
2373 Gusy 2000a, 36.
2374 Pyta 2008, 93; Pyta 2011, 32.
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of the people’ were merely slightly dierently formulated variations of the 
same basic idea.2375 
A further feature distinguishing Germany from the other three 
countries is that the German polity continued to live in a state of civil 
war so that politics tended to be conceptualised in military terms, and the 
war experience continued to inuence parliamentary politics, moulding 
political mentalities and actions.2376 is was more so than in Sweden and 
probably Britain, though in the Finnish case the scars of the Civil War and 
confrontation with the Russians would remain sore points for decades to 
come.2377 Wartime concepts such as Burgfrieden (party truce), Schütengraben 
(trenches) and Volksgemeinscha (community of the people) remained 
useful metaphors in everyday German political debate.2378 Metaphors of war 
had entered parliamentary discourse in the other three countries as well, 
military confrontations being reproduced in domestic political debates, 
though return to peacetime discourse was quicker in Britain, for instance.2379 
omas Mergel has also emphasised a tendency to see politics heroically 
as a matter of life and death, which contributed to the rejection of the kind 
of compromises that are typical of multi-party democracies. e prevailing 
conception supported the view that parliamentary politics and its inter-party 
compromises represented feebleness and an inability to really lead.2380 is 
may well have been one of the longer-term explanations for the weakness of 
the Weimar constitution, particularly as the parties of the pre-war Reichstag 
had also been unwilling to make compromises and had turned to violent 
polemics instead. On the other hand, the readiness to make compromises 
was not much better in the British, Swedish or Finnish parliaments in the 
period 1917–19: in Britain parliamentary politics remained confrontational 
and had contained references to a potential civil war; the Swedish right was 
unhappy with the constitutional compromise there to the very end and 
had suggested the possibility of armed resistance against revolutionaries; 
and in Finland ideological confrontations led to a civil war, which was only 
followed by a gradual restoration of constructive debate from 1919 onwards. 
7.2.5  Extolling, limiting and ignoring parliamentarism 
Parliamentarism had been generally despised in the Prussian political culture. 
e goal of the October reforms in 1918 had been to create a parliamentary 
government, and contemporaries had mostly also conceptualised it in that 
way. is kind of parliamentarism was implemented in spring 1919, though 
its nature was still debated.
Vorwärts emphasised how millions were looking to see ‘parliamentarism 
in Weimar’ when the National Constituent Assembly was opened2381 and 
2375 Pyta 2008, 93.
2376 Mergel 2002, 52; cf. Bessel 1993, 258–9 on the general rejection of militarism as 
opposed to right-wing propaganda.
2377 See Virtanen 2015 on Vihtori Kosola’s political rhetoric.
2378 Mergel 2002, 52.
2379 Müller 2002, 356 and 365, for Britain and Germany.
2380 Mergel 2002, 55–6.
2381 Vorwärts, 6 February 1919, 7 February 1919.
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viewing the representative institution as a sovereign parliament.2382 Friedrich 
Ebert, the Social Democratic leader of the Provisional Government, described 
the procedure of adopting a new constitution as a parliamentary realisation 
of the power of the people. e Germans had embarked on ‘the broad road 
of parliamentary consultation and decision-making’, he argued, and this 
road would allow them to carry out inevitable economic and social reforms 
as well. is was a very Social Democratic promise.2383 Parliamentarism 
meant that the provisional government considered the Assembly to be ‘the 
highest and only sovereign in Germany’, the power of which would never 
again be challenged by a monarch.2384 For Ebert, the process of transition to 
parliamentarism had only begun, but his expectations for it were high. 
Wilhelm Pfannkuch’s denition of the emerging political system 
likewise focused on the National Constituent Assembly. He emphasised 
the responsibility and unquestionable authority of the Assembly to create 
conditions that would be favourable to democracy and parliamentary 
rule. His denition of the representative institution as the embodiment 
of democracy is remarkable in the light of the German tradition of seeing 
parliamentarism and democracy as separate. Challenging both rightist 
authoritarian ideals and direct democracy as advocated by some of the far 
le in their council movement, Pfannkuch argued that ‘German democracy’ 
by a German parliament with a republican majority expressed ‘the will of 
the German nation’. is meant that the Assembly was not a mere symbol 
of German democracy but actually constituted it.2385 Eduard David likewise 
emphasised the status of the National Constituent Assembly, denouncing the 
pre-revolutionary Reichstag as ‘a pretence parliament’ (Scheinparlament), 
which could speak freely but had no say when decisions were made.2386 On 
the other hand, Simon Katzenstein, while insisting that the German method 
of realising democracy would be essentially parliamentary,2387 pointed out 
that the new constitution certainly did not mean a ‘system of unlimited 
parliamentarism’ thanks to the established role of the president and the 
referendum.2388 
A key position in the denition of the powers of the German parliament 
was held by Hugo Preuß, whose proposal distanced itself somewhat from the 
dualism between the executive and the parliament that had been typical of 
imperial Germany and much of northern Europe.2389 Preuß insisted instead 
that the constitution made the political position of the Reichstag inviolable 
in German political life.2390 e problem was that Germany lacked the 
traditions ‘of the politically leading countries’, which would have provided a 
basis for building ‘democratic parliamentarism’, and hence the planners had 
2382 Vorwärts, 11 February 1919.
2383 Verhandlungen, Friedrich Ebert, 6 February 1919, 1.
2384 Verhandlungen, Friedrich Ebert, 6 February 1919, 1.
2385 Verhandlungen, Wilhelm Pfannkuch, 6 February 1919, 4.
2386 Verhandlungen, Eduard David, 4 March 1919, 498–9.
2387 Verhandlungen, Simon Katzenstein, 29 July 1919, 2075.
2388 Verhandlungen, Simon Katzenstein, 3 July 1919, 1263.
2389 Pohl 2002, 114.
2390 Verhandlungen, Hugo Preuß, 4 July 1919, 1285.
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had to combine new elements of both democracy and parliamentarism in 
the dra constitution.2391 From the point of view of Preuß – inuenced by 
Robert Redslob’s theory of the ‘genuine’ parliamentarism of the British and 
the ‘ungenuine’ parliamentarism of the French type2392 – the Reichstag should 
not be the only dominant organ of the state, however: a balance between the 
executive and legislative powers was needed, thereby embodying a degree 
of duality of government. As a compromise, Preuß advocated a presidential 
democracy in which a nonpartisan president would execute the assumed 
‘true’ will of the people. e role of the parliament was to represent the 
‘empirical’ will of the people as expressed through elections. e problem 
with this parliamentary expression of the will of the people was that it could 
always be manipulated by factions and particular interests. Preuß and other 
le-liberals, like many of the parliamentary elite, remained sceptical about 
extensive forms of parliamentarism. Friedrich Naumann, for instance, 
referred to the British form of parliamentarism as a warning example of 
politicians rather than ideologies ruling the government.2393 
Other liberals, too, viewed parliamentary powers as essentially limited: 
the parliament alone was insucient to represent the will of the people 
in a democratic republic, they argued. Erich Koch-Weser, an expert in 
law and political science and a member of the Constitutional Committee, 
represented the principle of parliamentary support for the government as 
‘the best form to express democracy’ and, despite the inconveniences of 
agitation and procedural debates, for instance, as essential for the political 
system. However, a fear of extreme forms of parliamentarism was also to be 
heard in his desire for a counterweight: the new president, elected directly 
by the people, should act as a balance between the government and the 
parliament.2394 Koch-Weser’s point in contrasting representative democracy 
with popular participation was: ‘We do not think that the parliament is 
the only form of expression of democracy. We rather believe that the more 
pillars are created in the structure of a democratic state, the more securely 
established the will of the people will be.’2395
Gustav Stresemann of the right-liberals presented himself as a consistent 
spokesman for a parliamentary system of the British type: Britain was for 
him ‘the political educator in the eld of parliamentarism’.2396 Rudolf Heinze 
of the same party expressed the views of the majority of the party as being 
critical of parliamentarism, however, condemning the new constitution for 
creating ‘extreme parliamentarism’ without the necessary counterweights. 
As a consequence, ‘parliament is seizing the state administration’ and the end 
result would be Parteiherrscha (rule by the parties).2397 Like reform-minded 
constitutionalists before, he distinguished between ‘parliamentarisation’ as 
2391 Verhandlungen, Hugo Preuß, 29 July 1919, 2072.
2392 Gusy 1997, 64; Mergel 2002, 40.
2393 Pohl 2002, 155–62, 200.
2394 Verhandlungen, Erich Koch-Weser, 28 February 1919, 392.
2395 Bollmeyer 2005, 128, 133.
2396 Verhandlungen, Gustav Stresemann, 4 March 1919, 496. 
2397 Verhandlungen, Rudolf Heinze, 30 July 1919, 2094; Grosser 1970, 115–16.
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a positive increase in the power of the parliament and ‘parliamentarism’ 
as the ‘Western’ rule by political parties.2398 e right, when criticising 
parliamentary domination, still wished to see the executive power rather 
than the people or the special interests of the parties as its counterweight.2399 
ese views were in line with what most Swedish and Finnish conservatives 
also argued.
Leading Social Democrats and le-liberals remained the only MPs to 
speak explicitly in favour of parliamentarism during these debates, although 
the latter, too, wished to set limits to parliamentarism. e prevailing 
mistrust in parliamentarism meant that a strong presidency and national 
referenda were viewed as counter-weights to the parliament. Even many 
Social Democrats called for institutions that would counter-balance 
parliamentary power,2400 which diers from the far-reaching parliamentary 
rule favoured by Swedish and Finnish Social Democrats. e liberals accused 
the conservatives of being ‘inwardly enemies of parliamentarism’ and the 
far le of a desire to replace the parliamentary system and democracy with 
the representation of mere workers and outright far-le dictatorship.2401 
Clemens von Delbrück of the right, though recognising certain positive 
characteristics in ministerial responsibility, recalled that he had always 
opposed the parliamentary system.2402 ere were those among the far 
le, too, who remained highly sceptical about ‘parliamentary possibilities’. 
Parliamentary debates and decisions were not, according to Oskar Cohn, 
the way to advance the necessary social development; parliamentarism in its 
current form should rather be demolished.2403 In the crossre of such views, 
express support for parliamentarism certainly remained modest in the 
Assembly when compared to that of leading political groups in Britain, the 
Social Democratic-Liberal coalition in Sweden, and the Social Democrats 
and the centrist parties in Finland. Accusations of political opponents 
lacking democratic and parliamentary ideals were commonplace in Weimar. 
Outspoken opposition to the adopted model of parliamentarism survived 
among the right and the far le, and many members of the centre did not 
commit themselves to extended parliamentarism either. 
Long before the new constitution came into force on 14 August 1919, 
the German general public, struggling with the everyday problems of the 
transition from the wartime to the post-war situation, had lost interest in 
constitutional issues like democracy and parliamentarism.2404 Indeed, many 
had not been interested in such abstract and foreign sounding notions in 
the rst place. e legislative process of the bill had received some publicity 
thanks to the strong tradition to reviewing parliamentary debates selectively 
in newspapers, though detailed discussions in the National Constituent 
2398 Bruendel 2003, 246.
2399 Bollmeyer 2005, 131.
2400 Bollmeyer 2005, 130–1.
2401 Verhandlungen, Conrad Haußmann, 29 July 1919, 2082–3.
2402 Verhandlungen, Clemens von Delbrück, 4 July 1919, 1297. 
2403 Verhandlungen, Oskar Cohn, 30 July 1919, 2098.
2404 Bessel 1993, 255.
454
7. The spring of 1919: The beginning of an era of democracy and parliamentarism? 
Assembly were of little interest to a public overwhelmed with severe practical 
problems. Even though the predominance of violence in post-war German 
society should not be exaggerated, extra-parliamentary circumstances 
(including physical attacks on far-le politicians) diered dramatically from 
what was being debated in the Assembly.2405 e lack of wider publicity and 
public interest was typical of other constitutional reforms of the period, 
too: the British audience was rather more interested in the practicalities of 
warfare and the wartime economy in 1917 and 1918. In Sweden, on the other 
hand, the media continued to report and comment on the reform debates, 
and the interest of the public was mostly maintained. In Finland, the issue 
of the form of government had in principle played a key role in the election 
of 1917, but ideological confrontations, severe economic realities and extra-
parliamentary violence had led to violent rhetoric entering the parliament 
as well. In 1919, the election in Germany was about the constitution, and 
the constitutional process was discussed in the press, but most of the public 
clearly just wanted to have the old dispute solved.
For the formulators of the Weimar Constitution, its achievement was 
the completion of the Revolution of 1918 and the expected transition to 
ordered politics.2406 A republican and parliamentary democracy had 
been created in Germany as a result of a process of constitutional reform 
initiated by outside pressures in autumn 1918 rather than having been the 
initial goal.2407 In consequence, the project of constructing the constitution 
would remain, discursively at least, a partisan aair carried out by the 
leading Social Democrats and le-liberals. is was partly due to the 
fact that the German parliamentary culture emphasised the role of the 
spokesmen of the parliamentary groups. Even these spokesmen continued 
to entertain reservations about parliamentarism and to advocate alternative 
ways of expressing democracy. In the other three countries studied here, 
the participation of all parties, including their back-benchers, in the 
‘negotiations’ over the constitution was considerably more extensive than 
in Germany. True government by discussion engaging the entire political 
spectrum was not achieved in Germany in spring 1919. In that sense, the 
doubts of the British press about the extent to which parliamentarism had 
been adopted in Germany were not unfounded.
e German political system would not be moulded in the way the new 
constitution promised, particularly in the minds of the right. is conclusion 
corresponds with social historical studies that note that the Prussian 
aristocracy had played a key role in preventing the inuence of Social 
Democracy and the rise of democratic liberalism in German society and that 
this inuence continued.2408 It considered it necessary to exclude the masses 
from broader political participation.2409 Nor did it want to contribute to the 
democratic state in any constructive manner and continued to vehemently 
2405 Bessel 1993, 258, 261; Gusy 1997, 77.
2406 Gusy 1997, 78.
2407 Gusy 2008a, 421.
2408 e historiography has been summarised in Smith 2007, 5.
2409 Müller 2002, 351.
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oppose it. Reformist conservatism of the type existing in Britain – and to 
a lesser extent in Sweden and Finland – did not emerge in Germany.2410
7.3 Sweden: Adjusting the principles of a future democracy 
7.3.1  Swedish parties after the suffrage reform
Prime Minister Nils Edén had gathered the Liberals and Social Democrats 
around a further reform proposal in the immediate aermath of the German 
Revolution in November 1918 and persuaded the reluctant right not to vote 
the proposal down again. However, the reform still needed to be passed 
in spring 1919, and its passage entailed new challenges to the parties and 
turns in political discourse inspired by changing national and international 
circumstances.
e Social Democrats seemed to have tackled the domestic crisis of late 
1918 in a reasonably united way, although some wished for the reform to 
go further. ey had, aer all, nally achieved their most important goal, 
universal surage, and hence looked optimistically towards the future 
without needing to care too much about the far-le radicals, who had 
already quitted the party. e Liberals, by contrast, were divided aer the 
decisions of late 1918 since many felt that the prime minister had acted too 
independently in solving the crisis, failing to negotiate suciently with his 
party and making excessive concessions to the Social Democrats. e Liberals 
had not confronted Edén in the debates, being consistently supportive of 
the government cause (unlike some of their British, German and Finnish 
counterparts), but their enthusiasm for the reform had nevertheless been 
limited. As soon as the bill passed the preliminary stage, disputes emerged 
within the coalition, and its foundation began to crumble.2411 e Liberals 
in Sweden, as elsewhere, had a major party-political problem: they expected 
to be on the losing side in future elections, and in these circumstances many 
started to question the sense of continuing in a coalition with the Social 
Democrats, a major rival for votes. Liberal idealism in favour of the extended 
political participation of the people, democracy and parliamentarism also 
found its limits in Sweden.
All local representative bodies were re-elected at the beginning of 1919 
in accordance with the new legislation, whereas the First Chamber would 
not be re-elected until the autumn of 1919 and the Second Chamber in 
1921. In principle the lengthy ‘constitutional battle’ had come to an end with 
the settlement of late 1918. However, in late spring and early summer 1919, 
the same parliament needed to pass related legislation in both chambers to 
complete the reform. In practice, this appeared to many to be a counter-
productive repetition of arguments that had been heard in numerous 
previous surage debates, particularly as it was now obvious who were the 
winners (the Social Democrats) and the losers (e Right and possibly the 
Liberals) in the reform issue. Nevertheless, expressions of views aer the 
2410 Malinowski 2003, 602, 604–607.
2411 Gerdner 1946, 39–40.
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disputed passage of the reform bill deserve attention, not least because of 
the highly inter- and transnational nature of the Swedish debates during 
the preceding two years. Would this continue, or would the Swedish debate 
turn internal?
e Social Democrats, too, debated the issue among themselves aer 
what seemed to be their greatest political victory thus far. By early April 1919, 
when no more than a formal approval of the proposal by the parliament was 
needed to complete the reform, a discussion on the past achievements and 
the future goals of the party was activated. Some on the le of the party 
regretted that the reform had not gone beyond the goals of the ministry’s 
proposal; from their point of view, the Social Democratic leaders’ peaceful 
revolution had failed, and promises of extended reforms in the future did 
not change this fact. is disappointment was reinforced by the fact that 
in many European countries constitutions were still being reformed during 
spring 1919 in a much more democratic direction: in Germany and Austria, 
in particular, which were key countries for the purpose of international 
comparison and especially relevant to Social Democracy in Sweden, the 
Social Democrats had become major political agents, which was not 
necessarily the case yet in Sweden. Socialist demands for social and economic 
reforms together with political ones had been activated internationally – as 
the far le claimed in the German and Swedish parliaments. Reecting on 
the powerful status of the Social Democrats in the German government 
and the National Constituent Assembly, some Swedish Social Democrats 
were disappointed to see that their party had not gone further in its reform 
demands during the revolutionary moment of 1918 and hence called for 
a more radical approach. e leaders of the party maintained their moderate 
line,2412 but these tensions would nevertheless create pressures within the 
Liberal-Social Democratic coalition.
e Social Democrats and Liberals had campaigned both jointly and 
separately for parliamentary government and universal surage for decades. 
e Social Democrats had adopted a self-condent discourse on democratic 
reform in confronting e Right and the monarch before and during the 
war, and the Liberals had mostly supported them in their demands. Only 
in November 1918 – aer the revolutionary events in Russia, Finland and, 
most importantly, Germany – had the monarch and the leaders of e Right 
considered it necessary to accept a reform introducing universal surage. 
As this decision needed to be extended in the parliamentary session of 1919, 
other suggested changes in the constitution also became subject to debate. 
In practice, the erce constitutional debate of the preceding two years was 
already calming down: e Right seemed to have given up its previously 
consistent resistance to the reform,2413 although the continuing appearance 
of counterarguments every now and then reveal the existence of a broader 
dissatisfaction. Some opponents of the reform simply remained silent 
without having changed their minds, a lot like the German right. Torbjörn 
Nilsson has shown that the Swedish right would continue to emphasise the 
2412 Gerdner 1946, 66–7.
2413 Möller 2007; Hadenius 2008. 
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weaknesses of democracy and parliamentarism throughout the twenties and 
into the early thirties. e supporters of e Right still did not defend formal 
democracy but rather wished to redescribe ‘true democracy’ in conservative 
terms; following an international conservative pattern, they emphasised 
the surage qualications (or the lack thereof) of citizens. Women voters 
were nonetheless, welcome to join e Right in Sweden,2414 as they were for 
conservatives everywhere. 
7.3.2 Internationalism after war and revolution
e wartime revolutionary heat of the Swedish constitutional debate was 
calming down by early June 1919, as all knew that the surage reform would 
pass the parliament. e Social Democrats, rejoicing in their victory, were 
highly optimistic about the prospects for future progress. e advances of 
democratisation abroad remained objects of interest for leist reformists, 
though the need for appealing to foreign examples had decreased. 
Oscar Olsson oers an example of this universalist socialist optimism. 
He was convinced that ‘the general revolutionary movement out there in 
the world’ had not yet peaked. Further reforms remained on the agenda in 
Sweden and not merely in former autocratic monarchies (such as Germany 
and Austria).2415 While the le of the party is known to have been dissatised 
with the extent of the ‘revolution’ of late 1918, this was not articulated in the 
debates.
e spokesmen of the Liberals also remained outspokenly reformist 
despite rising pressures within the party. Mauritz Hellberg argued, in line 
with the government’s policy, for peaceful reforms aimed at removing 
societal injustice and the grounds for revolution2416 – events that had been 
seen in neighbouring countries like Russia, Finland and Germany. Otto 
von Zweigbergk pointed out that the Germans and Austrians had given up 
monarchy and realised a transition to a republic without the complicated 
procedures of changing the constitution.2417 e German Revolution 
continued to inspire not only Swedish Social Democrats but also Liberals 
– sometimes to the extent of that they speculated about the abolition of the 
monarchy. However, the republicans of the Swedish le would refrain from 
taking any concrete measures to that direction.
Among e Right, doubts about the claimed positive eects of the 
surage reform and the applicability of what they continued to regard as 
‘foreign’ constitutional models imported to Sweden had not withered away. 
e monarchy, in particular, should be le untouched. Ernst Trygger insisted 
that the abolition of monarchies and the introduction of republics had had 
no positive eects2418 – referring implicitly at least to Germany, Austria 
and Finland. Trygger also responded to Hellberg’s suggestion concerning 
the continuing risk of an ensuing revolutionary development by pointing 
2414 Torstendahl 1969, 212–13; Nilsson 2004, 81, 145.
2415 FK, Oscar Olsson, 5 June 1919, 53:39.
2416 FK, Mauritz Hellberg, 5 June 1919, 53:32.
2417 FK, Otto von Zweigbergk, 5 June 1919, 53:37.
2418 FK, Ernst Trygger, 5 June 1919, 53:36.
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out that any revolutionary attempt would be eectively suppressed by law-
abiding citizens.2419 e Right had already made its concessions and would 
forcefully resist any further leist attempts to revolutionise the political 
system. At the same time, Trygger denied the existence of ‘any kind of fear 
of revolution’ on the part of e Right as having led to their concessions.2420 
e concessions had been made because they had been considered necessary 
in the international situation of the time; they should not be regarded 
as opening a door for further reforms or as a licence for blackmail with 
threats of revolution. Aware of the remaining doubts among the German 
right concerning democracy and parliamentarism and of the opposition 
of the Finnish right to extended parliamentarism, Trygger’s party chose 
to stand rm in its opposition to the further radicalisation of the reforms. 
e revolutionary moment was over for all the major parties. Society would 
from now on be changed through Social Democratic electoral support. 
Swedish politicians would employ foreign examples to hasten belated 
domestic reforms less, view reform from the perspective of a nation-state 
and increasingly start to see their way to accepting democracy as universally 
valid and as a model for the rest of the world.
7.3.3  Further prospects for democracy  
 and parliamentarism
e Swedish constitutional debates of spring 1919 contained little substantial 
discussion on either democracy or parliamentarism. is is no surprise 
given that the concepts had already been debated pro et contra, dened 
and redened on four occasions in two chambers during the preceding 
two years. e contributions that were made merely recycled previously 
heard arguments. e far le did, however, take the chance to elaborate on 
their critical arguments made in autumn 1918 against Social Democratic 
moderation. ey were inspired in this by international radical leist 
discourse not only in Russia and Germany but also among the Western le 
more generally. 
Ivar Vennerström, for instance, emphasised that ‘complete political 
democracy’ had not been achieved with the reform. What ‘the Swedish 
democracy’ (democracy was here also being nationalised by the far le) 
needed was progress towards ‘social and economic democracy’.2421 Such 
extensions of democracy had been called for in socialist discourse that was 
unhappy with what bourgeois parliaments had to oer.2422 Especially the 
German far le were demanding these in Weimar, and the Social Democrat 
leaders were giving promises in that direction to appease the le wing of 
their party. e reform demands of the Swedish far le also included the 
introduction of the referendum, an instrument that was strongly present 
in the German constitutional proposal. ey carried on using Marxist 
discourse by questioning the justication of the prevailing societal order 
2419 FK, Ernst Trygger, 5 June 1919, 53:36.
2420 FK, Ernst Trygger, 5 June 1919, 53:45.
2421 AK, Ivar Vennerström, 24 May 1919, 54:16.
2422 See MacDonald at the beginning of this chapter.
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aer the reform. Fredrik Ström doubted whether even referenda would 
increase democracy since ‘in a bourgeois democracy and a capitalist society 
it is the money that governs’; they would merely give rise to unfounded 
beliefs in a ‘pseudo-democracy’ (skendemokratien),2423 again a term recalling 
recent German Social Democratic discourse. Such ideologically motivated 
and  obviously  transnationally  inspired discourse continued in Sweden in 
the aermath of the German Revolution. 
e Social Democrats no longer saw reason to carry on preaching 
the gospel of democracy. ‘Democracy’ in the sense of universal surage, 
for which they had been primarily campaigning, was already about to 
be achieved; other aspects of democratisation were expected to follow 
with the increase in Social Democratic representation at all levels. While 
the ministers themselves were careful not to promise too much, many 
backbenchers pressed for further reforms – the response from the Social 
Democratic leaders being to wait patiently. Arthur Engberg called on ‘this 
new democracy’ (referring to the next parliament) to decide on the proper 
system of representation ‘in a democratic state’,2424 suggesting (provocatively 
for e Right) that further adjustments were needed. Viktor Larsson referred 
to the referendum as part of this ‘democratic order’.2425 For the Swedish 
Social Democrats, the transition to parliamentary democracy would be 
a rapid but smooth one, leading as it did to four single-party governments in 
the 1920s. Jussi Kurunmäki has pointed out that their revisionism and rising 
responsibilities did not mean giving up the old Marxist emphasis on the 
class struggle or the ultimate goal of socialism. Parliamentary democracy 
continued to have an instrumental value for them rather than being the goal 
in itself.2426 It was just used very eectively. 
Some Liberals, too, were unhappy with the extent of the reform, while 
others did not wish for more: the ‘so-called democratic reform’ had remained 
‘all too primitively democratic’, as could be seen from the willingness of e 
Right to agree to it, as Anders Olsson claimed.2427 Most MPs of e Right 
kept their concerns about the nature of any future democracy to themselves, 
applying ‘the rhetoric of silence’ as a party newspaper aptly put it.2428 Ernst 
Trygger, who had reluctantly led e Right to accept the reform, only said 
that democracy as such was not the party’s goal; what was most benecial 
for the country was of the essence;2429 this could be interpreted by a well-
intentioned audience as an implicit recognition of the need for the transition 
to democracy in the sense of universal surage. Such accommodation 
had its limits: instead of recognising democracy in appreciative terms, 
the rightists continued to dierentiate between good and bad democracy, 
associating parliamentarism with the latter. At the same time, news about 
2423 FK, Fredrik Ström, 5 June 1919, 58:20.
2424 AK, Arthur Engberg, 24 May 1919, 54:6.
2425 AK, Viktor Larsson, 24 May 1919, 54:12.
2426 Kurunmäki 2014, 179–80.
2427 AK, Anders Olsson, 24 May 1919, 54:17.
2428 Aonbladet, ‘Författningsdemokrati och tilllämpning’, 25 May 1919.
2429 FK, Ernst Trygger, 5 June 1919, 58:36.
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the Bolsheviks questioning ‘democracy in the best meaning of that word’ 
and the idea of parliamentarism associated with it – the alternative being 
the dictatorship of the proletariat – caused e Right to reassess democracy 
as the lesser evil.2430 Aonbladet consequently recognised that the time of 
‘constitutional democracy’ had begun.2431 Democracy was thus creeping into 
conservative discourse, though the Swedish right of the interwar period 
would prefer to talk about ‘the rule by the people’ and ‘the government 
of the people’ rather than about ‘democracy’ or ‘parliamentarism’,2432 the 
vernacular phrases supporting the national and even nationalist senses of 
democracy with connotations that approach those of the Finnish concepts 
(and possibly those of the German ones as well).
David Norman, a prominent anti-reformist of e Right, nevertheless 
continued to criticise the Social Democrats and warn about the severe 
consequences of the expected democratisation. Now that Finland was 
returning on the road towards representative democracy, the warning 
example from the east could be more openly discussed than in 1918, when 
similar radicalisation had been seen as a risk in Sweden. According to 
Norman, the fall of Finnish democracy illustrated the potential consequences 
of universal surage in Sweden as well:2433
Finland ought to be for us a suciently telling and warning example of the fact 
that the most extensive surage, the most developed democracy by no means 
constitutes a shield against the spirit of illegality or stands for an increase in 
social solidarity.
Norman taunted the Social Democrats with having lost some of their 
enthusiasm about democracy since Hjalmar Branting’s return from 
Petrograd on 14 April 1917 – which demonstrates the signicance of that 
revolutionary moment in the discursive process of reform. Norman also 
made a further intertextual reference to Harald Hallén’s suggestion in spring 
1917 that full democracy might be introduced in Sweden with foreign help 
if the Swedish upper house did not opt for a reform.2434 Arthur Engberg of 
the Social Democrats responded with derisive humour, thanking Norman 
for his sensitivity to the rise and fall of the international democratic spirit. 
Norman’s remark was to be interpreted as reecting an international rise of 
anti-democratic thought. is reveals socialist concerns about a counter-
reaction to democratisation in Germany and elsewhere (though hardly 
really in Sweden, where only a few Prussian-minded ultraconservatives 
continued to expressly resist; in Finland the organ of the Swedish People’s 
Party also made similar suggestions):2435
2430 Aonbladet, ‘Bolsjevismens frukter’, 5 June 1919.
2431 Aonbladet, ‘Författningsdemokrati och tilllämpning’, 25 May 1919.
2432 Kurunmäki 2014, 180.
2433 AK, David Norman, 8 June 1919, 72:9.
2434 AK, David Norman, 8 June 1919, 72:9.
2435 AK, Arthur Engberg, 8 June 1919, 72:18.
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Anti-democracy and the powers of autocracy have wind in their sails, and why 
then should not Mr Norman from Läckeby hoist the sails on his little boat and, 
to please the public, try to show that he is the bold Achilles who can oppose 
Swedish democracy?
Harald Hallén rejected the comparison between Swedish and Finnish 
democracy2436 and did not comment on the insinuation about imported 
revolution. His message was that e Right was just continuing to employ 
misleading characterisations of democracy.2437 
Parliamentarism had been established in Sweden with the nomination of 
the Liberal-Social Democratic government in October 1917, but the attitudes 
surrounding it changed only gradually. During the reform struggles, some 
reformist academics had claimed that the Swedish political system had been 
based on parliamentarism at least since the mid-eighteenth century (if not 
even from the times of the tings around the year 1000). is interpretation 
was widely adopted by the le and, in a rhetorically redescribed form, by 
e Right as well.2438 As the time to reinforce the extension of surage was 
at hand, Arthur Engberg of the Social Democrats emphasised the organic 
development of a parliamentary practice that had not been foreseen when 
the constitution of 1809 had been formulated,2439 here suggesting that 
modern parliamentarism was a more recent innovation and not so much 
part of some immemorial native heritage.2440 Once universal surage had 
become a reality, historico-political theories based on political history 
claiming a thousand years of developing democracy and parliamentarism 
were no longer so eagerly cited; the modernity of parliamentarism was 
recognised. But theories about the age of reform emphasising mythical 
continuities nevertheless remained part of the Swedish historiographical 
tradition and national identity to an extent that still calls for rethinking.2441 
7.3.4 Politics of the people in a democratic Sweden
e surage reform, once realised, was expected to redene the political 
participation of the Swedish people. Women’s surage in parliamentary 
elections, in particular, was viewed as a turning point. Proposals on 
referenda, a unicameral parliament and a republican constitution were also 
placed on the agenda, but most attention was paid to the completion of 
female surage. By now, it was welcomed by all contributors to the debates, 
former opponents considering it best to stay silent in order not to provoke 
future voters. Nevertheless, the eects of women’s surage on the political 
system were interpreted in interestingly diering ways. 
Reform initiatives and analyses of the consequences of the reform 
mostly originated from the far le. ey had not become as ostracised as 
their counterparts in Finland and Germany aer unsuccessful revolutionary 
2436 AK, Harald Hallén, 8 June 1919, 72:26.
2437 AK, Harald Hallén, 8 June 1919, 72:34.
2438 Ihalainen 2015.
2439 AK, Arthur Engberg, 5 June 1919, 66:21.
2440 Also FK, Mauritz Hellberg, 5 June 1919, 53:31.
2441 See Ihalainen 2015 for an historico-political analysis of these debates.
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attempts in those countries, and their claims were not particularly militant 
either, but they nevertheless remained alone in their criticism. Ivar 
Vennerström wished for a future with ‘a complete political reorganisation, 
a complete political democracy’ in which the people would participate 
in major decisions through popular initiatives and referenda. Universal 
surage would make it possible for ‘the Swedish democracy’ (a nationalised 
term) to remove political injustices and to introduce not only ‘political 
democracy’ but also the le’s longed-for ‘social and economic democracy’, 
implying the replacement of the ‘formal democracy’ of universal surage 
with ‘real democracy’.2442 Socialist demands for further-going reform had 
been heard in late 1918, but the Liberal-Social Democrat government had 
prioritised the surage reform and continued to do so. Calls for extended 
democracy by the Swedish far le resembled those of the British, German 
and Finnish radical le, with the exception that Swedish beliefs in gradual 
progress towards socialist democracy were stronger than in the countries 
of comparison. Carl Lindhagen, for instance, presented women’s surage as 
productive of major shis in power relations that would benet the country 
and the people. When ‘women are involved in all ways in the whirl of party 
politics’, a just government for all would follow.2443 Politics in the future 
would stand essentially for the participation of a larger number of people in 
the activities of the parties that represented the workers. 
e Social Democrats, despite their obvious enthusiasm over the 
successful reform, were rather more cautious in drawing conclusions about 
the political momentum. Illustrative of their understanding of politics in the 
future are the associations they postulated between democracy and politics. 
e combination was talked about in a very positive way, and it was used to 
dene an idealised political system of the future.2444 Party Secretary Gustav 
Möller characterised the extension of surage as the ‘democratisation’ of 
Sweden, using a concept that was common when changes in the German 
political system were discussed but which was unknown among British 
debaters. Möller also envisioned the ‘political education’ that universal 
surage would provide for women and its potential for changing the 
country.2445 Oscar Olsson emphasised the principle of the will of the people 
within the new democratic constitution and insisted that in a democratic 
society all political institutions should be ‘manifestations of the popular 
will’,2446 which le the door open for future reforms. 
It is noteworthy that the Liberal ministers argued that the reform would 
extend popular participation, envisioning a better society resulting from 
it and without the reservations that some British, German and former 
Finnish Liberals might have expressed. ey did so, perhaps in order to 
appear as competent rivals to the Social Democrats as reformists, despite 
2442 AK, Ivar Vennerström, 24 May 1919, 54:16. On the extension of this discourse 
to the Social Democratic Party, see Friberg 2012, 92–4. 
2443 FK, Carl Lindhagen, 24 May 1919, 43:2–3, 5–7.
2444 See Möller 2007, 92, for the use of the concept folkhemmet (the people’s home) 
in the election campaign of the autumn of 1919.
2445 AK, Gustav Möller, 24 May 1919, 54:12–13.
2446 FK, Oscar Olsson, 5 June 1919, 58:39.
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the obvious party-political risks involved. Eliel Löfgren, the Minister of 
Justice, saw women’s surage and the participation of women in political 
parties optimistically as opening up an entirely new era, changing ‘the so-
called masculine culture’ in such a way that humanity and understanding in 
politics would increase.2447 While ‘the sovereignty of the will of the people 
in politics’ was emphasised,2448 some doubted the ability of ‘the masses 
themselves or the people as a whole’ to decide on minor issues as so many 
people ‘are from a political point of view completely illiterate.’2449 Hence, 
instead of referenda, ‘the people have a right to rule themselves and arrange 
their own house’ through representation in the parliament,2450 which was 
an old argument for ‘bourgeois’ democracy. In such a system, Liberal trust 
in the people was strong. Carl Fredrik Holmquist, the former chairman of 
the Committee for Surage Reform, extolled ‘a truly constitutional culture, 
which exists deep in the history of the Swedish people, its experiences 
and its . . . deep political maturity.’ e reform caused Holmquist to argue 
for a unique ‘Swedish democracy’,2451 nationalising the concept in a way 
resembling the discourse of the Social Democrats in Sweden and reformist 
liberals in Finland. e reform was thus viewed by both the Socialists and the 
Liberals as a national achievement enabling progress within a nation-state. 
References to a transnational wave of democracy, which Liberal politicians 
had also favoured in 1917 and 1918, were set aside as the process of reform 
was discursively nationalised.
For e Right, it continued to be dicult to view future politics as such an 
inevitable success story. Enthusiasm was perhaps dying away among other 
political groups as well, given the length of the reform process, which should 
already have been nalised. When the constitutional reform was nally 
approved in the parliament, a major newspaper with rightist sympathies took 
the half-empty strangers’ and press galleries in the parliament as evidence of 
the indierence of the public. e calmness of the debate was interpreted as 
a lack of enthusiasm among the politicians.2452 Samuel Clason nevertheless 
conceded in the parliament somewhat later that there was no getting around 
appeals ‘to the mass of the people’ in the new political system,2453 which 
reects an incipient adaptation to extended popular participation in politics 
also among the Swedish right. 
7.3.5 A glance across the Gulf of Bothnia 
e separation of the Swedish and Finnish polities and the inclusion 
of Finland in the Russian Empire in 1809 had by 1919, despite the same 
2447 AK, Eliel Löfgren, 24 May 1919, 54:20, 24–5.
2448 FK, Mauritz Hellberg, 5 June 1919, 58:31–3. 
2449 AK, Per Johan Persson, 5 June 1919, 66:12. 
2450 AK, Ulrik Leander, 5 June 1919, 66:22; FK, Otto von Zweigbergk, 5 June 1919, 
53:14.
2451 FK, Carl Fredrik Holmquist, 24 May 1919, 43:9–10, 16. 
2452 Aonbladet, ‘Författningsreformen godkänd av riksdagen’, 24 May 1919, 
‘Författningsdemokrati och tilllämpning’, 25 May 1919, ‘Författningsreformen 
slutförd och lagfäst’, 26 May 1919.
2453 FK, Samuel Clason, 5 June 1919, 58:17–18.
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constitutional heritage of the eighteenth-century Gustavian constitution, 
led to dierent constitutional circumstances and political cultures and 
practices, all visible in divergent conceptualisations of constitutional 
principles.2454 Despite continued connections with German and Swedish 
academic and ideological debates, the political link with Russia and the 
traumatic experience of a civil war in 1918 had given rise to dierent, both 
more conservative and more radically republican, understandings of the key 
political notions in Finland. In the Finnish debates, the linguistic dierence 
– even if the key terms were oen originally borrowed from German or 
Swedish and then vernacularised – led to conceptualisations that diered 
from those in Sweden. e parliamentary process of negotiation and debate 
had failed to solve the constitutional and other political problems in 1917 
and 1918. e majority of the political elite were nevertheless capable of 
reaching a constructive compromise in 1919, being forced to reconsider 
their positions aer the traumatic experiences of the Civil War and under 
external pressures arising from the outcome of the world war. In Sweden, 
a compromise on constitutional reform was achieved through a complex 
parliamentary process, albeit only aer similar external impulses. In 
Germany, the external impulses were strong, too, but the turn in political 
values less fundamental and lasting than in Finland or Sweden, no matter 
how radical some of the party-political discourse on democracy and 
parliamentarism there may have been.
During the constitutional debates in the Swedish and Finnish parliaments 
in spring 1919, the national contexts were more divergent than probably ever 
before or even later in the history of the two countries. e Swedes, who had 
avoided the war despite the sympathy for Germany among the royal family 
and e Right, were about to conrm the introduction of universal surage, 
which their both chambers had initially approved in the aermath of the 
fall of the German monarchy. It was generally expected (or feared) that 
the victory of reform aer a long struggle would open the gates for further 
constitutional reforms. Optimism over future politics was dominant among 
the socialist and Liberal speakers, and even e Right had begun a process 
of rethinking their position. 
Aer an unparalleled national calamity, visions for the future were far less 
optimistic in Finland. e Finns had experienced a radical parliamentary 
reform with universal surage in 1906 but had generally become disillusioned 
with parliamentary politics aer the parliament had proved to be unable 
to advance reforms either under tsarist rule or aer being liberated from 
it. Together with deep social and ideological confrontations and a radical 
political discourse, further radicalised through transnational contacts 
with Russia, this had led to a civil war in spring 1918 and a monarchical 
experiment as a counter-reaction in autumn 1918. In spring 1919, the 
Finnish parliament convened aer a new election, in which the losers of the 
Civil War had mostly participated, and the republicans gained a landslide 
victory. e major mission of the new parliament was to overcome the deep 
ideological dierences to nally agree on a republican constitution. e 
2454 Jansson 2009; Ihalainen & Sundin 2011; Ihalainen 2015.
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situation gave little reason for optimism given the traumatic experiences of 
the Civil War and its aermath, but the Finnish government and parliament 
made a serious (and in the long term successful) attempt to transform 
an open conict in the form of a civil war into a conned parliamentary 
confrontation. In the end, parliamentary democracy won out, albeit in 
a conned presidential form. 
In terms of foreign policy, too, Sweden and Finland were further apart 
in 1919 than in any other period. Most Swedes had wanted to avoid any 
ideological confrontation resembling the Finnish Civil War. Swedish 
attempts to annex the Åland Islands during that war had led to the deepest 
mutual foreign policy crisis that the two countries have ever experienced. 
News about the threatened status of the Swedish language in Finland was 
also commonplace in the Swedish press.2455 is confrontation nearly 
removed the neighbouring country as the usual object of comparison 
from parliamentary debates: Finland did not exist for the Swedes to the 
same extent aer the Civil War as during the surage campaign. Nor did 
contemporary Sweden really exist for Finns, if we look at press reports, 
for instance. is was exceptional in Finnish political culture, which 
customarily uses explicit and implicit comparisons with Sweden in all areas 
of life and has discursively integrated2456 much of Swedish political culture. 
Although interpretations of the immemorial native roots of democracy and 
parliamentarism were common to both countries at that time, references to 
the shared constitutional past diered considerably: in Sweden, continuing 
progress rather than the tradition of representative government or the 
inheritance of the long eighteenth century was emphasised aer the reform 
was achieved, whereas Finnish conservative circles called for the preservation 
of elements of the eighteenth-century Swedish constitution, and these were 
transferred to the new republican one as well. Finnish politicians went back 
much more readily to the experiences of a common history to argue for 
and against democracy and parliamentarism,2457 which illustrates the rather 
more historically oriented nature of Finnish political discourse.
7.4  Finland: Moving towards a compromise on a presidential 
 parliamentary republic
7.4.1  Re-orienting the polity after the war
In Finland, as in much of the rest of Europe, many republicans had realised 
by early October 1918 that Germany would lose the war and reform its 
constitution, and that this would have implications both for its international 
aairs and for transnational constitutional development. e republicans 
correctly foresaw that the German alliance and the election of Friedrich Karl 
to the Finnish throne would cause foreign political problems for the newly 
independent country and also delay the constitutional settlement. e 
2455 Aonbladet, ‘Hur länge hava svenskarna bott i Finland’, 24 May 1919.
2456 Leonhard 2011, 257.
2457 Ihalainen 2015.
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monarchical majority of the Rump Parliament had nevertheless proceeded 
to the royal election on 9 October 1918, dismissing the evident political turn 
in Germany, which was expected to lead to the creation of a parliamentary 
democracy, Allied calls for a democratic government for Finland and 
continuing republican protests in the national parliament. e leaders of 
the conservative Finnish and Swedish People’s Parties as well as many liberal 
Young Finns, ignoring news from the surrounding world, were unwilling 
to give up the chance to carry through their monarchical scheme, which 
was designed to save both the nation and the old elite from the excesses 
of democracy and parliamentarism. When updates to the eighteenth-
century monarchical constitution as concessions to the republicans did not 
convert the opponents, the monarchists went for a legalistic application of 
the provisions of the 1772 constitution and got their king – though only 
nominally and only for two months. 
Not only did Germany lose the war as expected, but the German 
monarchy also fell in early November. ese two facts – as well as the 
lacking recognition of independence by the Anglophone powers – forced 
the monarchists into profound reconsiderations of foreign policy and the 
constitution and to concede that a new election was needed.2458 e Finnish 
situation was in some respects parallel to that of both Sweden and Germany, 
though it was even more complicated and there was a time lag in its 
evolvement: in the new state of international aairs, it had become hopeless 
to carry on opposition to domestic reform demands as transnational trends 
were so obviously in favour of democracy and parliamentarism and indeed 
explicitly demanded it. Friedrich Karl abdicated from the Finnish throne 
in December aer it had become clear that Britain would not accept any 
combination of a German monarch with a Western parliamentary system 
in Finland.2459 e Finnish monarchy ceased to exist, and even a modied 
version of it had no chance of surviving given the questionable legality of the 
monarchists’ actions in electing a king. For the great majority of the political 
nation, monarchy had become associated with opposition to democracy and 
parliamentarism, which added to an age-old popular hatred of the ruling 
classes. 
In the changed international circumstances, the Finns had once again 
started to search for a constitutional solution in January 1919. ey needed 
to nd a compromise that would stabilise the polity aer two years of 
fruitless and destructive controversy, during which proposals ranging from 
extreme parliamentarism rejecting the division of power to a presidential 
parliamentary republic and a constitutional monarchy of the Prussian 
type had been the major alternatives. A solution was urgently needed: the 
international and domestic situation was dangerous in that it was not out 
of the question that a new revolutionary attempt might be made – by either 
the le or the right. A Bolshevik government had, despite the continuing 
civil war in Russia, established itself in Petrograd, and the Bolsheviks had 
allied themselves with exiled survivors of the Finnish Red government, 
2458 Jyränki 2006, 39.
2459 Paasivirta 1961, 111; Polvinen 1987, vol. 2, 112–13.
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including former Finnish MPs such as Kullervo Manner (the Speaker of 
the rst parliament of 1917), Otto Wille Kuusinen and Yrjö Sirola, who 
had all criticised bourgeois parliamentarism in the debates of November 
1917 and had been founding members of the Finnish Communist Party. 
is party openly denounced democracy and parliamentarism and strove 
for a dictatorship of the proletariat established by an unavoidably violent 
revolution that would destroy the bourgeois state. Kuusinen concluded 
that the Kautskyist parliamentary class struggle had failed by diminishing 
the workers’ belief in an armed struggle.2460 It is unlikely that these views 
only emerged aer the failed revolution; these men had already challenged 
bourgeois democracy and parliamentarism in earnest in 1917.
Finnish relations with the Entente could not have been worse. A civil 
war was going on in Russia, and some Finnish activists were considering an 
intervention on the White side. Britain and the United States were reluctant 
to recognise Finnish independence as long as the country remained a loyal 
ally of Germany – this was manifested in the application of a monarchical 
constitution of the Prussian type, the election of a German prince to the 
throne and the anti-Western attitudes expressed during the constitutional 
struggles of 1918. Germany itself provided a contrary constitutional model 
in January 1919: it had abolished monarchy aer losing the war and, aer 
the revolutionary council experiment by the far le, was moving towards 
a republican constitution based on universal surage and parliamentary 
democracy, though parliamentarism would remain limited by strong 
presidential exceptional powers and the possibility to appeal directly to the 
people through referenda. e German constitutional model nevertheless 
remained from a Finnish perspective more valid than any provided by the 
Entente or Sweden: this can be seen in extensive reports on the Weimar 
debates in newspapers of every major party.2461 Even if it remained unclear 
whether political attitudes had changed in Germany as fundamentally as the 
constitutional rearrangements suggested, transnational inuence from there 
continued to involve both the republicans and the monarchists.2462 Sweden, 
the old constitutional mother country, had also chosen a reformist path 
aer the right agreed to an electoral reform, mainly to stop the spread of 
revolutionary tendencies resembling those in Germany. However, Sweden 
remained an odious object of imitation for conservative and nationalist 
2460 Polvinen 1971, 66–8; Kettunen 1986, 90; Hyvärinen 2003, 86, 90. 
2461 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Krisens utveckling i Tyskland’, 4 March 1919; Suomen 
Sosialidemokraatti, ‘Saksan hallitusmuotokysymys’, 5 March 1919; ‘Johdon-
mukaisuutta’, 10 March 1919; Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Waikutelmia Weimarista’, 25 
April 1919.
2462 e Swedish and Finnish Ambassadors, together with those of Denmark, 
Lithuania and Norway, were the only major diplomats to attend the opening 
of the German National Assembly on 6 February 1919. Edvard Hjelt, who had 
signed the agreement with Germany in March 1918, continued to represent 
Finland in Berlin. Neue Preußische Zeitung, 7 February 1919; Berliner Tageblatt, 
7 February 1919. On the other hand, Hufvudstadsbladet obviously wanted to 
postpone decisions on the Finnish constitution until Germany had decided on 
its new polity. ‘Samhällets självbevarelseplikt’, 14 June 1919.
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Finnish MPs – despite the shared constitutional tradition – as long as 
it continued its attempt to annex the Åland Islands,  its domestic politics 
were run by the Social Democrats and their obedient Liberal allies, who 
had been unwilling to openly help the Whites during the Civil War, and the 
Swedish People’s Party in Finland demonstrated signs of separatism. As for 
the Finnish Social Democrats, they too had been disappointed by the lack of 
sympathy from Sweden during the Civil War but were reconsidering whether 
the revisionist Swedish strategy of reform through the parliament might not 
lead to better results aer all. Even Karl Kautsky, whose teachings they have 
been supposed by many Finnish historians to have followed, had denounced 
their previous policies as sheer Bolshevism. Väinö Tanner, a moderate Social 
Democratic leader, travelled around Scandinavia to create new contacts 
with sister parties. Hannes Ryömä, a member of the new Constitutional 
Committee and also the editor-in-chief of Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, 
described the revolutions of late 1918 as a breakthrough of democracy 
in a parliamentary sense rather than any advancement of Bolshevism.2463 
Both Tanner and Ryömä had been looking for contacts to German Social 
Democracy already during 1918.2464 e fact that these leaders wanted to 
direct Finnish Social Democracy towards Western European revisionism 
is visible in positive statements about the policies of the German SPD as 
opposed to Bolshevism and the failed Finnish Revolution.2465 
Constitutional questions had been far from merely domestic issues in 
1917 (under Russian inuence) or in 1918 (under German inuence), and 
they would continue to be inuenced by transnational connections in 1919. 
Britain had required the Finns to hold a new election as a demonstration 
of their renunciation of pro-German policies and as a precondition for 
the recognition of Finnish independence. To the British and Americans, 
the Finnish monarchists appeared as uncritical admirers of Germany, 
whereas the republicans were believed to support Western democracy.2466 
Not all republicans or reformists were Anglophiles, however, as connections 
with Germany had long been dominant in most areas of culture. Russian 
transnational involvement in Finnish constitutional debates had been nearly 
extinguished by the Civil War, Sweden was excluded because of its alleged 
expansionism (in the Åland Islands), Germany concentrated on solving its 
own constitutional and socio-economic challenges, and the United States 
was divided by a dispute on whether or not to commit itself to the League 
of Nations. In the meantime, victorious Britain had become the most 
important transnational actor on the constitutional scene and a model that 
could no longer be simply ignored.2467
Back home, the wounds of the Civil War remained sore with the 
incarceration of the defeated Reds in prison camps with death tolls that 
were higher than the casualties in the actual war. e treatment of the 
2463 Soikkanen 1975, 315, 319, 324. 
2464 Hentilä & Hentilä 2016, 221–3.
2465 Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, ‘Johdonmukaisuutta’, 10 March 1919.
2466 Vares 2006, 130.
2467 See also Pekonen 2014.
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prisoners had provoked concerned publicity in the Western media and 
among leist groups in particular. e exiled Reds in Soviet Russia were 
assumed to be eager for revenge, and the le at home was bitter about its 
previous exclusion from political life. e republican Whites who had been 
represented in the Rump Parliament were sour about the uncompromising 
constitutional dictation of the monarchists in autumn 1918 and unwilling 
to make concessions towards anything resembling a monarchy. e 
monarchists, too, were disappointed because their favourite polity of an 
updated Gustavian2468 or applied Prussian monarchical type had proved to 
be unachievable. Many found it dicult to believe in the political potential 
of the people aer the masses had let the ruling classes down by rejecting 
representative government and joining the Red rebellion. 
at rebellion had been crushed and traditionalist monarchism 
had received a major transnational blow, but no one knew whether 
the revolutionary period was over. e revolutionary language of class 
confrontation might well re-enter the parliament aer a new election. And, 
in fact, verbal strife would only gradually die out of constitutional debates, 
as a reection of reconsideration within the Social Democratic Party and 
also among some of the right. Radical Social Democrats nevertheless 
admonished the bourgeoisie to renounce the policies they had followed 
in the rst ten years of the reformed parliament if they wanted the Social 
Democrats to prevent a new revolutionary bid.2469 Non-socialist members, 
for their part, did not hesitate to remind the le about the lawless rebellion 
against a parliamentary majority that had taken place.
e weariness with constitutional strife had nevertheless increased 
a  readiness for compromise in most parties. International examples also 
contributed to this: if the Swedish right had given in aer over a decade of 
opposition, and if the German le and bourgeoisie could be expected to 
agree on a new constitutional settlement soon, why should the Finns demur 
– especially as the dangers arising from continued controversy for a newly 
independent state next to Russia were so grave? A constitutional compromise 
was known to be a precondition for the recognition of Finnish independence 
by Britain and the United States. Without this, the survival of the country 
in the post-war situation would remain precarious. Even so, the discursive 
process towards a compromise would not be an easy one: all parties would 
need to reconsider their old stands and possibly redene their key political 
concepts in order to be able to negotiate and agree on a compromise on the 
polity. All but the leaders of the Swedish People’s Party would turn out to 
be ready for such a reassessment in spring 1919, with the Swedish-speaking 
conservatives refraining for both ideological and language-policy reasons 
(in order to gain a stronger status for Swedish, a  minority language, as 
2468 e Swedish People’s Party did not give up its idealisation of the duality of 
government in Gustav III’s eighteenth-century constitution. Hufvudstadsbladet, 
‘Samhällets självbevarelseplikt’, 14 June 1919; ‘Regeringsformen antagen’, 22 June 
1919. 
2469 See VP, Jonas Laherma, 25 April 1919, 132; Mikko Ampuja, 25 April 1919, 134–5.
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a ‘national’ one). Ideological closeness to the Prussian right can be seen in 
quotations from its representatives published in the organ of the party.2470
e constitutional debates of spring 1919 were preceded by major 
changes in the Finnish party system. e overwhelmingly monarchist 
Swedish People’s Party, suspicious of the Finnish people at large aer the Civil 
War, won 22 seats in the election of March 1919. Many of the spokesmen 
of the party continued to hold political views and theories that resembled 
those of the German or the Swedish right; the party stood against extended 
democracy or parliamentarism and for the protection of minority rights. 
e Finnish-speaking conservatives had reorganised themselves into the 
monarchist National Coalition Party, based on a union between the former 
Finnish Party and monarchist Young Finns, and calling for the safeguarding 
of ‘the legal societal order inherited from forefathers’.2471 is party opposed 
extreme forms of parliamentarism as proposed by the Power Act of 1917 and 
looked for a counterbalance in a strong presidency resembling a monarchy, 
a polity recalling German counterbalances to parliamentarism. Its electoral 
support proved modest: the party won a mere 28 seats, which reected the 
unpopularity of the monarchical project of 1918. e National Progress 
Party created by the republican Young Finns, by contrast, gained 26 seats, 
which demonstrated the strong support for republicanism among liberal 
voters. e victory of the Agrarian League, the most consistent defender of 
republicanism, democracy and parliamentarism in the Finnish parliament 
throughout the constitutional disputes of 1917–18, was also important for 
the victory of parliamentary democracy. Ideologically this party was distinct 
from the German conservative Catholic Centre and the predominantly 
conservative Swedish peasant parties. e voters recognised its contribution 
with 42 seats. All in all, the republicans had an undisputable majority of 
almost three fourths, with only the National Coalition and Swedish People’s 
Party representing the lost monarchical cause.
e Finnish Social Democratic Party was completely reorganised 
aer the Civil War: armed revolution was denounced, previous links 
with the Bolsheviks were cut and the moderate German and Swedish 
Social Democratic Parties were adopted as models. e revolutionary 
Finnish Communist Party was declared illegal in Finland and remained 
so throughout the interwar period.2472 e Finnish le was thus divided 
only aer a failed violent revolution and signicantly later than the Social 
Democrats in Sweden and Germany; a comparable division and the lack of 
links with Russian revolutionary discourse in 1917 might well have saved 
Finland from a civil war. Even though the Social Democrats lost 12 seats 
in 1919, they remained the largest group in the parliament with 80 seats. 
An openly far le party was lacking, but some radicalism remained within 
the Social Democratic Party and would be revived in the Finnish Socialist 
Labour Party in 1922.
2470 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Krisens utveckling i Tyskland’, 4 March 1919.
2471 Kansallisen Kokoomuspuolueen vaalijulistus, 1919.
2472 Kettunen 1986, 90; Jussila, Hentilä & Nevakivi 1999, 126–7; Vares 2006, 132. 
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During the election campaign, the need for a proper constitution was 
widely discussed, and thus the mandate of the new parliament to solve 
the issue was undeniable. e choices to be made were between a limited 
democracy maintaining the duality of executive and legislative powers and 
an extended parliamentary democracy that would award the people, the 
parliament and the parties rather than the head of state the key role in the 
political system. As Vesa Vares has pointed out, the international situation of 
early March 1919 – in contrast to 1918 – favoured the republican alternative: 
three empires had fallen and many European countries were actively 
searching for democratic and parliamentary constitutional solutions.2473 
e implications of the changed international context and the transnational 
links of the Finnish parliamentarians need to be taken into account since 
they indicate that the formation of the Finnish republican constitution, too, 
was a partly transnational and not merely a national discursive process. 
Aer the election, the republicans formed a minority government 
supported by the Agrarians and the Progress Party and including the 
monarchist Swedish People’s Party – to avoid any escalation of the language 
issue. e ministry was led by Kaarlo Castrén, a rightist Progressivist. e 
new parliament, which convened on 1 April, voted down two proposals for 
a monarchical constitution conditionally approved in 1918, and on 13 May 
1919 it received a new proposal for a republican constitution, produced aer 
considerable disagreement within the ministry.2474 A republican constitution 
was not easy to accept for the monarchist majority of the Swedish-speakers, 
and the party would continue to oppose it to the end. is opposition was 
motivated by the language provisions, which they saw as corroding the 
status of the Swedish language, but the speeches of the party members 
show that their stands were also inuenced by ideological factors. e party 
would leave the coalition in August as a result of disagreements on language 
policy,2475 and possibly also in protest against the republican constitution.
e republican turn had immediate eects on relations with the Entente: 
Britain and the United States recognised Finnish independence in early 
May once they saw a parliamentary democracy emerging.2476 e British 
based this recognition on their view of the ongoing Russian Civil War and 
the potential construction of a new anti-German alliance: they believed 
that the recognition would reduce German inuence in the Baltic and win 
a trustworthy opponent to the Bolsheviks over to the British side.2477 e 
Finnish election result suggested that no more than a third had supported 
the monarchical project of 1918. Crypto-monarchism survived, of course, 
in the form of a presidency, the power of which continued to be negotiated 
between the republicans and the National Coalition Party until the nal 
passage of the bill on 21 June. 
2473 Vares 2006, 137.
2474 Sihvonen 1997, 15.
2475 Vares 2006, 140.
2476 Sihvonen 1997, 15; Jussila, Hentilä & Nevakivi 1999, 127–9. 
2477 Sundbäck 1994, 371–5.
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e formulation of the republican bill corresponds with the proposal that 
had been debated by the Weimar National Constituent Assembly since late 
February. Even though the Finnish proposal had been prepared to a great 
extent during 1917, old cultural contacts with Germany were kept alive by 
republicans and monarchists alike. e old model polity had turned into 
a parliamentary democracy, as the republicans had foreseen in autumn 1918. 
e Finnish right still followed the stances of the German right at least as far 
as political theory was concerned. e Germans, furthermore, faced similar 
challenges in reconciling parliamentarism with a presidency authorised by 
a popular vote. e issue of transnational inuence from Germany has not 
been much explored in Finnish historical research. Sven Lindman argued 
in 1937 (at a time when the Weimar Constitution had already failed and 
all associations with it were avoided) that the premises of the Finnish 
constitution had been formulated in 1917, well before the other constitutions 
that were adopted aer the First World War, and that it was not inuenced to 
any considerable extent by the debates of those states that needed to decide 
on a new constitution – despite some manifestations of inuence in the 
parliamentary debates of spring 1919. Lindman thus conceded that there 
may have been something that we could call transnational inuence but 
doubted the relevance of the German example, ‘even if the German proposal 
was probably known in Finland before the new form of government was 
accepted’.2478 e republican turn in the Finnish parliamentary debates on 
the constitution nevertheless remained transnationally connected with 
Germany – as the parliamentary turn in spring and summer 1917 and the 
monarchical reaction in summer and autumn 1918 had been. e Finnish 
press at least remained interested in German developments. e comparative 
and transnational analysis of parliamentary debates below also suggests that 
connections continued to exist even though the changed political situation 
made the speakers more selective in their references to German models. 
However, the new international set-up by no means predetermined 
the decisions of the Finnish parliamentarians. ere were still several 
options available: the republic could be based on the kind of far-reaching 
parliamentarism demanded by the Social Democrats and approved by the 
Agrarians as fellow proponents of the Power Act of 1917, or it could include 
a strong presidency as a counterbalance to the parliament as suggested in 
the republican proposal of late 1917. e latter alternative, which resembled 
the German plans with a strong Reichspräsident, was favoured by many 
republicans and former monarchists alike. Aer negotiations, which partly 
took place in conjunction with the parliamentary debates themselves, 
a compromise was found on a presidential republic combining parliamentary 
democracy with a strong presidency with veto rights. is would become 
a lasting polity that would be gradually parliamentarised only aer 1981. 
Full parliamentarism would be introduced in the constitution of 2000 and 
further extended in 2012. 
e constitutional compromise was supported by an increasing 
readiness among the le and centre (both traumatised by the failure of 
2478 Lindman 1937, 12.
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radical parliamentary rule in 1917 and the Civil War) to allow the president 
some independent executive power provided that legislative power would 
remain concentrated in the parliament. e German presidential model and 
the maintenance of the Swedish monarchy, accepted by their sister parties, 
may also have supported this readiness. e Finnish-speaking right, too, 
appeared to be increasingly prepared to go back to a slightly more optimistic 
conception of the people and to accommodate themselves to a republic 
provided that the president remained independent of the parliament and had 
a suspending veto in legislation – a model that was to be followed in Germany 
as well. e republicans, too, understood the necessity of compromise 
– unless they wished to take the risk of a further postponement through the 
right using minority provisions (with just 1/6 of the votes being enough to 
force a postponement).2479 is provision was, in fact, used by the National 
Coalition Party in the next to nal vote on 14 June 1919. As hardly anyone 
wanted the constitutional strife to continue, a nal compromise was sought 
and the National Coalition Party, too, voted for a presidential republic on 
21 June, aer obtaining some further additions to presidential power. 
e alternatives in the Finnish debates were in many ways parallel to 
those in Weimar; this was particularly true of the status of the president as 
a counterbalance to the feared extreme parliamentarism. In both countries, 
the right campaigned for a strong ‘monarchical’ president deriving his power 
directly from the people, whereas the le and some of the centre preferred 
a more parliamentarised polity. Lindman recognised that constitutional 
dualism connected the German and Finnish constitutions and distinguished 
them from other polities of the time (though a degree of dualism was 
retained in Sweden as well).2480 
Many members of the Finnish-speaking right, unlike the German right, 
were moving towards the acceptance of the republican constitution. Vesa 
Vares suggests that many of them were unwilling to appear as opponents 
of democracy and parliamentarism. ey were also concerned about extra-
parliamentary measures by the le and centre that might produce another 
revolution and civil war supported by the Bolsheviks in the east.2481 e 
right was drawing the same conclusions that the leaders of the Swedish right 
had drawn in November and December 1918: there was no way of halting 
an evidently Europe-wide transition to parliamentary democracy aer 
Britain had won the war and both Germany and Sweden had chosen that 
path. At the same time, the Swedish People’s Party remained an advocate 
of the traditional political order, trying to retain as much of the special 
status of the linguistic minority and the administrative elite as possible 
– even at the cost of appearing reactionary in its opposition to democracy 
and parliamentarism. Vares adds that the Social Democrats were not happy 
about the constitutional proposal in comparison the Power Act of July 1917. 
Nevertheless, the newly organised party considered it necessary to accept 
a compromise that allowed a degree of parliamentarism, as its leaders did not 
2479 Vares 2006, 141–2.
2480 Lindman 1937, 13–14.
2481 Vares 2006, 144.
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want radical socialists to take over the party again and to lead it into another 
civil war. A feared rightist coup was also to be prevented.2482 ese then were 
the dierent party-political reasons for the overwhelming majority support 
for the republican constitution.
Noteworthy are the rather rapid disappearance of the most uncompro-
mising Social Democratic references to a class struggle challenging 
bourgeois democracy and parliamentarism and the prominent roles given 
to a few moderate leaders in the constitutional debates. e party leaders 
had evidently decided to keep the process under control and to prevent 
the radicals from repeating the militant discursive attacks of 1917: the 
moderates could speak for compromise, while other Social Democrat MPs 
could carry on using socialist rhetoric to appease the party’s supporters 
(and to keep open an alternative option should the constitution fail). e 
German and Swedish models of successful constitutional reform carried out 
by Social Democrats supported belief in this strategy. However, it was not 
easy to persuade the majority of the Finnish workers to place their trust 
in the parliamentary system again, and even the more moderate of the 
Social Democrats recalled the injustices committed by the ‘half-parliament’ 
of 1918.2483 Bourgeois doubts about the ability of the Social Democrats to 
respect parliamentarism in a bourgeois or Western sense had not died out 
either,2484 though these doubts decreased in the course of the debate as the 
le turned out to be more constructive than had been expected. 
e constitutional compromise in its entirety was acceptable to few. 
e rightist members still protested against the denition of the powers 
of the presidency by using minority provisions2485 on 14 June and thus 
delayed the adoption of the constitution. e consequent anti-right reaction 
in the parliament and the press was erce,2486 which may be explained by 
the tendency of the rightist parties to (ab)use parliamentary procedure in 
1917 and 1918 as well2487 and the continuous obstruction of the Swedish 
People’s Party. e general weariness of the public with the never-ending 
constitutional strife played a major role. A compromise was reached 
around an earlier proposal, to a great extent identical with the postponed 
bill but including a few persuasive concessions to the right. ereaer 
the constitution was accepted by 165 votes against 22 on 21 June 1919.2488 
It was signed by the Regent, C. G. E. Mannerheim, on 17 July 1919, and 
a parliamentary republic with a monarchical presidency was established. 
2482 Vares 2006, 145, 147; see also Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, ‘Hallitusmuoto 
hywäksytty’, 22 June 1919.
2483 VP, Väinö Tanner, 25 April 1919, 135–6.
2484 VP, Santeri Alkio, 25 April 1919, 132; see Mikko Piitulainen (Agrarian) on 
the non-existent parliamentary basis of ‘the so-called People’s Delegation’ 
(kansanvaltuuskunta) of the Reds during the Civil War, 25 April 1919, 134. 
2485 Cf. the exibility of the British unwritten constitution, which had allowed the 
introduction of the Representation of the People Act with a simple parliamentary 
majority.
2486 Vares 2006, 145.
2487 Ihalainen 2017.
2488 Sihvonen 1997, 16; Jussila, Hentilä & Nevakivi 1999, 129.
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7.4.2  Rethought international comparisons and 
 transnational connections after the war  
 and the revolutions
As Prime Minister Paasikivi had argued during the constitutional conict 
of 1918, a small newly independent state had to design its constitution to 
correspond with the state of international aairs. e awareness of foreign 
powers observing the Finnish parliament and deciding on their future 
relationship with the country on the basis of the ability of the Finns to settle 
their constitutional disputes was high in spring 1919 as well.2489 However, 
the instability of the international situation was also used by the right to 
maintain that it was best to just stick with the constitution inherited from 
eighteenth-century Sweden.2490
e most obvious shi in international comparisons was a drastic 
decrease in direct references to Germany. In the circumstances of spring 
1919, further references to German models by former monarchists would 
have been out of place; it was more helpful to refer to Scandinavian and 
British monarchical models instead.2491 Bourgeois republicans, regretting 
their equally uncritical admiration of Germany during 1918,2492 did not 
wish to be associated with German models any more either. e Minister 
for Social Aairs, Santeri Alkio, rather used general European examples to 
justify parliamentarism. ough he expected the new German polity, too, 
to be built on far-reaching democracy, he preferred to take Switzerland 
and the United States as positive examples of republicanism.2493 Even the 
American system appeared in a positive light once US recognition of Finnish 
independence had been received.
e monarchical adventure of the Rump Parliament of 1918 had not 
merely discredited the Form of Government of 1772;2494 it had also made 
transnational links with Germany appear as unpatriotic scheming. e 
constitutional debates of the new parliament hence opened with mutual 
recriminations about the degree of commitment of the opposing parties in 
serving German interests and the abuses of German contacts in attempting 
to enforce a monarchical constitution. Georg Schauman, of the Swedish 
Le (a minority group within the Swedish People’s Party), who had actively 
tried to persuade Friedrich Karl to turn down the invitation to the throne, 
attacked the monarchist ministry of 1918 for having asked the Germans to 
issue statements intended to induce the Finnish republicans give up their 
2489 VP, Matti Helenius-Seppälä, 25 April 1919, 142; Oskari Mantere (Progressivists), 
14 June 1919, 903; Rafael Erich, 14 June 1919, 918; Juho Kaskinen (Progressivists), 
14 June 1919, 1025–6.
2490 VP, Ernst Estlander, 25 April 1919, 131.
2491 VP, Emil Nestor Setälä, 25 April 1919, 133.
2492 See Tekla Hultin’s reminder of this, VP, 25 April 1919, 137, as well as Santeri 
Alkio’s explanation, 25 April 1919, 138.
2493 VP, 24 May 1919, 511. e more conservative section of the Agrarians suggested 
that Finland had acted like David in the Old Testament, forgetting God and 
turning to external powers, which had led to famine, war and plagues. Frans 
Kärki (a clergyman), 14 June 1919, 888.
2494 For more on this, see Ihalainen 2015.
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resistance to a monarchical constitution. Schauman cited the German 
Foreign Minister Paul von Hintze as having stated in the Main Committee of 
the Reichstag on 24 September 1918 (two days before the nal breakthrough 
of the Entente on the Western front) that while the Germans had told the 
Finnish government that they considered the constitutional question an 
internal aair to be decided by the Finns themselves, a wish expressed by 
the Finnish government had caused the Germans to ‘semi-ocially’ express 
their sympathy for the institution of a constitutional monarchy.2495 e 
Finnish government was now accused of having contacted the Kaiser to 
ask his son to become a Finnish king before the constitutional issue had 
been settled in the parliament.2496 When Professor E. N. Setälä (National 
Coalition Party) reacted by questioning the reliability of von Hintze’s 
information about the issue and declaring Schauman’s claims about contacts 
with Germany to be unfounded,2497 Schauman added that von Hintze’s 
statement had been published in German papers and also in the Finnish 
paper Hufvudstadsbladet (which Schauman was citing).2498 Ernst Estlander, 
an even more fervent monarchist, consequently described Schauman’s 
activities in Germany, including his attempts to dissuade Friedrich Karl from 
taking the crown, as ‘disloyal’ and aiming at inuencing the legal decision 
of the Finnish parliament via Germany.2499 Both conservative monarchists 
and liberal republicans had, it seemed, abused their German connections 
in 1918, thereby transnationalising the constitutional dispute, and now the 
argument was about who had been more traitorous in their transnational 
connections.
Schauman resolutely defended his negotiations in Germany in autumn 
1918 as having been based on a mandate from the republican parties of 
the Finnish parliament.2500 He had reported in September that the German 
le encouraged the Finnish republicans to continue their opposition 
to monarchy and to wait for a change of regime in Germany.2501 Antti 
Juutilainen (Agrarian) conrmed this, conceding that such information 
from Germany had helped the republicans to hold on to their views. 
Schauman had later informed the republicans about the political changes 
in Germany aer they started in early October, which had strengthened 
their determination to block the monarchical scheme. He had also told the 
Germans about the limited support which the monarchical project of the 
Rump Parliament enjoyed.2502 Hjalmar Procopé (Swedish People’s Party), 
an activist who had recruited Finnish volunteers for the German army, 
further accused the republicans of having become ‘secret forces that played 
their game in Berlin’ at a decisive moment in September 1918, and called to 
2495 VP, Georg Schauman, 25 April 1919, 128–9.
2496 VP, Georg Schauman, 25 April 1919, 129. For a related accusation, see Väinö 
Tanner, 25 April 1919, 135.
2497 VP, Emil Nestor Setälä, 25 April 1919, 129. 
2498 VP, Georg Schauman, 25 April 1919, 130.
2499 VP, Ernst Estlander, 25 April 1919, 131; 25 April 1919, 133.
2500 VP, Georg Schauman, 25 April 1919, 131.
2501 Vares 1998, 248.
2502 VP, Antti Juutilainen, 25 April 1919, 137.
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account their claims that the Finnish parliament then did not represent all 
of the people of Finland.2503 Juho Vennola (Progressivist), the Minister of 
Commerce and Industry, for his part, declared that the right had given up the 
country’s independence in turning so one-sidedly to Germany to achieve its 
national political goals.2504 us both sides of the constitutional struggle of 
1918 had clearly been exploiting transnational connections with Germany 
to win a domestic political battle, and the pernicious consequences were 
now recognised. Generally, however, the debate tended to exclude Germany 
and other foreign countries from comparisons, and emphasised the national 
character of the constitutional reform in a way that was typical of other 
countries, too. While 1917 and 1918 had been years of transnational debate, 
1919 was one of increasingly nation-state-centred perspectives. 
Russia had been totally excluded from constitutional references as 
a consequence of the Civil War. Only the alliance of the Reds with the 
Bolsheviks was taken up in the heat of the debate in reactions to any continued 
use of the language of class struggle by the Social Democrats. Santeri Alkio 
accused the Social Democratic leaders of 1917 of having allied themselves 
with the Russian Bolsheviks and allowing Lenin to challenge the republican 
constitution of Finland. e risk of a further Bolshevik revolution remained 
present in the minds of several non-socialist members,2505 which in turn 
oended some socialists.2506 Others asserted that the threat of Bolshevism 
was, given the result of the Civil War, no greater in Finland than elsewhere.2507 
Some centrists suggested rather that the right might be equally inclined to 
launch an extra-parliamentary coup,2508 which was indeed a possibility until 
the promulgation of the constitution.
e Social Democrats, in seeking new models, were in principle re-
orienting themselves towards the Swedish2509 rather than the German 
SPD and could see the Entente in positive terms as well,2510 though their 
willingness to replace revolutionary radicalism with parliamentary methods 
were still generally doubted.2511 However, the moderates oered alternative 
visions. Väinö Voionmaa, a professor of history, used Britain, Sweden and 
2503 VP, Hjalmar Procopé, 25 April 1919, 140.
2504 VP, Juho Vennola, 25 April 1919, 141.
2505 VP, Santeri Alkio, 25 April 1919, 132; 2 June 1919, 654; 14 June 1919, 900. 
e point was repeated by Kalle Lohi (Agrarian), 25 April 1919, 134, Ernst 
Estlander, 25 April 1919, 140, and Juho Vennola (Progressivist), 25 April 
1919, 141. e National Coalition Party, furthermore, called for international 
cooperation against international Bolshevism in its party manifesto. Kansallisen 
Kokoomuspuolueen ohjelma, 1918.
2506 VP, Olga Leinonen, 25 April 1919, 136.
2507 VP, Matti Helenius-Seppälä (Christian Labour Union), 25 April 1919, 142.
2508 VP, Kalle Lohi, 14 June 1919, 903.
2509 For an indirect suggestion that this was so, see VP, Rafael Erich (National 
Coalition), 25 April 1919, 138.
2510 For a positive view of British parliamentarism and the political system of the 
United States, see VP, Väinö Voionmaa (Social Democrat), 24 May 1919, 518–19.
2511 Aonbladet, ‘Finsk politik just nu’, 26 May 1919, reported on ‘the inammatory, 
intemperate language’ used against the bourgeoisie and in favour of the Reds in 
the Finnish Social Democratic press and public meetings.
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Norway (to a lesser extent the United States and Australia) as points of 
reference when commenting on the practices of parliamentary government. 
e parliamentarised Norwegian Constitution of 1814 – based ‘on a longer 
political experience than ours’ – in his view contained restrictions to 
executive power that could be copied in Finland as well. For instance, in 
Norway the king could not dissolve the Stortinget before decisions on the 
budget were made. e British political system appeared to Voionmaa as 
the most developed model for control of the executive,2512 which was a 
daring suggestion in a country where Britain had just recently been looked 
down on as an enemy. Jonas Laherma of the Social Democrats provocatively 
went back to the Swiss constitution, recalling Kuusinen’s controversial 
arguments in 1917, but then turned to Austria and Estonia as examples in 
arguing for democratised supreme executive power.2513 e transnational 
process of formulating democratic constitutions oered Finnish speakers 
a variety of examples from which to choose in supporting their own 
particular arguments. Norway appeared as particularly applicable because 
of its cultural anity; moreover, Norway was not Sweden, which served as 
a less attractive model in the circumstances of the ongoing dispute about the 
possession of the Åland Islands.
e Swedish-speaking minority did maintain the link with Sweden to 
some extent. Swedish practices of the parliamentary control of government, 
for instance, were something that Georg Schauman of the Swedish Le, 
an expert on the Swedish Age of Liberty, would have liked to adopt.2514 
However, Ernst Estlander of the majority Swedish People’s Party explained 
why such Swedish examples were not applicable: the dispute over the Åland 
Islands had inamed relations between the two countries. Estlander’s hope 
was that the territorial question would be soon solved and good relations 
restored. In the meantime, other Scandinavia countries worked better as 
constitutional examples.2515 Estlander himself rejected France as being a 
failed republic and saw the United States and Switzerland as unique and 
hence inapplicable cases. is leading lawyer continued to warn about 
the risks of a democratic republican constitution, advising Finland not to 
join countries (like Germany and implicitly Sweden) where ‘radical and 
revolutionary upheavals’ were leading to forms of government that were 
unlikely to provide secure foundations for the future of these states.2516 
Estlander’s argument was that the Swedish constitutional tradition as 
safeguarded in Finland continued to provide an ideal form of government 
in times of transnational constitutional ferment.
Professor Rafael Erich (National Coalition Party), a specialist in 
constitutional law and a former pro-German monarchist who had invited 
2512 VP, Väinö Voionmaa, 24 May 1919, 520–2; 2 June 1919, 650.
2513 VP, Jonas Laherma, 24 May 1919, 538. On the continuity of the Swiss model but 
movement towards parliamentarism among Social Democrats, see Lindman 
1968, 373, 376.
2514 VP, Georg Schauman, 24 May 1919, 535–6; 3 June 1919, 699–700; Lindman 1968, 
386; cf. Georg von Wendt (also Swedish Le), 3 June 1919, 725.
2515 VP, Ernst Estlander, 2 June 1919, 668.
2516 VP, Ernst Estlander, 2 June 1919, 667–8, 670. 
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the German troops to Finland in spring 1918, also turned to the familiar 
debate on the deciencies of the constitution of the ird Republic to argue 
against the excessive democracy and parliamentarism that, in his view, 
were being proposed by the Finnish ministry.2517 He considered that British 
parliamentarism was inapplicable outside that country,2518 and he doubted 
the applicability of the German plans for a presidency as well,2519 wishing 
to see an even stronger executive power. is exemplies the Finnish 
conservatives’ disappointment with the radical course of the reforms in 
Germany. e French republican example was likewise rejected by the 
monarchist Paavo Virkkunen (a vicar by calling), who found support for 
a strong presidency in ‘the mighty United States of the west’, with which ‘wide 
circles of our people have made contact’,2520 mainly through emigration. is 
is revealing of the opportunism of the monarchists in Finland, given that 
Virkkunen had in the preceding year spoken for a Germanic ‘democratic 
monarchy’. Until 1918, conservatives like Virkkunen had tended to despise 
the USA as an upstart nation, but the monarchical elements of its presidency 
now paradoxically provided politically correct arguments for them. E. N. 
Setälä, while also recognising the American example, nevertheless preferred 
to emphasise the positive experiences of monarchy in Britain and Norway,2521 
in this way keeping the monarchical alternative alive.
Väinö Voionmaa of the Social Democrats could not help ironising 
these conservative turns from Prussian to American constitutional models. 
He himself rejected the American presidential model as being based on 
eighteenth-century practices.2522 Matti Helenius-Seppälä (Christian Labour 
Union) warned of copying the American system, which, he claimed, might 
soon be changed;2523 this was an over-interpretation of the consequences of 
the introduction of women’s surage in the United States. Helenius-Seppälä 
encouraged the Finnish Social Democrats to look rather to Germany, 
which was governed by one of their brethren, President Friedrich Ebert. 
A moderate Social Democrat was ruling Germany in an exemplary way 
aer a successful revolution made by parliamentary means under Social 
Democratic leadership. e German example demonstrated how the 
Finnish constitutional proposal opened access to power even to socialists 
and should hence be supported by them.2524 
Hjalmar Procopé, a pro-German attorney from the Swedish People’s 
Party, which opposed parliamentary democracy, found positive precedents 
in the Norwegian constitution, which had been disparaged previously by his 
party colleague R. A. Wrede for being excessively republican, and rejected 
British parliamentarism as inapplicable to any other country. Having worked 
in 1918 for the invitation of a German king, Procopé now painted a gloomy 
2517 VP, Rafael Erich, 24 May 1919, 526–7; 3 June 1919, 726.
2518 Lindman 1968, 362.
2519 VP, Rafael Erich, 4 June 1919, 749.
2520 VP, Paavo Virkkunen, 2 June 1919, 642; 2 June 1919, 658.
2521 VP, Emil Nestor Setälä, 2 June 1919, 665; 3 June 1919, 729; 4 June 1919, 738.
2522 VP, Väinö Voionmaa, 3 June 1919, 720.
2523 VP, Matti Helenius-Seppälä, 3 June 1919, 729.
2524 VP, Matti Helenius-Seppälä, 14 June 1919, 911.
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picture of a future parliamentary republic that resembled South American 
‘nigger republics’.2525 Georg Schauman of the Swedish Le countered his 
claim by emphasising the successful extension of parliamentarism in Britain, 
France, Germany and the Scandinavian states. e Swedish experience 
since autumn 1917 demonstrated to him how unfeasible non-parliamentary 
government had become in the modern world. e German Revolution, 
again, had invalidated older German constitutional theory, a favourite 
source of argumentation for Finnish conservatives.2526 is transnationally 
connected liberal thus recommended the Finns to become part of the 
northwest European cultural area of parliamentarism and not hold on to 
the outdated institution of monarchy. For many bourgeois republicans, 
too, Western European parliamentary democracies had become models to 
follow, in much the same way as they had for Swedish Liberals previously. 
e Chairman of the Constitutional Committee, Heikki Ritavuori 
(Progressivist), whose proposal would nally be adopted, saw Britain, 
France and Switzerland as precedents that were applicable to Finland.2527 
And as for the election of a president and his right of veto, the United States 
could be added to the list of models2528 – to please the monarchist National 
Coalition Party. 
Although Anglophile republicanism had existed to a limited extent before 
in the minds of the Finnish political elite, it had come into the open aer 
the war, which reects an incipient turn from German to Anglo-American 
models among them. is turn is illustrative of the highly contingent nature 
of international comparisons and transnational links in parliamentary 
debates on constitutional issues. e process of formulating the Finnish 
constitution between spring 1917 and summer 1919 belonged to the course 
of international events and the transnational debate on constitutional 
reform to a greater extent than was the case in Britain or even in Germany 
and Sweden, although the implications of the history of events and turns 
in the transnational discourse on constitutions were considerable in these 
countries, too. e insecure international standing of a small nation aiming 
at maintaining its independence made Finland particularly dependent on 
contingent transnational factors and developments: rst on the inherited 
Swedish constitutional tradition, second on the radicalising course of the 
Russian Revolution, third on the last phase of Prussian political culture 
and the German Revolution, and fourth on the symbolic victory of British 
parliamentarism and American presidentialism in the war. 
e transfers of inuence from Russia were curtailed as a result of the 
Finnish Civil War, those from Germany decreased with Germany’s defeat 
in the war, those from Sweden were temporarily obstructed by the Åland 
Islands crisis, and those from Britain and especially the United States 
opened up by the result of the First World War, although Britain had 
2525 VP, Hjalmar Procopé, 3 June 1919, 712; 4 June 1919, 741.
2526 VP, Georg Schauman, 4 June 1919, 744. For Rafael Erich’s response, see 4 June 
1919, 745.
2527 VP, Heikki Ritavuori, 24 May 1919, 537.
2528 VP, Heikki Ritavuori, 3 June 1919, 708, 724.
481
7.4  Finland: Moving towards a compromise on a presidentia parliamentary republic
sometimes provided a parliamentary model before.2529 e internationalism 
of the radical socialists derived from Russia in 1917 was replaced by the 
monarchists’ and the republicans’ transnational inuences from Germany 
in 1918, while selective transnational comparions of all political groups 
based on various versions of Western parliamentary democracy began to 
develop from spring 1919 onwards. At the same time, the constitutional 
debate tended to be increasingly nationalised and seen as a uniquely Finnish 
issue rather than one that was dependent on transnational constitutional 
debates. is was the predominant way of thinking in the other studied 
countries as well, with the transnational dimension being easily forgotten. 
On the other hand, the new or updated constitutions of the late 1910s, it has 
been argued in this book, are fully understandable only in the contemporary 
transnational context of their adoption.
7.4.3  Searching for a compromise between Socialist, 
 centrist and rightist democracy
e Finnish MPs simply had to nd a compromise on the constitution aer 
over two years of unproductive constitutional strife, a new election that had 
produced an overwhelming republican majority, and a general realisation 
that Finland would need to turn to republicanism and Western forms of 
democracy and parliamentarism to gain recognition of its independence 
from the Anglophone great powers. Parliamentary surage had been 
democratic in that it had been unique in its extent when implemented in 1907, 
but the polity had not really been democratised, and the parliamentarisation 
of government had also stopped half-way. Disagreements over the methods 
and the implications of further reform had not gone away, but a compromise 
was nevertheless needed to rectify the precarious situation of the state.
e Social Democrats had to reconcile their previous radical Marxism 
and involvement in a failed armed uprising against a bourgeois parliamentary 
majority with the necessity of cooperating with the winners of the Civil War 
to solve the constitutional strife through a compromise. e most radical 
leaders of the pre-war parliamentary party had either been killed or ed to 
Russia. e more moderate members rejected the use of extra-parliamentary 
force and demonstrated a willingness to redene socialist ‘democracy’ to t 
a multi-party polity based on parliamentary principles of the kind already 
exemplied by Sweden and Germany. e redenition was so fundamental 
that the pre- and post-Civil-War parties would resemble each other only 
in name and in their future goal of socialism. e Marxist rhetoric of class 
struggle was replaced with a more positive attitude towards parliamentary 
cooperation with ‘the peasant democracy’ and ‘the bourgeois democracy’,2530 
though that took time and did, of course, not apply to all MPs. 
Indeed, at the beginning of the session some Social Democratic MPs still 
continued the international le-wing tendency to monopolise ‘democracy’ 
for the Social Democrats. Jonas Laherma viewed the whole bourgeoisie, 
including the centre, as being united in the oppression of the workers and 
2529 See Pekonen 2014.
2530 Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, ‘Hallitusmuoto hywäksytty’, 22 June 1919. 
482
7. The spring of 1919: The beginning of an era of democracy and parliamentarism? 
hypocritical in their cant on democracy: bourgeois ‘democracy’ was only 
intended to fool the people.2531 Väinö Hupli lamented what he saw as the 
lack of a truly liberal and democratic bourgeoisie in Finland, ignoring the 
struggle of the Agrarians for a parliamentary democracy in 1917 and in 
the Rump Parliament.2532 According to Mikko Ampuja, the new election 
had not produced legitimate parliamentary representation owing to the 
fact that surage continued to be denied to the Red prisoners. If ‘all the 
power of the workers, all the power of democracy, is not represented in 
this parliament’,2533 the legitimacy of the parliament to legislate on the new 
constitution remained questionable. is recalled the uncompromising 
Social Democratic denition of democracy in 1917, which had associated 
it with the rule of the workers and presented the Social Democrats as its 
sole advocates. Ampuja argued that the spread of Bolshevism could only be 
stopped by passing ‘as democratic a constitution as possible’ – ‘democratic’ 
in the sense of parliamentarism as dened by the Social Democrats. In 
Ampuja’s view, the Civil War had not been caused by the concentration 
of power in the parliament but by a departure from proper democracy 
by the bourgeois parties. Now a constitution facilitating a transition 
to parliamentary democracy like that in neighbouring countries was 
needed.2534 Such a continuation of pre-war discourse did not make for an 
easy compromise.
Even MPs known for their moderation such as Väinö Voionmaa were 
at rst uncompromising. According to Voionmaa, the bureaucrats of 
the right had responded to the attempt of the Finnish people to liberate 
themselves by constructing barriers to the realisation of democracy. e 
bureaucrat class – which evidently stood for the National Coalition Party 
and the Swedish People’s Party here – was still ghting against the recent 
and consequently unstable democracy of the country, ready to ‘toll the bells 
of false democracy’. Consequently, Finland had seen nothing but ‘seeming 
democracy’ thus far. With their continuous rhetorical redecriptions of ‘a real, 
genuine, authentic, parliamentary democracy’, the monarchists were now 
campaigning for the extension of presidential powers. In Voionmaa’s view, 
future democracy and parliamentarism should rather be given the means 
to prevent the bureaucrats from abusing their power against the interests 
of democracy.2535 e Agrarian League, a party in the present government, 
was also accused of sacricing its ‘ne democratic principles’ and causing 
‘sad consequences for democracy’ with the current constitutional proposal. 
From the Social Democratic point of view, the Agrarians appeared to be 
2531 VP, Jonas Laherma, 25 April 1919, 132.
2532 VP, Väinö Hupli, 25 April 1919, 137. 
2533 VP, Mikko Ampuja, 2 June 1919, 662. He further claimed that the le and the 
defenders of democracy were identical. 
2534 VP, Mikko Ampuja, 2 June 1919, 663.
2535 VP, Väinö Voionmaa, 24 May 1919, 516–20; see also VP, Georg Schauman 
(Swedish Le), 24 May 1919, 536. e point about the bureaucrats resisting 
democracy was taken up by Jonas Laherma, 3 June 1919, 704. On the other hand, 
Rafael Colliander (Swedish People’s Party) pointed out ironically that the more 
democratic a country became, the more civil servants it needed. 3 June 1919, 755.
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betraying ‘the most important foundations of common democracy’ and 
were no longer standing ‘fraternally in the ranks of democracy’, no longer 
joining the Social Democrats in demanding the ‘pure democracy’ and 
‘proper democratic principles’ of the Power Act of July 1917.2536 e purpose 
of this was to persuade the Agrarians to join again in leist demands for 
extended democracy.2537 To the same end, Voionmaa presented the right 
with its claims that ‘real democracy consists in a divided democracy’ and 
its advocacy of ‘pseudo-democratic forms’ of presidency as the common 
rival of both parties. He was nevertheless positive that Finland would in the 
future, against all the odds, be democratic.2538 As Väinö Tanner’s criticism 
of rightist attempts in 1918 to curb democracy also shows,2539 the Social 
Democrats continued a discursive struggle to extend democracy. It helped 
the ongoing negotiations that the socialist radicals stayed quiet (possibly 
owing to group pressure) and the moderates cut down their oppositional 
rhetoric in the debates of June, allowing the new leaders to nalise the 
constitutional compromise with the bourgeois parties. 
e most prominent among these moderate Social Democrats was 
Hannes Ryömä, the editor of the party organ and a member of the 
Constitutional Committee. His discourse aimed at bridging the gap 
between the Social Democrats and the centre parties, and his appeals to 
democratic forces in the parliament included bourgeois politicians, unlike 
Social Democratic discourse before the Civil War. Ryömä was even ready to 
distinguish between socialism and democracy, explaining that the motives 
of the Social Democrats in their criticism of the proposal were ‘in no way 
socialist but purely democratic’. eir goal was to create ‘a constitution 
that would allow the democratic majority of the people to act within it and 
advance social development’,2540 i.e. democracy appeared as a procedural 
concept resembling the one adopted by the moderate Swedish le. Ryömä’s 
compromise-oriented statement suggested that his party now aimed at 
majority democracy in cooperation with other democratic forces. e 
party recognised – albeit only through the voice of Ryömä – that despite 
all its remaining shortcomings, the proposal ‘makes a democratic system 
of government possible’.2541 e only other compromise-seeking speech was 
made by Leo Hildén, who urged ‘every democrat’ to accept this constitutional 
compromise.2542 e compromise-seekers were few but – evidently with the 
support of the party leadership – they managed to unite their party and 
the bourgeois republicans in a collective redenition of Finnish democracy. 
Leaving the defence of the compromise to a few members did not commit the 
entire party to it should the bourgeois republican constitution fail; this may 
have been a conscious strategic choice aimed at satisfying those supporters 
2536 VP, Väinö Voionmaa, 24 May 1919, 521–2; 2 June 1919, 649–50.
2537 VP, Väinö Voionmaa, 2 June 1919, 650.
2538 VP, Väinö Voionmaa, 2 June 1919, 651; 3 June 1919, 721.
2539 VP, Väinö Tanner, 25 April 1919, 135.
2540 VP, Hannes Ryömä, 24 May 1919, 510.
2541 VP, Hannes Ryömä, 14 June 1919, 927.
2542 VP, Leo Hildén, 24 May 1919, 534.
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who were still bitter about the outcome of the Civil War and not necessarily 
ready to give in. However, the organ of the party would later –  under 
Ryömä's guidance – declare the compromise, despite its shortcomings, to be 
‘a victory for the rule by the people’.2543
e constitutional compromise was not easy for the Agrarians, either. 
eir leader Santeri Alkio was provoked by Social Democrat insinuations and 
suggested that some of the socialists were still looking for a new Bolshevik 
rebellion. He viewed ironically the demand to concentrate all power in 
the parliament from a party that had abolished democracy in favour of 
dictatorship in the Civil War. e proposed republican constitution would 
‘establish democracy here, and it would weaken class power whether this 
originated from the right or the le’,2544 the goal being that ‘all class interests 
must be subordinated to democracy: democracy must be established’.2545 e 
Agrarian conception of democracy continued to be essentially procedural, 
resembling that of the Swedish Liberals: ‘the rule by the people’ would 
increase in the future in such a way that the people would advance and take 
power increasingly into their own hands.2546 Disregarding Social Democratic 
criticism that they were compromising the constitution, the Agrarians 
followed the principle of ‘the rule by the people’ most consistently of all 
parties, the others being forced to modify their conceptions of democracy 
more radically so that they would able to vote for the new republican 
constitution. 
e Progressivists, who had separated themselves from the monarchist 
faction of the Young Finns to become resolute republicans, and who even 
referred to ‘the democratisation of economic life’ in their manifesto of 1918,2547 
were another group that continued to express their pre-war demands. Bruno 
Sarlin emerged as a major spokesman for bourgeois democracy. Sarlin 
challenged former monarchists by dening the rule by the people as the 
very force that had produced a victory in the ‘War of Liberation’ (as the Civil 
War was called by non-socialists). In his view, gradual steps towards the rule 
by the people since 1906 had signicantly added to the political conscience, 
love of liberty and patriotism of the Finnish people,2548 and democracy had 
hence signicantly contributed to the formation of an independent nation. 
e Declaration of Independence had already stated that a democratic and 
a parliamentary republic was the sole form of government suitable for ‘the 
democratic worldview of our people and our national character’.2549 It was, 
indeed, the regard for the rule by the people as primary that had enabled the 
Finns ‘to trample down the poisonous head of Bolshevism to astonishment 
of the great powers of the world’.2550 e Civil War had been fought together 
by the dierent social groups of the White side ‘for the rule by the people, for 
2543 Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, ‘Hallitusmuoto hywäksytty’, 22 June 1919. 
2544 VP, Santeri Alkio, 25 April 1919, 132–3; 2 June 1919, 651, 653.
2545 VP, Santeri Alkio, 2 June 1919, 654; also Mikko Piitulainen, 25 April 1919, 134.
2546 VP, Pekka Saarelainen, 14 June 1919, 908.
2547 Hyvärinen 2003, 87.
2548 VP, Bruno Sarlin, 14 June 1919, 884.
2549 VP, Bruno Sarlin, 14 June 1919, 884.
2550 VP, Bruno Sarlin, 14 June 1919, 884.
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democratic equal rights in the state and society and the liberty of the people 
[the nation]’.2551 is association between democracy, equal civic rights, 
national self-determination2552 and the national character – based on the 
fact that the Finnish word kansa means both the people and the nation, with 
the word for citizen (kansalainen) also being derived from it – went further 
in Sarlin’s rhetoric than in that of any other Finnish MP, except perhaps 
Santeri Alkio. Other centrists, too, saw a republican constitution as the only 
one suited to ‘such a democratically inclined people as the Finns.’2553 e 
nal dra could be described by the liberals as ‘democratic in the full sense 
of the word’, entailing the achievement of full ‘democratic independence’ 
and enabling the introduction of reforms in all elds of societal life in the 
future,2554 which again associated democracy with nationalism and the 
progress that the political process would produce. e Finnish centrist 
republicans evidently held a concept of democracy resembling that of the 
Swedish Liberals. 
However, the former monarchists of the National Coalition Party had 
to be won over before the constitutional issue could be settled. It took time 
before this party would include references to democracy in its manifestos.2555 
Even when a constitutional compromise aimed at healing the wounds of civil 
strife was in sight, Hugo Suolahti, the chairman of the party and a professor 
of German philology and Vice-Rector of the University of Helsinki with 
obvious connections with German conservatism, still referred to ‘the class 
hatred which the Social Democratic Party has used as its weapon in a ght 
against the so-called bourgeoisie’ as the worst kind of party fanaticism, to 
which a republican constitution might once again lead.2556 Not unlike the 
Swedish right in late 1918, the National Coalition Party distanced itself from 
the constitutional compromise to the very end, keeping thereby open an 
option to criticise it aerwards should it fail. It would take time before the 
party would nally adapt itself to parliamentary democracy, indeed until its 
denouncement of the far-right activism of the early 1930s by mainstream 
conservativism in both countries.2557 
Rafael Erich and E. N. Setälä, a professor of Finnish language and 
literature, who had authored the original Declaration of Independence, 
reiterated in mid-June that the goal of the National Coalition Party in 1918 
had been a ‘democratic … monarchy’2558 and that such a monarchy would 
have enabled the realisation of democracy just as well as a republic.2559 
2551 VP, Bruno Sarlin, 14 June 1919, 884. 
2552 Cf. Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Betänkliga riktningar inom regeringen och riksdag’, 15 
June 1919, which saw this principle as leading to the rule of the least capable 
elements of every society.
2553 VP, Oskari Mantere, 14 June 1919, 904.
2554 VP, Juho Kaskinen, 21 June 1919, 1026.
2555 Hyvärinen 2003, 86.
2556 VP, Hugo Suolahti, 21 June 1919, 1021.
2557 Nilsson 2002a, 101; Kurunmäki 2010, 76.
2558 VP, Rafael Erich, 14 June 1919, 917; also Paavo Virkkunen, 2 June 1919, 641, and 
Hedvig Gebhard, 14 June 1919, 918.
2559 VP, Emil Nestor Setälä, 25 April 1919, 133. 
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Making use of his authoritative academic position as the leading expert 
on the Finnish language, Setälä problematised the semantics of the key 
concepts of the constitution and concluded that the proposal failed to full 
the criteria of ‘real democracy’. His conservative scepticism was reected 
in his statement that the power of the parliament was ‘democracy if the 
parliament can be regarded as realising the will of the people’.2560 However, 
as the will of the parliament and the people might dier – a point accepted 
even by Liberals and Social Democrats in the Weimar debates – Setälä 
found in a presidency ‘the highest trustee of the people’, who should be given 
the right of veto and powers to supervise and dissolve the parliament as 
the way to curb the potential ‘oligarchic dictatorship’ that it threatened to 
become.2561 is point resembled the German justications for the powers of 
the Reichspräsident, although it was of course common anti-parliamentary 
discourse and had been heard with reference to the ird Republic as well. 
So were complaints about democracy as the ‘adulation of incompetence’.2562 
Setälä’s and Erich’s doubts about far-reaching democracy realised through 
the parliament were also reected in attempts to translate ‘republic’ with 
the coinage kansanvaltio (‘state of the people’) and to thus distinguish the 
Finnish term semantically not only from the Greek original but also from 
the established egalitarian vernacular term tasavalta (literally ‘the equality 
of power’),2563 which for the conservatives implied a leist understanding 
of the form of government. is rightist discourse found a transnational 
source in the German Liberals’ aim to call the new form of government 
a Volksstaat (state of the people, a coinage favoured not only by Hugo Preuß 
but even by some Social Democrats) and to thereby nationalise the political 
system and distinguish it from Western models. is term was not far away 
from Volksgemeinscha (community of the people), reecting an organic 
rather than pluralistic understanding of the state. But the professors of the 
Finnish National Coalition Party failed in their rhetorical redescription of 
the new form of government.
Even more uncompromising opponents to democratisation stood up 
from the ranks of the Swedish People’s Party, for whom the connotations of 
the rule by the people meaning the rule by the Finnish people, the common 
people or the workers were all to be rejected. e party represented a linguistic 
minority, and its spokesmen consisted mainly of members of the old elite,2564 
which to some extent explains their tough line. According to the party 
organ Hufvudstadsbladet, the entire revolutionary age was characterised 
2560 VP, Emil Nestor Setälä, 24 May 1919, 500.
2561 VP, Emil Nestor Setälä, 24 May 1919, 500. Jonas Laherma violently rejected the 
notion of the dictatorship of a democratic parliament. 24 May 1919, 538; 3 June 
1919, 707; 14 June 1919, 897. 
2562 VP, Emil Nestor Setälä, 24 May 1919, 504.
2563 VP, Emil Nestor Setälä, 24 May 1919, 524. See a reaction in Suomen 
Sosialidemokraatti, ‘Hallitusmuotokysymyksen käsittely eduskunnassa’, 25 May 
1919; 3 June 1919, 707; 14 June 1919, 896. See also Artturi Hiidenheimo, 2 June 
1919, 669, who regarded kansanvaltio as expressing the idea of ‘a real democracy’.
2564 Hyvärinen 2003, 86, 99. Its party manifesto of 1917, unlike those of the other 
bourgeois parties, did not refer to ‘citizens’ either. Stenius 2003, 351.
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by an uncritical and opportunistic use of the catchword ‘democracy’ to 
persuade the masses to wreck states and to destroy everyone who opposed 
them.2565 When the constitutional proposal came before the parliament, the 
paper wrote about ‘a purely anarchical democracy’ like that of the Age of 
Liberty that was threatening the country with demagogical politics, party 
dictatorship of the socialist type, the degeneration of democracy, bad 
government, the destruction of the European forms of culture that had been 
preserved in the Civil War and violations of individual freedoms and poverty. 
In demanding a republic, ‘the bourgeois le’ seemed to be overwhelmed 
by a ‘superstitious’ belief in democracy. But history demonstrated that such 
a ‘dominion of everyone’ (allhärskarmakt) would soon come to an end: once 
this ‘the rule by the people’ had done enough damage to the nation it would 
be replaced with a more sensible system, just as Gustav III had once saved 
the realm by introducing the constitution that was currently in force.2566 
Ernst Estlander remained convinced that excessively democratic societies 
(like the one now in the making) increased human weaknesses and hence 
endangered civic liberty.2567 e Social Democrats were not to be forgiven: 
they would just continue to abuse parliamentary government to establish 
their ultimate goal, the class rule of the workers.2568 Emil Hästbacka saw the 
Finns as not mature enough for a democratic state: the experiences of the 
unicameral parliament and the Civil War demonstrated that the radicals of 
the le would never be satised with ‘a democratic republican constitution’ 
and still aimed at a socialist political order.2569 ese spokesmen of the 
Swedish-speaking minority, concerned to ensure its linguistic and property 
rights but also ideologically opposed to democracy, had no sympathy for 
majority democracy in summer 1919, a stance that tended to marginalise 
the party and contributed to its exit from the government two months later. 
e ranks of the enthusiastic defenders of democracy remained limited in 
Finland as well, consisting mainly of the centrist and liberal republicans 
and Social Democrats, with even many of the latter continuing to question 
the true democracy of the new constitution. e Swedish-speaking right 
in the meantime continued to put forward openly anti-democratic views, 
concluding that the republican constitution did not provide a necessary 
counterweight to universal surage and ‘unbalanced democracy’.2570 
e conservative counterarguments caused Santeri Alkio to emphasise 
the fact that the democratic moment was at hand, defend the potential for 
progress that would be created by the power of the people and challenge 
the elitism of the conservatives’ attitudes. Democracy, would despite all 
2565 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Betänkliga riktningar inom regeringen och riksdag’, 15 June 
1919; ‘Regeringsformen antagen’ and ‘Från kammare och kuloar’, 22 June 1919.
2566 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Från kammare och kuloar’, 25 May 1919; ‘Köpslagandet 
om regeringsformen’, 4 June 1919; ‘Samhällets självbevarelseplikt’ and ‘Inför 
avgörandet i dag’, 14 June 1919.
2567 VP, Ernst Estlander, 3 June 1919, 675, 699; 5 June 1919, 811.
2568 VP, Ernst Estlander, 14 June 1919, 893.
2569 VP, Emil Hästbacka, 2 June 1919, 638.
2570 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Regeringsformen antagen’, 22 June 1919.
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its visible shortcomings, inevitably prevail, and the old elite had better 
recognise that in time:2571
e rule by the people is a recent newcomer. It is easy to mock. It does a lot 
of stupid things. But it contains a promise for the future! And if ‘the qualied’ 
remain entirely devoid of enthusiasm for the rule by the people, if they remain 
strangers to the factors and goals at which the rule by the people in its ineptitude 
aims, we can with good reason expect that the qualied will gradually be 
displaced. e people must through bitter experiences teach themselves to realise 
those aims to the realisation of which the people at large are right now invited 
by historical progress.
Few non-socialist politicians in the parliaments studied here voiced such 
optimistic descriptions of the democratic process in the aermath of the 
First World War. Alkio warned both the Swedish- and Finnish-speaking 
intellectual elites of the risk of nding themselves redundant if they should 
refrain from understanding the will of the people, moving onto the side of 
the rule by the people and thereby earning the respect of the nation.2572 is 
challenge to both the Svecoman and Fennoman elites (and separately to the 
Social Democrats) and the consistent defence of the rule by the people by 
the Agrarians combined with the new revisionism of the Social Democrats 
explains to a great extent the ability of the Finns to reject extremes and to 
nd a middle ground on bourgeois democracy. 
7.4.4  Popular sovereignty recognised by all but  
 one parliamentary party
While ‘the rule by the people’ remained a contested concept in the Finnish 
parliament in spring and summer 1919, the notion of popular sovereignty 
had undoubtedly established itself. Understandings of this sovereignty 
varied but even the National Coalition Party advocated a ‘state of the people’, 
as we have just seen. Despite the disappointment of the Civil War, the party 
was returning to the predominantly positive notions of the people they had 
held in 1917. 
e republicans of the ministry, as consistent spokesmen for the rule 
by the people, denounced the ways in which ‘the will of the majority of 
the people’ had been ignored both by the Red rule during the Civil War 
and by the monarchist campaign of 1918.2573 eir notion of the rule by 
the people was tightly connected with a conception of the nation state as 
a self-determining entity. is was not least due to the confused semantics 
of the Finnish terms for the concepts of the people, nation, citizen and even 
the state: they declared that they were aiming at ‘the political [valtiollinen, 
derived from word valtio (the state)]2574 liberty of the people’.2575 Especially 
2571 VP, Santeri Alkio, 24 May 1919, 513.
2572 VP, Santeri Alkio, 24 May 1919, 512–13.
2573 VP, Juho Vennola (Progressivist), 25 April 1919, 140–1.
2574 On the special connotations of this attribute, which was derived from the word 
for ‘the state’ and weakened the parliamentary dimension of the polity, see 
Pulkkinen 2003, 251.
2575 VP, Santeri Alkio, 25 April 1919, 132.
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the Agrarians spoke for the political involvement and honouring of the 
will of the people, seeing the realisation of the concept of the rule by the 
people as a necessary process in the construction of the nation state. Pekka 
Saarelainen criticised rightist politicians who ‘still do not want to submit 
themselves to the express will of the majority of the people’ and to the 
inevitable progress of the rule by the people.2576 Professor Juho Vennola 
(Progressivists) denounced the way in which the Prime Minister Paasikivi 
in 1918 had questioned the ability of Finnic peoples to form states. On the 
contrary, Vennola considered it the mission of the Finnish parliament to 
formulate a new constitution based solely on ‘the character of this people’, 
disregarding foreign inuences2577 and the transnational involvement of 
the Russians in 1917 and the Germans in 1918. He thus nationalised the 
process of legislating a constitution in a manner that was typical in all 
the studied states in the post-war period. Bruno Sarlin of the same party 
was optimistic about the political potential of the Finnish people to build 
a democracy thanks to its high political awareness, which had been growing 
since the parliamentary reform. It was, indeed, the duty of the Finns to 
demonstrate to the world that they possessed the political maturity to form 
an independent state.2578 In the end, as Juho Kaskinen put it, ‘this people 
through their parliament’ had formulated a constitution to their liking.2579 
Georg Schauman of the Swedish Le likewise called for a demonstration of 
the ability of the Finns to learn from hardships and to raise the level of their 
‘political culture’ by approving the proposed republican constitution.2580 e 
liberal republicans were capable of turning the traumatic experiences of the 
Civil War into a source of progress for a better political culture.
A willingness to rethink their position was not so evident among the 
Social Democrats, who continued to attack the right for their patronising 
attitude towards the people during the Rump Parliament of 1918. According 
to Väinö Tanner, ‘disregard of the will of the people’ had dominated that 
‘half-parliament’, in which even the prime minister had questioned the 
political maturity of his people and had been ready to disregard their will 
on constitutional issues.2581 Hannes Ryömä sought compromise and tried to 
explain the constitutional goals of the Social Democrats: they wanted ‘the 
people to feel that they were living under the rule of law in a state governed 
in accordance with the will of the people’,2582 a demand that most bourgeois 
MPs as well could easily associate themselves with. At the constitutional 
level, this implied for the Social Democrats that ‘the supreme power in the 
state will belong to the people, which is represented by the parliament’2583 
2576 VP, Pekka Saarelainen, 14 June 1919, 908.
2577 VP, Juho Vennola, 25 April 1919, 141. Ernst Estlander protested against Vennola’s 
characterisation of Paasikivi, 25 April 1919, 143.
2578 VP, Bruno Sarlin, 14 June 1919, 884–5.
2579 VP, Juho Kaskinen, 21 June 1919, 1026.
2580 VP, Georg Schauman, 14 June 1919, 894. Noteworthy is the use of the phrase 
‘political culture’ which only emerged in social scientic research in the 1950s.
2581 VP, Väinö Tanner, 25 April 1919, 136; Hannes Ryömä, 24 May 1919, 508.
2582 VP, Hannes Ryömä, 24 May 1919, 507.
2583 VP, Hannes Ryömä, 24 May 1919, 508.
490
7. The spring of 1919: The beginning of an era of democracy and parliamentarism? 
– a formulation that brought the bourgeois republicans and the Social 
Democrats together and was included in the proposal for the republican 
constitution. Ryömä went on to reinterpret the origins, course and 
implications of the transnational trend of democratisation aer 1917, 
connecting the Social Democratic rising in Finland with this trend: 
the pre-war concentration of political power in the hands of ‘qualied’ 
oligarchies had everywhere given rise to discontent and led to ‘a global 
crisis, a general cultural bankruptcy’. Since the rising masses had had no 
chance to participate in politics, they had turned to Bolshevism, with 
evident pernicious consequences, especially in Finland. Having explained 
away the Civil War, Ryömä envisioned a turn for the better: when the 
people got used to active political participation and were allowed to make 
‘the qualied’ understand their will, they, too, would learn to appreciate 
political qualications as opposed to political agitation. It was essential 
for this prospective transition to mutual understanding that the educated 
elite should approach the people rather than distance themselves from the 
masses2584 – a point that Santeri Alkio endorsed and developed further, 
thereby reconciling the constitutional discourses of the Social Democrats 
and the Agrarians. Ryömä’s vision of societal consensus in a parliamentary 
democracy, built on increased interaction and understanding between 
dierent social groups, was exceptionally optimistic by Finnish standards, 
and it recalled Swedish revisionist Social Democratic optimism as well as 
some arguments heard from members of the British Labour Party. is was 
a prognosis that would eventually come true in the Winter War (1939–40), 
by which time the Social Democrats had been integrated into the polity and 
joined the bourgeois parties in defence of the country against a new Soviet 
challenge.
Such a transition was by no means an easy one, and it was only 
beginning in 1919. Väinö Voionmaa pointed out the unwillingness of the 
Social Democrats to contribute to the ‘transfer of the current system of 
oppression into the new political era’, by which he meant the establishment 
of a bourgeois political order. Instead, a new ‘political direction for the 
entire people’ was needed. In Voionmaa’s analysis, the problems of Finnish 
society followed from the administration of the state having been run by 
small privileged classes. is had produced ‘a deep class division within 
the state’ and the submission of the Finnish people to the patronage of the 
bureaucrats.2585 All this should change: the Finnish people had reached a level 
of political development that simply demanded that their supreme power 
be recognised. While the people would still need to delegate their power 
to professionals, the constitution should provide guarantees against abuses 
of this power. Quoting Anton Menger, an Austrian socialist legal theorist, 
Voionmaa urged the masses of the Finnish people, who were still about to 
enter politics for the rst time, to preserve their political liberty by carefully 
scrutinising the use of political power.2586 One instance of the abuses of 
2584 VP, Hannes Ryömä, 24 May 1919, 512–13.
2585 VP, Väinö Voionmaa, 24 May 1919, 515–16.
2586 VP, Väinö Voionmaa, 24 May 1919, 517.
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‘our credulous and politically so inexperienced people’ was, in Voionmaa’s 
view, the rightist claim that a strong presidency was reconcilable with true 
parliamentary democracy.2587 Despite its pessimism, Voionmaa’s vision, too, 
saw a possibility of the Finns growing together politically provided that the 
people demonstrated a sucient degree of political activism.
e rightist doubts about the people had been undeniable in 1918 and 
could not be fully concealed in 1919 either. Most representatives of the 
National Coalition Party refrained from taking a clear stand, but their 
party manifesto dened citizenship in a way implying that not all members 
of the working class deserved citizenship.2588 Some rethinking of popular 
sovereignty was nevertheless taking place: Rafael Erich, a spokesman 
for a constitutionalist line within the party, recognised that in a modern 
state ‘the people are the foundation and source of all political [julkinen] 
power’, that the people in this role were above both the parliament and 
the government and that no form of government other than ‘a state of the 
people’ (kansanvaltio, the favourite Germanic concept of the conservatives) 
was thinkable.2589 e will of the people expressed in the election had 
unquestionably been in favour of a republic, even though their change 
of mind was, according to Erich, caused by global trends,2590 a statement 
that made republicanism appear as a transnational rather than a native 
phenomenon. is conservative adaptation to popular sovereignty and 
republicanism was spurred by the constitutional changes that had already 
been realised in Sweden and were being prepared in Germany as well as 
by related cautious re-evaluations in political theory. Trying to explain the 
policies of the conservatives in 1918, Erich insisted that the monarchists, 
too, had aimed at ‘the realisation of the permanent will of the people’,2591 
but they did not believe that a parliament necessarily expressed this will.2592 
Conservative reservations about the implications of popular sovereignty 
had not gone away, to be sure, and a republican form of government with 
‘an advocate of the people’ in the form of a strong president to counter party 
interests was called for.2593 is reects a conception of executive power that 
was inherent in the Gustavian constitutional tradition and was reinforced by 
the proposal for a new German constitution. 
Professor E. N. Setälä, who had participated in draing the previous 
version of the constitution, also recognised popular sovereignty and dened 
2587 VP, Väinö Voionmaa, 24 May 1919, 517, 520.
2588 Stenius 2003, 351.
2589 VP, Rafael Erich, 25 April 1919, 138; 24 May 1919, 524.
2590 VP, Rafael Erich, 14 June 1919, 917.
2591 VP, Rafael Erich, 25 April 1919, 139; 24 May 1919, 524.
2592 For a radical Social Democratic response, see Mikko Ampuja who accused the 
former monarchists of trying to hide their opposition to democracy with the 
reactionary term ‘the permanent will of the people’. e conservatives had, he 
claimed, bought the press and persuaded it to echo reactionary views about 
what ‘the holy will of the people is even if the people have not this time managed 
to understand it’. Reactionary clergymen presented conservative solutions, 
appealing to divine will, for the same purpose. VP, 3 June 1919, 713.
2593 VP, Rafael Erich, 24 May 1919, 526.
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a ‘state of the people’ as a political system in which ‘power originates from the 
people and is in the last instance in the hands of the people themselves’.2594 
However, he was not so certain about the parliament being ‘the sole 
omnipotent advocate of the cause of the people’: the parliament might 
not always observe the will of the people, and this called for a president 
who would be elected by the people to supervise on their behalf that their 
will was respected by the parliament and would be empowered ‘to appeal 
to the people’ by calling a new parliamentary election if necessary. Setälä’s 
conservative thinking did not include the referendum as an extension of the 
popular state as in his opinion it would have required the common people to 
possess higher levels of education and dedication to public aairs than was 
the case in Finland.2595 e ideas coming from the new Germany were not to 
be imitated uncritically.
At the same time, an even more conservative branch of the National 
Coalition Party, while recognising the principle of popular sovereignty, 
carried on the argumentation of the monarchist project. Paavo Virkkunen 
defended the duality of legislative and executive power, since both 
were legitimated by ‘the free authorisation of the people’ as expressed in 
elections.2596 A second political power was needed and could be found in 
a strong executive power authorised by the people and independent of 
the parliament.2597 Popular monarchy was to be replaced with a popular 
presidency: the president should be ‘most closely connected with the 
people’.2598 Erkki Kaila, a theologian in favour of democracy, also argued for 
a balance between ‘a democratic parliament’ and a president representing 
‘the will of the people’ as a solution suitable for the Finnish people in the 
midst of the Europe-wide ferment.2599 is was in fact the kind of presidency 
that the former monarchists and bourgeois republicans succeeded in 
introducing. At the same time, some members of the National Coalition 
Party still questioned the ability of ‘those classes of the people who now 
together constitute the majority and have little political experience’ (the 
centrist parties and the Social Democrats) to prevent the unavoidable 
degeneration of parliamentary sovereignty, as Professor eodor Homén 
claimed. He could not believe that the Finns were more rational, better and 
wiser than all other peoples2600 and thus capable of ruling a republic. 
e majority of Finnish-speaking conservatives did nevertheless 
participate in the construction of a new popular government. Once the 
National Coalition Party had managed – with a combination of rhetoric 
and obstruction – to get through a suciently strong presidency, their 
chairman, Professor Hugo Suolahti, began to speak optimistically about 
the people in a traditional Fennoman spirit: the remaining weaknesses of 
2594 VP, Emil Nestor Setälä, 24 May 1919, 500.
2595 VP, Emil Nestor Setälä, 24 May 1919, 500.
2596 VP, Paavo Virkkunen, 2 June 1919, 641.
2597 VP, Paavo Virkkunen, 3 June 1919, 719; 21 June 1919, 1018; Hugo Suolahti, 21 
June 1919, 1020.
2598 VP, Paavo Virkkunen, 3 June 1919, 730.
2599 VP, Erkki Kaila, 14 June 1919, 914–15.
2600 VP, eodor Homén, 14 June 1919, 912.
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the republican constitution would be remedied by ‘the common sense of 
the people and their growing maturity’. In the Civil War, the Finns had 
reached the lowest point of degradation, but Suolahti asserted that his party 
had always counted on the capability of the Finnish people.2601 Rafael Erich 
emphasised the responsibility of the people for maintaining legal order 
and spoke positively about ‘a common political conscience’ in the current 
parliament of the Finnish people, who had together planned ‘a democratic, 
parliamentary republic’.2602 E. N. Setälä, too, mitigated his previous criticism, 
emphasising the need for the legislators to trust the Finnish people again. 
He believed that ‘a people that can create and form a state can retain its 
political existence with this constitution’. It was better to accept this as a new 
starting point than allow the interregnum to continue.2603 e discursive 
process of negotiation and the concessions of the republicans, together with 
the changed inter- and transnational circumstances, had persuaded the 
National Coalition Party to accept a parliamentary and presidential republic 
– and in the end this acceptance was voiced in much clearer terms than was 
the case with the right in Sweden or Germany. e Finnish parliament had 
succeeded in constructing a compromise acceptable to the majority.
A similar turn is not visible in the Swedish People’s Party, however. Its 
spokesmen continued to express monarchical views and were sceptical 
about popular involvement in politics – partly out of a rightist ideology 
that resembled Swedish and Prussian conservatism, partly as a rhetorical 
tool to increase pressure on the majority to accord language-political 
concessions. Hufvudstadsbladet ridiculed the optimistic belief in the good 
intentions of the people, regarding it as too immature to take responsibility 
for governing the realm in a new ‘popular rule’. ese ‘orgies of popular rule’ 
(folkväldesorgierna), were likely to lead on the one hand to the degeneration 
of the polity but on the other also to a healthy transnational reaction that 
would cut equal surage, establish new political procedures and restore 
a strong state power. In fact, the paper claimed, condence in democracy and 
parliamentarism was already declining.2604 ere was a tendency for such 
views to be marginalised in the debates of early summer 1919: they could be 
dismissed as reections of a class-based defence of privilege and the status 
of a minority language by a group that belonged to the victors of the Civil 
War, but they also gave rise to considerable concern. e opposition of the 
Swedish People’s Party to democracy and parliamentarism was compared 
with the anti-parliamentary methods of the Bolsheviks, and its obstruction 
appeared as a fruitless prolongation of the constitutional strife.2605 
Ernst Estlander, as a representative of aristocratic elitism, painted 
a  pessimistic picture of the Finnish people in the aermath of the Civil 
2601 VP, Hugo Suolahti, 21 June 1919, 1021.
2602 VP, Rafael Erich, 21 June 1919, 1021–2; also Juhani Arajärvi, 21 June 1919, 1025.
2603 VP, Emil Nestor Setälä, 21 June 1919, 1028.
2604 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Från kammare och kuloar’, 15 June 1919; ‘Från kammare och 
kuloar’, 22 June 1919.
2605 Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, ‘Porwari-bolshewismi’, 25 May 1919; ‘Eduskunnan 
lehteriltä’, 3 June 1919; Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Totuuksia poliittisesta keinottelusta’, 
5 June 1919; ‘Ratkaisu käsissä’, 19 June 1919.
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War as not having ‘reached maturity in culture or politics’. For such a 
‘small and politically weak nation’ that ‘lacked political traditions’ and was 
prone to political agitation, a republic remained a very dangerous form 
of government.2606 Estlander spoke ironically about ‘those who believe 
that they represent the absolute will of the people’2607 and proposed the 
representation of interests of dierent sections of society in the parliament, 
but he failed to win support even from his own party.2608 Estlander claimed 
that extended parliamentarism endangered the rights of the people and 
even ‘democracy’.2609 
Emil Hästbacka went even further, seeing the Finns as too immature to 
understand ‘the life of the state’ or ‘to form a state’. As they lacked ‘a sense 
of political connectedness’, they could not be given unbounded political 
power. A threat from those elements of the people whose parliamentary 
representatives had been ready to lead an anarchical uprising (i.e. the Social 
Democrats) continued to exist: ‘the people of Manner and Tokoi’ would 
renew calls for a new societal order. Such a will of the people had, according 
to Hästbacka, been only ‘temporarily constructed through agitation’2610 
– implicitly of the Finnish-speaking lower classes – and thus could not be 
trusted. For Hästbacka, only a monarchy based on the inherited Swedish 
constitution would ensure stable politics that would benet all social 
classes.2611 Artur Eklund further suspected that the republicans were 
merely abusing a temporary ‘democratic high tide’ to pass a constitution to 
their liking2612 and that transnational trends were again being used to the 
detriment of the nation. Such anti-popular government discourse excluded 
the Swedish People’s Party from the compromise on a presidential republic, 
to which even the National Coalition Party had nally agreed.
ese sceptical attitudes towards majority rule were linked with the 
language question, i.e. the rights of Swedish-speakers in an independent 
Finland, which had become an issue aer the Civil War in both the Finnish-
Swedish and the Swedish press. While a single nation-state was being built, 
the people of the time were careful to distinguish between the dierent ethnic 
groups, one of which was constituted by Swedish-speaking Finns. Georg von 
Wendt, who represented the Swedish Le, when talking about the language 
provisions of the constitution, made a division between ‘the Finnish people’ 
(suomalainen kansa) and ‘the Swedish people’ (ruotsalaiskansa, det svenska 
folket) and referred to the ‘nationality solution’ (kansallisratkaisu) for each 
of these ‘brother peoples’ (veljeskansat),2613 the ethnic epithets being used 
with reference to linguistic groups in Finland. Such an understanding of the 
existence of two peoples within one state demonstrates the strong feeling 
of separateness among the Swedish-speakers at the time of the formulation 
2606 VP, Ernst Estlander, 2 June 1919, 668.
2607 VP, Ernst Estlander, 2 June 1919, 668.
2608 Vares 2006, 141.
2609 VP, Ernst Estlander, 24 May 1919, 505.
2610 VP, Emil Hästbacka, 2 June 1919, 638.
2611 VP, Emil Hästbacka, 2 June 1919, 639.
2612 VP, Artur Eklund, 14 June 1919, 917.
2613 VP, Georg von Wendt, 24 May 1919, 514.
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of the republican constitution and goes a long way to explaining why 
constitutional formulations about power belonging to the people (which 
possibly meant only Finnish-speakers) were not welcome to many Swedish-
speaking Finns. Opposition to republicanism and the advocacy of the 
monarchical tradition was thus related to concern about the equal standing 
of the two linguistic groups. Hjalmar Procopé asserted that the Swedish-
speakers were not aiming at any violent ‘revolution’ even though they would 
vote against the proposal because it lacked any provisions for national 
languages, for which the Swedish-speakers had been campaigning.2614 ese 
provisions would form the basis of the Language Act of 1922. Opposition 
to the constitutional proposal by the Swedish People’s Party was taken by 
the Agrarians as provocation, which illustrates the heated nature of the 
confrontation: Simson Pilkka threatened that the voters of the Finnish 
people would soon bring down such opposition to the will of the majority of 
the people.2615 e Swedish People’s Party voted in any case against the nal 
compromise and le the government soon aerwards.
e process of passing a constitution based on political power derived 
from the people as represented in the parliament was still a vexed one in the 
summer. However, an overwhelming majority nally voted for the proposal 
on 21 June. Lauri Kristian Relander (Agrarians), the Speaker, declared that 
this approval was a positive act of state (valtioteko) of the entire people and 
aimed at a happier future, and he thanked the parliament for having been 
able to overcome party divisions that tore the people apart.2616 Helsingin 
Sanomat saw the resolution as increasing trust in both the Finnish people 
and in their parliament.2617 While these comments still sounded to many as 
overly optimistic in June 1919, the goals would be achieved over the longer 
term: the constitution would unify most of the Finnish people.
7.4.5  The remaining limits on parliamentarism 
e implications of the introduction of parliamentarism to the Finnish 
constitution had been debated during 1917 especially in connection with 
a revision of the parliamentary procedure and the adoption of the Power Act 
in July. In the Rump Parliament of 1918, parliamentarism as a principle had 
been treated with suspicion by the monarchical majority, while the republicans 
had defended it ercely. A degree of parliamentarism had generally become 
understood as indispensable for the future Finnish constitution even then. 
However, the conceptions of parliamentarism still varied greatly in 1919, 
and some open opposition to the entire principle surfaced: there was no 
agreement about some Western notion of parliamentarism being applied as 
such to the Finnish constitution. 
e centrist governmental parties remained the most enthusiastic 
advocates of the principle. Kalle Lohi of the Agrarians depicted the Finnish 
2614 VP, Hjalmar Procopé, 2 June 1919, 661. On the depth of the language division, 
see Rinta-Tassi 1986, 37–9, and Ihalainen 2015, 16.
2615 VP, Simson Pilkka, 14 June 1919, 932.
2616 VP, Lauri Kristian Relander, 21 June 1919, 1029.
2617 Helsingin Sanomat, ‘Suuriarwoinen saawutus’, 22 June 1919.
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people, aer their miseries caused by the lack of parliamentarism, as 
practically unanimous in their determination to establish a parliamentary 
polity.2618 Heikki Ritavuori, a Progressivist lawyer who, as the Chairman 
of the Constitutional Committee, formulated the nal compromise for 
the republican constitution, likewise regarded it as impossible to oppose 
parliamentarism ‘in an era when the parliamentary form of government 
prevails in all leading European realms’.2619 Santeri Alkio shared this 
interpretation of an ongoing process of parliamentarisation throughout 
Europe and pointed out that domestic conicts had frequently arisen out of 
tendencies by governments to pursue policies that diered from the prevaling 
views held by parliaments.2620 For Alkio, parliamentarism should, however, 
be of the regulated American kind, a view that ignored the lack of actual 
parliamentarism in the United States and nurtured the ideal of a presidential 
republic resembling one that existed in a victorious great power. As Juho 
Vennola also conceded, the Finnish constitution would continue to be based 
on the duality of government rather than on any concentration of power 
in the parliament.2621 It should hence be seen as a compromise to appease 
the National Coalition Party and a polity that was distinct from Western 
European versions of parliamentarism. 
e Social Democrats had much rethinking to do with regard to 
parliamentarism. eir willingness to accept parliamentarism of a Western 
European type or in any bourgeois sense had become subject to serious 
doubt as a consequence of the events of 1917 and 1918. But the party had 
changed its course aer the Civil War, aiming at parliamentary cooperation 
and criticising the monarchists of 1918 for their utterly ‘indecent’ violations 
of ‘the parliamentary life of this country’.2622 In the course of the debates 
of 1919, the Social Democratic approach to parliamentarism became 
increasingly constructive. Speaking on behalf of his group, Hannes Ryömä 
consistently emphasised the principles of majority parliamentarism, by 
which he meant that the country would be governed according to the will 
of the majority of the people so that the views of all groups would be taken 
into consideration on an equal basis and all actions of the executive would 
be subjected to parliamentary scrutiny. e holders of the executive power 
should be elected by the parliament (a requirement that had not changed 
since 1917), should be accountable to it and would not be able to limit 
the legislative power of the representative institution. However, majority 
parliamentarism certainly did not stand for ‘parliamentary dictatorship’, 
as its opponents claimed.2623 Parliamentarism implied that the government 
should have no policy other than one supported by the parliament; it should 
hence search for concord between itself and the representative institution. 
2618 VP, Kalle Lohi, 4 June 1919, 743.
2619 VP, Heikki Ritavuori, 3 June 1919, 708. 
2620 VP, Santeri Alkio, 24 May 1919, 511–12.
2621 VP, Juho Vennola, 14 June 1919, 922.
2622 VP, Väinö Tanner, 24 April 1919, 136.
2623 VP, Hannes Ryömä, 24 May 1919, 508–9; 3 June 1919, 727; 5 June 1919, 814; 14 
June 1919, 927. 
497
7.4  Finland: Moving towards a compromise on a presidentia parliamentary republic
Such a principle would change the course of European history, which had 
previously been characterised by confrontations between parliaments and 
governments arising from the tendency of the latter to reserve autocratic 
powers for themselves and to disregard policies advocated by parliaments, 
thereby forcing these to ght for their rights.2624 Ryömä’s analysis placed 
the Finnish constitutional crisis of the preceding two years in a broader 
European context and helped to relativise it in the eyes of both the le and 
the right: the Finnish transition to parliamentarism was part of a global 
change; it was only distinguished by having been a particularly violent one. 
A further issue which the Social Democrats brought to the agenda and 
continued to express their demands concerning it in 1917 and 1918 was the 
parliamentarisation of foreign policy; this also entailed the abandonment of 
secret diplomacy as practised by governments before and during the war.2625 
is was a goal that their ideological brethren and some liberals pursued in 
other countries as well. At the same time, the Social Democrats expressed 
their frustration over the extent of parliamentarism that they could expect: 
despite the inclusion of the principle of political power belonging to the 
people as represented by the parliament, the presidency was in actual fact 
going to constitute another nub of power that was capable of bypassing the 
parliament. Future parliaments would hence need to ensure the realisation of 
parliamentary government in practice;2626 in other words, the constitutional 
process could not stop at this stage. 
Väinö Voionmaa was another Social Democratic MP who analysed the 
prospects for parliamentarism. Like many Swedish socialists, this professor 
of history based his argument on Fredrik Lagerroth’s thesis of a thousand 
years of democratic and parliamentary progress in Sweden and Finland.2627 
e thesis justied the claim that most Finns regarded it as ‘unthinkable 
that the parliament could act against the people, that the parliament as an 
institution could turn against the people, as it has itself grown and been 
formed out of the people’.2628 is understanding of the organic development 
of the Finnish people and their representative institution through four-estate 
diets to the current unicameral parliament was intended to persuade former 
monarchists and current supporters of presidential powers to accept an 
extension of parliamentary power. Both the parliament of 1917 and that of 
1918 appeared as having acted against the will of the majority of the people. 
Voionmaa also compared the Finnish situation with Western European 
parliamentarism, suggesting that ministerial responsibility would decrease 
class conicts and create ‘strong feelings of responsibility towards the wide 
layers of the people’ within the bureaucracy. is Social Democratic criticism 
of the civil service, heard from them and the Agrarians many times before, 
was directed against the old elite class represented by the conservatives. 
It culminated in Voionmaa’s suggestion that ‘Western bureaucracy does 
2624 VP, Hannes Ryömä, 24 May 1919, 511.
2625 VP, Hannes Ryömä, 24 May 1919, 509; also Jonas Laherma, 24 May 1919, 538.
2626 VP, Hannes Ryömä, 14 June 1919, 926–7. 
2627 Ihalainen 2015.
2628 VP, Väinö Voionmaa, 24 May 1919, 517.
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not see its interests to be in conict with the interests of the people as the 
bureaucracy in our country always does’.2629 is implied that a sense of 
responsibility and common interests with the people were lacking among 
the elite, as the legalistic manoeuvres of the right had demonstrated in 
1917 and 1918. Western European parliamentarism, although by no means 
perfect, should be set as the goal2630 and native and Prussian traditions of 
administration thereby challenged. 
With the compromises between the centre and the right that seemed to 
be cutting parliamentary powers and producing ‘a parliament that is not the 
master of itself ’,2631 Voionmaa lamented what he viewed as an international 
tendency to replace parliamentarism – which was claimed to be obsolete 
–  with the direct rule of the people as voters.2632 is was an implicit 
reference to the role of the presidency and the referendum in the future 
German constitution. e election of a president by a popular vote weakened 
parliamentarism in Finland before the principle had ‘had time to take root 
and strengthen itself, and there is really nothing in it that could be reduced or 
decreased,’ Voionmaa claimed.2633 e National Coalition Party appeared to 
be abusing the will of the people in order to create a political institution that 
would ‘upset parliamentarism, which is still at such a tender phase of growth’. 
In Voionmaa’s view, the parliament, as a democratic institution, should elect 
the president ‘on behalf of the people’ and subject him to ‘popular control 
via the parliament’.2634 Without such a solution, ‘our parliamentarism is in 
danger’: there was the risk of ‘some unknown unparliamentary forces . . . 
playing their dark games here and carrying through sudden amendments 
that appear to be in no way parliamentary’.2635 e analysis was pessimistic 
but well informed with regard to both developments in Germany and 
the stance of the remaining rightist opposition in Finland. Despite such 
pessimism, the Marxist militancy of 1917 aiming at the rule of a socialist 
majority in the parliament as the only alternative had been renounced. 
Although over twenty amendments proposed by the Social Democrats were 
voted down by the bourgeois majority, the Social Democrats nally acceded 
to the compromise.2636
e National Coalition Party was still not sure about the extent of 
parliamentarism either. Within this leading party of the right, there was 
a tendency to downplay parliamentarism by dismissing dierences between 
the government on the one hand and the parliament with its problem-
causing parties on the other by combining the two – a way of thinking that 
was also typical of Finnish political culture more generally.2637 Rafael Erich, 
as a specialist in constitutional law, proposed a concept of the state that was 
2629 VP, Väinö Voionmaa, 24 May 1919, 518.
2630 VP, Väinä Voionmaa, 24 May 1919, 521.
2631 VP, Väinö Voionmaa, 2 June 1919, 650. 
2632 VP, Väinö Voionmaa, 3 June 1919, 719.
2633 VP, Väinö Voionmaa, 3 June 1919, 721.
2634 VP, Väinö Voionmaa, 3 June 1919, 721.
2635 VP, Väinö Voionmaa, 3 June 1919, 722.
2636 Jyränki 2006, 41.
2637 Pulkkinen 2003, 234, 238, 251.
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in line with traditional political theory and was critical of the French version 
of parliamentarism in particular. According to this concept, democracy was 
not to be applied beyond the election of the parliament.2638 Erich could 
recognise the responsibility of ministers to the parliament as a ‘political 
principle’ and was not opposed to references to parliamentary government 
in the constitution, but he rejected any judicial principle of constitutional 
parliamentarism as extreme and unproductive, resembling the notorious 
Power Act. In his view, ‘correctly understood and healthy parliamentarism’ 
required a balance between the parliament and the government so that the 
parliamentary control of the government was kept ‘within proper limits’; it 
required a president as a moderator between the government and the people 
and between the people and the parliament.2639 Without the presidential 
right to dissolve the parliament, ‘no parliamentary system can function 
in the rst place, and then we are taken to an entirely dierent level and 
leave parliamentarism for good’.2640 Léon Duguit, a leading French expert in 
administrative law, had taught that ‘[a] parliamentary system is not possible 
unless we have, side by side with a parliament based on universal surage, 
a head of state who personies executive power’.2641 is lesson from the 
ird Republic was now relevant to Finland as well and was reinforced 
by the proposal for the Weimar constitution. Tekla Hultin, who was also 
knowledgeable about France, likewise called for an independent presidency 
under ‘a parliamentary form of government’.2642 is in fact represented 
the National Coalition Party’s demand before voting for any republican 
constitution, and the party could found its demands on a considerable body 
of international theoretical debate.
However, Erich’s conservative political theorising also enabled the 
National Coalition Party to recognise parliamentarism as a valuable 
element within the tradition of the duality of government as long as it 
did not take the form of simple majority parliamentarism. Erich certainly 
cited examples from France and Germany as indicative of the inevitability 
of parliamentarism in a modern state (unlike Paasikivi in 1918), but he 
also mentioned the various forms of parliamentarism existing in dierent 
countries. e ability of the parliament to cooperate with and scrutinise 
the actions of the government was valuable, but the parliamentary control 
of all state activities would lead to mock-parliamentarism and constant 
governmental crises. e government should possess expertise, inuence 
and authority in the eyes of both the parliament and the people. is could 
be achieved with a president who regulated and balanced parliamentarism. 
Moreover, governments were unlikely to abuse their power vis-à-vis the 
parliament as long as governmental power was no longer understood as 
contrary to the people and democracy.2643 
2638 Pekonen 2003, 144.
2639 VP, Rafael Erich, 24 May 1919, 1, 524–7; 2 June, 658, 661; 4 June 1919, 742, 745. 
2640 VP, Rafael Erich, 24 May 1919, 526.
2641 VP, Rafael Erich, 24 May 1919, 526.
2642 VP, Tekla Hultin, 3 June 1919, 724.
2643 VP, Rafael Erich, 2 June 1919, 658–60.
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Once the National Coalition Party had managed to negotiate a suciently 
strong government and presidency, Erich welcomed the compromise as 
‘functional parliamentarism’, a polity that had been prepared with the 
parliamentary reform of 1906 and the decisions of late 1917.2644 is was one 
more rhetorical conservative description of parliamentarism. Juhani Arajärvi, 
the chairman of the parliamentary group, even declared the MPs to be ‘the 
representatives of the majesty of the nation’,2645 a speech act that is illustrative 
of the turn from the monarchism of 1918 to the presidential republicanism 
of 1919. At the same time, opposition to the ‘parliamentary dictatorship’ of 
the type of 1917 continued to be voiced by former monarchists.2646 eodor 
Homén referred to the history of every country where the parliament had 
received all political power – including the Swedish realm in the eighteenth-
century Age of Liberty – as revealing the abuses that resulted from this, 
whereas the cooperation between the government and the parliament when 
the Estates of Finland convened between 1863 and 1906 had, in his view, 
produced good results. e experiences of parliamentary supremacy aer 
1917 provided a further warning instance of an omnipotent parliament 
that was characterised by ‘the adulation of incompetence’, the waste of 
public funds and the degeneration of all administration.2647 Homén would 
consequently join the Swedish People’s Party in voting against the urgent 
adoption of the proposal, but the leaders of the National Coalition Party 
managed to persuade the majority of Finnish-speaking conservatives to join 
the side of limited parliamentarism.
Even aer it had achieved many of its language-policy goals, the Swedish 
People’s Party chose not to be reconciled with a form of parliamentarism 
limited by a presidency. In fact, it challenged the national parliament 
concretely by holding meetings of the Swedish Folktinget, of which many 
of the party’s MPs were also members, and having its debates reported in 
Hufvudstadsbladet as if it was another parliament.2648 e organ of the party 
wrote about parliamentarism with a degree of hostility not paralleled in 
Swedish papers of the right, viewing it as a catchword that the majority of the 
parliament abused in order to weaken the power of the state by introducing 
the rule of a 200-headed assembly divided by parties.2649 It claimed that the 
proposal made the parliament ‘autocratic’ so that 200 members of ‘the most 
ignorant parliament in the world’, possessing less than average intelligence 
and a tendency to follow all extreme theories, would determine all the aairs 
of the state on a weekly basis. is meant that ‘the ckle mass’ and ‘the 
mob’ became the king (with the role of the president being played down) 
2644 VP, Rafael Erich, 21 June 1919, 1022–3.
2645 VP, Juhani Arajärvi, 21 June 1919, 1025. e same expression in German had 
been used in the Weimar debates earlier in the spring.
2646 VP, Paavo Virkkunen, 2 June 1919, 641.
2647 VP, eodor Homén, 14 June 1919, 912.
2648 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Svenska folktinget’ and ‘Svensktinget’, 25 May 1919.
2649 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Betänkliga riktningar inom regeringen och riksdag’ and 
‘Från kammare och kuloar’, 15 June 1919; ‘Regeringsformen antagen’, 22 June 
1919.
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and that as a result there would be constant government crises just as in 
there had been Italy and France and in Sweden in the Age of Liberty. e 
speeches made by the Agrarians and Social Democrats in the parliament 
were excoriated as mere agitation.2650 
In the Eduskunta (the national parliament), Ernst Estlander used his 
academic expertise to consistently oppose parliamentarism and to deplore 
cuts in the power of the president as a return to the Power Act, which had 
led to ‘the Red treason and its democratic ideals about the state and society’. 
In Estlander’s view, the republican Agrarians, too, held the same pernicious 
ideals.2651 He claimed that ‘the so-called parliamentary principle’ would 
lead to a deplorable loss of governmental independence and authority 
to the parliament,2652 producing ‘an omnipotent representation of the 
people’.2653 Majority parliamentarism would endanger the most important 
legal rights of the citizens,2654 and particularly those of the speakers of a 
minority language. Hjalmar Procopé saw the new Finnish constitution 
as the establishment of parliamentary despotism run by ‘a collegium 
of autocrats’.2655 According to him, ‘utterly rampant parliamentary rule’ 
(lantdagsvälde), potentially supportive of the extension of Bolshevism, was 
to be expected.2656 is parliamentarism would not advance democracy but 
rather endanger the realisation of the power of the people. Swedish theorists 
(discussed in the subsections on Sweden) had shown that parliamentarism 
was a specically British system, the applicability of which was questionable 
unless a monarchy, strong parties and the governmental management of 
the parliament of the British kind were also introduced. e experiences of 
the preceding two years demonstrated that the formation of parliamentary 
government of a Western European type would not succeed in Finland.2657 
is was quite a  provocative statement for Finnish-speaking republicans 
and recalls the views of the German right. Emil Hästbacka gave further 
expression to the fears of many Swedish-speakers over their minority status 
and the safety of private property by arguing that proportional representation 
in the parliament gave power into the hands of ‘people who are more or less 
illiterate in the elds of economy and politics’. e proposal would produce 
‘a ruling parliament’ based on ‘the notorious ideals of the Power Act’, which 
Hästbacka, speaking in Swedish, disparaged by using the Finnish word 
valtalaki-idealet rather than translating it into Swedish, thereby implying 
2650 Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Från kammare och kuloar’, 25 May 1919; ‘Köpslagandet om 
regeringsformen’, 4 June 1919; ‘Regeringsformen antagen’ and ‘Från kammare 
och kuloar’, 22 June 1919.
2651 VP, Ernst Estlander, 24 May 1919, 505.
2652 VP, Ernst Estlander, 24 May 1919, 505–506.
2653 VP, Ernst Estlander, 3 June 1919, 722.
2654 VP, Ernst Estlander, 24 May 1919, 506.
2655 VP, Hjalmar Procopé, 2 June 1919, 648. Väinö Voionmaa responded by pointing 
out that parliamentarism was the opposite of dictatorship. 2 June 1919, 651. 
Santeri Alkio likewise rejected the term as inappropriate. 2 June 1919, 652.
2656 VP, Hjalmar Procopé, 14 June 1919, 930.
2657 VP, Hjalmar Procopé, 4 June 1919, 741–2.
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that such radicalism ourished among Finnish-speakers only.2658 Clearly 
the Swedish People’s Party remained opposed to any extended form of 
parliamentarism, even to a greater extent than the Swedish right.
Liberal circles were provoked by such opposition. Georg Schauman of 
the Swedish Le could not sympathise with opponents of parliamentary 
government in an era when parliamentarism was making a breakthrough 
in Germany as well as in Western Europe and Scandinavia. e time of 
parliamentary government had come: it had become impossible to govern 
without parliamentary support in any modern democracy.2659 It was 
unjustied to talk about parliamentary dictatorship as no concentration 
of power in the parliament of the type envisaged in the Power Act would 
ensue.2660 Bruno Sarlin, a Progressivist, also lamented the fact that opposition 
to the results of the parliamentary reform of 1906 was still being waged with 
dreams of limiting surage, instituting a bicameral system and obstruction 
of the adoption of a parliamentary republic.2661 e government parties 
together with the Social Democrats and some Swedish-speaking liberals 
had clearly opted for Western parliamentarism and brought the Finnish-
speaking right on board with the presidential compromise.
Even aer the approval of the proposal by an overwhelming majority, 
there was a risk that the Regent C. G. E. Mannerheim, the commander of 
the Whites and an old monarchist, might not promulgate the republican 
constitution. As it was generally assumed that the Swedish Instrument 
of Government of 1772 was still in force – a reection of the truly long-
term trajectories that prevailed in Finnish political life – no law would 
enter into force without ratication by the regent. Mannerheim, who was 
close to the Swedish People’s Party, was far from enthusiastic about the 
new constitution, which in his view reduced the political impact of the 
presidency, and he therefore postponed the ratication to mid-July. Plans 
for a coup d’état, an invasion of Petrograd (possible for a monarch under 
the Swedish Constitution of 1772) and the rejection of the new constitution, 
all proposed by rightist activists during this postponement, did not, in the 
end, win his support. Neither were the leaders of the National Coalition 
Party, many of whom had already made a rhetorical turn in favour of 
regulated parliamentarism, ready to challenge the parliamentary majority 
again or to encounter the international reactions that would follow. ey 
had the failure to establish a monarchy in the previous autumn in mind. 
e former prime minister J. K. Paasikivi pessimistically warned that ‘all 
sorts of democracies would attack us’ if the republican constitution was 
rejected, which shows how unhappy this devout monarchist was about the 
2658 VP, Emil Hästbacka, 5 June 1919, 881. Otto Wrede condemned ‘economic 
democracy’ even before the term had really entered Finnish debates; Germany, 
he claimed, provided a warning example of democracy, having demolished the 
best ordered state in the world. Hufvudstadsbladet, ‘Betänkliga riktningar inom 
regeringen och riksdag’, 15 June 1919.
2659 VP, Georg Schauman, 4 June 1919, 744.
2660 VP, Georg Schauman, 14 June 1919, 894.
2661 VP, Bruno Sarlin, 14 June 1919, 884.
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‘democratic’ line to which the National Coalition Party had been forced to 
bow. According to this constitution, the supreme power belonged to the 
Finnish people as represented by the parliament. Legislative power was 
divided between the parliament and the president. e president also had 
a role in the use of executive power side by side with the government. e 
government was responsible to the parliament, but the president also had 
a role in its appointment. He further had the right to call new parliamentary 
elections.2662 Even this kind of balance between legislative and executive 
powers remained unacceptable to some former monarchists: R. A. Wrede 
saw the republican constitution as a representative of a trend towards ‘a half-
anarchical parliamentary power’ characterised by ignorance and tending to 
destroy morality and cultural values.2663 Despite this constant opposition to 
parliamentarism, the constitution turned out to be a lasting one that, much 
later, enabled the establishment of a truly parliamentary polity. 
2662 Sihvonen 1997, 16; Jussila, Hentilä & Nevakivi 1999, 129; Vares 2006, 143, 147–8.
2663 Vares 2006, 147.
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R ecent surveys on the First World War suggest that the discrepancies   between the sacrices that the war demanded from the people and 
their possibilities for political participation made them call for reforms from 
1916 onwards and increasingly aer the Russian Revolution broke out in 
March 1917. I have argued in this book that consequently several political 
cultures – both great powers and smaller states not directly involved in 
the war – almost simultaneously entered new cycles of nationally multi-
sited and transnationally interconnected debates on constitutional reform. 
e entangled discourses concerned the political implications of the war, 
the possibilities opened and the threats posed by the Russian Revolution 
and ideologically motivated competing conceptualisations of democracy, 
the people and parliamentarism. ese concepts were becoming objects 
of constant debate, redenition and contestation within – and to some 
extent also between – European political cultures. While the discursive 
processes of constitutional reform took place primarily at the level of nation 
states, they were transnationally connected to a greater extent than national 
historiographies have previously recognised, thanks to existing transnational 
personal connections between the political elites, interlinked media debates 
and alternative ideological transnational networks of professionals and 
politicians linked by theory and ideology that facilitated the transfer of ideas 
at many levels. 
I have reconstructed and analysed the dynamics of these simultaneously 
national and transnational discursive processes in their national, comparative 
and transnational contexts, focusing on four national parliaments – those of 
Britain, Germany, Sweden and Finland – and selected conservative, liberal 
and socialist party newspapers, in seeking an understanding of the logic 
of the competing conceptualisations of the political actors and groups 
involved in dening the proper nature of a future polity. Debates have been 
contextualised in order to show which discursive constructions of each 
concept the participants entertained, how they dened and rhetorically 
redescribed related terms by employing them in specic arguments to 
achieve particular goals and why certain processes of rethinking took place 
and the political consequences of these. At the same time, I have explored 
how and why obvious transnational transfers occurred or were blocked and 
what their political implications were. 
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is study oers a contribution to the comparative and transnational 
history of political discourse based both on comparisons between parallel 
nation-state-level debates as recorded in parliamentary and press sources and 
on an examination of the mutual links between these debates. Such research 
reveals and explains similarities and dierences in attitudes and ideologies 
between national contexts and, by pointing out contemporary comparisons 
and transnational discursive transfers, increases our awareness of the 
entangled nature of national pasts. ough building on existing national 
historiographies and reasserting some of their ndings, this analysis gives us 
reason to modify some earlier nation-state-centred interpretations: similar 
or alternative outcomes in other national contexts challenge the exceptional, 
self-evident or self-sucient nature of the national reform processes. While 
exceptional in some respects, the national processes had a lot in common 
and were oen transnationally connected. Even some of their particular 
features only become visible through this kind of transnational comparison 
focusing on discourse, textual content and concepts. 
For instance, exceptionally consensual wartime attempts to strengthen 
the legitimacy of parliament and limited reformulations of British 
‘democracy’ become visible in international comparative contexts, including 
uses of ‘democracy’ and ‘Prussianism’ in Allied propaganda and some 
contemporary international comparisons in the British parliament. e 
pressures of Western propaganda played a role in attempts to democratise 
and parliamentarise the Prussian political order, turning the key concepts 
party-political, potentially treasonous or in need of nationalisation, 
emphasising the unity of the people in ways not found in the other countries. 
ere was no such complex parliamentary negotiation on democracy and 
parliamentarism in Germany as in Sweden and Finland. ough Swedish and 
Finnish constitutional solutions depended to a great extent on the course of 
the war and on German debates, they diered from them as for the readiness 
of at least some of the right to experiment with democratisation. Sweden 
moved from German to Western political models aer major ideological 
confrontations over democracy. In Finland, radical political discourses 
adopted from Revolutionary Russia and legalist responses contributed to 
a ercer confrontation on democracy and parliamentarism than  in the 
other countries and to the rise of a crisis of independence: the legitimacy 
of parliamentary government deteriorated, a cycle of violent parliamentary 
discourse, civil war and Prussian reaction followed, and nally a republican 
compromise was made under external pressures. While Finland became 
internationally a warning example of a failed democracy in spring 1918, 
foundations for what would much later be called a ‘very sustainable’ polity 
were nevertheless laid in spring 1919.
Politics has been understood here as consisting of discursive and related 
physical processes that took place on dierent potentially interlinked 
levels and in dierent forums simultaneously – as well as at dierent times 
–  with political actors constructing, reproducing and contesting policies in 
interaction with each other and with the political process. Parliamentary 
debates have been analysed as nexuses of multi-sited political discourses, 
including connected academic and public debates, so that the previous 
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and simultaneous activities of the parliamentarians in other national and 
transnational forums, historical spaces, their mobility between these spaces 
and connected physical experiences and possible discursive transfers 
have been taken into consideration whenever traceable and interpreted 
as relevant for the understanding of a speech act. is methodological 
approach, focusing on the evolving meanings of the concepts in use in 
political arguments, integrates discourse-oriented methods ranging from 
language policy studies to the study of the history of political discourse, 
thereby widening the repertoire of conceptual history beyond the historical 
semantics of Begrisgeschichte or the analysis of speech acts in the history 
of political thought. It is applicable to any corresponding comparative and 
transnational study of political discourse.
e analysis of the parliamentary reform debates was organised into 
four national contexts, ve half-year periods of evolving national and 
international contexts and four broad topics: (i) national debates on the 
political implications of the First World War and national revolutions 
together with international comparisons and the transnational connections 
of these debates; (ii) competing ideologically motivated conceptualisations 
of democracy; (iii) alternative arguments concerning the political role of the 
people; and (iv) rival understandings of parliamentarism. In the rest of this 
conclusion, the central ndings of these four categories are summarised in 
their national contexts in a generalising manner, related causal explanations 
discussed and the consequences for our understanding of the political history 
of the late 1910s explicated. e relative importance of the transnational 
aspects for the national discursive processes of reform is also discussed.
e First World War was the major transnational force that changed 
polities: the simultaneity and entanglement of reform pressures and related 
debates arose to a great extent from the realities and experiences of the 
war. In early 1917, political leaders on both sides of the Western Front 
shared an understanding that the people’s sacrices for the war eort had 
made it necessary to look for new ways to take the will of the people into 
consideration and to counteract a threatening crisis of legitimacy. Universal 
surage and parliamentary representation were seen not only in Britain but 
also increasingly in Germany as the best method to reconnect the people 
and the government. 
In Britain, the War Cabinet proceeded with a previously prepared 
proposal on a surage reform shortly aer the outbreak of the Russian 
Revolution, in the expectation that the U.S.A. would soon enter the war. 
e American emphasis on ‘democracy’ in war propaganda increased 
the pressure for reform, requiring that political realities should better 
correspond with the rhetoric of the Entente, although in the British 
domestic wartime context the concept of democracy was politicised late in 
comparison with the other countries and mainly by opposition forces. e 
common war experience that had united classes and parties was generally 
seen as enabling the political nation to move forward with the reform, the 
government presenting it as mobilising the power of the people for victory 
and reconstruction, creating a new Britain in the new world. As elsewhere, 
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the rightist opposition wished to concentrate on the war eort and postpone 
the reform, questioning its legitimacy. e majority of the Conservatives, 
however, adapted themselves; in this they were inuenced by their new 
conceptions of the lower classes arising from the shared war experiences and 
by optimistic prospects of obtaining party-political support from them. is 
adaptation, justied with talk about power being ‘derived from the people’ 
– which led to conceptualisations of democracy not so dierent from those 
voiced on the Continent – allowed the British reform process to take place 
earlier and made it more consensual than in the countries of comparison. 
Britain thus provided a model that reformists in Germany, Sweden and 
Finland used to persuade the right in those states, as the comparison shows. 
e relatively consensual nature of the process is also explained by the 
moderation of the Labour Party, which had been successfully integrated into 
the wartime government. As part of a national front, this party avoided in 
wartime the kind of labour internationalist argumentation that was typical 
of Social Democratic parties, striving to bridge class dierences, saving 
further reform demands for later and rejecting revolution.
In Germany, dissatisfaction over the marginalisation of the Reichstag 
came into the open from late 1916 onwards. As in Britain, the impetus for 
reform was a reection of the pressures caused by the war and the inuence 
of war propaganda. Even the Chancellor recognised a certain need to 
rethink how the popular will could be taken into consideration when, in the 
aermath of the Russian Revolution and the inception of the British surage 
reform and with the threat of the U.S.A. joining the Entente, the opposition 
openly challenged him about the postponed Prussian surage reform. I have 
shown how the British and German reform processes became discursively 
intertwined in ways that lent support to German rightist theories that the 
defeat in the war had been caused by domestic treason, with the Social 
Democrats being inspired by the British example. While the reformist le and 
centre emphasised that the war had changed Germany and the entire world, 
the right rejected all reform as a violation of the constitutional monarchy at 
a time when all forces should be concentrated on winning the war.
e Swedish reform process was likewise dependent on the course of 
the war even though the country was not directly involved in the ghting. 
e war forced the political elite to reconsider which constitutional model 
to follow: whereas e Right, supported by academics, continued to favour 
the Prussian example, the Liberal and Social Democratic le tended to 
turn towards Western European models and especially that of Britain. e 
implications of interconnections between the constitutional strife of the 
1910s and historical writing for the long-term national grand narrative 
on the rise of Swedish democracy have not been previously considered to 
a sucient degree. is study challenges teleological historiography on the 
rise of ‘democracy’ in the eighteenth century, above all,2664 and strengthens 
the consideration of transnational aspects as for the reforms of the early 
twentieth century. e Russian Revolution, the British reform, the German 
reform debates and the American entry allowed the Swedish le to argue 
2664 Discussed in Ihalainen 2010 and Ihalainen 2015.
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that the entire world was changing and that Sweden must therefore join this 
transnational reform. is was an argument that e Right still refused to 
accept.
Finland, though still part of the Russian Empire, had experienced the 
hardships of the war only indirectly and remained discursively outside it 
– in rather misleading ways. However, the dierent stages of the Russian 
Revolution (in March, July and November 1917) brought to the fore 
postponed reforms and disappointment with the results of the radical 
parliamentary reform of 1906 and provided evolving revolutionary models 
for new reformist and anti-reformist cycles of discourse. While the Finnish 
right counted on the Prussian model of a well organised polity prevailing in 
a new Europe, and thus also in Finland, aer a German victory, the le in 
1917 adopted a parliamentary discourse that was at times indistinguishable 
from Bolshevist revolutionary rhetoric. e importance of this discursive 
confrontation for the rise of a concrete violent conict have not been 
considered suciently in older Finnish research. Discursive transfers from 
Revolutionary Russia remained limited in Britain and Germany, but Sweden 
and Finland were aected more concretely, the former owing to the mobility 
of internationalist socialists and the latter by way of a rail connection with 
Petrograd, the centre of the Revolution, although the Finnish socialists had 
diculties in understanding the divisions and dynamics of the Russian 
revolutionary movement. e Revolution at rst intensied national debates 
on democracy, inspiring the le, but it soon turned into a yardstick for the 
denition of democracy by all political groups. e Revolution also brought 
about redenitions of parliamentarism as its Bolshevist version challenged 
‘bourgeois’ and ‘Western’ parliamentarism.
British MPs were unenthusiastic about the Revolution, prioritising 
the continuity of the alliance with Russia. e concept was nevertheless 
politicised by the right to oppose the reform as an illegitimate ‘revolution’ 
introduced in the midst of a war. Some reformist Conservatives and 
Liberals, on the other hand, shared the suggestion of Labour MPs that the 
reform in fact would prevent a revolution by redening the relationship 
between the people, Parliament and the government. At the end of 1917, the 
Representation of the People Bill became conceptualised as a parliamentary 
revolution in a positive sense, as a substitute for a socialist revolution. 
In Germany, the Russian Revolution could be presented as a challenge 
to the Prussian order. Even in autumn 1918, however, it was still only the 
far le that spoke about an unavoidable transnational revolution and aimed 
at a socialist revolutionary democracy, which diers from Finland in 1917. 
e Social Democrats consistently emphasised reform, and from autumn 
1918 onwards their moderate revolution was tailored to the circumstances 
in Germany: a revolution against the old Prussian order had been made, but 
it was not to be radicalised in the ways suggested by the far le. Even this 
restricted revolution was rejected by the right, and the tendency to extend 
the revolution to socio-economic issues was disliked by many liberals as 
well, which le the Social Democrats and their le-liberal allies alone in 
their revolutionary project, which diers from cooperation across the bloc 
lines in Sweden, for instance.
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Stockholm, as a meeting place for international socialists, experienced 
the Revolution through cross-national mobility. e transnational 
revolutionary moment received its most concrete expression when the 
Social Democrat leader Hjalmar Branting participated in the reform 
debate on 14 April 1917, having just arrived from a visit to revolutionary 
Petrograd, and in interventions by far leists who had on the preceding 
days hosted Lenin on his way to Petrograd. e le, including the Liberals, 
took the Revolution and the promises by the Kaiser on a future reform as 
evidence of a transnational constitutional change that Sweden was bound 
to join. However, the Social Democrats distanced themselves from direct 
action, prioritising reform through universal surage and parliamentary 
cooperation and opposing the Bolsheviks in late 1917, while at the same time 
pressurising e Right with insinuations about a possible popular rising. e 
far le conceptualised the constitutional confrontation in Sweden as part of 
a transnational revolution, supported a more revolutionary constitutional 
reform and sympathized with the radicalised discourse and related action of 
the Finnish Social Democrats. e split among the socialists marginalized 
support for the revolutionary cause in Sweden. e Right nevertheless 
attacked all reformists for their alleged ‘revolutionary’ scheming. 
e analysis shows that the Finnish Civil War of early 1918 made the 
Swedish Social Democrats argue all the more consistently that a revolution 
should be executed through parliament, not by violent means. However, 
in order to force through a reform aer the German Revolution in late 
1918, they raised the possibility of a more radical revolution in case their 
moderate version was not approved by e Right and supported their 
argument with street demonstrations and emphasising the dictate of 
an irresistible transnational constitutional change. eir Liberal allies 
presented the reform as a way to prevent the progress of Bolshevism and 
hence to counter a possible revolution – a lot like in Britain. e Right still 
denied the legality of foreign revolutions and their relevance for Sweden, 
implying that the reformist coalition was importing a revolution by ‘violent’ 
extra-parliamentary agitation that might lead to civil strife of the kind seen 
in Finland. e surage reform was by no means a mere matter of course: 
most rightist MPs carried on their anti-reformist discourse to the end, and 
in summer 1919 some were still asserting that revolutionary activities would 
be answered with force. Only a few joined the leists, using similar natural 
metaphors to describe an inevitable constitutional change. e far le, on the 
other hand, was disappointed with the Social Democrats’ limited revolution 
and did not exclude the possibility of a civil war to advance democratic 
socialism. ere was not yet a shared ‘Swedish democracy’ inherited from 
the eighteenth century, and the ideological confrontations reminded to 
a great extent those in Finland. 
In Finland, the revolution was creeping in even more concretely. 
During the spring and summer of 1917, Finnish socialists received news 
of revolutionary developments not only in Petrograd but also in Berlin and 
Stockholm. I have shown how the concept of revolution became highly 
politicised in the parliament, the alternative interpretations being either that 
an international revolution had already entered Finland and was spreading 
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to Sweden, Germany and Britain or that the Social Democrats were trying 
to import a Russian phenomenon through agitation. By the time of the 
introduction of a bill on parliamentary sovereignty in July 1917, the Social 
Democrats were applying the language of irreconcilable class antagonism 
to interpret the Finnish situation, building on previous radical discourse of 
their own and inspired by the Russian revolutionary discourse transferred 
through the mobility of revolutionaries between Petrograd and Helsinki. 
When the Bolsheviks – the only foreign socialist group supporting the aims 
of the Social Democrats, who seemed to be promoting the Bolshevist goal to 
internationalise the revolution – were believed to be taking over in Russia, 
parliamentary cooperation tended to be replaced with increasingly radical 
interpretations of the class struggle, revolution and civil war as the means 
to establish the rule of the working classes. is diers drastically from the 
avoidance of associations with Bolshevism in mainstream socialist discourse 
in Sweden, Germany and Britain – and from claims that the Bolsheviks had 
little inuence on Finnish Social Democrats who rather looked at Germany. 
Risto Alapuro, among others, has argued that the Finnish Social Democrats 
wished to prevent a socialist revolution by introducing reforms still in 
November 1917 – that there was a revolution but no leaders or participating 
masses.2665 I have shown how the sovereignty of the Finnish parliament, as 
advocated by the leading minister, the head of the Constitutional Committee 
and the Social Democratic parliamentary majority, was to be seen as part 
of the international ‘last ght’ between the proletariat and the capitalists, 
while a compromise with the bourgeoisie as counter-revolutionaries was 
discursively excluded. When the right responded with a class-based and 
legalistic discourse, the revolutionary class division of the Russian type 
became discursively established.
e breakthrough of revolutionary discourse and related extra-
parliamentary action was even more obvious in the second parliament of 
1917, which had a bourgeois majority and convened immediately aer the 
October Revolution in Russia. e Social Democrats talked constantly about 
an unavoidable revolution of the Bolshevik type leading to violence, and 
a class war and a civil war being needed for the destruction of capitalist society, 
monarchies, parliaments and the press. ey presented the bourgeoisie as 
counterrevolutionaries belonging to an international alliance that had used 
the same sinister methods in all revolutions throughout history. anks to 
their capitalist injustices and conspiracies, the Finnish and international 
bourgeoisie were to blame for the rise of a revolution which the Social 
Democrats were unable to stop. It appeared to the Social Democrats that it 
was their world-historical duty to make a revolution as opposed to carrying 
on the use of parliamentary means. is parliamentary vituperation, 
even hate speech, was reinforced by the party press and implemented in 
extra-parliamentary violence. e radicalisation of the Finnish Social 
Democratic discourse two months before the actual outbreak of the Civil 
War went far beyond anything heard in revisionist or even far-le socialist 
2665 Alapuro 1988, 167–9; Liikanen 1993, 577, commenting Alapuro’s thesis; Alapuro 
2003, 541; Haapala & Tikka 2013, 109, 111, Hentilä & Hentilä 2016, 98.
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discourse in the British, German or Swedish parliaments. Consequences 
for political events should be considered: radical discourse was leading to 
an attempted revolution against a parliamentary majority and also to an 
armed conict when the right and the centre questioned the justication of 
what they saw as an imported revolution and the use of extra-parliamentary 
violence. is revolution failed, and the government of the White victors 
would see it as identical with the Bolshevik Revolution. Indeed, even the 
decision on a  republican constitution in connection with the Declaration 
of Independence in December 1917 would be presented as an illegitimate 
revolutionary measure to be countered with a monarchy. Anthony D. Upton’s 
concept of the ‘Finnish Revolution’ thus nds a lot of support in the analysis 
of parliamentary discourse: it was how the contemporaries understood the 
development.2666
e collective experiences and propagandistic discourses of the First World 
War and the Russian Revolution brought democracy, too, to the centre of 
the political debate around Europe and among nearly all ideological groups, 
even ones with authoritarian goals. Democracy (in contradistinction to 
Prussianism, against which the Entente claimed to be ghting) was becoming 
the norm for organising post-war political systems, though endless debate 
on the proper form of democracy ensued. I have demonstrated that the 
course of the national debates on democracy everywhere was greatly 
inuenced by the state of international aairs constituted by an intensifying 
dispute between Germany and the Entente on what democracy stood for, 
Woodrow Wilson’s successful importation of the rhetoric of democracy to 
Europe, the Russian Revolution opening entirely new visions for the future, 
and the outcome of the war. Typical of the debate in all countries was an 
emphasis on equal voting rights for both sexes and (with the exception of 
the far le) on the parliamentary representation of the people as constitutive 
of democracy.
Britain was the forerunner in constitutional reform in 1917–18 but not 
really in the rhetoric of democracy, despite pre-war examples: the analysis 
shows that few British politicians conceptualised the surage reform as a 
step in the advancement of democracy in spring 1917, their stance being 
that, while there was no need to democratise the British political system, 
the reform was needed to strengthen the people’s morale in wartime. e 
anti-reformist opposition nevertheless tactically redescribed the established 
system as democratic and themselves as its defenders against the ‘Prussian’ 
methods employed by the government. Some reformists viewed democracy 
in Britain as essentially regulated, but only a few Liberals described the 
entire political system as democratic. Democracy was not a programmatic 
concept even for the Labour Party at this stage; this diers from continental 
Social Democracy and nds an explanation in the desire of the coalition 
partners to avoid associations with the Russian Revolution and the Marxist 
concept of democracy as the rule of the proletariat. It is illustrative of the 
2666 Cf. Liikanen 1993, 576, on the unwillingness of Finnish historians to refer to 
a ‘revolution’.
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isolationist attitudes of the British parliamentary elite that the use of the 
word ‘democracy’ reproduced the war propaganda claim about ghting 
the war for democracy rather than expressing any vision of a transnational 
democratic breakthrough that would change the world and Britain with it.
In autumn 1917, when the legislative process was still under way, some 
reformists began to redene the British political system through a normative 
concept of democracy. e Irish Nationalists attacked the government 
for its ‘Prussianism’ and used ‘democracy’ in a positive sense to engage in 
politicking. Identifying oneself and one’s party with democracy became 
increasingly common towards the end of 1917, but even so the references 
to democracy remained few in comparison with continental Social 
Democratic and Liberal reformist discourses. Awareness of the diversied 
uses of ‘democracy’ to defend a variety of policies was nevertheless rising. 
Aer the Bolshevik Revolution, fears of socialist revolutionaries taking over 
democracy and turning it into class rule were common. ey were reinforced 
by far-le publicity that questioned the reality of democratisation in Britain 
in comparison with Germany. Some critics of mass democracy appeared in 
both Houses in early 1918, but downright anti-democratic views were not 
articulated as they were in the other countries of comparison. On the contrary, 
some explicit parliamentary speech acts showed the British Conservatives 
were moving over to the side of the democratic masses – honestly or for 
tactical reasons. For many peers, a transition to a democratic constitution 
seemed unavoidable, and some saw democracy as a way to diminish class 
confrontations and to advance societal progress. Such readiness among the 
old elite to adapt to democracy in the exceptional wartime circumstances 
would be decisive for the success of the British reform.
From spring 1918 onwards, the Entente was demanding the 
democratisation of Germany as a precondition of peace. In the British 
press, the constitutional debate was taken over by the focus on the war 
being fought for democracy. Only some Labour activists conceptualised 
the surage reform as the democratisation of British society and implying 
further reforms, while the far le continued to criticise the British system 
for its lack of democracy in comparison with Germany. In autumn 1918, 
the mobilisation of ‘the new democracy’ for an election remained modest 
by international standards. While the Labour Party urged Britain to support 
the progress of democracy on the Continent, denounced Bolshevism and 
called for reforms at home, the Conservatives and Liberals suspected Labour 
of advocating socialist democracy. e Conservatives wished to avoid any 
fuss about democracy, viewing Britain as already being a democracy and 
rejecting reform demands based on the advancement of democracy. Liberal 
papers defended the policies of the War Coalition as democratic, emphasised 
democratic progress and spoke for reforms designed to stop the advance 
of socialism. Prime Minister Lloyd George himself, on the other hand, 
dened his government as a representative of democracy more distinctly 
aer he had secured an election victory. e opposition, on the le but also 
within the Liberal Party, responded by challenging Lloyd George’s foreign 
and domestic policies as incompatible with the advancement of democracy. 
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A debate, both theoretical and political, on the implications of democracy 
for domestic politics was activated as soon as peace had been restored.
In 1919, the discourse of the British Conservatives began to see the 
prevailing political system as democracy in a positive light, especially as 
the rise of ‘Tory democracy’, sympathetic towards the working classes and 
believing in the construction of democracy through education, had been 
rewarded with electoral success. e Liberal press described Parliament 
as ‘British Democracy’ and Lloyd George’s reformist government as the 
realisation of that democracy. e Labour Party, despite its unhappiness about 
the manipulated election that had enabled the old elite to retain power under 
the rhetoric of democracy, proled itself as a supporter of representative as 
opposed to direct democracy as the way to achieve socialism. It denounced 
the notion of democracy as the rule of the workers and challenged Lenin, 
who had rejected parliamentary methods in favour of democracy produced 
by a revolution. e far le carried on using a discourse on democracy as the 
rule of the working class, but it remained a marginal force. 
If the British reform could be turned into a source of optimism and 
disputes about democracy saved until the post-war period, in Germany 
democracy became a concept of open dispute that inamed the political 
debate during and aer the war. Spring 1917 already saw the reactivation of 
an older debate on ‘Western’ democracy that was critical of the American, 
British and French political systems. is debate was provoked by the 
attacks of the war propaganda on Prussianism as an opponent of democracy, 
the Russian Revolution, the British reform and the US entry into the war. 
As a reection of their dissatisfaction with the running of wartime policies, 
some socialists and liberals pointed to the strengths of ‘democracies’ in order 
to challenge the Prussian political order. Whereas ocial Germany denied 
the Western accusations about the lack of democracy in Germany and 
emphasised the popular elements of the constitution, le-liberals demanded 
democratisation as compensation for military service. e Social Democrats, 
while recognising certain strengths in the German polity in comparison 
with the West, deplored the delayed democratisation of its institutions, 
calling for a surage reform in Prussia and hoping for a reform of the federal 
constitution as well. However, the other parliamentary parties did not share 
the socialist and le-liberal views: the right rejected all democratisation as 
treason and defended the monarchical political order. Outside Germany, 
the challenge to the Prussian order was overinterpreted and the ability of 
the established political system to stop reform underestimated. In Sweden 
and Finland, it encouraged both Social Democratic and Liberal reformism, 
whereas rightist anti-reformism continued to trust the stability of the 
Prussian system. e same happened in summer 1917, when the German 
le called for democracy with universal surage as the rst step and spoke 
enthusiastically about the advancement of democratic ideas. e reform 
process came to a standstill as a result of an intervention of the military 
leaders, for whom democratisation was associated with a readiness to 
give up ghting the war produced by Western propaganda. e false 
impressions abroad were also inspired by the fact that Vorwärts and Berliner 
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Tageblatt nevertheless published overoptimistic news about the progress of 
democratisation in Germany and internationally. e conservative press, by 
contrast, mocked the leist ‘Reichstag democracy’ and encouraged foreign 
opponents of similar reforms to stand rm against Western democracy in 
the expectation of a German victory.
When no such victory was won, a legitimacy crisis broke out. In late 
September 1918, the General Sta advised the politicians to respond 
positively to Woodrow Wilson’s call for democratisation in order to achieve 
better peace terms. e right responded by rejecting all reform as the 
importation of ‘Western democracy’ and mass rule by the opportunistic 
and treasonous ‘German democracy’, and most other parties, too, were 
hesitant to talk about democratisation. Since the Social Democrats did not 
hesitate to monopolise the concept, ‘democracy’ took on a party-political 
connotation not known in the three countries of comparison. For the SPD, 
the reform stood for the crushing of Prussianism and the realisation of some 
of the party’s main goals, which went on to call for ‘economic’ together with 
political democracy; this strengthened the associations between democracy 
and socialism, particularly as the le-liberals spoke only very generally about 
the advent of ‘a democratic era’. e Social Democrats were le practically 
alone with their ‘democracy’. 
A similar division was established in the Weimar Assembly, the Social 
Democrats using majority democracy as a normative concept that dened 
proper political behaviour and as a programmatic concept directing 
future policies, their leaders being roused by their own rhetoric, which 
talked about making Germany the ‘most democratic democracy in the 
world’. e comparative analysis shows, however, that they also tried to 
sell the concept to its critics by nationalising it as ‘German democracy’ or 
vernacularising it by using the ethnic, organic, collectivistic and seemingly 
apolitical term ‘rule of the people’ (Volksherrscha), which came close to 
the popular word Volksgemeinscha (community of the people), and the 
notion that the collective popular will was more than the mere will of a 
parliamentary majority. e German right did not participate in such 
deliberations about democracy beyond some rhetorical redescriptions and 
oppositional interjections. is diers from the readiness of the right in 
the other national cases to argue about the nature of democracy. e right-
liberals denounced the project, and the Catholic Centre continued to recycle 
traditionalist and federalist views, needing time to accommodate itself to 
the new system. Even the le-liberals set limits to democratic progress and 
replaced ‘democracy’ with terms such as Volksstaat (state of the people), 
calling for a strong presidency and referenda as expressions of the popular 
will as opposed to parliament. e far le saw the constitution as not going 
far enough in the direction of ‘proletarian democracy’. All these stands were 
relevant also for contemporary Swedish and Finnish constitutional debates 
which cannot be fully understood without knowledge of them.
An even more extensive debate on democracy took place in Sweden, 
where the surage reform was postponed until aer the German Revolution. 
Immediately aer the Russian Revolution, the le launched a campaign 
proclaiming that the time of irresistible democratisation had come – even 
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referring to the breakthrough of demokratism, a term used positively by 
the Social Democrats and pejoratively by the right. Unlike Germany, all of 
the le, from the liberals to future communists, adopted ‘the democracy 
of Sweden’ as the denomination of their joint reformist bloc. Only the 
right remained outside in leist discourse, which deepened the opposition 
between the reformists as democrats and the anti-reformists as anti-
democrats but implied that the socialists recognised bourgeois reformists 
as equal democrats. is inclusiveness diered decisively from the Finnish 
Social Democratic understanding of themselves as the only democrats and 
facilitated discursive and other kinds of cooperation across the ideological 
divide. 
In the Swedish constitutional debates, democracy nevertheless became 
a key term for all political groups from the right to the far le. I have shown 
that this has to do with a widely adopted but ideologically interpreted 
nationalist narrative of ancient Swedish democracy. Not unlike their 
counterparts in Britain and Finland, the theorists of e Right consistently 
claimed that the prevailing system already constituted a democracy in 
comparison with all foreign models and was evolving towards an even 
more democratic character without the need for further reforms; indeed, 
the extension of surage would even make Sweden excessively democratic 
by international standards. Democratisation required an advanced political 
maturity among the people at large, and hence a constitutional change 
would only become possible with further political education. ough 
anti-reformist and motivated by political theories shared with German 
academia, the Swedish rightist understanding of democracy did include an 
evolutionary element that was supported by an historiographical myth of 
native Swedish democracy and parliamentarism.
e Liberals in Sweden believed to a greater extent than their brethren 
in Britain, Germany or Finland in the democratic process as productive of 
a better society. is enabled them to join the socialist le in criticising e 
Right. In spring 1917 they agreed with Woodrow Wilson on the necessity 
of replacing Prussianism with democracy as the way out of the war, and 
in spring 1918 they already viewed Sweden as a Western democracy. is 
facilitated the change of sides with regard to political models. Cooperation 
with the Social Democrats was easy in that the latter had clearly turned to 
revisionism in their understandings of democracy, rejecting the tenets of 
an irreconcilable class struggle. For them the concept of democracy was 
essentially processual: universal surage would produce Social Democratic 
majorities, and consequent reforms carried out by the parliament would lead 
to the goal of democracy. ey shared a leist historiographical interpretation 
according to which Swedish political culture had been democratic for nearly 
a thousand years. eir leader Hjalmar Branting dened democratisation 
as ‘democratic equality with respect to the public aairs of the state and 
the community’. He welcomed a revision towards Western democracy and 
denounced Russian and Finnish revolutionary versions of democracy. 
is democracy would be much more moderate than that of the far le, 
for whom democracy stood for a new socialist political order achieved 
through immediate constitutional reforms that would abolish the monarchy 
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and the upper house and implement direct democracy. However, even the 
far le generally prioritised reform over revolution as the way to achieve 
democracy. ey shared with the Finnish socialists a critical attitude to 
Western varieties of democracy, and an idealisation of the Swiss system 
as an alternative to the shortcoming of ‘Western’ democracy. ey also 
entertained an understanding of the rst Finnish parliament of 1917 as 
a ‘complete democracy’ and voiced expressions of support for the Finnish 
radical Marxist concept of democracy during the Finnish Civil War. 
e practical parliamentarisation of the Swedish government in autumn 
1917 supported conceptions of the First World War and the constitutional 
struggle at home as a battle between Prussianism and democracy, with the 
Liberal-Social Democratic coalition, which wished to see Sweden move 
over to the democratic Western side. It also increased Social Democratic 
optimism about achieving reforms and democracy in a parliamentary way. 
e Social Democrats consequently denounced the Red rising in Finland as 
a violation of the principles of democracy, which caused the far le to accuse 
them of capitulating to ‘bourgeois’ democracy. For the Social Democrats, 
democracy realised through equal parliamentary representation remained 
the key concept of their reformist discourse. Even in spring 1918, e Right 
still sought support against the reform from classical political thought 
and the situation in other European countries (especially Finland), where 
democracy seemed to be on the retreat. e cases of Finland as another 
Sweden and Sweden as another Germany should clearly be considered more 
profoundly in Swedish historical research.
Towards the end of 1918, the surrounding reality changed dramatically 
as a result of the German Revolution. e Swedish reform was brought 
forward with an extensive extra-parliamentary campaign for folkstyre 
(rule by the people, cf. Volksherrscha). is reected the revolutionary 
development in Germany, and it emphasised, again, the irresistibility of 
the ongoing pan-European transition. A party-political compromise was 
reached between the reformists and e Right, but I have demonstrated 
how the discursive battles over democracy continued in the parliament. e 
Social Democrats, encouraged by the success of their brethren in Germany, 
tended to monopolise democracy and went on excluding e Right as an 
undemocratic force that merely cynically abused the term. e reform had 
its limits but these would be compensated for by future progress towards 
Social Democracy; even the ultimate goal of socialism was proclaimed more 
openly now that a breakthrough was at hand. e Right, on the other hand, 
emphasised the mature nature of ‘Swedish democracy’ as being capable 
of solving national problems. Some Liberals also liked to nationalise the 
concept, while others favoured a processual and dynamic concept that 
might include connected social reforms. 
Few rightists moved discursively to the side of democracy; most 
continued to obstruct the reform with procedural points, redescribe 
Sweden as a democracy and themselves as democrats, distinguish between 
good and bad democracy, express doubts about the ‘democratic’ future, put 
forward downright anti-democratic ideas or just remain silent. Even the 
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few spokesmen for compromise preferred nineteenth-century informed 
democracy to what they saw as a degeneration resulting from easiness by 
which the masses could be manipulated. It was only the need to oppose 
Bolshevism that encouraged them to envisage concessions, and they 
stipulated that these should be accompanied with education of the people to 
wield ‘the rule by the people’ in senses not so dierent from those attached to 
the concept by their counterparts in Germany and Finland. e radicalised 
far le, by contrast, proled themselves as opponents of ‘bourgeois 
democracy’ and, motivated by German examples, proponents of the radical 
Marxist notion of complete political, economic and social ‘real’ democracy. 
eir socialist republic would now be created outside the parliament and 
through revolution if necessary. 
e comparative analysis shows that the intensity and confrontational 
character of the Finnish debate on democracy was unique in comparison 
with the other three parliaments, which suggests that the Civil War which 
the country experienced in spring 1918 is partly explained by the heat of 
this ideological confrontation. While the Germans and Swedes sometimes 
used vernacular translations for democracy, the Finnish word kansanvalta 
was more widely used and could convey particular connotations such as 
the community of the people or the rule by the Finnish-speaking majority, 
the common people or the proletariat. e Finns did not generally view 
the First World War as a battle for democracy; instead, they conceptualised 
their internal constitutional strife as one concerning the proper nature of 
democracy. 
e ndings of this study, opening the logic of socialist parliamentary 
discourse in Finland, question interpretations of the Finnish Social 
Democratic Party as having held a purely Kautskyist concept of democracy 
and being driven into a civil war unwillingly only by prevailing socio-
economic circumstances and the radicalisation of the masses. e 
consideration of the discursive aspect of parliamentary politics demonstrates 
that the party tended to increasingly adopt the Russian revolutionary, even 
Bolshevist-like, understanding of democracy, which emphasised class 
divisions and saw democracy and the bourgeoisie as necessarily opposite 
forces. Social Democrat MPs frequently dened parliamentary democracy, 
social democracy and the rule by the proletariat as identical and excluded 
all non-socialist groups from cooperation in the construction of democracy. 
In the other three national parliaments, by contrast, the majority socialists 
typically aimed at cooperation with liberal reformists, recognising them as 
democrats. e concept of democracy used by the Finnish Social Democratic 
Party during 1917 was exceptionally exclusive and divisive, resembling 
that of Russian revolutionary discourse, which to a large extent explains 
the ideological confrontation leading to the Civil War, particularly as the 
centre and the right concluded that the Social Democrats had adopted the 
Bolshevik concept of revolutionary democracy. e non-socialist Agrarians 
spoke enthusiastically for the rule by the people but wished to retain the 
duality of government; the liberals feared that democracy had been hijacked 
by the socialists; and the conservative Finnish Party saw limitations to 
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parliamentarism as a condition for the establishment of the rule by the 
people. e Swedish People’s Party refrained from expressing its scepticism 
about democracy at the time of the declaration of independence. 
In the aermath of the Bolshevik Revolution, the confrontation on 
democracy deepened further. While the Social Democrats endeavoured 
to monopolise the concept, some bourgeois speakers defended alternative 
understandings. e Social Democrats insisted that the bourgeoisie had 
launched a class war aimed at destroying the rule by the people (or of the 
proletariat) and were only abusing the concept of democracy in their claims. 
emselves, they demanded the immediate democratisation of society at 
all levels, represented Bolshevik rule as ‘genuine democracy’ and rejected 
defences of parliamentary democracy as generally understood in Western 
Europe: only a parliament with a socialist majority and a constitution 
based on socialist principles deserved to be called democratic. In rightist 
responses, the established system and the proposed new constitution were 
typically presented as democratic, and the bourgeois coalition set democracy 
as its constitutional goal, dening itself as an opponent of socialist policies 
of terror and envisioning a bourgeois democracy in which parliamentary 
power would remain regulated. However, the centre and the right held 
dierent conceptions about what constituted proper democracy: the centre 
considered that democracy lay in the Finnish people, while the right 
remained committed to the eighteenth-century constitutionalist tradition, 
which regarded excessive popular power with suspicion. Finding a common 
discourse on democracy with the socialists turned out to be impossible, 
and a civil war followed. During the hostilities, the Red government issued 
a constitutional proposal built on the notion that the rule by workers 
constituted democracy and denounced ‘bourgeois’ or ‘Western’ democracy.
is wartime propaganda of the defeated Reds, together with the political 
process that had led to the civil war, supported the association of democracy 
with socialist extremism among the centre and the right. German support 
for the White regime oered a chance to restore the traditional monarchical 
political order as a reaction to what was seen as extreme democracy. In the 
post-war situation, even many liberals favoured the German constitutional 
model over that of the Entente. Socialist views did not count as nearly 
all Social Democrats were excluded from the parliament. Even so, there 
followed erce disputes between the monarchists and the republicans over 
the proper extent of popular power. e conservatives and some liberals 
redescribed the existing state of aairs as constitutive of democracy and 
asserted that a monarchy, too, would be reconcilable with democracy. is 
reects the fact that they accepted democracy in the sense of universal 
surage as necessary for a modern polity even if their intention was to 
limit it into a mere formality. e conservative prime minister actually 
doubted the desire of the Finns to establish democracy, and MPs from the 
Swedish People’s Party opposed parliamentary democracy as practised in 
the Finnish unicameral form. e Agrarians and some liberals, by contrast, 
demanded the rule by the people, claiming that it was justied by the 
national character, the nation’s developed political culture, a civil war fought 
to defend democracy and an international trend of democratisation that 
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was unstoppable. ey contrasted the perverted democracy of Bolshevism 
with the Nordic tradition of peasant democracy and rejected monarchy as 
being opposed to the principles of the rule by the people. is confrontation 
ended with a further impasse when the monarchical project failed along 
with the German Revolution, the Finnish debate remaining dependent on 
the course of international politics and competing political groups making 
opportunistic use of chances opened by it.
In spring 1919, however, the Finnish parliament managed to discover 
a spirit of reconciliation under external pressures. Class-based arguments 
were gradually replaced by views searching for a compromise with 
representative democracy limited by a strong presidency. Centrists who 
denounced both leist and rightist class interests, moderates among the 
Social Democrats and compromise-minded politicians within the National 
Coalition Party played a key role in the process. e centrists continued to 
emphasise the democratic awareness of the Finns as demonstrated in their 
will for independence and their readiness to defend democracy in the Civil 
War and referred to an international democratic moment that Finland was 
compelled to join, envisioned progress towards a more advanced democracy 
and challenged the rightist anti-democratic attitudes as outdated elitism. 
e Social Democratic Party – or at least its prominent spokesmen in 
the parliament – rethought its attitude towards ‘peasant’ and ‘bourgeois 
democracy’, recognising the possibility of cooperating with those who held 
dierent understandings of democracy under a constitution that appeared 
to be democratic at least as far as procedures was concerned. Many Finnish-
speaking conservatives who were also academics (ab)used their authority to 
express doubts about democracy, which reected continuity in conservative 
transnational ways of thinking, but nevertheless voted for the compromise 
once it included a suciently strong presidency. e Swedish People’s Party, 
by contrast, remained relentlessly anti-democratic. is party would become 
an advocate of liberal values only much later. 
Divergent conceptions about the people were used to motivate dierent 
views about their political role everywhere. Not all conservatives were 
equally sceptical about the political potential of the people: many members 
of the British Conservative Party viewed the contribution of the lower classes 
to the war positively and expressed respect for the political capabilities 
of the people, arguing for a reform in response to popular expectations. 
ey believed that redening the relationship between the people and the 
state through universal surage would maintain and help to restore the 
diminished legitimacy of the parliamentary system.2667 ey could even nd 
a common goal with the Labour Party, with whom they had cooperated in 
the War Cabinet, in calling for ‘a Parliament of the people’, as well as with 
the Liberals, some of whom expressed a vision of ‘government for the people 
and by the people’. is was a unique crossing of the ideological divide in 
comparison with the German, Swedish and Finnish conservatives, and also 
2667 Müller 2002, 359, has drawn a similar conclusion when comparing nationalistic 
wartime discourse in Britain and Germany.
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in British history. It was built on the exceptional wartime notion of the unity 
of the nation, some Conservatives using nationalist rhetoric to persuade 
their party fellows and ignoring the potentially radical implications of 
democracy. Even though gendered descriptions of the political system 
remained dominant, a readiness to allow women to vote prevailed in the 
Lords as well, which set an important example for Continental bicameral 
parliaments deliberating the same question. 
Wartime patriotism had revived traditional appeals to the people as an 
authority in Germany as well. e reformist parties in the Reichstag and 
indirectly even the Chancellor recognised the contributions of the people to 
the war, emphasising the need to increase their opportunities for participation. 
Despite the weaknesses of the Reichstag, parliamentary debates deserve 
more attention in reconstructions of prevalent views than has been the case 
in German historiography; in them we can nd links between British and 
German reform debates that the German right would later abuse against 
democracy. From March 1917 onwards, the Social Democrats recalled 
the role of the Reichstag as the voice of the German people, emphasising 
that rising popular discontent could be appeased only by reforming the 
Prussian surage system. e far le, inspired by the Russian Revolution, 
pointed more openly to the readiness of the people for action to advance 
their rights. e centrist parties, too, joined in the argumentation for the 
political mobilisation of the people for the war eort, although they avoided 
open advocacy of popular sovereignty. e right, while strongly cherishing 
a concept of a community of the people, prioritised the monarchy as the way 
to express the popular will. 
With the monarchical polity already in decline in autumn 1918, 
arguments for a government based on the will of the majority of the 
people strengthened, especially in Social Democratic discourse. A peculiar 
conceptualisation of democracy – one that was transferred to contemporary 
Swedish and Finnish discourses as well – was provided at this time by the 
expression der deutsche Volksstaat (the German state of the people), which 
emphasised the unity of the people and the state. Even reformist socialists and 
liberals used this to nationalise democracy as a kind of Volksgemeinscha, 
a community of the people, as opposed to Western democracy (something 
that the Nazis would later exploit). e right interpreted all vindications of 
democracy as contempt for the heroic German people, but the prevalent 
notion of a Volksgemeinscha tended to make the concept of the people in 
a nationalistic sense dominate over democracy and parliamentarism to an 
extent not seen in Sweden and Finland. e idea of popular power remained 
an object of constant dispute in the Weimar Republic. In the Weimar 
Assembly, only the Social Democrats and the le-liberals emphasised 
popular sovereignty as being expressed by the parliamentary majority, oen 
with vocabulary distinguishing the German popular government from the 
Western type, and introducing alternative expressions of the popular will, 
including the referendum and a strong presidency. 
Germanic conceptions of the people found their way to the north as well. 
However, one feature distinguishing Swedish and Finnish political concepts 
of the people from the British and German ones is the politicisation of 
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the notion of the ancient liberty of the peasant estate. e Swedish right 
denied the need for reform by arguing that the people proper (the common 
people, the peasantry in the sense of the early modern estate society) did 
not call for one, that ‘the people’ of the Social Democrats only represented 
the interests of the working class and that extended surage did not serve 
the interests of the ‘realm’, to which the interests of the people remained 
subordinated. e people were regarded as subject to leist abuse, and 
women were not included in the Swedish people in a political sense. 
Nevertheless, some rightist suggestions about the need for concessions to 
save the state were heard, which reects a gradual rethinking on the right 
that entertained the possibility of reform. e le, by contrast, called for 
the restoration of the ancient peasant liberty and emphasised the identity of 
the people and the realm, employing the German term ‘state of the people’ 
(folkstat) to make this point. e far le spoke for the activation of the 
people and emphasised the popular readiness for mass action, whereas the 
Social Democrats wanted to make the parliament a more accurate voice of 
the people, hinting occasionally at the possibility of an extra-parliamentary 
popular rising should the upper chamber obstruct the reform. At the time 
of the breakthrough of the reform, the Social Democrats described ‘the 
informed democratic will of the people’ as the hope of the Swedish state and 
the world and emphasised the universal right of the people to participate in 
the administration of the state. e Liberals, too, prioritised the sovereignty 
of the people over that of the state and welcomed the political activation of 
the people – to a greater extent than in the countries of comparison. 
Nearly all the Swedish parties rejected the Finnish Red concept of the 
people as being a Bolshevist notion, standing for the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. I have shown how the discourse of the Finnish Social Democrats 
had tended to monopolise ‘the people’ in 1917, regarding only their party 
as voicing the wishes of the lower classes, the core of the Finnish people; 
this created a division between the people proper and the educated classes 
resembling the use of the concept of narod in Russian revolutionary discourse 
which had more impact on Finland than has been generally recognised. 
Such a denition was consistently questioned by the centre and the right, 
who, having ensured a bourgeois parliamentary majority, emphasised the 
role of the parliament as the representative of the Finnish people, while the 
Social Democrats questioned this aer losing their majority. At the time 
of the declaration of independence, however, all political groups except the 
Swedish People’s Party were overwhelmingly optimistic about the Finnish 
people as a wielder of power and praised its political maturity. Aer the 
Civil War, especially clerical MPs of the Finnish Party and many members of 
the Swedish People’s Party questioned the political maturity or the political 
culture of the Finnish people with regard to the introduction of democracy, 
parliamentarism or a republic. e religious castigation of the people as 
an argument against democracy in the Finnish Rump Parliament of 1918 
was exceptional in comparison with the other studied parliaments. Both 
the monarchical right and the republican centre used organic analogies to 
refer to a mentally deranged socialist segment of the people to either justify 
a monarchy or to explain away the guilt of the people as a whole by claiming 
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that the rebellion had been imported by Russian Bolsheviks and their Finnish 
followers, who had led the people astray. e Agrarians and some liberals 
reiterated their trust in the Finnish people, interpreting the Civil War as 
the defence of the rule by the people and demanding a role for the sacred 
will of the people in the formulation of the constitution. ey emphasised 
the potential of political education for preparing the people to participate 
in the government of the state and rejected monarchy as totally opposed 
to the political character and experience of the Finns. I have suggested 
that the ability of the Finnish-speaking conservatives to re-nd their trust 
in the Finnish people and to recognise their supremacy in a modern state 
more openly than e Right in Sweden or Germany was decisive in the 
formulation of the republican compromise in 1919. e parliament found 
a compromise in which the popular will was expressed through both the 
parliament and a presidency. e Swedish People’s Party, by contrast, 
emphasised the existence of Swedish-speakers as a separate people in order 
to advance the status of the minority language and continued to entertain 
doubts about the excessive involvement of the Finnish masses in politics.
Were then parliaments capable of expressing the will of the people? Even 
if the status of Parliament in British political culture was stronger than 
in any other state and no MP problematised parliamentarism (the far le 
being le outside Parliament), the British political elite found a common 
wartime goal in the creation of a parliament that could be trusted by the 
people, who should not be allowed to reject parliamentary government 
and turn to direct action. e Conservatives were particularly concerned 
about the deterioration of the legitimacy of Parliament, and this concern 
oers a further explanation for their support for the reform. e War 
Cabinet consequently proclaimed its unreserved optimism about the future 
of parliamentary government, implying that the unity produced by the 
war eort would be perpetuated. Some Conservatives saw in a stronger 
parliament a counterbalance to the growing power of the executive, others 
tried to obstruct reform by questioning the legitimacy of the process on the 
basis of the prolonged legislative process and the lack of a public debate. 
e Bolshevik Revolution increased awareness of the political changes that 
universal surage implied, but Parliament was generally viewed as adaptable 
and capable of preventing a revolution in Britain. Many Conservatives 
spoke positively about the potential of popular government and emphasised 
the need to ensure that Parliament would maintain its dominant role in the 
future democratic system. is Conservative strategy proved successful, 
guaranteeing a gentler transition to parliamentary democracy than in 
Germany, Sweden or Finland, where the right was more sceptical. In Britain, 
the reform gradually won the support of a large majority of the old elite, 
maintaining the essence of the old constitution while democratising it to 
a degree sucient to absorb post-war societal pressures. e parliamentary 
process proved able to handle ideological eruptions without them turning 
into cycles of mutual provocation. 
e story of German parliamentarism would be very dierent, despite 
the strengthening role of the Reichstag in the pre-war political culture. All 
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political groups continued to have their doubts about parliamentarism, 
especially in its ‘Western’ form, with even Social Democratic discourse 
traditionally distrusting the parliament as opposed to the people as 
a  democratic political agent. For most non-socialist parties, the duality 
of government was a dominant sine qua non. e idea of introducing the 
parliamentary responsibility of the government was nevertheless brought 
to the agenda by the Social Democrats, the far le and some liberals in 
order to challenge Prussian anti-parliamentary views. A distance from the 
British and French types of parliamentarism was maintained even though 
the strength of those systems was admired by some Social Democrats. e 
centre parties were unclear as to what they meant by parliamentarisation: 
the right-liberals said that the German people had been trained politically 
by the war, while the le-liberals suggested intensied inter-parliamentary 
cooperation between the Central Powers as a way of mobilising public 
opinion transnationally. All such speculation was taken by the Prussian 
right as using parliamentarism, which according to them was declining 
in the West, to challenge the monarchy. e opposition demands and 
the vague reform promises made by the executive have sometimes 
been overinterpreted in German research as silent democratisation or 
parliamentarisation,2668 particularly as the contemporary opposition press 
was enthusiastic about them, but this comparative study suggests that they 
did not really parliamentarise the conceptual world of the German political 
elite.
From October 1918 onwards, the government adopted parliamen-
tarisation as its ocial goal in the hope of gaining better terms of peace. 
However, owing to previous doubts, war propaganda and wartime 
confrontations, parliamentarism remained a concept of fundamental 
contestation. e Social Democrats emphasised their belief in parliamentary 
democracy, increasingly in spring 1919, when they had a strong 
parliamentary presence, whereas the centre parties were not so certain 
about the applicability of the ‘Western’ concept: the le-liberals wished to 
retain a notion of democracy being constituted by popular and presidential 
interventions side by side with parliament, while the right-liberal leader 
lacked the backing of his party when he extolled British parliamentarism. 
e right refrained from all cooperation, regarding parliamentarism as 
a shameful replacement of the well-organised constitutional monarchy with 
the rule of the masses misled by political parties. Some on the far le also 
wished to demolish parliamentarism, but for very dierent reasons. Like 
‘revolution’ and ‘democracy’, ‘parliamentarism’ remained a partisan concept 
in Germany held by Social Democrats and a few le-liberals; it did not 
become a concept shared by liberals and conservatives – to some extent at 
least – as would be the case in the countries of comparison.
Sweden and Finland turned to parliamentary government in the studied 
period, but the debate on its pros and cons continued with arguments drawn 
from the rival Prussian and British models just as the timing depended 
on the result of the world war. At the same time, the rise of the Bolshevik 
2668 Müller 2014, 47–8; Leonhard 2014, 739, 763, for instance.
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alternative made all sides clarify what they meant by parliamentarism and in 
the case of the right move gradually to its side. e theorists of the Swedish 
Right, echoing German political theory, consistently condemned Western 
parliamentarism as productive of an excessive concentration of power, rule 
by the masses and party abuses; they considered the established political 
system in Sweden a better version of parliamentarism. Leist agitation had 
made people expect too much of parliamentarism, the weaknesses of which 
had been demonstrated in history and which was in decline internationally. 
As in the case of democracy, the le responded with the theory of an ancient 
native parliamentary tradition that just needed to be revived. e Liberals 
were ostentatiously in favour of British parliamentarism and eager to accuse 
e Right of anti-parliamentarism. e socialists were divided over direct 
versus representative democracy. e majority Social Democrats favoured 
parliamentarism as a political process productive of reforms once universal 
surage was introduced and the power of the lower chamber asserted, 
which caused the far le to accuse them of surrendering to bourgeois 
parliamentarism and to voice occasional calls for mass action. e Social 
Democrats proled themselves as defenders of parliamentarism in Sweden, 
seeing it as a way to reform the international system as well. ey opposed 
far-le anti-parliamentarism, implying that the rejection of their alternative 
might lead to the rise of Bolshevist extra-parliamentary activities. e 
division of socialists, parliamentarisation of government and connected 
promises of democratic reforms took place in Sweden at a decisive moment, 
preventing the escalation of the constitutional debate into violence, as 
happened in Finland. e Right continued to question the positive eects of 
parliamentarism and warned about extended surage leading to increased 
anti-parliamentarism. eir criticism decreased gradually, however, as 
a result of the outcome of the war, parliamentarisation in Germany and, 
perhaps, demonstrations from the Swedish le that they indeed favoured 
parliamentary methods.
e Finnish government was in principle parliamentarised in spring 
1917, but the all-party ministry did not work in practice. ere was no split 
of the socialists into supporters of parliamentarism and advocates of direct 
action, as there was in Germany and Sweden, and this led to the radicalisation 
of the entire party. A socialist parliamentary majority strengthened doubts 
about majority parliamentarism among non-socialists. e right idealised 
the duality of power in the inherited eighteenth-century constitution and 
the contemporary German and Swedish models. Mutual recrimination 
about breaking parliamentary rules tended to diminish the legitimacy of 
parliamentary procedures. In the aermath of the Russian Revolution, the 
Social Democrats challenged the authority of the national parliament by 
calling their revolutionary organisation a ‘parliament’ and by presenting 
the soviets in Petrograd and the Finnish parliament as parallel institutions. 
Parliamentary work in a chamber with a socialist Speaker was aected by 
extra-parliamentary politics manifested in crowd demonstrations. is, 
together with a tradition of confrontational socialist agitation and constant 
revolutionary impulses from Petrograd, led to the further deterioration of 
parliamentary legitimacy. e Social Democrats attacked the bourgeoisie 
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for the failure of parliamentary government, citing the frustration of their 
supporters with an unproductive parliament, emphasising their exclusive 
understanding of parliamentary democracy and social democracy as 
identical, and suggesting that further extra-parliamentary measures would 
follow. e deterioration of the parliamentary legitimacy was further 
acerbated when the Speaker of the parliament reconvened it aer its 
dissolution. e dynamics of parliamentary discourse and the intentional 
deconstruction of parliamentary legitimacy during 1917 have not been 
previously much considered in Finnish research.   
Aer the Social Democratic idea of a socialist-dominated parliament 
ruling the country came to nothing, the supporters of a parliamentary 
strategy were driven out of the parliamentary group for the new election 
or were not allowed to voice their opinions. e Social Democrats 
disputed the legitimacy of the new parliament, prioritising revolution over 
parliamentarism, since, according to them, the proletariat had given up 
their trust in the parliament and the party was not capable of, or responsible 
for, preventing the consequent extra-parliamentary action. e bourgeoisie 
was to blame: its policies had initiated a revolution, and it was accused of 
aiming at the destruction of all parliamentary activity. Moreover, bourgeois 
parliamentarism was declared to be an institution that was incapable of 
producing any reform and hence due to be destroyed by the masses in 
a  revolution that would produce a socialist society. Crowd violence and 
a civil war against the parliament were presented as likely if the parliament 
failed to subordinate itself to socialist democracy. In autumn 1917, Finnish 
Social Democrat MPs contributed to the normalisation of violent political 
discourse by attacking all non-socialists as counterrevolutionaries and 
communicating their message to a larger audience through party papers 
which they themselves edited. No matter what has been maintained in much 
previous research, any Kautskyist conceptions of the parliament2669 were 
taken over by more radical Marxist view of parliaments as mere forums for 
agitation.
e centre and the right in Finland, like many theorists and politicians 
in Germany and France, called for alternatives to extended parliamentarism 
as a way to express the will of the people. Some were sceptical about 
parliamentarism, using what they regarded as the unfortunate eighteenth-
century Swedish experience of a ruling ‘parliament’ (the Diet) as 
a  counterargument, wishing to retain the constitution that had emerged 
as a reaction to such rule and redescribing it as suciently parliamentary. 
Challenges by ‘the workers’ parliament’ and demonstrators were denounced. 
When the legitimacy of the new parliament with its bourgeois majority was 
challenged by the socialists, even many members of the right defended the 
institution despite their remaining reservations about the proper extent of 
parliamentarism, an indication of an ongoing change of attitudes among 
them. Since, in parliamentary discourse, a civil war started to appear as 
possible and even inevitable, bourgeois MPs, too, began to give up hopes 
2669 Kettunen 1986, 87–8, for instance.
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of solving the crisis by parliamentary means, seeing the organisation of 
the White Civil Guards as necessary. All this facilitated a transition to the 
concrete use of violence.
Aer the Civil War, considerable limitations to parliamentarism 
were included in the monarchical constitutional proposals, the process 
that had led to the Civil War being interpreted as a demonstration of its 
detrimental character. While not completely questioning parliamentarism, 
most monarchists emphasised that a monarchy would counterbalance 
parliamentarism while still allowing it to exist; others, like Prime Minister 
J. K. Paasikivi, were openly hostile. e centre rejected monarchy, emphasised 
international progress towards parliamentary government and saw parlia-
men tarism as the only way for the government to keep contact with the 
people and to reintegrate the socialists into the political system. In 1919, they 
stressed the progress of parliamentarism in Western Europe but proposed 
a presidency as a check on it in order to appease the right, who continued to 
oppose far-reaching parliamentarism of the type of the ird Republic, citing 
foreign literature that was critical of parliamentarism, although in the end 
they did accept a ‘functional parliamentarism’ – even quasiparliamentarism 
– regulated by a presidency. e Social Democrats were moving towards 
the acceptance of majority parliamentarism in the Western sense, distancing 
themselves from direct democracy but still opposing a strong presidency. 
To persuade the right, they referred to national traditions of popular 
representation and to the more trusting relationship between the people 
and the administration that Western parliamentarism would create. e 
Swedish People’s Party remained openly anti-parliamentary, arguing against 
parliamentarism and organising a rival parliament to defend the interests 
of the linguistic minority and thereby challenging the national parliament. 
It is time to assess the relative importance of international comparisons 
and transnational connections for the national processes of constitutional 
change in the late 1910s. It has become clear that foreign models were always 
selected, oen tendentiously interpreted and deliberately applied in order to 
win arguments and extend political power at home. Nevertheless, alternative 
ideological transnational networks contributing to discursive transfers 
existed, on both the le and the right, and to some extent among liberals, 
too. Politicians from smaller countries were typically more transnationally 
connected and readier to use foreign examples in arguments than those of 
the more self-sucient great powers. 
e signicance of interrelations between Germany, Sweden and 
Finland (and increasingly also Britain from late 1918 onwards) found much 
support in primary sources and biographies of the actors: comparisons 
between Sweden and Germany and Finland and Germany were particularly 
frequent in the smaller national parliaments. e international events 
of early 1917 increased transnational thinking everywhere. For Finland, 
eighteenth-century rather than contemporary Sweden was a major focus 
of comparison owing to the continuation of the old Swedish constitution 
there; for Sweden, the failed Finnish democratic parliament provided an 
essential warning example. Both countries turned increasingly to British 
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models aer the Entente won the war. In 1919, however, national debates 
interconnected by the war and revolutionary impulses faded away when 
the war was over and connections with Bolshevist Russia cut. Comparisons 
with other parliamentary democracies also decreased, the debates and the 
concepts used were increasingly nationalised, which le the mistaken long-
term impression (also in national historiographies) that each reform had 
been a national aair only marginally inuenced by what was happening at 
the same time elsewhere. is assumption clearly needs to be reconsidered 
and the interaction between the national and the transnational aspects and 
the temporal variation in their relative importance recognised, with the 
transnational predominating in 1917 and 1918 and the national again in 
1919.
e British debates tended to be insular, ignoring any possible 
transnational connections even in late 1917, when constitutional debates 
had been going on in several other European countries for some time. British 
internationalism focused mainly on the Empire and on Britain as a universal 
model nation, although American inuence is visible in the extension of 
discourse on democracy during 1917. Continental examples were rarely 
used, attempts by the supporters of proportional representation and 
women’s surage to refer to Sweden and Finland being overshadowed by the 
opponents’ use of warning examples. e transnational aspect nevertheless 
mattered. e prevailing attitude among the British Conservatives and 
Liberals towards democratisation in Germany was sceptical if not downright 
hostile, its honesty being doubted and an inclination to Bolshevism feared. 
Critical reports presented the Weimar Parliament as being dierent from 
Western parliamentarism and questioned the ability of the Germans 
to become a democratic nation, which only served to reinforce the anti-
democratic stand in Germany. Doubts about the ability of the Finnish 
right to distance themselves from Prussianism, the socialists to denounce 
Bolshevism and Finnish society to survive its unprecedentedly violent class 
war were still strong in early 1919, although progress towards a republican 
constitution and support for British foreign policy interests restored some of 
the lost condence later on.
Germany was subject to external pressures for reform arising out 
of Allied war propaganda, which, like German propaganda previously, 
emphasised the contrasts between the political systems. Germany remained 
a centre of rival transnational networks: that of the Prussian monarchical 
order as a model of a stable polity and that of Social Democracy – either 
in the sense of reformist parliamentary socialism or the establishment 
of the rule of the working class through a class struggle and revolution. 
Nordic liberals were also highly interested in German developments. In 
Sweden and Finland, the le and the centre (quite correctly) maintained 
that socialist internationalism was being countered by a transnational 
network of rightist capitalists, academics and bureaucrats, professors 
playing prominent roles. ese networks have not been very extensively 
explored in previous research. Signicant for German history would be 
the daringly open Social Democratic and liberal recommendations of the 
British system as a model for reform, which provoked the right to develop 
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a conspiracy theory. Transnational awareness also gured interestingly in 
autumn 1918, when the parliamentarisation of the German government was 
at hand: the German le raised the issue of the persecution of workers in 
Finland, implying that the time for such Prussianism was over in Germany 
and suggesting that its application in Finland should likewise be brought to 
an end. e course of international aairs also famously directed the course 
of debates on the Weimar Constitution during 1919, the outer world being 
excluded from the nation-state-centred debates and the terms of the Treaty 
of Versailles decreasing German enthusiasm for a political change towards 
‘Western’ democracy and parliamentarism. 
e dependence of the Swedish constitutional debate on the course of 
the war and transnational debates became equally evident. Parliamentary 
debates and the press contain both insinuations and evidence of the 
existence of transnational connections between the Prussian and Swedish 
right; likewise the le, emphasising the inevitability of the transnational 
constitutional transformation, were inspired by the dierent stages of the 
reform demands of the German le to a greater extent than by the Russian 
Revolution. e Social Democrats even occasionally implied that foreign 
support for a reform initiated by the united le would be available. Finland 
provided a model of reform mainly for the far le, whereas the Social 
Democrats avoided all association with the Finnish socialists, and e Right 
used the Finnish development as a warning example. e Swedish Liberals, 
too, were more reformist and internationalist in their rhetoric than their 
brethren in the other studied countries. e Right, by contrast, denied the 
existence of transnational trends of reform and comparability with other 
countries, pointing out the problems in foreign systems and condemning 
the internationalism of the le with its inclination towards revolutionary 
or Anglo-American models. Rightist opposition to reform in Germany and 
Finland supported the continuation of the Swedish Right’s anti-reformist 
stands.
e Swedish reform debates also referred to Finland, especially during 
the Civil War there. e bourgeoisie and the Social Democrats were to some 
extent united in defence of a ‘parliamentary’ and ‘democratic’ Finnish regime 
against ‘Bolshevism’, e Right moving rhetorically to the side of Finnish 
democracy, while the Social Democrats viewed the bourgeois Finnish 
government as based democratically on a parliamentary majority and saw 
the Finnish Social Democrats as promoting ‘anti-democracy’. e far le saw 
the Finnish Civil War as a class struggle between the have-not working class 
and the haves, revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries. When Prussia 
intervened in the ghting, the Civil War became part of an international 
ideological conict. e defeat of the Reds made Finland an uncomfortable 
object of comparison for the le, the Social Democrats looking to Norway, 
Denmark and Germany for instances of democratisation and e Right 
exploiting the Finnish case to argue against universal or female surage. By 
this time, Hjalmar Branting had become an exceptionally well-connected 
transnational actor, and when talking to the Western press, he was able to 
redene the course of Swedish politics from German inuences towards 
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‘Western democracy’. e change of sides over to Western democracy took 
place gradually and more distinctly in Sweden than in Finland. 
Until the recognition of Finnish independence at the end of 1917, 
Finnish transnational links to Russia were strong, as visible in previous 
research. e participation in revolutionary assemblies by Finnish MPs and 
visits by Kollontai, Lenin and Stalin to Helsinki demonstrate their intensity. 
Lenin, who saw the Russian and Finnish revolutions as interconnected, 
was hiding at the home of a Social Democrat MP and was in contact with 
MPs who opposed bourgeois democracy and Western parliamentarism, 
sending letters to them calling for a revolution. Transnational links with 
Sweden, Germany and Britain existed among the socialists, but they were 
overshadowed by the links with Petrograd. e present analysis shows how 
the right presented Prussia as the model for building an ideal society, while 
the Social Democrats attacked Prussianism and overestimated the success 
of the reformist initiatives in Berlin as a demonstration of an international 
revolution in which they themselves were participating. In socialist parlance, 
the workers appeared as the defenders of global democracy against the 
bourgeoisie, who were part of a reactionary international. Aer the Bolshevik 
Revolution, these transnational discourses were further strengthened, 
the socialists looking for support from Russia and the bourgeoisie from 
Germany. Constitutional debates became transnational to an exceptional 
degree, and accusations of malicious transnational alliances for and against 
the Revolution and democracy were commonplace. e Social Democrats 
associated themselves with an international and more particularly a Russian 
class struggle and revolution, arguing that membership in the Zimmerwald 
International obliged them to take part in this ‘last ght’. 
In 1918 and 1919, alleged Swedish indierence towards the Finnish Civil 
War, the occupation of the Åland Islands and the deepening of language 
disputes in Finland reduced international comparisons and transnational 
connections between Sweden and Finland in an exceptional way. Sweden 
existed for the Finnish monarchists only in its eighteenth-century form. 
A strong consciousness of the signicance of international developments 
prevailed in the Rump Parliament, but very dierent conclusions were drawn 
about the implications for the future constitution. Under the dominant 
inuence of Germany and a one-sided public debate that favoured Germany, 
both the Western Powers and the Bolsheviks were rejected as models by 
the government. For the monarchists, Germany constituted the model 
polity in all areas of political life: the government justied its constitutional 
proposal with references to German political theory on constitutional 
monarchy and used anti-parliamentary quotations from Otto von Bismarck. 
Transnational interference from Germany was at times requested, and 
news about the German defeat and the initiation of parliamentarisation 
there were disregarded. Republicanism was associated with international 
socialism and rejected as a foreign import. At the same time, the republicans 
emphasized the republican, parliamentary and democratic features of the 
German polity and its likelihood to soon reform itself. ey also defended 
the strengths of the French republican constitution, denying associations 
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between republicanism and democracy on the one hand and Bolshevism 
on the other. 
In spring 1919, the formation of the republican constitution as 
a  compromise was discussed through international comparisons and was 
pushed forward by external pressures: the need to prevent a new Bolshevist 
revolution, the German example of constructing a democratic republic 
with a strong presidency, other examples of transnational democratisation 
and the readiness of the Anglophone great powers to recognise Finnish 
independence only aer the Prussian alliance had been given up and 
a republican constitution adopted. While previous transnational connections 
were condemned and explicit references reduced, interest in the Weimar 
Assembly remained high and led to further conceptual transfers. Links with 
Bolshevist Russia were limited to underground communists. With regard 
to parliamentarism or a monarchical presidency, Britain, the Scandinavian 
countries (though preferably not Sweden) and the United States now served 
as sources of examples for all sides, and France and Switzerland for the 
republicans, even though there was a growing tendency to nationalize the 
constitutional question, just as in other countries. 
Previous research in political history has mainly focused on the course of 
events at national, and especially governmental, levels without analysing 
interconnected discursive processes in parliaments and the press or making 
international comparisons between thematically, synchronically and 
ideologically parallel constitutional debates in various national parliaments 
or considering concrete transnational links between the national debates. 
Transitions to parliamentary governments based on democratic surage 
have consequently been seen as nation-specic, even if in the period 
1917–19 such transitions took place simultaneously in several northwest 
European polities as a consequence of a total war that touched everyone 
and were evidently interdependent. e above analysis, while specifying 
the common and distinctive features of debates on constitutional reforms 
that were primarily nation-state-centred, has demonstrated the signicance 
of transnational connections for the reform processes in all the studied 
countries and shown that competing transnational networks were of the 
utmost importance in smaller states such as Sweden and Finland and indeed 
also mattered in more self-sucient great powers like Britain and Germany.
In Britain, the surage reform was to a great extent conceptualised as 
the evolution of the existing form of popular government to make it better 
able to respond to popular expectations in the post-war situation and to 
counteract any revolutionary developments. Imperial perspectives and 
conceptions of Britain as a universal model meant that there were few 
transnational transfers from continental Europe. e wider politicisation 
of ‘democracy’ during the war was avoided by the government through 
denitions of the war eort as a defence of democracy, which included 
the established domestic political order, but aer the restoration of peace 
democracy tended to become politicised in domestic political contexts as 
well. Such special features of the British polity only become visible through 
comparison.
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In Germany, the war propaganda of the Entente denitely aected debates 
on democracy, deepening party-political divisions in understandings of the 
concept. ere seems to be no reason to claim that there was a process of 
wartime parliamentarisation in Germany despite the rise of reform demands 
during 1917: the demands were unspecic as to what parliamentarisation 
might mean and were accompanied with reservations from reformists of 
all parties. Aer the war, too, democracy, the political role of the people 
and parliamentarism were conceptualised in specically German ways 
with both the reformists and their opponents delimiting the legitimacy of 
parliamentary democracy. Comparisons with Sweden and Finland – rather 
than with Britain only – are particularly enlightening here.
German wartime calls for reform aected discourses on democratisation 
and parliamentarisation in Sweden and Finland to a greater degree than 
has been previously acknowledged, which supports the impression of 
a transnational revolution. is study has shown that we cannot fully 
understand Swedish and Finnish constitutional history, especially in the late 
1910s, without studying it side by side with German constitutional debates. 
German historiography, too, would benet from comparisons with political 
systems that were in many ways similar to the German one, such as those of 
Sweden and Finland, rather than only with those of the other great powers 
with their rather dierent polities and traditions of political debate. 
In Sweden, the First World War was experienced concretely as 
a constitutional battle that divided the ideological eld to the very end. e 
victory of the reformist alliance, which was much stronger discursively than 
in the other three countries, also implied the victory of their interpretation 
of the national constitutional past and their vision of democracy as 
a parliamentary process leading inevitably to (social) democracy. However, 
it is important to keep in mind the contingency of the Swedish reform 
process as well as the inuence of foreign powers such as Britain, Germany 
and Russia – and even Finland – in the formation of ‘Swedish democracy’.
Parliaments such as the German and the Finnish ones, based on nearly 
universal surage but lacking real power, easily turned into forums of 
uncompromising and violent political debate, which – instead of solving 
societal problems through the parliamentary process of deliberation – added 
to the heat of the public debate, and thereby exacerbated the crisis. e 
Finnish parliament saw an exceptionally confrontational debate throughout 
the studied period but especially in 1917. is study has shown that the 
radicalisation of the Social Democratic parliamentary discourse – and the 
parliamentary politics of the Finnish le in general – as well as the discursive 
links of the right to Swedish and German debates have not been suciently 
considered in previous research together with other factors. While the path 
to the Finnish Civil War has been customarily explained from the point of 
view of social history by economic diculties and class divisions,2670 and 
while the Finnish case still appears problematic in international comparisons 
in the lack of a direct link between engagement in the war and the outbreak 
2670 Kirby 1976, Alapuro 1988, Haapala 1992 and Haapala 2014, for instance. 
Reviewed in Liikanen 1993.
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of a civil war, an emphasis on transnational links and the dynamics of 
political discourse oers an alternative, overlooked, explanation. e 
Finnish case evidently deserves more attention in comparative research 
given the exceptional degree to which the concepts of democracy, the people 
and parliament became subject to dispute there, as part of international 
constitutional and ideological debates applied to the Finnish context. On 
the other hand, the course of Finnish political history can be explained 
better in transnational contexts and with the consideration of the dierent 
justications for their political actions which the rival sides expressed in 
the parliament. e impact of transnational revolutionary discourses was 
strongest of all in Finland, particularly as they reinforced an already existing 
Marxist discourse that was exceptionally confrontational. Transfers of 
revolutionary language from Petrograd and especially the Bolsheviks to the 
Finnish Social Democrats (as opposed to links between the latter group and 
revisionists in Germany and Sweden or rival Russian groups) deserve more 
attention in the analysis of the Finnish road to a civil war. e erceness 
of the discursive class struggle in the Finnish parliament was unique in 
comparison with the debates in Britain, Germany and Sweden. 
A consideration of the discursive dimensions of the debates in the 
Finnish parliament and the press leads to conclusions that dier from 
those drawn by above-cited scholars who have emphasised dierences in 
Finnish Social Democratic and Bolshevik goals and support conclusions 
on the interconnectedness of Russian and Finnish radical discourses in 
the revolutionary situation of 1917 – though not denying longer-term 
ideological dierences between the parties.2671 I have shown in this study 
that, discursively, the Finnish Civil War already started in the aermath of 
the October Revolution in November 1917. ere is no reason to ignore 
this discursive confrontation as mere talk designed to put pressure on 
the bourgeois parties as the same violent discourse was heard from most 
Social Democrat MPs and was reinforced in the extensive socialist press. 
Furthermore, instead of comparisons with Eastern European countries, ones 
with states that shared legal and representative traditions of the Swedish 
and Finnish kind are needed – even though they may reveal some ‘eastern’ 
features in Finnish political developments.
is is not the place for an epilogue on the inter-war or post-Second World 
War crises of democracy and parliamentarism. Yet disappointments with 
the post-First World War rise of ‘an age of democracy’ and its consequent 
fragility remain evident. Parliamentarism became under attack by Carl 
Schmitt and others in a few years’ time, and many new democracies were 
transformed to autocracies during the following two decades. Yet despite 
all the contestedness and fragility of democracy an evident change had 
taken place as a consequence of the First World War: even within autocratic 
2671 See Soikkanen 1961, Upton 1980, Kettunen 1986, Rinta-Tassi 1986, Zetterberg 
1992, Hyvärinen 2003 and Siltala 2009, for instance.
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regimes there was an increased need to construct political legitimacy 
through appeals to the people and to contest the meaning of democracy.2672 
Whereas connections between war experiences and calls for reform and 
revolution have been pointed at in previous research,2673 a more systematic 
interpretation of the post-war situation of 1919 in national and transnational 
debates on democracy, the people and parliamentarism oered in this 
book contributes to our understanding of the long-term pan-European 
conceptual histories of these key concepts of modern political cultures. 
It demonstrates both decisive breaks with predominantly conservative 
nineteenth-century constitutional debates and important continuities in the 
contestability and fragility of parliamentary democracy.2674 e comparative 
and transnational perspectives reveal the particular dynamics of national 
discursive processes and their entanglements across borders. Diversied 
and competing understandings of democracy, the political involvement of 
the people and parliamentarism as the way of realising this remain decisive 
factors in present-day national, international and transnational debates as 
well, both in Europe and globally. In the years 1917–19 an evolutionary 
reform succeeded in countries where the conservatives concluded that mass 
democracy might serve their interests (in Britain and to a limited extent 
in Finland and Sweden) and where socialists and liberals were capable of 
cooperation at the decisive stages of reform (in Britain and Sweden, in 
Germany to a limited extent and in Finland from 1919 onwards). It failed 
where a readiness to adapt or cooperate across the ideological divide did 
not exist.
2672 Eley 2002, 3; Müller 2011, 3–5, 47.
2673 Müller 2011; Bessel 2014; Leonhard 2014.
2674 See Grotke & Prutsch 2014, Sellin 2014 and Stråth 2016. 
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Appendix: Selected key events in national politics
Year Britain Germany Sweden Finland other countries
1905 Norway leaves the 
union
general strike Russo-Japanese War 
ends with a Russian 
defeat; Revolution in 
Russia
1906 parliamentary reform: 
unicameral parliament 




State Duma in Russia; 
Russian socialist parties 
struggle to control key 
concepts
1907 extensions of male 
surage
1st parliamentary 
elections produce a 
Social Democratic 
victory
1909 People’s Budget universal male 
surage for the 
lower chamber; 
unequal surage for 
the upper chamber 
retained
1910 general elections; 
Liberal ministry; threat 
to create new peers
proposal for the reform 
of Prussian surage 
withdrawn





aim at seizing power 
from the bourgeoisie 
and carrying out a 
revolution
1912 elections with high 
attendance; Social 
Democrats become the 
largest parliamentary 
group; warnings about 
Kryptoparlamentarismus
1914 war against Germany; 
constitutional 
confrontations on the 
Irish Home Rule Bill 
le aside; party truce















1915 War Coalition 
formed; debates on 
electoral reform in the 
Commons
some Social Democrats 
protest on the war; Preuβ 
writes on Volksstaat
female surage in 
Denmark; Zimmerwald 
International formed
1916 preparations for 
extended surage
calls for surage reform 
in Prussia
elections produce a 
Social Democratic 
parliamentary majority 






Appendix: Selected key events in national politics
1917 March: the 1st reading 
of the Representation 









March: intensied calls 
for reform of the Prussian 
surage
April: imperial promises 
for reform
July: Reichstag intervenes 
in foreign policy; anti-
reformist reaction
April-June: demands 

















of autonomy within 




government with a 





through by the Social 
Democratic majority
October: new elections 











recognition by the 
Bolshevik government
March: abdication 
of Nicholas II and 
the nomination 
of the Provisional 
Government in Russia
April: Woodrow 
Wilson’s speech on 
making the world safe 
for democracy and 
US declaration of war 






Lords debates and nal 




focuses on Germany; 
politicisation of 
‘democracy’ in the 
domestic context by 
the le
November: ceasere
December: 1st elections 
with extended surage 
lead to a Conservative 
victory
September: defeat of the 
German army appears 




parliamentarisation of the 
monarchical constitution
November: ceasere; 
Revolution; abdication of 
Wilhelm II
February: debates on 
the Finnish Civil War
April: reform 
proposal voted down 





pressure for reform 
aer the German 
defeat; reform passed 
in both houses
January: German and 
Swedish recognitions of 
independence
January-April: Civil 
War between the Reds 
and the Whites ends 





proposals in the Rump 
Parliament
October: election 
of Friedrich Karl of 






March: peace between 
Bolshevik government 
and Germany
1919 disputes on the 
implications of 
democracy at 
home; doubts about 
Finnish and German 
democracy
January: elections lead 
to a republican majority 




Assembly debates the 
republican constitutional 
proposal
June: the Treaty of 
Versailles discredits 
democracy further 
August: the Weimar 
Constitution comes into 
force
May-June: 
completion of the 
surage reform
March: elections 
produce a republican 
majority
April: British and 
US recognitions of 
independence
May-June: debates on a 
republican constitution 
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Abstract
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e Springs of Democracy
National and Transnational Debates on Constitutional Reform 
in the British, German, Swedish and Finnish Parliaments, 1917–1919
During the First World War, conicts between the people’s sacrices and their 
political participation led to crises of parliamentary legitimacy. is volume 
compares British, German, Swedish and Finnish debates on revolution, rule 
by the people, democracy and parliamentarism and their transnational links. 
e British reform, although more about winning the war than advancing 
democracy, restored parliamentary legitimacy, unlike in Germany, where 
Allied demands for democratisation made reform appear treasonous and 
fostered native German solutions. Sweden only adopted Western political 
models aer major confrontations, but reforms saw it embark on its path to 
Social Democracy. In Finland, competing Russian revolutionary discourses 
and German- and Swedish-inspired appeals to legality brought about the 
deterioration of parliamentary legitimacy and a civil war. Only a republican 
compromise imposed by the Entente, following a royalist initiative in 1918, 
led to the construction of a viable polity.
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and Prussian nobleman, German 
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National People’s Party, 434, 442, 444, 
453
Dernburg, Bernhard, German MP, 
Progressive People’s Party, 247
Devlin, Joseph, British MP, Irish 
Nationalists, 225–6
Dickinson, Willoughby, British MP, 
Liberals, 87
Dillon, John, British MP, Irish 
Nationalists, 225n, 226, 233
Duguit, Léon, French expert in 
administrative law, 499
Düringer, Adelbert, German MP, 
German National People’s Party, 434
E
Ebert, Friedrich, German MP, Chairman 
of the Social Democrats, Chancellor, 
Reichspresident, 69, 115, 241, 247, 
351–2, 355–6, 358–9, 363–5, 432–3, 
435–6, 445, 451, 479
Edén, Nils, Swedish Member of the 
Second Chamber, Chairman of the 
Liberals, Prime Minister, Professor 
of History, 144–6, 153, 155, 161, 172, 
254, 302, 370, 378, 385, 389, 394, 455
Ekman, Carl Gustaf, Swedish Member of 
the First Chamber, Liberals, Editor-
in-Chief of Aontidningen, 390
Ekman, Karl, Swedish Member of the 
First Chamber, e Right, Court of 
Appeal Judge, 375, 387, 398
Eloranta, Evert, Finnish MP, Social 
Democrats, 209
Engberg, Arthur, Swedish Member 
o he Second Chamber, Social 
Democrats, 304, 311, 377, 381, 391n, 
393, 459–61
Engels, Friedrich, German Marxist 
theoretician, 70
Erich, Rafael, Finnish MP, National 
Coalition Party (Conservatives), 
Professor of Constitutional Law, 181, 
317, 478, 485–6, 491, 493, 498–500
Ericsson, Aaby, Swedish Member of the 
First Chamber, e Right, 388, 397
Ericsson, Ollas Anders, Swedish 
Member of the First Chamber, e 
Right, 401
Erkelenz, Anton, German MP, German 
Democratic Party, 440
Erzberger, Matthias, German MP, 
Catholic Centre, 241
Estlander, Ernst, Finnish MP and 
nobleman, Swedish People’s Party, 
Professor of Legal History, 212, 277n, 
476, 478, 487, 489n, 493–4, 501
F
Fehrenbach, Constantin, German MP, 
Catholic Centre, 357
Field, William, British MP, Irish 
Nationalists, 226
Fisher, William Hayes, British MP, 
Conservatives, Parliamentary 
Secretary of the Local Government 
Board, 96
Frederick William IV (von 
Hohenzollern), King of Prussia, 196–7
Friedrich Karl von Hessen, Count of 
Hesse, German nobleman and King 
Elect of Finland, 402, 465–6, 475–6
Furuhjelm, Annie, Finnish MP, Swedish 
People’s Party, 267, 323–4, 329, 409
G
Graefe, Albrecht von, German MP and 
Prussian nobleman, Conservatives, 
131, 134, 138, 442
Gascoyne-Cecil, James, 4th Marquess 
of Salisbury, British nobleman, 
Conservatives, 228
Geijer, Erik Gustaf, Swedish historian, 
152
George V (Windsor), King of United 
Kingdom, 47
Giard, Hardinge, 1st Earl of Halsbury, 
British nobleman, Conservatives, 
former Lord Chancellor, 232
Goltz, Rüdiger von der, German general 
and nobleman, 321
Goode, William T., British reporter, 428
Gradnauer, Georg, German MP, Social 
Democrats, journalist with Vorwärts, 
241–2
Gretton, John, British MP, 
Conservatives, 90–1
Gullberg, Wilhelm, Swedish Member of 
the First Chamber, Liberals, 306
Gustavus V (Bernadotte), King of 
Sweden, 140
H
Haapanen, Santeri, Finnish MP, 
Agrarian League, 337
Haase, Hugo, German MP, Chairman of 
the Independent Social Democrats, 
55–6, 120, 147, 241, 247, 352–3, 355
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Haataja, Kyösti, Finnish MP, Finnish 
Party (Conservatives), 409, 416
Hahl, Eero, Finnish MP, Agrarian 
League, 404
Hahl, Pekka, Finnish MP, Agrarian 
League, 418
Haldane, Richard, 1st Viscount Haldane, 
British nobleman, Liberals, 49, 229, 
236
Hallén, Harald, Swedish Member of the 
Second Chamber, Social Democrats, 
144, 146, 151, 157, 162, 164, 169, 
172, 303, 305, 307, 309, 377, 383, 392, 
460–1
Hallendor, Carl, Swedish Member 
of the Second Chamber, e Right, 
Professor, Rector of the Stockholm 
School of Economics, 145, 161, 167
Hamilton, Raoul, Swedish Member of 
the Second Chamber, Liberals, Vice-
Speaker, 303, 389
Hammarskjöld, Hjalmar, Swedish 
nobleman, e Right, former Prime 
Minister, 60, 139 
Hammarskjöld, Hugo, Swedish Member 
of the First Chamber, e Right, 
former Minister of Ecclesiastical 
Aairs, 388
Hammarström, Alexis, Swedish Member 
of the First Chamber, e Right, 397
Hansson, Per Albin, Swedish Member 
of the Second Chamber, Social 
Democrats, editor-in-chief of Social-
Demokraten, 308, 313, 368, 371, 374, 
383–4, 400
Harrison, Austin, British journalist, 342
Haußmann, Conrad, German MP, 
German Democratic Party, Chairman 
of the Constitutional Committee, 244
Heine, Wolfgang, German MP, Social 
Democrats, 137
Heinze, Rudolf, German MP, German 
People’s Party, Chairman of the 
Parliamentary Group, 434, 441, 452
Helenius-Seppälä, Matti, Finnish MP, 
Christian Labour Union, 202, 479
Hellberg, Mauritz, Swedish Member of 
the First Chamber, Liberals, editor-
in-chief of Karlstads-Tidningen, 150, 
153, 158, 164, 398, 457
Hemmerde, Edward, British MP, 
Liberals, 219, 224
Henderson, Arthur, British MP, Labour, 
minister, 79, 82
Hermelin, Richard, Swedish nobleman, 
389, 397
Herold, Carl, German MP, Catholic 
Centre, 359
Hertling, Georg von, Graf von Hertling 
(Count Hertling), Catholic Centre, 
Chancellor, 249, 305
Hildebrand, Karl, Swedish Member 
of the Second Chamber, e 
Right, historian, editor-in-chief of 
Stockholms Dagblad, leader of the 
lower house opposition, 61, 145, 150, 
153, 158, 161, 165, 168, 306, 313–14, 
375, 380, 384–5, 394–6, 400
Hildén, Leo, Finnish MP, Social 
Democrats, 483
Hindenburg, Paul von, Prussian 
nobleman and general, leader of the 
German army, 55, 246, 355
Hintze, Paul von, Prussian nobleman, 
German foreign minister, 476
Hjelt, Edvard, Finnish diplomat, 317, 
467n
Hjärne, Harald, Swedish Member of the 
First Chamber, e Right, professor 
of history, 305, 311, 387–8, 396
Holmquist, Carl Fredrik, Swedish 
Member of the First Chamber, 
Liberals, 463
Homén, eodor, Finnish MP, National 
Coalition Party (Conservatives), 
professor of applied physics, 492, 500
Hope, Harry, Sir, British MP, 
Conservatives, 101
Hornborg, Eirik, Finnish MP, Swedish 
People’s Party, 186, 195, 276, 284
Hultin, Tekla, Finnish MP, Young Finns 
(Liberals), 210, 329, 417, 499
Hupli, Väinö, Finnish MP, Social 
Democrats, 482
Huttunen, Evert, Finnish MP, Social 
Democrats, editor-in-chief of Työ, 
182, 183n, 193, 202, 209, 257, 279n
Hyöki, August, Finnish MP, Finnish 
Party (Conservatives), 202
Hänninen-Walpas, Edvard, Finnish MP, 
Social Democrats, editor-in-chief of 
Työmies, 63–4, 69, 183n, 191–3, 206, 
212, 264, 274–5, 284, 286
Härmä, Erkki, Finnish MP, Social 
Democrats, 263, 269
Hästbacka, Emil, Finnish MP, Swedish 
People’s Party, 487, 494, 501
Höglund, Zeth, Swedish Member of 
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the Second Chamber, Leist Social 
Democrats, 58, 152, 161–2, 165, 
170–1, 370
I
Ingman, Lauri, Finnish MP, chairman 
of the Finnish Party (Conservatives), 
professor of theology, 210n, 276, 287, 
332, 408, 414
J
Jokinen, Alma, Finnish MP, Social 
Democrats, 279
Joukahainen, Vilkku, Finnish MP, 
Agrarian League, 406, 416
Juutilainen, Antti, Finnish MP, Agrarian 
League, 193, 265, 404, 408, 414, 416, 
419, 476
K
Kaila, Erkki, Finnish MP, National 
Coalition Party (Conservatives), 
theologian, 492
Kairamo, Oswald, Finnish MP, Finnish 
Party (Conservatives), botanist, 267, 
289, 404, 410, 418
Kallio, Kyösti, Finnish MP, Agrarian 
League, minister of agriculture, 277, 
337, 408, 413n
Kaskinen, Juho, Finnish MP, National 
Progress Party (Liberals), 489
Katzenstein, Simon, German MP, Social 
Democrats, 451
Kautsky, Karl, German Marxist 
theoretician, 17n, 35, 56, 59, 66–70, 
120, 149, 151, 157, 179, 188n, 197, 
199–200, 241, 261, 268, 271–2, 283, 
285n, 286, 467–8, 517, 525 
Kerensky, Alexander, Socialist 
Revolutionary Party, minister in the 
Russian Provisional Government, 82, 
239n, 341
Key, Ellen, Swedish feminist activist and 
socialist intellectual, 303, 307 
Kjellén, Rudolf, Swedish Member of the 
First Chamber, e Right, professor 
of political science, 61, 145, 154, 161, 
166
Koch, Gerhard Halfred von, Swedish 
Member of the First Chamber, 
Liberals, 311
Koch-Weser, Erich, German MP, 
German Democratic Party, 440,  
452
Koenen, Wilhelm, German MP, 
Independent Social Democrats, 443
Kokko, Juho, Finnish MP, Agrarian 
League, 207, 337, 414
Kollontai, Alexandra, Russian Bolshevik 
revolutionary, 58, 182n, 188–9, 
191–2, 199, 279, 529
Kujala, Jussi, Finnish MP, Social 
Democrats, 266, 269, 275, 286
Kuusinen, Otto Wille, Finnish 
MP, Social Democrats, Marxist 
theoretician, 67, 69, 183n, 257, 262–
3, 265, 266n, 272–5, 278–9, 282, 285, 
290–1, 302, 316, 326, 467, 478 
L
Lagerroth, Fredrik, Swedish historian, 
61n, 168, 497
Laherma, Jonas, Finnish MP, Social 
Democrats, 182n, 478, 481, 482n, 
486n 
Laine, Augusta, Finnish MP, Young 
Finns (Liberals), 326
Larsson, Viktor, Swedish Member of the 
Second Chamber, Social Democrats, 
145, 459
Ledebour, Georg, German MP, 
Independent Social Democrats, 
former London correspondent, 56, 
115, 132, 134, 360
Lehokas, Vilho, Finnish MP, Social 
Democrats, 282
Lehtimäki, Kondrad, Finnish MP, Social 
Democrats, author, 193
Lenin, Vladimir, Russian Bolshevik 
revolutionary, 17n, 22, 56, 69–70, 
89n, 112, 142, 145, 148–9, 155, 157, 
160–1, 170, 179, 182, 184, 187–9, 
191–2, 202–3, 257–9, 262–4, 271, 
274n, 275, 278–9, 280n, 283, 291, 
298, 323, 341, 425–6, 443, 477, 509, 
513, 529 
Levy-Lawson, Harry, 2nd Baron 
Burnham, British nobleman, Liberal 
Unionists, the owner of e Daily 
Telegraph, 220
Liebknecht, Karl, German socialist 
leader, chairman of the Independent 
Social Democrats, 57, 363
Lindblad, Ernst, Swedish Member of the 
First Chamber, e Right, 150, 380, 
389
Lindgren, Adolf, Swedish Member of the 
First Chamber, e Right, 397
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Lindhagen, Carl, Swedish Member of the 
Second/First Chamber, Leist Social 
Democrats, mayor of Stockholm, 
61, 144–5, 148–9, 152, 154, 157, 160, 
162, 163n, 170, 370, 462 
Lindman, Arvid, Swedish Member of 
the Second Chamber, the chairman 
of e Right, 58–9, 141, 172, 224, 
302, 310–311, 313, 369, 393–4
Lithander, Edvard, Swedish Member 
of the Second Chamber, e Right, 
chairman of the conservative cultural 
association Götiska Förbundet, 379, 
385–6, 395
Lloyd George, David, British MP, 
chairman of the Coalition Liberals, 
prime minister, 47–9, 74, 78, 88, 
93, 97, 100, 102–103, 119, 292, 296, 
340–3, 345–7, 423–5, 512–13
Lohi, Kalle, Finnish MP, Agrarian 
League, 267, 277, 495
Long, Walter, British MP, Conservatives, 
the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies, 80, 83, 91, 94
Lonsdale, John, Sir, British MP, Irish 
Unionist, 226
Lowther, James, British MP, 
Conservatives, the Speaker of the 
House of Commons, 73
Ludendor, Erich, eld marshal, leader 
of the German army, 55, 246, 295, 
349
Luopajärvi, Mikko, Finnish MP, 
Agrarian League, 265, 277, 284
Luxemburg, Rosa, German Marxist 
theoretician, 36, 188n
Lvov, Georgy, Russian prince, Liberals, 
204
Löfgren, Jonas Eliel, Swedish Member 
of the Second Chamber, Liberals, 
Minister of Justice, 164, 303, 309, 
394, 463
Löwegren, Gunnar, Swedish Member 
of the Second Chamber, Social 
Democrats, 146, 155–6, 172 
M
MacDonald, James Ramsay, British 
MP, former chairman of the Labour, 
theoretician, 84, 89, 94–5, 345, 424–5 
MacKinder, Halford, British MP, 
Scottish Unionists, the Director of 
the London School of Economics, 77, 
99, 216
Mallock, William Hurrell, British 
author, Conservatives, 293
Malmivaara, Wilhelmi, Finnish MP, 
Finnish Party (Conservatives), Pietist 
leader, 329, 330n, 404, 413
Manner, Kullervo, Finnish MP, 
Social Democrats, the Speaker of 
Eduskunta, later the Prime Minister 
of Red Finland, Commander-in Chief 
of the Red Guards and chairman of 
the Finnish Communist Party, 177, 
183n, 206, 256–7, 266n, 274, 275, 279, 
283–5, 287, 337, 467, 494
Mannerheim, Carl Gustaf Emil, Finnish 
nobleman (friherre), Commander-
in-Chief of the Finnish White Army, 
Regent, 317, 474, 502
Månsson, Fabian, Swedish MP, Leist 
Social Democrats, 160n, 370, 400
Marx, Karl, German Marxist 
theoretician, 70
Meinecke, Friedrich, German historian, 
304
Menger, Anton, Austrian socialist legal 
theorist, 490
Mertin, Erich, German MP, German 
Reichspartei, also a member of the 
Prussian House of Representatives, 
123, 138
Michaelis, Georg, German Chancellor, 
246–7
Mikkola, Antti, Finnish MP, Young 
Finns (Liberals), Chairman of the 
Legal Aairs Committee, the founder 
of Turun Sanomat, 267
Molotov, Vyacheslav, Russian Bolshevik 
revolutionary, 179
Mond, Alfred, British MP, Liberals, 84, 
108
Müller-Meiningen, Ernst, German MP, 
Progressive People’s Party, 122, 361n
Mäkelin, Yrjö, Finnish MP, Social 
Democrats, Chairman of the 
Constitutional Committee, 183n, 
185–90, 193, 198–200, 202, 206, 262, 
266n
Mäkelä, Santeri, Finnish MP, Social 
Democrats, 271
Mäki, Jaakko, Finnish MP, Social 
Democrats, chairman of the 
parliamentary group, 198, 273–4, 283n
Möller, Gustav, Swedish MP, party 
secretary of the Social Democrats, 




Napoleon III (Bonaparte), French 
president and emperor, 108
Naumann, Friedrich, German MP, 
chairman of the Progressive People’s 
Party, 354, 356, 359, 361, 452
Nevanlinna, Ernst, Finnish MP, 
chairman of the Finnish Party 
(Conservatives), professor of political 
economy, 206, 211, 329, 405, 407, 
411, 416, 418
Nicholas II (Romanov), Russian Tsar, 
Grand Duke of Finland, 109, 144, 
173, 207
Niukkanen, Juho, Finnish MP, Agrarian 
League, 328
Nordström, Ludvig, Swedish journalist, 
348
Norman, David, Swedish Member of 
the Second Chamber, e Right, 
chairman of the antisocialist Svenska 
folkförbundet, 154, 165, 168, 267, 307, 
375, 378, 386, 394n, 395, 460–1
Noske, Gustav, German MP, Social 
Democrats, 117–19, 128–9, 132, 352
O
Olsson, Anders, Swedish Member of the 
Second Chamber, Liberals, 459
Olsson, Olof, Swedish Member of the 
First Chamber, Social Democrats, 
166n
Olsson, Oscar, Swedish Member of the 
First Chamber, Social Democrat, 457, 
462
O’Neill, Charles, British MP, Irish 
Nationalists, 226
P
Paasikivi, Juho Kusti, Finnish MP, 
Finnish Party (Conservatives), Prime 
Minister, 63, 322, 324, 329, 403, 410, 
412, 417–18, 475, 489, 499, 502, 526 
Paasivuori, Matti, Finnish MP, Social 
Democrats, 288, 406, 409, 420
Palme, Olof, Swedish historian, 299
Palmer, Roundell, Viscount Wolmer, 
British nobleman and MP, 
Conservatives, 224, 233, 236
Palmstierna, Erik, Swedish nobleman 
(friherre), Member of the Second 
Chamber, Social Democrats, Minister 
of Naval Defence, 142, 146, 159, 164, 
168, 304n, 374, 381, 384n
Pankhurst, Sylvia, British suragist 
leader, 88n, 426
Payer, Friedrich von, nobleman from 
Wurttemberg, German MP, chairman 
of the parliamentary group of the 
Progressive People’s Party/German 
Democratic Party, former Vice-
Chancellor of the Reich, 114, 242, 
247, 438n, 440, 447
Peel, William, Viscount Peel, British 
nobleman, Conservatives, 237
Pennanen, Pekka, Finnish MP, Young 
Finns (Liberals), 407–409
Persson, Daniel, Swedish Member of 
the Second Chamber, Liberals, Vice-
Speaker, 153, 165 
Pettersson, David, Swedish Member of 
the Chamber, e Right, 378, 386, 
395
Pettersson, Jakob, Swedish Member 
of the Second Chamber, Liberals, 
chairman of the Law Committee, 
374, 390, 393
Petty-Fitzmaurice, Henry, 5th Marquess 
of Lansdowne, British nobleman, 228 
Pfannkuch, Wilhelm, German MP, 
Social Democrats, 437–8, 445–6, 451
Pilkka, Simson, Finnish MP, Agrarian 
League, 495
Pollock, Ernest, British MP, 
Conservatives, 98–9
Ponsonby, Arthur, British MP, Liberal/
Labour, 111
Posadowsky-Wehner, Arthur von, 
Silesian nobleman (Graf von 
Posadowsky-Wehner, Freiherr von 
Postelwitz) and German MP, 362
Preuß, Hugo, German Minister of 
Interior Aairs, German Democratic 
Party, Professor of Law, 365, 433, 
440–1, 447–8, 451–2, 486  
Procopé, Hjalmar, Finnish MP, Swedish 
People’s Party, 476, 479, 495, 501
Pykälä, Bertta, Finnish MP, Agrarian 
League, 327
Päivänsalo, Bror Hannes, Finnish MP, 
Finnish Party (Conservatives), 332
Pärssinen, Hilja, Finnish MP, Social 
Democrats, the editorial secretary of 
Työläisnainen, 271
R




Rantakari, Kaarle, Finnish MP, Finnish 
Party (Conservatives), 53, 194, 
196–7, 210
Rantanen, Frans, Finnish MP, Social 
Democrats, 196–7, 202, 210
Rawlinson, John, British MP, 
Conservatives, 107
Redmond, William, British MP, Irish 
Nationalists, 227
Redslob, Robert, German constitutional 
lawyer, 138n, 365, 452
Rees, Caradoc, British MP, Liberals, 
Parliamentary Secretary for Home 
Oce, 100
Rees, John David, British MP, Unionists, 
225
Reid, George, British MP, Unionists, 
former prime minister of Australia, 
84
Relander, Lauri Kristian, Finnish MP, 
Agrarian League, the Speaker, 495
Rentola, Antti, Finnish MP, Young 
Finns (Liberals), 277, 288, 405, 408, 
415–16, 419
Ritavuori, Heikki, Finnish MP, National 
Progress Party, chairman of the 
Constitutional Committee, 480, 496 
Rosenqvist, Gustaf, Finnish MP, Swedish 
People’s Party, Professor of Dogmatics, 
194, 210, 331n, 333–4, 339
Russell, Frank, 2nd Earl Russell, British 
nobleman, Labour sympathizer, 221, 
235, 237
Rühle, Otto, German MP, Independent 
Social Democrats, 355
Ryömä, Hannes, Finnish MP, Social 
Democrats, editor-in-chief of 
Suomen Sosialidemokraatti, 468, 483, 
489–90, 496–7 
Räf, Erik, Swedish Member of the 
Second Chamber, e Right, 150, 
154, 165, 168, 386
Röing, Erik, Swedish Member of the 
Second Chamber, Liberals, 303n, 
374, 390
S
Saarelainen, Pekka, Finnish MP, 
Agrarian League, 328, 489
Salin, Eetu, Finnish MP, Social 
Democrats, 191, 266, 275, 287
Salter, Arthur, British MP, Unionists, 76, 
81, 83, 92, 98–9, 103
Samuel, Herbert, British MP, Liberals, 
former home secretary, 80, 86, 88, 
101–102, 216
Sarlin, Bruno, Finnish MP, National 
Progess Party, 484–5, 489, 502
Schauman, Georg, Finnish MP, Swedish 
Le, historian, 321n, 475–6, 478, 480, 
489, 502
Scheidemann, Philipp, German MP, 
Social Democrats, Chancellor, 147, 
150n, 363, 432
Schmoller, Gustav von, Prussian 
nobleman, Member of the Prussian 
Herrenhaus, Professor of Economics, 
403
Schotte, Axel, Swedish Member of the 
Chamber, Liberals, Minister of Public 
Administration, 389, 393
Schybergson, Emil, Finnish MP, Swedish 
People’s Party, 63, 186, 194, 276 
Scott, Leslie, British MP, Conservatives, 
83, 103
Setälä, Emil Nestor, Finnish 
MP, National Coalition Party 
(Conservatives), Professor of Finnish, 
acting prime minister, Minister of 
Education, 63, 289, 330, 358n, 412n, 
413, 476, 479, 485–6, 491–3
Simon, John, Sir, British MP, Liberals, 
former minister, 79
Sneidern, Axel von, Swedish Member of 
the Second Chamber, Liberals, 309
Sirola, Yrjö, Finnish MP, Social 
Democrats, 63, 69, 152, 261–3, 266n, 
269–71, 274–5, 277–9, 283, 300, 467
Sivkovich, Hans, German MP, 
Progressivists, 57
Smith, Frederick, British MP, 
Conservatives, Attorney General, 219
Spahn, Peter, German MP, chairman 
of the parliamentray group of the 
Catholic Centre, chairman of the 
Main Committee, 116, 121, 135, 441
Staa, Karl, Swedish politician, Liberals, 
former Prime Minister, 60
Ståhlberg, Kaarlo Juho, Finnish MP, 
Young Finns (Liberals), Professor of 
Law, 63, 183, 209, 273, 280, 324–6, 
334, 405
Sterne, Axel, Swedish Member ohe 
Second Chamber, Social Democrats, 
journalist writing in Folkbladet, 159, 
304–5, 309, 312
Stresemann, Gustav, German MP, 
chairman of the National Liberals/
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German People’s Party, 121–2, 130, 
132, 135–6, 243, 354, 359, 361, 366, 
441, 452
Ström, Fredrik, Swedish Member of the 
First Chamber, party secretary of the 
Leist Social Democrats, 148, 152, 
157, 170, 376, 380, 391–2, 400, 459 
Stuart-Wortley, Charles, 1st Baron 
Stuart of Wortley, British nobleman, 
Conservatives, 238
Suolahti, Hugo, Finnish MP, chairman 
of the National Coalition Party 
(Conservatives), professor of German 
philology and Vice-Rector of the 
University of Helsinki, 485, 492–3
Suosalo, Kalle, Finnish MP, Social 
Democrats, 203
Svinhufvud, Per Evind, Finnish 
nobleman, Prime Minister, 276
Swartz, Carl, Swedish Member of the 
First Chamber, e Right, former 
Prime Minister, 141, 143, 372, 375, 
388–9, 395, 397–8
Sydenham Clarke, George, 1st Baron 
Sydenham of Combe, British 
nobleman, 221, 223n, 228, 235
Söderberg, Ernst, Swedish Member of 
the First Chamber, Social Democrats, 
398
Söderblom, Nathan, Archbishop of 
Uppsala, 224
Söderholm, Karl, Finnish MP, Swedish 
People’s Party, 210–211
T
Taimi, Adolf, Finnish Bolshevik 
revolutionary, 179
Takkula, Eetu, Finnish MP, Agrarian 
League, 327
Talas, Onni, Finnish MP, Young Finns 
(Liberals), Minister of Justice, 
Professor of Administrative Law, 195, 
280, 291, 328
ore, Alexander, Swedish Member of 
the Second Chamber, e Right, 386
orsson, Fredrik Vilhelm, Swedish 
Member of the Second Chamber, 
Social Democrats, Minister of 
Finance, 374, 399
Tokoi, Oskari, Finnish MP, Social 
Democrats, Prime Minister, workers’ 
union leader, 179–80, 182n, 190–3, 
198, 205, 207, 260–2, 259, 275, 281–2, 
337, 494
Trygger, Ernst, Swedish Member of the 
First Chamber, leader of e Right, 
158, 168, 305, 311, 315, 369, 379–80, 
386–7, 395–6, 401, 457–9
Tulenheimo, Antti, Finnish MP, Finnish 
Party (Conservatives), Minister of 
Justice, 194, 204, 205n, 212
V
Vahlquist, Condrad, Swedish Member 
of the Second Chamber, e Right, 
161, 168
Valkama, Wäinö, Finnish MP, Finnish 
Party (Conservatives), 281, 323
Valpas, Edvard, see Hänninen-Walpas
Vennerström, Ivar, Swedish Member of 
the Second Chamber, Leist Social 
Democrats, 149, 152, 157, 160, 165, 
302, 312–13, 370, 376, 380, 391–2, 
394, 400n, 458, 462 
Vennola, Juho, Finnish MP, National 
Progress Party, Minister of Commerce 
and Industry, 477, 489, 496
Victoria von Baden, Queen of Sweden, 
253
Virkkunen, Artturi, Finnish MP, Finnish 
Party (Conservatives), editor-in-chief 
of Uusi Suometar, 331–2
Virkkunen, Paavo, Finnish MP, Finnish 
Party (Conservatives), the Speaker, 
269, 288, 329, 403–4, 412–13, 479, 
492
Vogtherr, Ewald, German MP, Social 
Democrats, 114
Voionmaa, Väinö, Finnish MP, Social 
Democrats, Professor of History, 
477–9, 482–3, 490–1, 497–8, 501n
Vuoristo, Jussi, Finnish MP, Social 
Democrats, 266n, 270, 285
W
Waldén, Ola, Swedish member of the 
First Chamber, Social Democrats, 
148
Wallenberg, Knut Agathon, Swedish 
Member of the Chamber, e Right, 
former Foreign Minister, 398
Walton, Joseph, Sir, British MP, Liberals, 
83
Ward, Arnold, British MP, 
Conservatives, 84, 91, 93
Wardle, George, British MP, Labour, 




Wartenburg, Heinrich Yorck von, 
Prussian nobleman (Graf Yorck 
von Wartenburg), Member of the 
Prussian Herrenhaus, Conservative 
leader, 134
Watson, John Bertrand, British MP, 
Liberals, 84, 88, 97n
Weber, Max, German political theorist, 
109, 365
Wedgwood, Josiah, British MP, 
independent liberal radical, 100, 216
Wendt, Georg von, Finnish MP, Swedish 
Le, 494
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